Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Our Sages decreed that a man give a certain portion of his holdings to his daughter as a dowry.1 This is referred to as parnasah. When [a man] marries off his daughter, he should provide her with at least the wardrobe that is given to the wife of a poor Jewish man, as we have explained.2

When does the above apply? When [the bride's] father is poor. If he is wealthy, he should provide for his daughter according to his standards.

If a father explicitly tells the prospective husband that his daughter does not possess anything, and that [his intent is that] he marry her although she does not possess a wardrobe, [the bride] is not entitled to anything of her father's.

[In such a situation, the prospective] husband should not say: "When she comes to my home, I will provide her with a wardrobe." Instead, he should provide her with a wardrobe while she is living in her father's home.

When a father dies and leaves [at least one son and] a daughter [she is provided with a dowry from his estate]. We estimate what the father would have desired to give the daughter as a dowry, and she is given [that sum].

How is it possible to arrive at such an estimate? [We survey the habits of] his friends and acquaintances, his business affairs and his standard of living. If he married off a daughter during his lifetime, we base our estimate [on what she was given]. If the court is unable to determine what he would have desired [to give his daughter], she is given a tenth of his estate as a dowry.3

When a man leaves [a son and] many daughters, the first [daughter] who desires to marry4 is given a tenth of the estate. The second [daughter to marry] receives a tenth of what was left after providing the first [daughter with her dowry]. And the third daughter receives a tenth of what was left after providing the second [daughter].

If all [a man's] daughters come to marry at the same time, [money is set aside for them according to the above pattern,] even if there are ten daughters [or more]. Afterwards, [all the allotments are pooled], and then divided equally among the daughters. The remainder of the estate is given to the sons.

The allotment of a tenth [of the estate] as a dowry is not one of the provisions of the ketubah. Therefore, even according to the enactment of the later Sages,5 it is only to be collected from landed property.6 It may, however, be collected from rent due for landed property.7 If, however, [a girl's] brothers desire to give her money in lieu of a tenth of the landed property, they have that right.

With regard to this allotment of a tenth [of the estate], the daughter is considered to be a creditor of her brothers. Therefore, she is entitled to collect it from property of intermediate quality. An oath is not required of her.

If her brothers die, she is entitled to collect it from their sons, [expropriating] property of inferior quality, and an oath8 is required of her. For she is collecting property from heirs, and [it is an accepted principle that] a person who comes to collect property from heirs may collect only from that of inferior quality and is required to take an oath [before doing so], as will be explained in the laws of loans.9

Should her brothers have sold the landed property of their father's estate, or given it as collateral, the daughter may collect her dowry from the purchasers,10 just as other creditors are entitled to collect from the purchasers, as will be explained in the laws of loans.11

When a man has [several daughters, but] no sons, [his estate] is divided equally [among his daughters at the time of his death]. Although he married off the older daughters during his lifetime [and provided them with dowries], we do not grant dowries to the younger daughters and then divide the estate.

[The following rules apply when a man] has died, leaving two daughters and a son. The older daughter received a tenth of the estate as a dowry, but before the younger daughter had collected her dowry, the son died [without leaving any heirs], and [the two sisters] inherited the entire estate. [In this situation,] the younger sister is not entitled to her tenth of the estate.12 Instead, the entire estate is divided equally, but the older sister is granted the tenth [she had received previously].13

When a man gives an order at the time of his death: "Do not give my daughters a dowry from my estate," his words are heeded. [The rationale is that a dowry] is not one of the provisions of a ketubah.14

[The following rules apply when] a man dies, leaving a widow and a daughter. It has already been explained15 that the support of a man's widow16 takes precedence over the support of his daughter. Similarly, if the daughter marries, she is not entitled to collect her tenth [of the estate], because of [the obligation to] support the widow.17

Even if the daughter dies after she marries, her husband is not entitled to inherit the dowry that should have been given her.18 For the entire estate is considered to be in the possession of the widow so that she can derive her sustenance.

When an orphan girl is married off by her brothers or her mother as a child with her consent, and she is given 50 or 100 zuz as a dowry, she is entitled to collect the dowry that is due her - according to the estimation of her father's desires or one tenth of the landed property19 [of his estate] - from them after she attains the age of majority.

