Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

[The following rules apply when] a woman makes a provision with her husband in which he agrees to forgo one of the privileges that a husband is granted. If he wrote down [this provision] for her after she was consecrated, but before nisu'in, there is no need to formalize the matter with an act of contract; everything he wrote to her is binding.1 If he wrote down [this provision] for her after nisu'in, he must formalize the matter with an act of contract.2

If, [after nisu'in,] the husband stipulates that he will have no say with regard to [his wife's] property, and she sells it or gives it away as a present, the sale or the present is binding.3 Nevertheless, [the husband] is entitled to the benefits [that accrue from the property] during the time it is in her possession.4

If he affirmed these statements with an act of contract between consecration [and nisu'in], he is considered to have waived his rights to the land itself, and he no longer has any rights to the benefits that accrue from her property.5

His words are not heeded if he protests this action, saying: "I did not realize that this act of contract formalized my waiver of all rights to benefit from the property. [I thought that it only entitled my wife] to make a binding sale. [This interpretation is justified,] for no one will marry a woman without property." Instead, he is considered to have waived [all] rights to the land itself.

If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, he is not entitled to this benefit. Nevertheless, the benefit that accrues should be converted to financial resources, landed property should be purchased, and [the husband] is entitled to the benefits from that property.6 For he waived only the rights to the property [she owned originally].

If [the husband] made a provision with [his wife] not to receive the benefit that accrues from her property, nor to receive the benefit that results from property purchased with the income from her original property, the proceeds from that property should be used to purchase other property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefits that accrue. These are called "the fruit of the fruit's fruit."

This pattern continues until the husband makes a provision that he has no right to any by-product of the proceeds from [his wife's property]. [If he makes such a provision,] he has no right to any benefit during her lifetime, but if she dies, he inherits her entire estate.

If he makes a provision that he will not inherit [his wife's] property, the provision is binding. He is, however, entitled to receive the benefits that accrue [from this property] during her lifetime.

Similarly, [his word] is binding if he stipulates that he will inherit [only] a portion of her estate, or if he stipulates that if she dies without bearing children, her estate will return to her father's household.

When does the above apply? When he made this provision before nisu'in.7 For a man has the prerogative to forgo an inheritance that comes to him from a source outside his family before he acquires the rights to it. If, however, he made the provision after nisu'in, his provision is not binding, and he inherits her estate as we explained.8

When, after nisu'in, [a husband] stipulates9 that he has no say with regard to his wife's property - not with regard to the benefits from that property nor any eventual byproducts from them during her lifetime - then after her death he is not entitled to any benefit from this property at all.10 If she dies, however, he inherits her estate, as explained [above].

[The following rules apply] when a husband spends money [to improve property belonging to his wife that is classified as] nichsei m'log. Whether he spent a small amount and derived much benefit, or spent a large amount and derived little benefit [he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.

[The above applies] even if he ate only one dried fig in a respectful manner,11 if he ate a dinar's worth of produce in a haphazard manner, or if he did not even take produce [from the field on which he spent money] and took merely a bundle of twigs.12

Similar [laws apply] if a woman inherited funds in a distant place, and the husband undertook expenses in order to bring them [to their home], or [expenses were required] to take them from the person who was holding them. If [the husband] purchased land [with these funds] and ate the measure of fruit [mentioned above, he is not required to pay anything, nor may he collect anything]; what he spent, he spent, and the benefit that he enjoyed, he enjoyed.

[The following procedure is adhered to if] a husband incurred expenses [on behalf of his wife's property] and did not derive any benefit or derived less benefit than the above measure. We evaluate the increment to the property, and we ask him the extent of his expenses.

If the increment is greater than the expenses, the husband must take an oath holding a sacred object, stating how much he spent. He is then reimbursed for those expenses.13 If the increment is less than the expenses, he receives only the amount of the expenses that is justified by the increment, and he must take an oath [with regard to the extent of those expenses].

