Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Ra’avad (and this is also Rashi’s interpretation of Bechorot 43a) differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of this disqualifying factor. The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam had a different version of that Talmudic passage.

The accompanying drawing is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 7:1). Similarly, all of the disqualifying factors mentioned here are discussed there and in the following mishnah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 7:3), the Rambam explains that when a person has a pair of organs, it is expected that they be identical and a deviation is considered a blemish.

Leviticus 21:20. The Rambam chooses the first interpretation of this term offered by Bechorot 7:2. Rashi follows the second interpretation, overly long eyebrows. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that the two opinions agree that these two conditions are blemishes; the difference of opinion between them concerns only the definition of the term gibein in the Torah.

Reaching his eyelids [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.)].

Some interpret this simply. Others understand it as meaning that the person’s two eyebrows are connected above his nose so that they appear as one long eyebrow.

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 7:3).

I.e., while focusing on one storey, he will see the other.

I.e., for most people, the bridge of the nose interposes between one eye and the other and it is impossible to apply ointment to them both in one motion. There are certain individuals whose bridge of the nose is so sunk that they can do so.
Bechorot 7:3 defines charum as having a bridge of the nose sunk to the extent that the above is possible. Nevertheless, in the Talmud, another opinion is cited which states that as long as the bridge is sunken more than what is ordinary, it is considered a blemish even if it does not reach such an extreme state. The Rambam accepts this view, because it appears to be favored by the Talmud (Kessef Mishneh).

Leviticus 21:18.

This term is used by the Mishnah (Bechorot 7:1). Although the term is generally interpreted as meaning a hunchback in contemporary Hebrew, the implication above is also included in the Talmudic term.

And thus the two hands appear the same.

I.e., to the end of one's fingers.

Leviticus 21:20.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this point. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s view.

Bechorot 45b explains that although a tall person is considered attractive, if he is exceptionally tall, people consider it objectionable.

I.e., blotches that are not associated with the impurity resulting from tzara’at.

See Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 1:1 for a definition of this term.

With regard to the impurity of tzara’at. See ibid. 6:4.

An isar is a Roman coin that the Talmud mentions in various halachic contexts (Kiddushin 2a, Bava Metzia 51b, Mikvaot 9:5, et al.). More recently, Middos VeShiurei Torah, p. 169, gives the diameter of an isar as 23 mm. Thus its area would be slightly more than 3.6 cm.

Since it has hair, it is considered objectionable, regardless of its size.

If it smaller, it is not that noticeable, and hence, it is not considered a blemish.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 7:5), the Rambam describes this condition as severe melancholia to the extent that the person’s physical functioning is impaired.

I.e., the total of those mentioned in this and the previous chapter.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 5-6.

I.e., and it does not forbid merely entering the Temple or ascending the Altar.

I.e., where is stated the prohibition for which this punishment is given? (Sifri)

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 74) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 390) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Thus restricting the priestly service to males and excluding females. The Radbaz questions why two verses are necessary to exclude the women of the priestly family. He explains that since they are permitted to partake of terumah and certain sacrificial foods, they are not entirely similar to Israelites. Hence, a second verse is necessary.

Service which is the final stage in a sacrifice being brought to the altar (Yoma 24a).

E.g., receiving the blood, carrying the blood or the limbs to the altar.

See Halachah 3.

See Halachah 4.

As performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur and also when offering certain atonement offerings.

The sprinkling or dashing of blood on the external altar.

See Hilelwt Mechusrei Kapparah 4:2 where these sprinklings are mentioned.
Rav Yosef Corcus questions why the water libations and the wine libations are considered as separate categories and the sprinkling of blood and oil are not. He explains that the two different libations stem from entirely different commandments. The sprinkling of the oil, by contrast, is not a commandment in its own right, but an ancillary element to the offering of a sacrifice and that sacrifice also involves sprinkling blood. Hence, the two are included in the same category.

I.e., entities that are usually set afire on the altar.

As Sh’vuot 17b states, this applies even if the entity would have ultimately been consumed by fire without his activity, but his act hastens its consumption.

For one to be liable, a portion of this minimum size is necessary, for an incense offering may not be smaller, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:2. Hence, if he sets afire less, he is not performing service. Even though a larger amount of incense is offered each day, that is a Rabbinic enactment and not a Scriptural requirement (Radbaz).

