Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Arachin 27a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:27.

See Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval 10:3, 8-10 which explains that the Jubilee years is observed only when the entire Jewish people live in the Holy Land. Hence when the tribes of Reuven and Gad were exiled - decades before the destruction of the First Temple - the observance of the Jubilee no longer had the status of Scriptural Law.

Chapter 4, Halachot 19-20. Since either the person who redeems it or the priests will pay for it, the Temple treasury will ultimately receive its due. Hence, there is no need to compel the owner to redeem it.

As evident from Chapter 8, Halachah 8, this refers to a time when the Temple is standing, but the Jubilee year is no longer observed.

Were the person not to be compelled, it is possible that the Temple treasury would not receive its due (Radbaz).

The Ra'avad differs and states that the person is not compelled to redeem his field, but the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's understanding.

The owner is compelled to make the initial bid, because he is required to add a fifth and thus the Temple treasury will be profiting more than if another person would offer the same price. Also, we assume that since it was his property, he is attached to it and will pay more to repossess it (Arachin 27a).

I.e., for the price people are willing to pay, not for the standard value decreed by the Torah. Since the laws pertaining to arechim are taught as a single unit in the Torah and all the particulars do not apply, this fundamental factor is also not applied.

For anything less than a p'rutah is not financially significant.

Since a field that he consecrated will never return to him if he does not redeem it, he is given a greater opportunity to do so (Arachin 30a).

In which instance, these restrictions do apply. See Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval 11:17-18; 12:2.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 116) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 354) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The laws involving kosher animals are found in Halachot 5-7.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 115) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 353) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This - and not a standard value - is what the person must pay. The Torah established a standard value only for humans and fields.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and notes.

I.e., as long as another person has not redeemed it first. As stated in Hilchot Shemitah V'Yoval, ch. 12, there is a difference in the relevant laws with regard to the sale of such dwellings to private individuals. A home in a walled city must be redeemed from a private purchaser within a year. Otherwise, it becomes his property forever. These restrictions do not apply with regard to a home in an unwalled habitation.

I.e., it does not return to the original owner in the Jubilee. It is as if the purchaser acquired the field from the owner.

As would be the law had he purchased it from him directly.

I.e., were the animal to have a blemish that disqualifies it from being offered as a sacrifice, these laws would not apply.

As obvious from Halachah 7, this applies when he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for this purpose.

As stated in the following halachah.

In contrast to an animal consecrated as a sacrifice which is redeemed only when it is blemished. See Halachah 11.

See Halachah 12. The commentaries have noted that in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, the Rambam mentions that a priest is required to participate in the evaluation of humans and fields, but not in that of movable property. He makes no mention of the evaluation of animals. There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Sanhedrin 15a.

I.e., depending on the type and gender of the animal it is fitting for some sacrifices and not others.

See temurah 7b.

A blemished animal like those mentioned in the verse.

I.e., although the prohibition is of Scriptural origin, since the Torah did explicitly forbid it by saying: "Do not consecrate an unblemished animal for this purpose," it is not considered as the transgression of a negative commandment. Temurah 7b states that a negative commandment is also involved. Nevertheless, based on our Sages' statements in the Sifra, the Rambam considers that passage as merely an asmachta, the derivation of support for a concept by the Rabbis and not a Scriptural prohibition.

Although they could also be used for other types of sacrifices, it is preferable to offer them as burnt offerings.

Which may not be brought as burnt offerings.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this issue, offering a different interpretation of the Rambam's source, Shekalim 4:7-8. The Radbaz explains the rationale behind the Rambam's ruling. Since animals can be redeemed, we assume that he consecrated them with the intent that they be redeemed and the money given for improvements to the Temple building. Since these other items cannot be redeemed, by contrast, we assume that from the outset, his intent was that they be consecrated for the sake of the altar alone. These concepts also apply with regard to Halachah 9.

As stated in Halachah 7.

See Halachah 11.

