Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., a priest from serving in the Temple.

From being offered as a sacrifice.

See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash, ch.7.

See the gloss of the Radbaz who explains that it appears that the Rambam’s intent is not that if these conditions are found in men, they do not disqualify a priest. Instead, the intent is that it is extremely uncommon to find such a condition in a human. Hence, they are “not appropriate.” Nevertheless, if a priest does have such a condition, it is considered as a blemish and he is disqualified.

If, however, both are small or both are large, this is not considered a blemish. Note the contrast to the blemishes for humans mentioned in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 8:6 (Kessef Mishneh).

If, however, it does not have a hair, it is not considered as a blemish (Bechorot 40b).

Compare to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:6.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 6:4). There he also suggests an alternative meaning, the animal’s teeth.

If, however, their substance was merely reduced, this is not considered as a disqualifying blemish. See Halachah 8 and notes.

I.e., this explanation is necessary because usually, the inner tonsils are not seen.

Compare to Halachah 8.

Similarly, if a male was born without horns, their absence is not considered as a blemish (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

I e., the portion of the female organ that projects outside the body [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 6:5)].

Rashi (Bechorot 39b) explains that the tail of an animal is made up of several vertebrae. If it is severed in the midst of a vertebra, it is considered as a blemish. If, however, it is severed at the joint between one vertebra and another, it is not considered as a blemish.

The commentaries refer to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:11 which states: “Whenever there is a groove made in any bone that is apparent, it is considered a blemish. It is included in the category charutz mentioned in the Torah.” The tail is considered such a limb; the ribs are not.

See the parallel to Hilchot Shechitah 8:11.

Leviticus 22:23.

The 23 mentioned here and the 50 mentioned in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash, ch. 7.

These blemishes are mentioned in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:12-13.

Rashi (Bechorot 41b) states: “Because these are not absolute blemishes.”

Which would disqualify it in its own right.

Because as of yet, it is not permanently disqualified as a sacrifice.

Because in its present state, it is not fit for sacrifice.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 2:2), the Rambam also mentions a dislocated or broken limb that can be healed.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:4.

Unlike the boils visited upon the Egyptians in the Ten Plagues, these boils are moist inside and can possibly heal.

And thus prevents the animal or the person from seeing. As the Rambam explains in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 6:3), there are times when this blemish will heal and the water will cease running. Then the sight of the person or animal will return. See Halachot 13-15 which describe the process through which it is determined whether the water in an animal’s eyes is permanent or not.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

The commentaries note that the Hebrew wording is not quoted exactly. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 11.

If hair is growing from it, it is considered as a permanent blemish, as stated in Halachah 2.

Compare to Halachah 4.

Compare to Halachah 3. Since its inner tonsils are seen only when it shrieks, as long as something of their substance remains, it is not considered a disqualifying blemish. Nevertheless, the animal is not sacrificed.

For an animal is redeemed only when it has a disqualifying blemish.

At which point, it can be redeemed.

For its blemish did not disqualify it. .

It was sodomized, used for relations with a woman, worshiped as a false deity, or consecrated for that purpose, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 6.

Were it to have been observed by two witnesses, Torah Law would require it to be executed. This punishment is not given when the murder was observed only by one witness or the owner. See Chapter 4, Halachah 2.

An animal that will die within twelve months and is hence, forbidden to be eaten.

See the Kessef Mishneh who debates whether the disqualification is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin.

The passage in Malachi speaks of bringing blemished animals for sacrifice. The prophet asks whether a mortal governor would appreciate being given such offerings. Certainly, they are inappropriate to be offered to God.

For there would be no purpose in its redemption, since it is inappropriate to use it as food for animals as the Rambam continues to explain.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 19:11.

I.e., the place where impure sacrifices are burnt not as offerings. See ibid.:1. If the animal was known to be tereifah and slaughtered, it should be buried rather than burnt (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Shechitah 8:25; 6:20 which states that these conditions do not render an animal as treifah.

See Halachah 4; Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:11.

And is hence disqualified as a sacrifice. This is a general principle in Torah Law. See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:5; Hilchot Shechitah 8:4, 11, et al.

Which disqualifies an animal as a sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 7:5; see also Halachah 7 of this chapter.

In the midst of the above period.

In Eretz Yisrael, these months are directly after the rainy season and the grasses are still fresh.

I.e., the grasses were eaten in this order.

In these months, rain has not descended for more than half a year and the grasses have dried.