Leviticus 16:12. If he sets fire to a lesser amount, he is not performing service. Hence, he is not liable.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:l. Arranging these two logs is the final stage in the arrangement of wood on the altar. Hence a non-priest is liable (Radbaz).

Rabbi Akiva Eiger cites Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 12:23 which states that the preliminary stages of the offering of a meal offering may be performed by a non-priest.

See Halachah 7.

Se also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:1; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:1.

Even as an initial preference (Radbaz). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that, after the fact, if a non-priest kindled the lamps, it is valid, but as an initial preference, he is not allowed to kindle them. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam’s position from Yoma 24b which states that kindling the lamps of the Menorah is not an act of service. Since it is not an. act of service, asks the Radbaz, why should a non-priest be restricted from performing it? How is it different from the slaughter of an animal?
The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 98) reinforces the Ra’avad’s question, asking how is it possible for the Menorah to be lit outside its proper place? The Rambam LeAm explains that the mitzvah is not lighting the lamps, but rather putting the lamps in their place.

I.e., out from the Temple building to a place in the courtyard where a non-priest is allowed to stand. Note the discussion of the meaning of the term hatavah in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 3:12 and notes.

See ibid. 2:10.

See Halachah 2.

I.e., the verse has two connotations: a) that the priestly service is a gift to the priests, b) (and this is the focus here), that the priestly service involves giving: offering sacrificial substances on the altar.

I.e., the removal of the ashes.

Because arranging the wood is considered sacrificial service (Radbaz). The Kessef Mishneh points out that from Yoma 27-28a, one might conclude that it is permitted for a non-priest to arrange the wood of the altar. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam that passage only absolves a non-priest from the punishment of death. It does not grant him permission to arrange the wood.

The commentaries question why the Rambam omits a priest who does not wear the priestly garments. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that it is not necessary to mention such a person because in Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 10:4, the Rambam stated that a priest who does not wear the priestly garments is considered as a non-priest.

I.e., each one is liable according to the punishment appropriate for him. An impure priest and one who did not wash his hands and feet are liable for death and one who is physically blemished is liable for lashes (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., services that are not followed by other services which involve giving.

And must wait until the evening before performing service.

E.g., a person afflicted with tzara'at who must bring an atonement offering before serving.

With another type of impurity.

Since he violated many prohibitions with one act of service, he is liable for a sacrifice for each violation.
The Ra’avad cites a Tosefta that does not accept the Rambam’s ruling on this point and instead, maintains that he is liable for only one sacrifice. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh, however, support the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that each of the prohibitions expands the scope of the obligation. See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 7:2 and Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 8:6 which discusses the ground rules for these concepts.

Even if he also possessed all the other disqualifying factors.

For all of the other prohibitions were given only to a priest. They do not apply to a non-priest (Kessef Mishneh).

For the Temple services involve performance of forbidden labors. These prohibitions are superseded by the obligation to offer the sacrifices, but since a non-priest’s service is not valid, he is considered as liable for these prohibited acts.

Here also although a single act is performed, since two different prohibitions are involved, he is liable for both of them. We do not follow the principle: One prohibition does not fall on another prohibition, because the prohibition against performing the Sabbath labors is greater in scope, encompassing other acts besides the Temple service.

For the ritual impurity increases the scope of his liability, making him liable also for entering the Temple and partaking of sacrifices. Since it is of a greater scope, we do not follow the principle, one prohibition does not fall on another (Radbaz).

A parallel also exists with regard to the recitation of the priestly blessing. See Hilchot Nesiat Kapayim 15:3. There the Rambam also excludes a priest who was compelled to serve idols and he cites a different prooftext, II Kings 23:9.

The priests who “who distanced themselves from Me during Israel’s straying, when they strayed after false deities” (Ezekiel 44:10).

I.e., though it is not disqualified, it is not considered as desirable.

Note a parallel in Hilchot Shechitah 2:15.