The Ra'avad notes that fine flour, wine, and oil may be redeemed if they became impure before being placed in a consecrated vessel. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since they cannot be redeemed once they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, that is most significant. For until they have been placed in a consecrated vessel, they have not been sanctified in a complete sense. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 6:4-5.

As explained in Hilchot Shekalim 4:12, in every year that is not a leap year, there is a certain amount of incense left over. For 365 portions were prepared for daily offerings and there are either 353, 354, or 355 days in such a year. Thus there were extra portions left over. The holiness associated with these portions of incense was then transferred to money and that money used to purchase burnt offerings. Afterwards, the portions of incense would be given to the craftsmen who prepare the incense as their wages. They would then sell this incense back to the Temple treasury, so that it would be purchased back with the funds designated for communal sacrifices for the new year.

This halachah is speaking about an instance where one of those craftsmen consecrated the incense in his possession to the Temple treasury. It should be given to other craftsmen as their wages and then purchased back as above.

I.e., it should be given to the craftsmen as part of their wages and then purchased with the money designated for the purchase of communal sacrifices.

I.e., a blemish that will not become healed (Radbaz).

Bechorot 37b explains that the intent is not an animal from an impure species, but rather an animal from a kosher species that became disqualified because of a blemish, for there is a second verse (27:27) that speaks about evaluating non-kosher animals. See also Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 1:10.

As explained in Halachah 5.

After its consecration. The laws applying to the consecration of a blemished animal are the same as those applying to other movable property. See the gloss of the Ra'avad.

Some commentaries suggest emending the wording of the text and having it read 'as was explained,' i.e., referring to Halachah 5. The Merkevet HaMishneh suggests that the text should be left as is and that the reference is to Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which refers to consecrating to the Temple treasury an animal that was already designated as a sacrifice.

For the holiness that rested upon a consecrated animal cannot be transferred to money after its death. (See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Temurah 7:3). Instead, it must be buried so that no one will make use of it.

The windpipe and the esophagus. These are referred to as 'the signs' of ritual slaughter. See Hilchot Shechitah 1:9.

For that is sufficient for the slaughter to be acceptable (ibid.).

Note a similar ruling in Hilchot Shaar Avot HaTumah 2:1.

The commentaries note that according to the Rambam, this applies even if the animal is incapable of standing unsupported. There are, however, other authorities who differ; see Shitah Mekubetzet (Bava Kama 76a).

I.e., the person desired that the animal be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed.

Since the animal is fit to be sacrificed, it is dedicated to the altar and should be sacrificed itself (Temura 19b).

Based on Temurah 11b, the Or Sameach explains that were a person to consecrate the limb itself, there is no question that the sanctity would spread throughout the entire animal. The question is since the person did not consecrate the limb itself, merely its worth, do we make two extensions: from the worth of the limb to the limb itself and from the limb to the entire body. There are, however, those who note that in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:2, the Rambam does not accept the principle that the sanctity spreads from a limb or organ throughout the entire animal unless the limb or organ is of vital importance.

For we cannot require the donor to sacrifice the entire animal (for perhaps it did not become consecrated), nor may allow him to regard it as his personal property (for perhaps it did).

As the commentaries to Temurah 11b explain, there is a difficulty when one limb of an animal was consecrated and another person purchases it to offer it as a sacrifice, for it is as if the person offering the sacrifice is offering an animal lacking a limb. For that limb was not consecrated by him, but by the original donor. They explain that this is referring to an instance where the purchaser pledged to purchase a burnt offering of a certain value and the animal is worth that amount, even without the limb in question. See Hilchot Maaseh HaKorbanot 15:2.

We follow the principle that when there is a question concerning ownership, one who desires to expropriate property (in this instance, the Temple treasury) from a colleague (the donor), must prove the validity of his claim. Since that is not possible (because the question is unresolved), the donor may retain the proceeds from the portion of the animal that was not consecrated.

Since the animal could not live without that limb, consecrating it is equivalent to consecrating the entire animal.