Eating these grasses is a natural cure for this malady. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 6:3).

Needless to say, eating more increases the therapeutic value.

I.e., the two month and a half periods.

Our Sages (Bechorot 39a) discuss all these aspects of the animal’s treatment. If the treatment was not administered correctly, it is possible that the blemish is not permanent and could be healed through proper treatment.

For even if the blemish is merely temporary, it is, nevertheless, unfit to be sacrificed.

For until it is established that the blemish is permanent, the animal cannot be redeemed.

But not at the appropriate time of year.

It is forbidden to cause a consecrated animal to incur a disqualifying blemish. Nevertheless, if the animal is already blemished, one who causes such a blemish is not liable for lashes, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 8. Since we are unsure of this animal’s status, we cannot hold the one who causes the blemish liable.

Thus if the redemption was valid, the article used to redeem the animal is consecrated and the person who benefited from it transgressed. If, however, the redemption was not valid, the article is not given that status and hence, there is no transgression involved.

I.e., even if the benefit was derived after they despaired of its recovery, in which instance, it was definitely permanently blemished, since it was redeemed before that time, the situation is still questionable, as explained.

I.e., because the matter is unresolved.

See Hilchot Me’ilah 1:5; Hilchot Shegagot 9:11. As will be explained in the notes to those halachot, it is not necessary to bring a sacrifice conditionally, stipulating: “If I transgressed, this will serve as atonement for my transgression, and if I did not transgress, it will be considered a free-will offering” (Radbaz).

I.e., those outlined in the previous chapter.

I.e., with regard to an animal, there are sacrifices which require a male and others which require a female. Such distinctions are not made with regard to sacrifices brought from fowl. All sacrifices are acceptable whether one brings a male or a female. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:8.

The commentaries explain that the fact that the fowl lost its sight is not enough to disqualify it. It must be as if the eye has been removed.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 11.

See ibid.:10.

I.e., young, underdeveloped birds. They are considered as “lacking in age” (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:8).

We have translated the verse literally so that the source for the concept derived is clear. None of the other animals prescribed for sacrifices are described as b’nai, “the children of.” By using that term, the Torah sought to imply that the birds must be young and underdeveloped.

An intermediate stage of development.

It is unacceptable for turtle-doves, because such a fowl is still considered in its preliminary stages of development. It is not mature yet. Yet it is unacceptable for ordinary doves, because such a fowl has developed beyond its initial stages.

An animal whose reproductive organs were covered by a mass of flesh and thus its gender cannot be determined.

An animal with both a male and female reproductive organ.

Which could be offered if it possessed a blemish.

Even though it makes no difference if a fowl is male or female, it must be definitely a male or definitely a female.

For Caesarian section is not considered as “birth.”

See Halachah 8.

I.e., the mother was pregnant. It was slaughtered and the fetus was removed alive from its womb and then consecrated as a sacrifice. The Radbaz explains that since this animal is also born through Caesarian section, it is not mentioned as a separate category in the first clause of this halachah and in Halachah 11.

Either a male or a female. See Chapter 4, Halachah 3.

In Chapter 4, Halachah 2, and in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 8:1), the Rambam explains that this is referring to a situation where the forbidden sexual act was observed by only one witness, by the owners, or the animal was consecrated before being brought to court, or the forbidden sexual act was performed by a gentile. If, however, the forbidden sexual act was performed by a Jew and observed by two witnesses, once the matter was ruled upon by the court, the animal must be executed and is certainly unacceptable as a sacrifice. See also Chapter 4, Halachah 3, 5 for more details regarding the disqualification of such an animal.

Even if it had not been used for such worship as of yet. See Chapter 4, Halachah 4, which explains when such an animal is disqualified. As the Radbaz explains in his gloss to that halachah, this is speaking about both an animal which is itself going to be worshipped, and also an animal that will be used for the service of a pagan deity.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 6.

This refers even to an animal that was worshipped or set aside for pagan worship, as stated in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:1.

The commentaries to that verse explain that its intent is to refer to animals mating with partners from different species. It is, however, unlikely that this is the Rambam’s intent in citing that prooftext. Most probably, the intent is that only animals that shared relations with humans are forbidden.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 3, for more particulars concerning this category.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 100) and Sefer HaCVuch (mitzvah 571) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Although the prohibition involves two subjects, not one, it is still considered as only one prohibition. See the Introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 9, for more details on why the two prohibitions are considered as one mitzvah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 60) and Sefer HaCVuch (mitzvah 293) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger postulates that this mitzvah applies only with regard to animals. Young doves, by contrast, may be offered even before their eighth day of life. This conclusion can be derived from the Rambam’s wording in the following halachah and in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:8. See also Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 3:10 which allows a chick to be slaughtered for food even on the day of its birth.