When does the above apply? When a husband divorces his wife [under ordinary circumstances]. [Different rules apply regarding] a woman who rebels against her husband [and denies him intimacy].14 Even if he derived much benefit, the benefit that he derives should be evaluated and subtracted from the amount fit to be given him for the expenses he undertook.15 After he takes an oath [affirming his claim], he is entitled to collect it. For he did not [incur these expenses on behalf of his wife] so that she would take them and leave him on her own accord.

Similarly, [different rules apply when] a man undertakes expenses [to develop] property belonging to his wife who is below the age of majority, and she dissolves the marriage through the right of mi'un.16 We evaluate the amount of benefit he received, the amount of his expenses, the extent of the property's increment - and then he is given the share usually allocated to a sharecropper.17[This consideration is taken] because he had permission to work [his wife's property].18

There are various customs regarding [a woman's] dowry. In certain places it is customary to [state a higher figure] in the ketubah [with regard to the value of the dowry], increasing by a third, a fifth or a half. For example, if the dowry was 100 [zuz], it is written [in the ketubah] that the woman brought 150 [to the household], in order to appear more generous in the eyes of the people. [Therefore,] when the woman comes to collect her dowry, she collects only 100.

Conversely, there are places where it is customary to write a lesser amount. If it is agreed that she will bring utensils worth 100 [zuz to the household], she must bring a value of 120 or 150, and yet, [in the ketubah,] it is written that she brought only [a value of] 100.19 And there are other places where it is customary to write a value of 100 [zuz] as 100.

There are places where it is customary for a man to give a set amount of money proportionate to the dowry, for the bride to adorn herself and purchase perfume and the like. There are places where [it is customary for] the man to add an additional sum of his own for his wife and add it to her dowry, for her to appear attractive.

When a man marries a woman without specifying any conditions, he should write her a ketubah, giving her a sum that is customarily given in that locale. Similarly, if she makes a commitment to bring [utensils to the household], she must bring what is customarily brought in that locale. And when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, she collects as is customary in that locale.

In this and in all similar matters, local custom is a fundamental principle, and it is used as a basis for judgment, provided that the custom is commonly accepted in the locale.

[The following rules apply when a man and a woman were engaged to each other. When he asks her, "What is the value [of the utensils] you are bringing [to the household]?", and she answers him with an amount, and she asks him, "How much will you give me [for my ketubah]?", and he answers with an amount, and afterwards he arises and consecrates her, the commitments are binding even though they were not formalized with an act of contract.20

Similarly, a commitment made by a father on behalf of his son or daughter [is binding]. For example, if he is asked, "How much will you give on behalf of your son?", and he specifies an amount, or he is asked "How much will you give on behalf of your daughter?", and he specifies an amount, [his commitment is binding].

These are commitments that are established through speech alone.21

When does the above apply? When a father made a commitment on behalf of his daughter, whether she is a minor or past majority, or on behalf of his son, for their first marriage. For a man feels an inner connection to his son, and because of his happiness at his first marriage, he makes a definite commitment, and designates [the sum] for him with a verbal statement [alone].

[Different rules apply when], by contrast, a brother makes a commitment on behalf of his sister, a woman makes a commitment on behalf of her daughter, [when a commitment is made by] other relatives, and similarly, when a father makes a commitment on behalf of his son or daughter for a second marriage.22 The commitment is not binding until the person making it formalizes it with an act of contract and states the amount he will give.

When a father makes a commitment for his daughter, the daughter does not acquire that present until her husband consummates the marriage with her.23 Similarly, a son does not acquire [the present that he was promised] until he consummates his marriage. For whenever one makes [such] a commitment, his intent is that [it be fulfilled when] the marriage is consummated.