[This applies] even if her brothers did not provide her with sustenance,20 and even if she did not object at the time of the wedding. For a minor is not capable of making an objection [in court].21

When a daughter marries after she reaches majority - whether as a na'arah or as a bogeret - and does not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If, however, she protested at the time of her marriage, she may collect her due whenever she desires.

[A further point must be considered when] she reaches the age of bagrut and remains in her father's house - regardless of whether she reaches bagrut after his death, or [he died] when she had already reached the age of bagrut.22 If her brothers have already ceased providing her with her sustenance, which is their prerogative, as we have explained,23 and [the girl] remained silent and did not demand her dowry, she forfeits her dowry. If she protests, she does not forfeit her dowry.

If, however, her brothers had not ceased providing her with her sustenance [although] she reached bagrut, she is not considered to have forfeited her dowry as long as they continue to provide her with her sustenance, even though she did not protest. For she can claim that she did not demand her dowry because [her brothers] are supporting her although they are not obligated to do so,24 and she has not yet married.25

[The following rules apply when a man] stated - whether while making an oral will before death or while healthy - that his daughter should be given a specific sum of money as a dowry, and that this sum should be used to purchase landed property, and [then] died [afterwards].

When the money is in the possession of a third party and the daughter states: "Give the money to my husband and let him do with it as he desires," [the third party should do as follows]. If [the daughter] has reached the age of majority and has married, she is granted this prerogative.26 If she is [past majority, but merely] consecrated, the third party should follow the instructions he was given.27 And if she is a minor, even if she is already married, her request is not heeded.28 Instead, the third party should carry out her father's instructions.29

A husband is entitled to [any ownerless objects] discovered by [his] wife,1 and the proceeds of her labor.2 What [type of work] must she perform on his behalf? Everything follows the custom of the country. In a place where it is customary for women to weave, she should weave. [In a place where they] embroider, she should embroider. [In a place where they] spin wool or flax, she should spin.

If it is not customary for women in that place to perform these labors, he may compel her only to spin wool; [wool, but not flax,] because flax damages [a woman's] mouth and lips. [This occupation is chosen because] spinning is a task designated for women, as [implied by Exodus 35:25]: "And all the skilled women put their hands to spinning...."

If a woman exerts herself and produces more than would be expected of her,3 her husband is entitled to the extra amount.4

Even when her husband5 is very wealthy and even when the woman has several maids, she may not sit idle, without work. For idleness leads to lewdness. [Her husband] may not, however, compel her to work for the entire day. Instead, according to the extent of his wealth, her obligation to work is minimized.

When a man takes a vow that prevents his wife from doing any work at all, he is obligated to divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that] idleness leads to lewdness.6

Every wife is obligated [to perform the following household tasks] on behalf of her husband: to wash his face, feet and hands, to pour him beverages, to make his bed,7 and to do his bidding - e.g., to bring him water or a utensil, to remove an article from his presence, or to perform similar tasks. She is not, however, required to do the bidding of his father or his son.

These tasks should be performed only by a man's wife alone.8 Even if she possesses several maids, these tasks are performed for a man only by his wife.

There are other tasks that a woman performs for her husband when they are poor; they are: to bake bread in an oven9 - Ezra ordained that a woman get up early and bake bread so that there will be bread available to give the poor.

She should cook food, wash clothes, nurse her child, place straw before her husband's beast10 - but not before his cattle - and grind [flour].

What does grinding [flour] involve? [Not that the woman actually operates the mill herself,] but that she stays at the mill, sifts11 the flour and prods the animal [who turns the mill], so that [the operation of] the mill will not be hampered. If it is the [local] custom, for women to grind [flour] using a hand mill, [a woman] should grind [flour in this manner].

When does the above apply? With regard to a poor [couple]. If, however, a woman brings a maid to [the household] or property with which a maid could be purchased, or if the man possesses a maid or funds with which a maid could be purchased, the wife is not required to grind [flour], to bake, to do laundry or to place straw before her husband's beast.