See ibid. 1:11-12 for more particulars. There the Rambam states that it is preferable to offer a sacrifice after it is at least one month old.

The Rambam adds this explanation, because in contrast to the disqualifying factors mentioned in Halachah 7, this factor is mentioned explicitly in the Torah (Radbaz).

As can be inferred from the prooftext cited.

See Halachah 2 which explains when these doves are fit to be offered.

That same halachah explains when these doves become unacceptable.

See also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:7-9 which mentions other time factors that render an animal unfit to be sacrificed.

There is no specific prohibition forbidding such offerings. Instead, the manner in which the positive commandment is stated in the Torah makes it clear that a younger fowl is prohibited, as stated in the previous halachah.

Since these types of animals are not acceptable as sacrifices as explained in the previous halachot, the consecration is not effective.

Immediately; there is no need for one to wait until the animal is blemished.

The Ra’avad emphasizes that the person’s words are not entirely of no consequence. Instead, the animal must be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a sacrifice. This, he explains, applies only when the person states: “This animal is consecrated to the altar.” If he states: “This animal is a sacrifice,” his words are of no consequence and no holiness is attached to it at all.

I.e., if an animal with a blemish is consecrated, the animal itself becomes holy. Also, the one who consecrates it is liable for lashes (Radbaz).
See also Hilchot Temurah 1:14, 3:5, when one desires to transfer the holiness of a consecrated animal to a blemished animal, the transfer is effective and the blemished animal is considered as consecrated. This does not apply with regard to these animals.

Were it to be unblemished. Therefore even when it is blemished, the holiness of an animal can be transferred to it.

Which are all unacceptable, as explained in the previous halachot.

For ultimately, it will come of age, and then be acceptable for sacrifice.

In Halachah 8. There the Rambam states that one who offers such a fowl is not liable. From that, we can infer that one who consecrates it is also exempt.

As explained in Chapter 2, Halachah 8.

As explained ibid.:11.

And the forbidden animal cannot be identified. Note the parallels in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:2.

Zevachim 73a,b states that the rationale is that animals are important and therefore are never nullified in a mixture. The Sages then ask: Let us have the herd in which the animal is intermingled moved and then we will follow the principle: Whenever one is separated, we consider it to have separated from the majority (which in this instance is permitted). They reply that this is not done because of a Rabbinical decree, lest an animal be removed from the mixture while it is at rest.

Temurah 30b states that it is disrespectful to offer an animal that has been associated with such a transgression as a sacrifice. From the following halachah, it appears that the rationale is that it is considered to have actually taken part in the transgression.

The disqualification of the offspring in those four instances.

In keeping with the principle (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:12; Temurah, loc. cit.): “A fetus is considered like the thigh of its mother.”

For, in that instance, the animal was brought into being by two factors, one of which is associated with a source forbidden as a sacrifice (the mother) and another (the father) which was not (ibid.).

For a chick is an entirely new entity that was not directly associated with the forbidden animal (ibid. 31a).

As mentioned in the previous halachot. I.e., just as the offspring is the product of the forbidden animal, the flour is the product of the grain. See Avodah Zarah 46b-47a.

In this instance, it is not even remotely connected to the forbidden entity. See Temurah, loc. cit. 53. Similarly, an animal brought by a gentile to sacrifice as a burnt offering is acceptable (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2).

Similarly, an animal brought by a gentile to sacrifice as a burnt offering is acceptable (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2).

King Saul gave this explanation to the prophet Samuel after failing to destroy the herds of the Amalekites. Although that excuse was rejected, it was rejected only because God had explicitly stated that the Amalekites' herds must be destroyed. Had there not been such a command, presumably they—and by extension, animals belonging to any other gentile nation—would have been acceptable.

The Rambam does not mention an animal that had relations with a person, for that is not possible with regard to a fowl.

The Rambam mentioned this concept in the previous chapter. In this chapter, he outlines the details of these restrictions. The point of this halachah is that the restrictions apply to a fowl as well as to an animal.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:16; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:1.

Even if slaughtered according to Jewish Law (Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:22; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:9).