Since the animal is unfit to be sacrificed, we do not say that the sanctity spread throughout the entire animal.

The animal should be sold and the proceeds from the sale of that limb or organ used to purchase a burnt offering.

Since neither a donkey or a servant is fit to offer on the altar, the principles mentioned in the previous halachah apply.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that a person's severed head is of no monetary value whatsoever, for it is forbidden to benefit from any portion of a corpse. And seemingly, if we would evaluate his head separately, it would be considered as equivalent to his entire worth, for of what worth is a person without a head? Hence, the Temple treasury should be the sole owner without leaving any portion for the person himself. Therefore the Ra'avad suggests that the intent of saying that they are partners is that the consecrated entity's value is divided in half.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Talmud clearly mentions evaluation in that passage and therefore, does not accept the Ra'avad's view. How is a head evaluated? The Kessef Mishneh explains that we consider the tasks the servant or the person performs. To the extent he is involved with those that require intellectual activity, his head is worth more. If, by contrast, his activity is primarily physical, his head is worth less.

The Radbaz maintains that if a limb or organ is of vital importance to the animal or person, the value is divided in half as the Ra'avad states. The Rambam speaks of evaluating the worth of the organ only when it is not of vital importance.

I.e., for improvements to the Temple, for as stated in Halachah 7, whenever a person consecrates an entity without explicitly stated the purpose for which it was consecrated, we assume that it was consecrated for improvements for the Temple.

Since the animal or person would not be worth anything without this organ, there is no difference between the worth of that organ and the worth of the entire entity.

The difference between this instance and those mentioned in the previous halachot is that the previous halachot involve limbs or organs explicitly consecrated to be offered on the altar. Thus that is all that may be done with them. Even when an article itself may not be sacrificed on the altar and hence, we understand that the person is referring to the value of the article, since he is singling out that limb or organ, we consider his intent to be that its individual value be offered on the altar.

In those instances, the holiness is focused on the physical substance of the limb or organ. Its value is only a substitute for that physical substance. Hence, we look it at as a particular and not part of the person or animal as a whole. In the instances referred to by this halachah, from the outset, we are concerned with value. Hence, we consider the value of the limb or organ in a more encompassing manner.

I.e., the fixed amount required by Torah law, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

In which instance, were we speaking about a person who pledged his airech, he would be required to pay according to his financial capacity, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

And there are no other instances where a pledge to the altar can be fulfilled by giving less that the article's worth (Arachin 5a).

A shekel and a pundiyon for each year until the Jubilee, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachot 2, 5.

And there are no other instances where a pledge to the altar can be fulfilled by giving less that the article's worth (Arachin 5a).

And the Temple treasury is always given the benefit of the doubt. If the airech is more, the donor must pay the airech. If the worth is more, he must pay the worth.

Any specific entity.

This term is being used for the Hebrew term cherem. Cherem implies the removal of an entity from one framework of reference and its inclusion in another. Similarly, in this instance, the property is being taken from the realm of private, personal possessions and being sanctified (see the gloss of HaKtav VeHaKabalah to Leviticus 27:29). It must, however, be emphasized that the term cherem has negative connotations, meaning 'a ban' and the root has the connotation 'absolute destruction.' In that context, in his Living Torah, Rav Aryeh Kaplan interprets the term is meaning 'declare taboo,' i.e., banned from ordinary mortal use and hence, designated for the Temple treasury or the priests.

As stated in Halachah 2, a person should not dedicate all of his possessions. Nevertheless, if he chooses to do so, his statements are of consequence.

The differences between the two types of dedication offerings mentioned are described in Halachah 4. To which priests the property is given is described in Halachah 5.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Arachin 28b) and it appears that the conclusion of the Talmud is that if no specification is made, dedication offerings should be given for improvements to the Temple. Indeed, Rashi (Beitzah 36b) and others rule in this manner. The Or Sameach suggests that the Rambam's source is Ezekiel 44:29 which states: 'All the dedication offerings from the Jewish people shall be yours.'