If the wife brings two maids to [the household] or property with which two maids could be purchased, or if the man possesses two maids or is [wealthy] enough to purchase two maids, the wife is not required to cook or to nurse her child. Instead, she gives him to a maid to nurse.12

Thus, there are five tasks that every woman must perform on behalf of her husband: to spin [thread], to wash his face, hands and feet, to pour beverages for him, to make his bed and to do his bidding. And there are six tasks that some women perform and some women do not perform. They are: to grind [flour], to cook, to bake, to do laundry, to nurse, and to place straw before her husband's beast.

All the tasks that a woman must perform on behalf of her husband must also be performed by a woman while she is in the niddah state, with the exception of pouring beverages, making his bed and washing his face, hands and feet. [The rationale for the exceptions is that] this is a decree, [enacted] lest [sexual] thoughts arise, and the husband be prompted to engage in relations.

Therefore, when she is in the niddah state, she should make his bed when he is not present. When pouring a beverage for him, she should not place it in his hand as is her usual practice, but rather leave it on the ground, on a utensil or on a table, and he will take it.13

When a woman breaks utensils while performing household tasks,14 she is not held liable. This ruling does not reflect the dictates of the law, but is instead an enactment [of our Sages]. For if this were not the case, there would never be peace in a household. For a woman would be overly cautious and would refrain from performing many tasks, and there would thus be strife between [the couple].15

Whenever a woman refrains from performing any of the tasks that she is obligated to perform, she may be compelled to do so, even with a rod.16 When a husband complains that [his wife] does not perform [her required tasks], and [the wife] claims that she does, [the dispute should be clarified by having] a [neutral] woman dwell with them or [by asking] the neighbors.17 The judges should clarify the matter in the best way they see fit.

During the time a woman nurses her child, she is not compelled to perform as many tasks [as usual], and wine and foods that are beneficial to nursing are added to her support.

If, despite the fact that she was allotted the foods appropriate for her, she desires to eat more or desires to eat other foods, because of the craving in her stomach, she is entitled to eat everything she desires [provided she pays for the additional food] from her own funds. The husband cannot prevent her, saying: "Perhaps she will overeat or eat harmful foods18 and the child will die." [The rationale is] that the physical pain the woman feels takes priority.

When a woman bears twins, she cannot be compelled to nurse both of them. Instead, she is required to nurse one, while the husband is required to hire a nursemaid for the second child.19

If a woman desires to nurse another woman's child together with her own, her husband may object and restrict her to nursing only her own child.20

Although a woman takes a vow not to nurse her child, she may be compelled to do so until the child - whether a boy or a girl - is 24 months old.21

If a woman desires to nurse her child, but her husband objects, claiming that this will mar her beauty, she is given this prerogative, for it is painful for her to part from her child.22 [This law applies] even if she owns several maids.

If she is poor and would thus be obligated to nurse her child, but her husband is rich, and it is appropriate that his wife not be obligated to nurse his child - if his wife does not desire to nurse, he must hire a nursemaid or buy a maid, even if he did not possess any maidservants beforehand. [The rationale is] that the woman's social standing rises together with that of her husband and does not descend with his.

If a woman claims that [her husband] is of [a social standing that] requires him to hire or purchase a maid, and he claims that he is not, the burden of proof is on the woman. [The husband] is not [required] to take an oath.

When a woman is divorced, she cannot be compelled to nurse [her child]. If she desires to nurse the child, [her ex-husband] must pay her a wage.23 If she does not desire [to nurse], she should give the son to his father, and he should care for him.24

When does the above apply? When she did not nurse the child long enough for him to recognize her. If, however, [the child is able] to recognize his mother, even if [the child] is blind,25 he should not be separated from his mother because of the [possible] danger [the separation will cause] the child.26 Instead, the woman is compelled to nurse the child for a wage until he reaches the age of 24 months.

[A husband] is not [obligated to] support his divorcee, even when she is nursing his child. In addition to the wage she receives [as a nursemaid], he must, however, provide her with those things that the child needs for clothing, food, drink, salves and the like. A woman who is pregnant is not entitled to any [payment] at all [from her ex-husband].

[The following rules apply after the 24] months have been completed, and the child has been weaned. If the divorcee desires that her son remain in her custody, he is not separated from her until he completes his sixth year [of life].27 Instead, his father is compelled to provide him with his sustenance while he lives with his mother.