In matters of financial law, the testimony of one witness is of consequence only in that it can require an oath.

Similarly, the testimony of a person regarding his own property is of no consequence.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 8:1), the Rambam mentions two other instances where this law applies: the animal was consecrated before being brought to court or the forbidden sexual act was performed by a gentile.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 6:5 which explains that such an animal is not executed, because Exodus 21:28 requires such a punishment: “When an ox gores…,” i.e., that it does so on its own initiative, and not when it was prompted to gore.
See the gloss of the Radbaz to Chapter 3, Halachah 5, where he states that such an animal should be forbidden to the altar under all circumstances just like a sodomized animal is.

For relations with a male are not significant until that age (Hilchot Ishut 11:3; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 1:16).

See Hilchot Melachim 9:5-6 which states that although a gentile is liable to be executed for engaging in sexual relations with an animal, the animal itself is not executed. Nevertheless, involvement in the transgression disqualifies it as a sacrifice.

See Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:8, et al, where it is explained that until a girl is three years old, sexual relations with her are not significant.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on the latter point, noting that the ages the Rambam mentions are relevant with regard to the punishment of execution by stoning. Nevertheless, he argues that since the animal is disqualified from being offered as a sacrifice, because it becomes offensive to offer it after it engaged in forbidden relations, that concept would seemingly apply regardless of the age of the human with whom it engaged in those relations. Moreover, since the animal derived pleasure, the sexual activity should be considered significant. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that what is significant here is the halachic definition of sexual relations, not the pleasure the animal experiences. Since halachicly, the act is not considered as sexual relations, the animal is not forbidden.

The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about both an animal which is itself going to be worshipped, and also an animal that will be used for the service of a pagan deity.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that if one designated an animal as a false deity, that is sufficient to cause the animal to become repugnant and forbidden as a sacrifice, even if a deed is not performed. The Radbaz brings support for the Ra’avad’s ruling from Isaiah 30:22 which, when speaking about making the covering of idols’ impure, uses the expression: “Tell it: ‘Be gone,’” implying that “telling it,” i.e., speaking, is sufficient to cause an article to be considered as an idol.
The difference between the Rambam’s view and that of the Ra’avad results from a variation in the text of Temurah 29a. According to the Rambam, the passage is speaking about an animal dedicated to the service of a false deity, while according to the Ra’avad, it refers to an animal intended to be worshiped as a false deity. (The standard printed text supports the Rambam’s version, although Rashi mentions the other version as well.).
The Radbaz explains that according to the Rambam an animal is forbidden as a sacrifice only when it is forbidden to benefit from it. As the Rambam states in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:1, whether an animal is designated to be worshipped or as a sacrifice to a false deity, it does not become forbidden until a deed is performed. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the prohibition against benefiting from the animal is different from the prohibition against offering the animal as a sacrifice. More stringent rules apply in the latter context.

The Radbaz states that in an instance where two witnesses did not observe the transgression (as stated in Halachah 2), the person who engaged in relations with the animal is not at all liable to its owner financially, for he is not prohibited against benefiting from the animal.

In contrast to an animal which kills, which is not disqualified if it was goaded into killing (see Halachah 3), an animal that engaged in relations with a human is disqualified in all instances. Since the act causes it to be considered loathsome, the circumstances under which the act was performed are of no consequence.

This applies even (as stated in the previous halachah), he performed a deed indicating that the animal was set aside for pagan worship (Radbaz).

For once he consecrated it as a sacrifice, it is as if it no longer belongs to him.

Since a transgression has not been performed with it as of yet, it is not considered as loathsome (Radbaz).

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim (and in many other sources) a person cannot. cause an article that does not belong to him to become forbidden.

The Ra’avad quotes Avodah Zarah 54a which states that the above restriction applies only when one performs a deed with the article he worshipped. From the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:1, it is apparent that he maintains that the principle that a person cannot cause property that does not belong to him to be forbidden to be used applies even if he actually worships the article as a false deity and even when he performs a deed. The Rambam here is speaking about causing the article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to the altar and for that, a deed is not necessary.

Chapter 3, Halachah 10. Since the animal was consecrated, it cannot be used for ordinary purposes until it is redeemed and it cannot be redeemed until it is blemished.

Any garments or ornaments used to adorn the false deity. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 6:1), the Rambam explains that the reason for this restriction is that the ornaments were worshipped together with the false deity.

See Hilchot Avadat Kochavim 8:7.