The Rambam is not speaking about a mere hypothetical situation. As he relates in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:10), Chonio, the son of Shimon the Just, entered into a power struggle with his brother Shimi to inherit his father’s position as High Priest. Chonio incurred the people’s wrath, because he brought about a very deprecating situation in the Temple. He fled to Alexandria where he established a following, constructed a temple to God resembling the Temple in Jerusalem, and offered sacrifices there just like those offered in Jerusalem. Needless to say, our Sages shunned Chonio’s shrine, because its sacrificial worship violated the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside the Temple. Indeed, the majority of those who worshiped there were non-Jewish Egyptians whom Chonio had attracted to God’s service.

This represents a conclusion reached by the Rambam on the basis of deduction without a prior Rabbinic source.

Since they were disqualified by Rabbinic decree, after the fact, their service is acceptable (Kessef Mishneh).

Halachah 13.

Halachah l.

Chapter 6, Halachot 1-2.

Ibid.:8.

Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

Ibid.:4.

Ibid.:5.

Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 10:4.

Ibid.:5.

Chapter 1, Halachah 14.

Ibid.:8-9.

Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

Ibid.:17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.:18.

See the conclusion of these halachot (Chapter 7, Halachah 11).

The Sifra explains that the phrase should be understood, not only as a description of the animal, but as a commandment.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 61) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 286) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 91) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 285) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. One is liable for merely consecrating such an animal even if it is never actually offered on the altar (Sefer HaChinuch).

The Sefer HaChinuch questions why lashes should be given, because the transgression does not involve a deed, but explains that it can be considered comparable to temurah, exchanging an animal for a sacred animal. There too the exchange/consecration of the animal is considered as significant enough to warrant lashes.

And thus the animal will be sold, rather than offered on the altar itself.

For as above, the sacrifices should be associated only with perfect and unblemished animals. Anything less is an insult to He to Whom they are offered.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:12; Hilchot Nizirut 9:8. This is a general principle: Whenever a person wants to take a vow, consecrate an article, or set it aside as holy, his statements must reflect the will of his heart.

Since he did not know of the prohibition involved, his act does not minimize the holiness of the sacrifices. Hence the consecration is effective. And since, he did not act intentionally. He is not liable for lashes.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on this point, based on his understanding of Temurah 17a. The commentaries elaborate on this difference of opinion.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that he must slaughter the animal for the sake of a sacrifice to be liable.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 92) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 288) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The verse speaks of animals with physical blemishes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 93) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 289) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 290) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 95) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 494) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. In his hasagot to Sejer HaMitzvot, the Ramban differs and maintains that this should not be considered as a separate commandment, but rather as an element of the above commandments. Even according to the Rambam, this one negative commandment includes all of the three prohibitions mentioned above.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 7, where these blemishes are listed.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2-3 for a description of these sacrifices.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 96) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 292) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The verse speaks of animals with physical blemishes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 97) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 287) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Radbaz explains that this concept can be derived from the prooftext cited in Halachah 1: “unblemished to arouse favor.” Implied is that when a sacrificial animal can arouse favor, i.e., when there is a Temple where it can be offered, it must be unblemished. If that is not the case, there is no penalty for causing such a blemish.
The Kessef Mishneh and other commentaries have noted that the Rambam’s ruling appears to be in contradiction with Avodah Zarah 13b which implies that there is no prohibition at all in causing a blemish in the present era, because there is no Temple where the sacrifices can be offered. The Minchat Chinuch (loc. cit.) and others explain that the difference can be resolved on the basis of the Rambam’s ruling (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:15) that if the altar is constructed on the Temple Mount, sacrifices may be brought even if the entire Temple has not been rebuilt.

From Chapter 2, Halachah 15, it would appear that if the first merely brought about a temporary blemish, the second would be liable.

For the animal was already disqualified due to the actions of the first person. Although the second person is not liable for lashes, he is still considered to have violated a Scriptural prohibition.

Although it is forbidden to transfer the holiness of a sacrificial animal to another animal, once that act has been performed, the second animal is consecrated and the prohibitions associated with a sacrifice apply to it.

Hilchot Temurah 3:1.

As explained in Hilchot Bechorot 8:1-2, when a person is tithing his flocks and he mistakenly calls the ninth animal to emerge, the tenth. In such an instance, a certain measure of holiness is conveyed upon that animal and it cannot be eaten until it becomes blemished. It should not, however, be offered on the altar. Since it is not fit to be offered, causing a blemish in it does not make one liable for lashes.