Therefore, when a man makes a commitment to his [prospective] son-in-law, but the son-in-law dies [after erusin, but] before the marriage is consummated, and the woman is bound to his brother, [if he desires to perform the rite of] yibbum, [the woman's] father may [retract his commitment], saying: "I desired to give your brother; I do not desire to give you." [This applies] even if the first husband was an unlearned man and the second is a Torah scholar, and even if the woman desires [to marry] the second man.24

When a man makes a financial commitment to his son-in-law and then moves to another country [without fulfilling his commitment], the woman has the prerogative of telling her [prospective] husband: "I did not make this commitment myself. What can I do? Either consummate the marriage without a dowry or divorce me."25

If, however, she made such a commitment herself, and she was not able to muster the funds, she must remain [in this intermediate state] until she accumulates the sum to which she committed herself or until she dies.

Why does she not release herself from her obligation by becoming a moredet26 against her husband? [Because there is a difference between these two instances.] With regard to a moredet who has [merely] been consecrated, the husband desires to consummate the marriage; it is she who does not desire. In this instance, by contrast, the husband does not want [to consummate his marriage with] her until she gives the dowry to which she committed herself. She, however, desires him, [as reflected by] her request: "Either consummate [the marriage] or divorce me."

When does the above apply? To a woman past majority. If, however, a woman makes a financial commitment while she is still a minor, we compel [her prospective husband] either to divorce her or to consummate the marriage without a dowry.

When a man marries a woman and makes a commitment to support her daughter for [an explicit number of] years, he is obligated to support her for [all] the years to which he committed himself, provided he made this commitment at the time of the woman's consecration.27

If, however, he made the commitment [after] the kiddushin [were given], the commitment is not binding until he affirms it with an act of contract or composes a document to that effect, as will be explained in the laws of business transactions.28

[The following rules apply when] a woman is divorced within the time that her husband committed himself to support her daughter, and she married another man who also committed himself to support her daughter for a particular number of years. The first husband does not have the prerogative to say: "If she comes to my house, I will support her."29 Instead, he must bring her support to the place where she is staying together with her mother. Similarly, both husbands do not have the prerogative of saying: "We will together provide for her support." Instead, one of the husbands must provide for her support, and the other must give her the financial value of her support.

[The following rules apply when the woman's] daughter marries during the time [in which her mother's husbands] obligated themselves to supply her with her sustenance. Her own husband is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, and both of her mother's husbands are obligated to give her the financial value of her support.

[Even when the men] who obligated themselves to support her die, if they affirmed their commitment to her mother with an act of contract or they composed a formal document recording their obligation, [the daughter] is considered to be a creditor whose claim is supported by a deed, and she has the prerogative of collecting her due from property that has been sold until the conclusion of the time period for which he committed himself.

If the commitment was made at the time of the kiddushin, and was not affirmed by an act of contract, it is a commitment that was not to be recorded in a contract,30 and [the daughter] does not have the prerogative of expropriating property [from purchasers] for her support.

When a man who marries an aylonit1 is childless and does not have another wife with whom he will father children, he is compelled to divorce her.2 Nevertheless, [during and after the marriage], the financial arrangements that [govern] other women [govern] her. She is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah and [all] the provisions of the ketubah. Similarly, her husband acquires the same financial privileges with regard to her as he would with regard to another woman.

If, however, a man married a woman without recognizing her condition, and later it was discovered that she was an aylonit, or forbidden to him by virtue of a negative commandment [for which he is not liable to death - neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court] she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, nor to any of the provisions of the ketubah. She is, however, entitled to the extra amount that the husband added to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah. She is not entitled to receive her sustenance, [neither during her husband's lifetime,] nor even after his death.3

The couple [should be] forced to separate.4 When that is done, the value of the produce of which the husband partook is not expropriated from him.5

The same laws apply when a man marries a sh'niyah,6 regardless of whether or not [the husband] was aware of the prohibition.