Since they have not been worshipped, one is permitted to benefit from them and they may even be used as sacrifices [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

See Hilchot Avadat Kachavim 8:1 which states that “Any article that was not touched by human hands or made by man is permitted to be used even though it was worshipped as a false deity.”

Or any other part of the Temple building (Radbaz). As stated in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:16, the altar was made with whole stones, both large and small, over which is poured a liquid with lime, pitch, and molten lead. In the above instance, since the stones were taken from a mountain that was worshipped, it is inappropriate for them to be used for the altar.

Implied is that if the water is not his own, it may be used even as a libation even though it was worshipped (Rav Yosef Corcus). The Radbaz notes that no such leniency is granted with regard to the stones mentioned in the previous clauae. He differentiates between the two as follows: The water of a spring is constantly flowing. Thus, the water that was worshipped is not the same water that will be used for the libation. The stones of the mountain, by contrast, were worshipped themselves. Hence even though they are not a person’s private property, they may not be used for the Temple.

In this instance as well, an ordinary person is permitted to use the water, but it is inappropriate to be used for the altar.

I.e., the water libation offered during the Sukkot holiday. See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 10:6-10.

A tree that is worshipped. See Exodus 34:13; Deuteronomy 7:5, 12:3, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:3; et al.

In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:8, the Rambam writes that once a gentile nullifies the connection of a worshipped entity to paganism, it is permitted to benefit from it. The subsequent halachot in that chapter, describe the process of nullification. Here the Rambam is emphasizing that although it is permitted to benefit from the article afterwards, the fact that it was once worshipped - or served as an accessory to an article worshipped - prevents it from being offered as a sacrifice.

Similarly, the branches of a palm tree that was worshipped should not be used as a Lulav (Hilchot Lulav 8:1).

See the conclusion of the tractate of Kinnim which mentions how a sacrificial animal can be used for these purposes.
There the Mishnah states that the wool is unacceptable for use as techelet. The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 3, Halachah 14, the Rambam ruled that even though wheat was worshipped, the flour made from it is not disqualified for use as a meal offering, because it underwent a change. Nevertheless, in this and the other instances mentioned below, although the color and the form of the article may have undergone a change, that change does not alter its fundamental nature and it is still disqualified for the altar and its service.
Such wool is also disqualified for use in tzitzit or for any other purpose associated with a mitzvah. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 11:8).

I.e., as shofarot that are sounded together with the trumpets (Hilchot Taaniot 1 :4).

Among the instruments sounded in the Temple service were flutes (Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 3:4-6). Apparently, the thighs of sacrificial animals were hollowed out and converted into such instruments.

Because it was an integral part of an entity that was worshipped.

This general principle summarizes the concepts mentioned in the previous halachot. The Rambam now goes on to discuss other reasons why animals were forbidden as sacrifices.

Which is forbidden to be used as a sacrifice as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

Which is forbidden to be used as a sacrifice as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

I.e., in exchange for intimacy.

The Rambam is explaining that here the emphasis is on the halachic meaning of the term zonah (“harlot”) and not its popular meaning. The point is not that the present is forbidden because it was given in exchange for intimacy, but that it was given in exchange for intimacy with a woman who meets the halachic definitions of that term. That definition is given in Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 18:1: “Based on the Oral Tradition, we learned that the term zonah used by the Torah refers to one who is not a nativebom Jewess (thus excluding a gentile woman or maidservant) [or] a Jewish woman who engaged in relations with a man she was forbidden to marry, violating a prohibition that is universally applicable” (excluding the prohibited relations the Rambam mentions).

Incestuous and adulterous relations for which one is liable for karet (Hilchot Ishut I :5). These forbidden relationships are mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 18.

The nine forbidden relationships mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 1:7.

I.e., although he is engaging in intimacy out of lust and in exchange for payment, the woman is not termed a harlot, as Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:2 states: “Whenever a person has relations with an unmarried woman, even if she is a harlot who wantonly makes herself available to everyone ... she is not deemed as a zonah ... for she is not forbidden to marry [the people with whom she engaged in relations].”

I.e., she has experienced menstrual bleeding and has not purified herself afterwards.

For such relationships are also punishable by karet (see Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:1). Nevertheless, the fact that a woman is in the niddah state does not prevent the consecration of a woman from taking effect.

The consecration of such a woman is binding and she is considered as his wife (Hilchot Ishut 4:14).