After the child completes his sixth year, the father has the right to say: "If [my son] is in my custody, I will support him. If, however, he continues to live with his mother,28 I will not give him anything."29

A mother, by contrast, is given custody of her daughter forever, even after [she passes] the age of six.30

What is implied? If the father is [wealthy enough] to be obligated to give charity, the money necessary for his daughter's support should be expropriated from him and used to support the daughter, while she is in her mother's custody.

Even if the mother marries another [man], her daughter remains in her custody, and the father is obligated to provide for her sustenance until his death, as an act of charity. [Moreover, even if the girl's] father dies, she is entitled to receive her sustenance from his estate, as a provision of [her mother's] ketubah, although she remains in her mother's custody.

If a mother does not want her children - either males or females - to remain in her custody after she weans them, she has this prerogative, and she can give their father their custody, or make them wards of the community if there is no father, and [the community] must care for them.31

The husband takes precedence over any other person with regard to the inheritance of his wife's estate.1

When does the husband acquire this right? When his wife leaves her father's domain, even though she has not entered the chuppah.2 Since the woman has entered her husband's domain, he [has the right] to inherit [her estate].

What is implied? When a woman has been consecrated and her father hands her over to her husband or to his agents, or the agents of the woman's father hand her over to her husband or to his agents, and the woman dies on the way, before she enters the chuppah, her husband inherits her estate, even though her dowry is still in her father's home.3

Similarly, if the father or his agents went together with the husband, and the husband entered into privacy in a courtyard together with [his bride] with the intent of marriage,4 and afterwards she dies, her husband inherits [her estate].

If, however, [the woman and] her husband or his agents are still accompanied by her father or his agents on their journey to the husband's house, her father inherits [her estate] if she dies, even if her dowry is already in her husband's home. [This law applies even if the woman] and her husband entered a courtyard together to spend the night, as travelers lodge together in one inn.5 [The rationale is that] she is accompanied by her father or his agents, and [her husband] has not entered into privacy with her for the sake of marriage.

Similarly, when a bogeret, an orphan, or a widow6 goes from her father's house to her husband's home on her own initiative without being accompanied by her husband or his agents, and dies on the way, her husband does not inherit [her estate].7

Although a man marries a woman with whom he is forbidden [to have relations], if she dies [during his lifetime], he inherits her estate when his consecration of her is binding.8 Similarly, a man who marries a k'tanah [after her father's death]9 inherits her estate if she dies in his lifetime, even though his consecration of her is not binding entirely.

When, by contrast, a mentally capable man marries a deaf mute, he is not entitled to inherit her estate when she dies.10 When, however, a deaf mute marries a mentally capable woman and dies, he should inherit her estate. For she is capable of understanding and married him voluntarily. [In doing so,] she gave him a right to her property.11

When a k'tanah was consecrated with her father's consent, but married without his consent - whether in his presence or outside his presence - her father has a right to object, as we have explained.12 [In such a situation,] if the girl dies, her husband should not inherit her estate, even if the father remains silent, unless he expressed his consent to her marriage.

The geonim ruled that when a woman falls sick and asks her husband to divorce her so that he will not inherit her estate, her words are of no consequence, [even if] she [agrees to] forfeit her ketubah. Even if she says: "I hate him and no longer desire to live with him," her words are not heeded, and she is not judged as a woman who rebels against her husband.13 This is a desirable ruling.

During a woman's lifetime, her husband enjoys the benefits of all the property she owns, regardless of whether it is classified as nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log. If she dies in her husband's lifetime, her husband inherits everything.

Therefore, if the woman sold property classified as nichsei m'log after she married, even if she became the owner of that property before she became consecrated, her husband may expropriate the income from that property from the purchasers throughout his wife's lifetime. He may not, however, expropriate the land itself, for he has no right to the land itself, if it is classified as nichsei m'log, until his wife dies.14

If she dies in his lifetime, he may expropriate the land from the purchasers15 without paying them for it.16 If the actual money that [the woman] took from the purchasers still exists, however, it must be returned to the purchasers. The husband cannot say: "Perhaps this money was found [by my wife]" [and on that basis take it as his own].17

When does the above apply? With regard to property about which the husband knew.18 When, however, a woman inherits property in another country without her husband's knowledge and sells it, the sale is binding.19

Similarly, if a woman sells [property]20 between her consecration and the consummation of the marriage bond, the sale is binding. For the husband has no right to his wife's property until their marriage is consummated.