Why are these women not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah, when they are granted the extra sum added [by the husband]? The fundamental requirement of the ketubah was instituted by our Sages so that [a man] should not think that the divorce [of his wife] is a light matter. Since he was not aware [of the prohibition or of his wife's condition], she is not granted the essential requirement of the ketubah.7

With regard to the extra amount for which he obligated himself: as long as she desired to maintain their relationship, she kept her part of the agreement. She granted him [marital] satisfaction,8 and is willing to continue their relationship; it is the Torah that deems her to be forbidden. What then can she do? Therefore, she is granted this extra amount, for it is not her deeds that cause her to be forbidden after marriage;9 she was forbidden beforehand.

Why did [our Sages] not distinguish between a sh'niyah [whom her husband] recognized, and one that he did not recognize, but rather said that in all instances she is not entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah? Because [the prohibition involving these relations] is Rabbinic [in origin], they reinforced it.

If, by contrast, a man married a woman [whom he was forbidden to marry because of] a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death, neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court] and he was aware of the prohibition, [his wife] is entitled to [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.[Similarly, if he marries] a woman whom he was forbidden to marry because of a positive commandment, whether he was aware of the prohibition or not, [his wife is entitled to a ketubah].

[The rationale is] that if he recognized that a woman was forbidden by a negative prohibition, he willingly undertook to damage his resources. And with regard to [relations which are forbidden] because of a positive commandment, the prohibition is light.

In both these instances, the women are entitled to support [from their husband's estate] after his death.10 Similarly, if [during his absence,] they borrowed money for their sustenance, [the husband] is liable to pay.11 And when the husband is forced to divorce [a woman in either of these situations], he is forced to reimburse her for all the benefit that he received from her property.12

A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to a ketubah.13 She is, however, entitled to the extra amount [added by the husband to the ketubah].14 The husband is not required to reimburse her for the benefit that he received from her property.15 If she borrowed money for her sustenance while she was still his wife, and afterwards terminated the marriage through the rite of mi'un, that money is not expropriated from the husband.

When a woman commits adultery [her husband is obligated to divorce her]. She is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount. Nor is she entitled to any of the conditions of the ketubah. [The rationale is that] it is her own deeds that cause her to become forbidden to her husband.

What is the law with regard to the rights these women have to their dowries? Whenever a woman's dowry endures, she is entitled to take her property when she leaves [her husband's household after divorce].16 This applies even when she commits adultery.

[If the property is not intact, the following laws apply.] If the woman was a sh'niyah or forbidden as a result of a positive commandment - whether or not her husband was aware of the prohibition - the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her. Similarly, if the woman was an aylonit or was forbidden because of a negative prohibition of the Torah [that was not punishable by death - neither by the hand of God nor by an earthly court], the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to her.17

[What are those laws?] The husband is liable for nichsei tzon barzel. With regard to nichsei m'log, if anything was lost or stolen, she suffers the loss. [The husband] is not liable to pay.

[Different rules apply when] a woman is either an aylonit or prohibited because of a negative commandment, and [the husband] did not recognize her status. Whatever was lost, stolen, destroyed or damaged from nichsei tzon barzel, her husband is not liable to pay. For she gave him permission to use them.18

With regard to nichsei m'log, by contrast, whatever was lost or stolen, he is liable to pay. This is the opposite of all other women. Since the marriage bond is not of a binding nature, he did not acquire [rights to use] the nichsei m'log.19

A woman who dissolves a marriage through the rite of mi'un is not entitled to any compensation at all for property that was destroyed. Nothing is expropriated from her husband in payment for what was lost or stolen, with regard to both nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel.20 Instead, she takes whatever property is intact and departs.

A woman who committed adultery is not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount. Nor is the husband held responsible for any of her nichsei tzon barzel that were lost or stolen.21 Needless to say, this ruling also applies with regard to her nichsei m'log.

[The above does not apply] only to an adulteress, but also to a woman who violates the faith of Moses,22 one who violates the Jewish faith,23 or one who is divorced because of a scandalous report.24 These women are not entitled to a ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the extra amount - nor are they granted any of the conditions of the ketubah.