But not his Hebrew servants. See Halachah 21 and notes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 145) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 357) include the laws governing dedication offerings among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the dedication offering must be 'from what he owns,' i.e., implying that he is giving a portion of what he owns, but not all that he owns. The rationale for this ruling is explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 13.

I.e., in contrast to a person who pledges an airech who is allowed to retain ownership of his basic necessities, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachot 14-17.

I.e., until they are redeemed - by the owner or by another person - they are the property of the Temple treasury and it is forbidden to benefit from them or use them for mundane purposes.

I.e., the owner loses all rights to them. They become the property of the priests, able to be used for whatever purposes the priest who receives the property desires, as explained in the following halachah.

I.e., before it is given to the priest. Once it is given to the priest, he may sell it if he so desires.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 110-111) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 358-359) include both the prohibitions against selling and redeeming property designated as a dedication offering among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam's apparent source is the Sifra, but the version of the standard text of the Sifra speaks of a prohibition against selling the property to the Temple treasurer. There are those who maintain that the Rambam followed a version of the Sifra with a different reading. Significantly, however, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines the prohibition as forbidding the sale to the Temple treasurer.

The implication appears to be that, like terumah, the donor has the right to give the dedication offering to the priest of his choice from the watch. It is not divided among all the priests of the watch. See Arachin 28a.

As stated in the notes to Chapter 4, Halachah 24, there were 24 priestly watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week at a time according to a rotating cycle.

They may not be used by the former owner for his own purposes and the prohibition of meilah, misappropriating consecrated property, applies.

Our translation follows the commentary of the Kiryat Sefer. The version of the standard published text (which reflects that of authentic manuscripts and early printings) would be literally translated as 'When a priest possesses a field that was designated as a dedication offering which he acquired after the Jubilee.' We prefer the version of the Kiryat Sefer, because there is no connection between the Jubilee year and a priest's acquisition of dedication offerings.

See Chapter 4, Halachot 19, 24.

I.e., just like an ancestral field belonging to an Israelite is given to the priests, so too, a field owned by a priest that is designated as a dedication offering is given to the priests.

Since he was the original owner, one might think that the laws that apply when one consecrates an ancestral field would apply. This is not the case, because once he designated it as a dedication offering, it became the property of the priest.

Which, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 26, returns to its original owner. In that instance, as in this halachah, the person who consecrated it did not have everlasting ownership of it. Hence, he cannot consecrate the field forever.

For once it is given to him, the priest is considered its owner for all time.

This ruling was a matter of question for the Rambam. There is a difference of opinion concerning this point among the Sages. The standard published test of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 8:5) indicates that he favored the view that maintains that this only applies to priests. Rav Kapach maintains that this is an error and his ruling there is - as stated here - that it applies to both priests and Levites.

I.e., if they make such a dedication, it is of no consequence.

I.e., their landed property is theirs forever. It cannot be given as a dedication offering, because a dedication offering is given to a priest as his private property. Hence there would be no advantage in his making such an offering (Rashi, (Arachin 28a).

Thus there is obviously a difference between land or movable property that belongs to a priest and property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering, as stated in Halachah 6. The rationale is that property that a priest owns as an ancestral heritage is essentially his. On the other hand, property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering is not essentially his. Hence, it can be given to other priests as a dedication offering.

The rationale is that consecrating an animal for the sake of improvements to the Temple is like taking a vow to pay its value to the Temple treasury. Hence, such a vow can be taken even if the animal is already consecrated.

For the second consecration and the redemption do not effect its original status.

Tosafot (Temurah 32a) explains the difference between the two instances as follows: The owner of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice still shares a connection to it. For if it is blemished, he must redeem it and replace it. In contrast, once an animal is consecrated to the Temple treasury, it leaves the owner's domain entirely.

And once an animal has been consecrated to the Temple treasury, it is not the owner's unless he redeems it.