When a woman signs over all21 of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if she becomes a widow, this present is nullified - as will be explained in Hilchot Matanah22 - her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.

[The rationale is] that she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband's lifetime, the recipient of the present acquires full title to it.

Moreover, [the same laws apply] even if she gave away a portion of her property - or all her holdings - before she married and wrote [in the deed of transfer] to the recipient: "Acquire the property from this time onward, [dependent] on my consent."23 [Although] the recipient does not acquire complete ownership until the woman expresses her consent,24 her husband is not entitled to benefit from the income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it.25

While a woman is waiting for her yavam [to marry her according to the rite of yibbum], she may sell or give as a present property that she acquires during the time she is in this status.26 Until he marries the yevamah, the yavam has no right to benefit from the property, even the nichsei tzon barzel,27 that she brought to his [deceased] brother's household.

If the yevamah dies in this status, her heirs from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log28 and half of her nichsei tzon barzel.29 Her husband's heirs inherit [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah30 and the remaining half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and they are responsible for her burial.31

The money due a yevamah by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a lien on her [late] husband's estate. Therefore, a yavam is not entitled to sell any of his brother's property32 - neither before yibbum nor after yibbum.

If he sells the deceased's property, gives it away as a present, divides it with his brothers - whether before yibbum or after yibbum - his actions are of no consequence. For it is already obligatory to make this property available to the widow so that she can collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from it.

When a man marries his yevamah at a time when there is produce growing on the land left by her husband, this produce should be sold,33 and the proceeds used to purchase land from which the yavam will derive the benefit that accrues.

When, [by contrast, the deceased] left produce that was already harvested, money or movable property, it becomes the property of the yavam. He may use it as he sees fit, and [the yevamah's] objections are of no consequence.

[The rationale is that the woman's right] to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from movable property stems only from an enactment of the geonim, and this enactment does not have the power to prevent [the yavam from taking possession] of his brother's property,34 and cause him to be restrained from dealing with them because of this lien.

[The following rules apply when] a yevamah's [first husband was not obligated to] grant her a ketubah35 or [when] she waived her ketubah in his favor. The yavam acquires his brother's estate and may sell [portions of it] or give them away as he desires. When he marries his yevamah, he is obligated to compose a ketubah for 100 [zuz]. All of his property will be considered as being on lien for the ketubah, [i.e., the same laws apply to her] as apply to other women who have a ketubah.36

When a woman sells nichsei tzon barzel - whether to her husband or to others - after she marries, her act is of no consequence.37

Similarly, if her husband sells landed property belonging to his wife - whether it be nichsei tzon barzel or nichsei m'log - his act is of no consequence.38

[Should the husband] sell movable property that is classified as nichsei tzon barzel39 - although he is not allowed to make such a sale - the sale is binding.40

If both [the husband and the wife] sell nichsei m'log, the sale is binding,41 regardless of whether the purchaser purchased the property from the husband first and then from the wife, or if he first purchased it from the wife and then from the husband.

Similarly, when a woman sells her nichsei m'log to her husband or gives them to him as a present, the sale or the gift is binding. She cannot rationalize her actions by saying, "[This was not my true intent.] I did it [only] to appease my husband."42 With regard to other property, however, she may offer such a rationalization.

What is implied? When a woman sells her nichsei tzon barzel to her husband or gives them to him as a present, her husband does not acquire this property. [This applies to] landed property and movable property [in this category], to a field that was designated for her from which [she could collect the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, a field belonging to her that was specifically mentioned in her ketubah or a field that [her husband mentioned in her ketubah] as his present to her [to be included in her dowry].43

[In all the above instances,] even though [the husband] formalized the transaction with his wife through an act of contract that she voluntarily agreed to, she has the prerogative of recanting whenever she desires.44 [We assume that] she gave the present or made the sale only for the sake of maintaining peace in her home.45

Accordingly, a husband has no way of substantiating his claim to his wife's property46 except with regard to nichsei m'log, as explained [in the previous halachah].47