When these [women are divorced], each one should take what remains from her dowry and depart. Her husband is not liable to pay anything, neither what was reduced in value nor what was lost.

The following are the actions for which a woman is considered to have "violated the faith of Moses":

a) going out to the marketplace with her hair uncovered;25

b) taking vows or oaths that she does not keep;

c) engaging in sexual relations [with her husband] while in the niddah state;

d) failing to separate challah or feeding her husband food that is forbidden to eat - needless to say, this applies to forbidden crawling animals and animals that were not ritually slaughtered; it applies even to produce that was not tithed.26

How can the latter [two] matters be known? For example, she said: "So and so, the priest, [separated tithes] from this produce for me," "So and so separated challah [from this dough]," "So and so, the Sage, said this stain does not render me a niddah" - and after eating the food or engaging in sexual relations with her, the husband asked the person whose name was mentioned and he denied the occurrence of the incident. Another example: a woman's [conduct caused] it to be established in her neighborhood that she was in the niddah state,27 but she told her husband that she was ritually pure. He engaged in relations with her [and afterwards discovered the truth].

What is meant by "the Jewish faith"? The customs of modesty that Jewish women practice. When a woman performs any of the following acts, she is considered to have violated the Jewish faith:

a) she goes to the marketplace or a lane with openings at both ends without having her head [fully] covered - i.e., her hair is covered by a handkerchief, but not with a veil like all other women,28

b) she spins [flax or wool] with a rose on her face29 - on her forehead or on her cheek - like immodest gentile women,

c) she spins in the marketplace and shows her forearms to men;30

d) she plays frivolously with young lads,

e) she demands sexual intimacy from her husband in a loud voice until her neighbors hear her talking about their intimate affairs, or

f) she curses her husband's father in her husband's presence.31

Ezra ordained that a woman should wear a belt32 in her home at all times, as an expression of modesty. If a woman does not wear [such a belt], however, she is not considered to have violated the faith of Moses, nor does she forfeit her ketubah.

Similarly, if she goes from courtyard to courtyard without having her hair [fully] covered - as long as it is covered with a handkerchief, she is not considered to have violated the [Jewish] faith.

A woman who violates the faith must have had a warning issued to her [prior to her having performed the act] and [the warning and her improper conduct must be observed by] witnesses before she forfeits her ketubah.

[The following rule applies when a woman] transgresses privately, her husband knows that she violated the faith and [therefore] gives her a warning, [but the warning] was not observed by witnesses, and then she transgresses again. Should the husband claim that she violated [the faith] after receiving a warning,33 and the woman claims not to have transgressed, or not to have received a warning, the husband must pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah if he desires34 to divorce her, after she takes an oath that she has not transgressed. [This oath is required because] she would not be entitled to any payment if she admitted to having transgressed after having received this warning.

What is meant by "a woman who is divorced because of a scandalous report"? For example, there were witnesses that she performed a very indecent act that indicates that a sin was committed, but there is no definitive testimony [that she committed adultery].

What is implied? She was alone in her courtyard, and they saw a perfume salesman leaving. They entered immediately afterwards and saw her getting up from bed and putting on her underwear or tying her belt, or they found wet spittle on the canopy above the bed.35 Alternatively, they saw them coming out of a dark place [together], or one helping the other up from a trench or the like, or they saw him kissing the opening of her cloak, or saw them kissing each other, or embracing each other, or they entered a room one after the other and locked the doors,36 or any similar act [that would arouse suspicion].

[In all these instances,] if her husband desires to divorce her, she is not entitled to receive [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. There is no necessity for a warning [in this instance].37

[When a woman] violates the faith of Moses or the Jewish faith, and similarly, one about whom is issued a scandalous report, her husband is not compelled to divorce her. If he desires [to remain married], he need not divorce her.38

Nevertheless, even when her husband does not divorce her, she is not entitled to a ketubah.39 [The rationale is that] a ketubah was ordained by our Sages so that a husband should not consider the divorce [of his wife as] a light matter. Our Sages were concerned only with modest Jewish women. This institution was not enacted for women [who act] wantonly. On the contrary, let their husbands think that divorcing them is a light matter.