For the sake of improvements to the Temple. Whether he states this explicitly or not, it is consecrated for that purpose as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 7, unless he explicitly states that he is consecrating it for another purpose.

Because the consecration did not take effect yet. The Or Sameach notes that the Rambam's apparent source, the Tosefta (Temurah 3:1), states that it is permitted to partake of the animal that was slaughtered and questions why the Rambam does not rule accordingly. He explains that the Rambam considers the person who consecrated the animal equivalent to an apostate for by slaughtering the animal, he prevents his vow from being fulfilled. As stated in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, there are certain conditions necessary for slaughter performed by such a person to be successful.

Since the original consecration has not yet taken effect, he may still consecrate it for another purpose.

I.e., if the animal does not die within 30 dies, retroactively, the consecration will take effect from the time of his statements.

Since the consecration of the animal will ultimately take effect, it may not be used for mundane purposes unless it is evaluated by the court. That evaluation may not be performed when the animal is dead (Lechem Mishneh).

Since retroactively, the animal will become consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration as a sacrifice is not of consequence, as stated in Halachah 8.

I.e., this evaluation is necessary to establish the extent of his obligation, but nothing more. We do not require him to wait until he actually redeems the animal. The Radbaz explains that there are commentaries that if the animal was not redeemed the Temple treasurers are required to be present at the offering of the animal, because the owner of a sacrifice must be present when it is offered. The Rambam does not, however, require the treasurers' presence.

For the Sages decreed that the animal be considered as if its body has become consecrated.

I.e., because the requirement to wait until its redemption is Rabbinic in origin.

Rashi (Temurah 32a,b) states that in such an instance, the person is not required to pay anything for the dedication offering, because the animal was never evaluated.

Burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.

All other sacrifices.

I.e., he pledged to bring an offering of a particular type. Afterwards, he designated an animal to be offered to fulfill his pledge. If the animal is lost or stolen, he is required to supply another animal.

Since he is obligated to replace his sacrifices, he is required to redeem the consecrated animal.

E.g., he said: "I will bring this animal as a burnt offering." In this instance, if the animal dies or is stolen, he is not required to replace it with another animal.

I.e., one might think that since the animal itself is already designated as a sacrifice and the person is not required to replace it if stolen, it is no longer his, and he does not have the right to consecrate it at all.

I.e., since the person could in fact bring the sacrifice, we evaluate how much that right is worth to a person.

Since the person who consecrated the animal is not obligated to replace it, we do not require him to redeem it and offer it. Instead, anyone who desires to pay the estimated amount has the right to do so.

An unblemished firstborn animal is offered as a sacrifice and a priest is given the right to partake of it, while a blemished one must be given to a priest to use as his private property.

And the animal must be redeemed as stated in the previous halachah.

This is speaking about a firstborn animal with a blemish. It becomes the priest's private property, as stated in Hilchot Bechorot 1:3. Hence, there is no question that he has the right to do as he pleases with it.

I.e., we do not require the person who consecrated the animal to redeem it.

See Leviticus 27:32; Hilchot Bechorot, ch. 6, for a description of this offering.

In which instance, we follow the principles stated in Halachah 12. A price to be paid to offer the sacrifice is established. Anyone willing to pay that price may redeem the animal.

I.e., if the animal selected to be sacrificed as a tithe offering dies or is stolen, he is not required to offer another animal in its place.

The Rambam is referring to the half-shekel every male is required to give to purchase his share of the communal offerings. See Hilchot Shekalim, chs. 1-3.

This is parallel to the law mentioned in Halachah 11, that a person may consecrate animals designated as sacrifices.

The first fruits that were brought to the Temple and then given to the priests. See Exodus, ch. 23; Deuteronomy, ch. 26, Hilchot Bikkurim, chs. 1-4.

For the bikkurim are not his, but rather the property of the priest.

The bikkurim become the priest's private property (ibid. 4:14). Hence he may do with them whatever he desires.