It appears to me that a woman is not entitled [to nullify her statements, based on the rationale]: "I did it [only] to appease my husband," when her nichsei tzon barzel were lost or stolen, and she waived the debt in favor of her husband. [This applies even when the commitment] is formalized in the presence of witnesses.48

To what can this be compared? To a man and a woman who formalized an agreement in which she forgoes the responsibility [he had taken for property that had been classified as nichsei tzon barzel] and considers it instead nichsei m'log.49 For the husband is not bringing a proof for the sake of taking possession or maintaining possession of property, merely to free himself of the obligation to pay a claim [his wife will issue].50

If, by contrast, she gives him movable property that exists and was considered to be nichsei tzon barzel, the husband does not acquire it. For the wife may rationalize her conduct saying: "I did this to appease my husband."

When a husband sells [the right to] the benefits from landed property [that belongs to his wife, to another person, while the legal owner of the property remains his wife, the sale] is of no consequence. [The rationale is that] the reason our Sages granted a man [the right to] the benefit that accrues from his wife's property is [to afford him additional income] so that he will spend more generously on the household expenses.51

[Based on that rationale,] if he sells the benefit to be derived [from the landed property to another person] and takes the money and invests it in a business [which offers profit], he is given that prerogative.

[The following laws apply if] the woman possesses financial resources [that she brings to the household]. If they are nichsei tzon barzel, her husband may use them for commercial enterprises.52

If they are nichsei m'log - regardless of whether she brought them to the household at the time of marriage or she inherited them or received them as a present53 [- landed property should be purchased with them, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues].54 [Similarly,] if she inherited or was given movable property, it should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

Similarly, if a woman was injured by others,55 all the money that is ordained to be given to her should be used to purchase land, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues, as stated in Hilchot Chovel.56

[The following law applies when] a woman inherits servants [while she is married]. Even if they are old, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household.

[The following law applies when] she inherits olive trees or vines, but did not [inherit] the land on which these trees were planted. If they produce enough to pay for their upkeep, they should not be sold, because they bring honor to her family's household. If they do not, they should be sold as firewood, land should be purchased with the proceeds, from which the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

When [a married woman] inherits produce that is still attached to the land [on which it is growing], it becomes her husband's [property].57 When the produce has been uprooted from the land, it should be sold and used to purchase landed property, from which her husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues.

When, however, a husband divorces his wife, and there was produce that was still attached to the ground, it belongs to the woman. If it has already been reaped, it belongs to the man.58

A husband is obligated to provide for the sustenance and all the needs of the servants59 and livestock that belong to his wife and are classified as nichsei m'log. They must work for him, and he is entitled to the benefit that accrues. Therefore, a baby born to a maid classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband. And a calf born to a cow that is classified as nichsei m'log belongs to the husband.

If, however, the husband divorces his wife and she desires to pay the worth of a child born from a maidservant who is classified as nichsei m'log and take the child as her property because this brings honor to her family's household, she is given that prerogative.60

[The following laws apply when] a woman brings two utensils or two maidservants to the household and has them classified as nichsei tzon barzel. They were [originally] evaluated at 1000 zuz; afterwards, their value increased and they were evaluated at 2000 zuz. If the woman's husband divorces her, she is entitled to one [utensil or maidservant] for the 1000 zuz that she is owed. With regard to the other - if she desires to pay its value and take it because of the honor it brings to her father's household, she has that prerogative.

When a man gives a present to his wife - regardless of whether he gave her landed property, or he gave her money and she bought landed property - her husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from the present [that was given].61

Similarly, when a man gives a woman a present on the condition that her husband not be entitled to derive the benefits from it, but rather the benefits that accrue will belong to the wife to be used for whatever she desires,62 [the provision is binding, and] the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from this present.

Similarly, if a woman sells the rights to her ketubah [in the event of her divorce or her husband's death],63 the money she receives belongs to her, and her husband is not entitled to derive the benefit that accrues from it.