When a man sees his wife commit adultery, or he was informed of this by one of his relatives or her relatives - whether male or female - whom he trusts and whose statements he believes, he is obligated to divorce her and is forbidden to engage in relations with her,40 for he relies on their word as true.

He must [however] pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah,41 [unless] she admits that she has committed adultery, in which case she should be divorced without receiving her ketubah. Therefore, if [her husband saw her commit adultery himself], he can require her to take an oath, while she holds a sacred object, that she did not commit adultery while married to him.42 [Only afterwards] can she collect the money [due her by virtue of] her ketubah. With regard to other matters,43 he cannot require her to take an oath, except through the convention of gilgul [sh'vuah].44

When a woman tells her husband that she willingly committed adultery, no attention is paid to her words. [We suspect] that she is attracted to another man [and wants to be released from marriage to her husband so that she can marry him].45 She does, however, lose the rights to her ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and any extra amount - and [her right to any of her property] that was destroyed, for she admitted that she has committed adultery.46 If he believes her and considers her word to be true, he is obligated to divorce her.

A court, however, does not obligate a man to divorce his wife through any means, unless two witnesses come forth and testify that the person's wife willingly committed adultery in their presence. [In such a situation,] he is compelled to divorce her.

A woman who committed adultery unknowingly47 or who was raped is permitted to [continue marital relations with] her husband, as [implied the Numbers 5:13, which describes adultery:] "and she was not raped," indicating that if she was raped, she is permitted. [This applies whether] she was raped by a gentile or by a Jew.

Whenever [a woman] was forced into relations at the outset, she is permitted [to her husband], even if she ultimately consented - even if she says: "Let him continue, if he had not raped me, I would have hired him." For [her] natural inclination has overcome her; originally, she was forced against her will.

When women have been abducted by robbers, they are considered as though they have been taken captive and were raped; they are permitted to their husbands.48 If, however, they were left alone and they went to the robbers on their own initiative, they are considered to have acted willingly and they are forbidden to their husbands.

The laws applying to a woman who acted unwittingly and to one who was raped are the same. For acting unwittingly is comparable to a deed committed under coercion.

When does the above apply? When the woman's husband was an Israelite. If, however, a priest's wife [committed adultery] unwittingly or under duress, she is forbidden to her husband. For these relations cause her to be deemed a zonah at all times, and he is forbidden to have relations with a zonah, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.49

With regard to both an Israelite's wife and a priest's wife who have been raped, they are entitled to their ketubah - both the fundamental requirement and the additional amount. She does not lose anything in this regard. We compel50 the priest to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah and then to divorce her.

When a priest's wife tells her husband: "I was raped," or "I unwittingly had relations with another man," he should not pay any attention to her words. [We suspect that perhaps] she was attracted to another man.

If he believes her, or he was told about it by a person upon whose word he relies, he should divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.51

[The following rules apply when] a man tells his wife in the presence of witnesses: "Do not enter into privacy with so and so." If two witnesses observed her entering into privacy with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place,52 she is forbidden to engage in relations with her husband until he causes her to drink "the bitter waters",53 as will be explained in Hilchot Sotah.54

If he dies before he has caused her to drink [these waters], she is not entitled to her ketubah. Although witnesses did not see any [blatant] wanton act, there is no more wanton behavior than [disobeying her husband's words in] this [manner].