I.e., for the portion given to the priest becomes his private property.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 18, when a person consecrates a limb or an organ on which an animal's life depends, the entire animal becomes consecrated. Here, too, the servant cannot live with only half his body.

Nevertheless the prohibition against meilah, misappropriating sacred property, do not apply. See Hilchot Meilah 5:10.

I.e., they are sold to others and the proceeds of the sale are used for the sake of improvements to the Temple.

For freeing them might create the impression that they were treating consecrated property with disdain and not seeking its full worth.

In which instance, they will receive the market value of the servant.

What the owner is attempting to do is to consecrate the servant's earnings. That, however, is not possible, for a person is unable to consecrate an entity that has not come into existence already (see Halachah 26). Therefore, he consecrates the servant's hands, for they do exist, and thus any earnings they produce become consecrated (Radbaz). Note the parallel in Halachah 28.

A servant's master is not liable to provide for his sustenance (Hilchot Avadim 9:7). Hence that money must be taken from the servant's earnings. Nevertheless, since his earnings are consecrated, the process the Rambam continues to explain should be followed.

Tosafot, Gittin 12b, explains that even a sum less than a p'rutah can be consecrated. (See Hilchot Meilah 7:8.) Nevertheless, the owner had the intent that this amount not be consecrated so that the servant would be able to sustain himself.

The price that would be paid if he was sold as a servant in the marketplace.

A servant is considered as property and consecrating him makes him the property of the Temple treasury. Hence it is entitled to all of his earnings. This does not apply with regard to a free man.

Bava Kama 69b derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:14: "When a person will consecrate his house." Just as his house is his own, so too, everything he consecrates must be his own.

All of the four types of people mentioned above are considered as independent personalities. Although a father and owner possess certain rights with regard to the earnings of these individuals, he does not own their physical persons. This applies even to his children who are beneath the age of majority (Arachin 28a). Similarly, a field that one acquires is never totally his, for he must return it to its original owners in the Jubilee.

For there is no way that they could regain possession of it immediately. Nor may the watchman consecrate it, because it does not belong to him.

I.e., although it is in the physical possession of the watchman, it is still considered as belonging to - and able to be secured by - the owner. See Halachah 25 and notes.

And instead, claimed to be the legitimate owner.

Proving his ownership through the testimony of witnesses or through a valid deed of title.

This is a principle applicable in many aspects of Jewish business law. Land can never be stolen and is always considered as being in the possession of the person who has title to it. See Bava Metzia 7a.

Even if the owner despairs of the recovery of the article, it is not desirable for the thief to consecrate it. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 5:7.

Since a standard price for each article was established and the articles were left for sale, we assume that as soon as the person took the article, he committed himself to the purchase and hence, the sale is completed.

For it is as if it was already sold.

Since the price has to be established, until it is established, the sale is not complete. And until the sale is complete, the article is considered as belonging to the seller. Hence, the prospective purchaser is considered as the watchman of an entrusted article and the law stated in the final clause of Halachah 22 applies. Indeed, Bava Batra 88a mentions this instance and from it, the law stated in Halachah 22 is derived.

Kiryat Sefer explains the rationale for this ruling: Since the object has not come into existence as of yet, it is not in his domain. And, as stated in Halachah 22, a person cannot consecrate an article that is not in his domain.

Needless to say, this applies when the person never owned the field he seeks to consecrate. By mentioning this instance, the Rambam (and his source, Ketubot 58b) emphasize that even though the person originally and ultimately owned the field, since he did not own it at the time he consecrated it, the consecration is not effective.

The Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De'ah 258:15 emphasizes that his statement is not even considered a vow, because the wording used does not have the implication of a vow. See Halachah 31 which speaks of this issue. Note, however, the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Mechirah 22:15.

I.e., the consecration is not effective, because the fruits of the woman's labor did not exist at the time her husband sought to consecrate them.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 12:3, all of the proceeds of the work a woman performs belong to her husband.