Because he is forbidden to marry her and thus the present meets the criteria mentioned in the previous halachah.

See Temurah 29b.

The Radbaz explains that the Rambam’s intent is that although in a strict halachic sense, there is no prohibition against offering such an article as a sacrifice, it is an abomination unto God and should not be offered.

There are two points expressed by this halachah:
a) that, as stated above, a Canaanite maidservant is considered as a harlot;
b) that even though the present is not being given by the person engaging in the intimate relations, the present is still forbidden as a sacrifice.

Hilchot Avadim 3:3-4.

I.e., one might think that the law applies only with regard to a bondsman and his master, for the master has authority over the bondsman and has certain responsibilities toward him, but not with regard to two free men who are not associated in this manner (Kessef Mishneh).

And not an ordinary gift (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh). This applies evert when he does not explicitly say that he gave them to her because of the relations they shared (Radbaz).

Because it was given to her in exchange for relations. It is not significant whether it was given before the relations or afterwards.

Because they had not engaged in relations yet. We do not say that since it was designated as “a present for a harlot,” it is forbidden as a sacrifice (Radbaz).

Thus she was the legal owner at the time it was sacrificed.

If he did not make such a stipulation, he remains the legal owner of the animal. It is in the woman’s possession as security, but she is not its owner.

Temurah 29b considers this question and does not reach a conclusion.

And from the time an entity is consecrated, it is considered as having been given to the Temple. Hence, it could be considered as if it already had been sacrificed.

Instead, it should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish.

As evident from Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:20, this is the ruling whenever there is a question whether a substance offered as a sacrifice is acceptable.

The principle under which this halachah operates is that for a “present to a harlot” to be forbidden as a sacrifice, it must be acquired by the woman at the time of relations even though it does not come into her full possession until afterwards (Temurah 29a).

I.e., if the gentile woman later desires to offer this animal as a sacrifice, it is not accepted from her. Although we do accept animals brought by gentiles as burnt offerings, the animals must be acceptable.

According to Scriptural Law, an exchange is completed when an exchange is made. Hence, at the time the two engaged in relations, the lamb became the woman’s property. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that movable property is not transferred to the legal domain of the recipient until he acquires it through meshichah, physically drawing it into his possession (Hilchot Mechirah 3:1). Our Sages, however, did not impose this decree with regard to gentiles and transactions with them follow the original guidelines of Scriptural Law (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14). Hence a gentile harlot became the legal owner of the lamb directly after the relations. Hence it is considered as “the present of a harlot.” The fact that it was not given to her until years afterwards is not significant.

Because a person’s courtyard can acquire an article on his or her behalf when it is placed within it (Hilchot zechiyah UMatanah 4:8). Hence, while the woman is holding the lamb in lieu of the money, it is considered to have entered her possession.

Or other entities.

The finished product is considered as different from the raw material from which it is made.

For a consecrated article is not considered as his personal property. Hence, it is not his to give her (Temurah 30b).

To partake of a Paschal sacrifice, one must be designated to partake of it from the outset.

This refers to the festive offering brought on the fourteenth of Nisan to accompany the Paschal sacrifice. See Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:11.

Although the owner retains the right to give others to partake of the offerings, they are not considered as his private property. Instead, he is giving them the right to partake of consecrated property, not his own possessions.

For at that point - since the owner has despaired of its return and it has departed from the possession of the thief the harlot becomes its legal owner (as evident from Hilchot Geneivah 5:3). Accordingly, it is disqualified as a sacrifice.

I.e., the Rambam understands Temurah 30b as deriving this law from the exegesis of a verse. According to logic, we would apply the principle: A person cannot cause an article that does not belong to him to be become forbidden.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding the interpretation of the above passage. He maintains that it is speaking about ordinary doves. Nevertheless, since blemished doves are acceptable as sacrifices (Chapter 3, Halachah 1), one might think that a present to a harlot is also acceptable. Therefore, the Torah must teach us that this is not the case. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh favor the Ra’avad’s understanding of the passage.

Which is forbidden for the altar, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 7.

For a certain portion of each one is being given in exchange for the dog.

For the article being offered is not considered as the article exchanged.

I.e., a person sodomized a dog and separated a lamb as a fee.

I.e., a person gave a colleague a lamb in exchange for a maidservant who was a harlot.

I.e., the articles donated to the Temple treasury are sold and the money used for improvements. Thus the distasteful article itself is not becoming part of the Temple.

See Temurah 30a.