In the present age, when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us, the woman becomes forbidden to her husband forever. She must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount, for it is her evil deeds that caused her to become forbidden.55

[The following laws apply when a husband] tells [his wife] in private: "Do not enter into seclusion with so and so." If he observed her enter into seclusion with the said person, and she and he remained there sufficient time for relations to have taken place - in the present age,56 when the waters [to test a] sotah are not available to us - the woman becomes forbidden to her husband. He is obligated to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

If she admits entering into seclusion with the said person after having received the warning, she must be divorced without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Therefore, she is required to take an oath in this regard.57 Only afterwards must he pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

When a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about that matter, and it is discovered that she is bound by vows, he [may] divorce her without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.1

With regard to which vows does this rule apply? [I.e., a vow] not to eat meat, not to drink wine, or not to adorn herself with colored garments or with other objects with which women of her locale customarily adorn themselves.2 If, however, she is bound by other vows, she does not forfeit anything.

Similar [rules apply when] a man marries a woman without having made any specifications about the matter, and it is discovered that she has one of the blemishes [that mar] a woman's [appeal to her husband], as outlined above.3 If the husband neither knew nor heard about this blemish, and did not willingly accept it, he [may] divorce [his wife] without having to pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.

What is implied? If there is a bathhouse in the city, and he has relatives [in the town], he does not have the prerogative of saying: "I did not know about these blemishes." [This applies even if] the blemishes were located in hidden places. For we assume that he checks with his relatives [and asks them about his wife's condition]. [If he marries her nonetheless,] we can assume that he heard [about the blemishes] and accepted them.

If the town does not possess a bathhouse, or if he does not have relatives, he may issue a claim with regard to blemishes that are usually unseen. Regular fits of epilepsy are considered to be a blemish that is unseen.4

By contrast, with regard to physical blemishes that are openly seen, the husband cannot claim [not to have known about the blemish]. For they can be seen by everyone, and it may be assumed that he heard about them and accepted [the matter]. This law applies only in those places where it is customary for women to walk in the marketplace with their faces uncovered, and everyone recognizes each other and will say: "This is so and so's daughter," and "This is so and so's sister," as in the European cities of the present era.

In places where, by contrast, women do not go out to the marketplace at all, and if a girl goes out to the bathhouse in the evening she goes out veiled, and no one will see her except her relatives, a claim may be issued with regard to blemishes that can be openly seen as well.

[Such a claim may be issued] when there is no bathhouse in the city, or [the husband] does not have a relative with whom he can check. If, however, there is a bathhouse in the city, [even] when it is not customary for women to go out with their faces uncovered, if [the husband] has a relative in the city he may not issue such a claim, for everyone sees her naked in the bathhouse.

If the woman's habit is to cover herself and to hide even in the bathhouse, or she washes at night, or in a small private room in the bathhouse, so she will not be seen, and no one will know of her, [her husband] may issue a claim, even with regard to blemishes that can be seen openly.

These matters are concepts that reason dictates; they are not decrees of the Torah [to be accepted on faith].

Some of the geonim have ruled that our Sages' statement that a husband can check [concerning his wife's appearance] with his relatives does not apply only to his relatives, but also to his friends. [According to their thesis,] even if a man lives in a city in which he does not have any relatives at all, if there is a bathhouse in the city he does not have the right to issue a claim, for it is impossible that he will not have friends, and he can tell one of his friends to have his wife or sister check the appearance of so and so [i.e., the woman he thinks of marrying]. Therefore, we assume that he had heard of [any blemishes she had] and accepted them.

I do not agree with this conclusion.5 For a man will not reveal all the concerns he has regarding matters such as these to anyone other than his relatives. Moreover, he will rely only on the word of his relatives.

What is meant by a claim issued because of physical blemishes? If the blemishes that were found were such that it is certain that they existed before she was consecrated - e.g., an extra finger or the like - the burden of proof is on the father. He must prove that the husband knew about them and accepted them, or that they were such that we may assume that he knew.6 If he cannot bring proof, the woman may be divorced without receiving any [of the money due her by virtue] of her ketubah at all.7

[The following rules apply when] the blemishes were such that they could have come about after she was consecrated. If the blemishes were discovered after the woman entered her husband's home, the burden of proof is on the husband. He must show that she possessed these blemishes before she was consecrated, and that he entered into the relationship under false premises. If the blemishes were discovered while she still was in her father's home, the burden of proof is on [the father]. He must show that the blemishes came about after the consecration, and the husband suffered the loss.8

If the husband brought proof that [the woman] had [the blemishes] before she was consecrated, or she admitted that fact, and the father brought proof that the husband had seen the blemishes and accepted them in silence, or that one could assume that he knew about them and accepted them, [the husband] is obligated with regard to the ketubah.