When a calf born from cattle that was classified as nichsei m'log is stolen, and the thief is apprehended and forced to pay twice the amount, the woman receives the extra payment. [The rationale is that] this is not the benefit that our Sages granted [the husband].64

When a man injures his wife, the entire [amount he must pay] - the damages and the restitution for the pain and the embarrassment - belongs to the woman,65 and the husband is not entitled to the benefits that accrue from [property purchased with this money], as explained in Hilchot Chovel.66

[The following rules apply when] a husband sells landed property [that he owns] to his wife. If the husband knew about the funds with which she purchased the land previously, the sale is binding,67 and the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from that land.

If, however, [the existence of] these funds was concealed, she does not acquire the land. For the husband may [explain that he did not really intend to complete the sale]. [His intent was] to reveal the existence of funds that his wife had hidden. The funds that were revealed should be used to purchase landed property,68 from which the husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue.69

When funds or movable property are discovered in a woman's possession, and she claims that they were given her as a present, while her husband claims that they stem from the fruits of her labor and hence belong to him, it is the woman's claim that is accepted.70 [The husband] may, however, have a ban of ostracism [conditionally] issued against anyone who makes false statements.71 [The funds should be used] to purchase landed property, from which [the husband] is entitled to the benefit that accrues.72

If the woman claims that the funds were given to her with the provision that her husband have no control over them, but rather that they be used for whatever purpose she desires, she must bring proof [that such a provision was made].73 [The rationale is that] the prevailing assumption is that a husband has the right to the benefits from all the funds found in a woman's possession, unless she brings proof otherwise.

If [a wife] tells [her husband]: "You gave me [these funds] as a present," she is required to take a Rabbinic oath that her husband gave her [the funds]. [After she takes that oath,] her husband is not entitled to the benefit [from the property purchased with these funds].74

One should not accept an article for safekeeping that was given by a wife, a servant or a minor.75 If one transgressed and accepted [an article given by] a woman, one should return it to the woman.76 If she dies, one should return it to her husband.77

If one accepted [an article given by] a servant, one should return it to the servant. If he dies, one should return it to his master. If one accepted [an article given by] a minor, one should purchase a Torah scroll with the proceeds or an article that will provide [the minor] with benefit.78

[The following rules apply] with regard to all [the abovementioned individuals], if at the time of their death, they say: "The article I gave for safekeeping belongs to so and so." If the person caring for the article operates under the presumption that the person who entrusted it to him is true to his word, he should carry out the command he was given. If not, he should give [the article] to the person's heirs.

[The following rules apply when] a woman has financial resources sufficient [to purchase property] from which the husband would derive the benefits [but they disagree with regard to the property fit to purchase]; he suggests that this type of property be purchased, and she desires that another type be purchased. A property should be purchased that brings a large revenue and requires little upkeep,79 regardless of whether this is the article desired by [the husband] or by [the wife]. We do not purchase any article that does not renew itself,80 lest the entire property be used and the principal lost.

[The following rule applies when] a woman brings to her husband's household a goat [that she is entitled] to milk, a sheep [that she is entitled] to shear or a date palm whose fruit [she is entitled to take], although she is entitled only to these benefits [and not to the principal]. [Her husband] is entitled to [these benefits] although the principal is dwindling.81

Similarly, if she brought utensils or articles of clothing to his household that were classified as nichsei m'log, he may use them, wearing them or using them as spreads or as covers until the articles themselves are destroyed. If he divorces [his wife], he is not required to pay for any nichsei m'log that became worn out.

The geonim [issued the following] ruling. A husband takes responsibility for the diminished value of nichsei tzon barzel. Nevertheless, if [such property] exists [at the time a woman's ketubah is due for payment,] and still serves its initial purpose, the woman must take it regardless of its condition at that time.82

If they are no longer fit to serve their initial purpose, it is as if they were stolen or lost, and the husband is obligated to pay the value appraised originally at the time of the marriage.

This is the common custom. Whenever a man marries, he accepts responsibility for [the woman's] dowry as contingent on this custom.83 On the basis of this custom, just as the husband does not pay for the depreciation of the article, so too, he does not take the appreciation of the property if it increases in value.

A husband has the right to compel some of the servants and maidservants who belong to his wife to serve him84 in the home of another woman he has married.85 [This applies] regardless of whether the servants are classified as nichsei m'log or nichsei tzon barzel. The husband may not, however, take these servants to another city without his wife's consent.