This is speaking about an animal with a permanent blemish. The laws that apply if it has merely a temporary blemish are mentioned in the following halachah.

As stated in Halachah 1.

As indicated by the sources cited by the Rambam at the conclusion of this halachah, the evaluation of the animal’s worth must be made by a priest and not by any other person.

Once such an animal has been redeemed, it may be shorn or used for labor (Hilchot Me’ilah 1:9).

I.e., they should be redeemed and a sacrifice brought with the money, as stated in Hilchot Arachin 5:11. 32. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 86) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 441) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., they should be redeemed and a sacrifice brought with the money, as stated in Hilchot Arachin 5:11. 32. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 86) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 441) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the new concept taught by the verse is not that one may slaughter ordinary animals and partake of their meat, for there is no need for a verse to teach us that. Instead, the new idea is that consecrated animals can be redeemed and then used as food. It is, however, forbidden to shear them and perform work with them even after they have been redeemed (Hilchot Me’ilah, loc. cit.).

Hilchot Arachin, loc. cit.

Bechorot 31b explains that the intent is not an animal from an impure species, but rather an animal from a kosher species that became disqualified because of a blemish, for there is a second verse (27:27) that speaks about evaluating non-kosher animals.

To be evaluated and then it may be redeemed.

It had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated.

I.e., before it was redeemed.

This represents a departure from the usual practice, because generally, unblemished animals are not redeemed, but are offered as sacrifices; see Temurah 33b.

I.e., it would not be appropriate for the animal that was consecrated not to be offered as a sacrifice and its offspring, which was never directly consecrated, to be used for that purpose.

For it was redeemed together with its mother.

And then its meat can be used even as food for animals, and certainly for humans. Moreover, a formal process of evaluation by a court is not required before its redemption.

The Rambam is explaining why leniency is granted to redeem it after it died although generally we do not redeem a consecrated animal to feed its meat to the dogs (Chapter 2, Halachah 10; based on Temurah 6:5). In this instance, however, because the animal was blemished permanently, the consecration never affected its actual body, only its worth (i.e., it was not destined to be sacrificed itself, but rather to be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a sacrifice). Hence, after it dies, it can still be sold after it is redeemed.

Rather than redeemed. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:11.

And this process of evaluation must be performed while the animal is alive.

Hilchot Arachin 5:12.

For as long as it is making convulsive motions, it is considered alive and the process of evaluation can take place (ibid.:13).

See Hilchot Temurah 4:9.

But after it contracted a permanent blemish.

To be used for ordinary purposes by Rabbinic decree. Although according to Scriptural Law, its holiness has departed, our Sages forbade its use, lest many such animals be maintained and flocks of them raised (Bechorot 15b).

It then receives holiness on its own accord, independent of its mother.

Since the mother was unfit to be sacrificed because of its blemish, its holiness is considered to be suspended. Because the holiness of the mother was suspended, the offspring is not considered to be consecrated to the complete extent. Hence it must be consecrated again.
(It must be noted that the commentaries have questioned this ruling, because in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:4, the Rambam writes that the holiness of consecrated animals is never suspended. It can, however, be explained that a suspension stemming from a permanent blemish is different, because the animal can never be fit for sacrifice again. See a parallel in Hilchot Temurah 3:4.)

Because of a blemish or similar reason.

I.e., we do not say that since the animal was originally consecrated, it is disrespectful to treat it in this manner after it was redeemed. The Radbaz adds that the purchaser need not be notified that the meat came from a sacrifice that was disqualified.

See Hilchot Bechorot 1:18; 6:5-7 which mentions the restrictions against selling such meat.

So that the best price could be received for it.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:18; Hilchot Bechorot 1:3; 6:4; Hilchot Temurah 3:1-2.

For this represents disdain for consecrated property.

By the priest who received it after it was blemished.

One might think that since its value will be given to the Temple treasury, one would be allowed to sell it like normal meat to increase its price, as explained above.

In this instance, the priest cannot sell this animal in the market as private property. Hence he does not have the right to give this privilege to the Temple treasury (Rashi, Zevachim 75b).