If [a husband] had relations with his wife and waited several days,9 and [afterwards,] claimed that he discovered a blemish only then, his words are disregarded. [This applies] even if [the blemish] is in the folds [of the woman's skin] or on the sole of her foot. [The rationale is that] we presume that a man will not drink from a cup unless he checks it well first.10 [Therefore,] we assume that he knew [of the blemish] and accepted it.11

[The following rules apply when a man] marries a woman and it is discovered that she does not have a fixed time for the onset of her menstrual period, but rather she does not feel anything until she begins to menstruate. She may engage in sexual relations only if she uses two cloths with which she checks herself, one before relations and one afterwards. In addition, her husband must also check himself with a cloth, as will be explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah.12

Even though this is a great blemish, it does not cause the woman to forfeit anything [with regard to her ketubah], for she can inspect herself and engage in relations.

[The following rules apply if] she inspected herself and then engaged in relations, and when she and her husband cleaned themselves afterwards, blood was found on either his cloth or her cloth.13 If this phenomenon recurred on three consecutive occasions, she is forbidden to remain married to her husband. Instead, she must be divorced, and she is not entitled to the money due [her by virtue of] her ketubah - neither the fundamental requirement nor the additional amount.14 Nor do any of the provisions of the ketubah apply to her. [She suffers these losses] because she is not fit to engage in sexual relations.15

When he divorces her, he may never remarry her. [This restriction was instituted,] lest her condition heal, in which instance his decision to divorce her would not have been final.16

She is permitted to marry another man,17, as will be explained with regard to [the laws of] niddah.18

When does the above apply? When the woman had this condition from the beginning of her marriage, and on the first occasion that she engaged in relations she menstruated.

If, however, this ailment occurred after she married, it is the husband who suffers the loss.19 Therefore, if [the couple] engaged in relations once and the woman did not menstruate, and afterwards she began to menstruate whenever they engaged in relations, he must divorce her and pay her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. He may never remarry her, as explained above.

Similarly, if a woman suffers blemishes after marriage, even if she becomes a leper [the loss is her husband's]. If he desires to remain married to her, he may. If he desires to divorce her, he must pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

[The following rules apply when] a husband suffers blemishes after he marries. Even if his hand or foot is cut off, or he becomes blinded in one eye,20 and his wife no longer desires to live with him, he is not forced to divorce her and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Instead, if she desires to remain married, she may. If she does not desire this, she may obtain a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, as is the law concerning any woman who rebels against her husband.21

If, however, he becomes22 afflicted by [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or becomes a collector of dog feces, a miner of copper, or a tanner,23 he is forced to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah [if she desires to terminate the marriage].24 If she desires, she may remained married to her husband.

If a man becomes a leper,25 he is compelled to divorce his wife and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. Even if she desires to remain married to him, her request is not heeded. Instead, they are compelled to separate, because [having relations with] her will cause his flesh to be consumed. If she says: "I will remain married to him, [and we will live in the presence of] witnesses, so that we will not engage in relations," her request is heeded.

[The following rules apply when] a woman's husband had [constant] bad breath or a smell from his nose, or he was a collector of dog feces, or the like, and he died [childless, causing his wife to be obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of either yibbum or chalitzah]. If [the yavam] possesses the same difficulty that his brother, [the late husband,] had, she has the right to say: "I was willing to accept this difficulty with regard to your brother. I am not willing to accept it with regard to you." He should perform the rite of chalitzah and pay [her the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.26

"May you see your children [father] children, and may there be peace over Israel."27