For although the fruit did not exist at the time of the original consecration, the tree did. And once the tree is consecrated all the fruit it produces is consecrated. Similarly, the woman's hands exist at the time the consecration was made, and as a result, all the products of her work are consecrated.

Rabbenu Nissim does not accept the Rambam's ruling. He explains that although our Sages ordained that the profits from a woman's labor should be given to her husband, those profits are given in exchange for his support of her. If she desires, she has the right to withdraw from the arrangement, decline his support, and keep her earnings. Since she has this right, her hands are not on lien to her husband, and he cannot consecrate them. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 81:1) follows the Rambam's view, while the Rama quotes that of Rabbenu Nissim.

I.e., at the time he makes this statement it is in his possession.

Even though he does not make a second statement, it becomes consecrated if and when he repurchases it.

Thus the fact that he sells it to another person in the interim does not detract from the consecration.

For a loan.

Even though the field was not in his possession at the time he made his statement, since he had the right to redeem it, it is considered as if it were.

And during that time, he did not have the right to redeem it.

Although the house is the tenant's for the duration of the rental period, since ultimately it belongs to the owner, his consecration takes precedence over the rental agreement. For as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 14, consecration takes precedence over other obligations.

Although as implied by the previous halachah, the owner could not consecrate a field given as security while it was in the possession of the lender, he has a greater right to the land in this instance. In the previous case, the field will not return to him unless he pays the loan, while in this instance, the home will return to him at the end of the rental period without payment. Hence he is considered to have greater rights over it and is given the right to consecrate it (Radbaz).

He may, however, avoid the prohibition by paying his rent to the Temple treasury (Arachin 21a).

This phrase indicates a law that the Rambam derived through the process of deduction without an explicit prior Rabbinic source.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Hilchot Nedarim 1:4-5, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:13.

I.e., were the person to have the intent to consecrate the article with this statement, the consecration would not be effective, because the article does not yet exist. He is not, however, consecrating the article, merely pledging to do so in the future. See also Hilchot Mechirah 22:15. On his notes to that source, the Ra'avad differs and maintains that for the statement to be considered a pledge, it must be worded in that matter. See Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Choshen Mishpat 212:7).

After his vision of the ladder extending to heaven. He was speaking of "what You will give me," i.e., possessions that he would acquire in the future.

When Jacob tells his wives of the message the angel gave him to return to Eretz Yisrael.

I.e., the pledge he made is considered as a vow.

The Radbaz explains that the second proof is necessary, because one might say that Jacob's reference to his vow refers to his statement: "And the Lord will be my God."

See Hilchot Nazir 1:4 which states that he must observe the nazirite restrictions immediately, because he does not know how long he will live and he is required to fulfill his pledge before he dies.

The Ra'avad accepts the support from Jacob's statement, but not that from the nazirite's pledge, bringing two objections:

a) at present, it is within his potential to carry out the nazirite vow. Hence, the comparison to an entity that has not yet come into existence is not appropriate.

b) Since the person does not know when he will die, it is as if he has committed himself to observe the vow immediately. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam's position.

Just like a vow made in error is not binding (Hilchot Nedarim 8:3).

I.e., we assume that his mention of a black ox was deliberate and intended to be a stipulation, not merely a statement of his supposition of what would happen.

In which case, we might say that he would accept the change, because he will be saving money.

In which case, we might say that he would accept the change, because he will be bringing a more attractive offering.

This ruling has amazed the commentaries, because if the first entity does not become consecrated, how can the second? Seemingly, its consecration is dependent on that of the first.

The Radbaz seeks to explain that the second consecration is dependent not on the status of the initial article, but the intent of the donor who sought to consecrate it. He admits, however, that the interpretation is forced. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this clause is referring to a different concept entirely. If he had an article that was consecrated and extended its holiness to another article unintentionally, that article is consecrated.

Articles which a person consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple.

This applies not only in this context, but also in many other areas of Jewish business law. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:4; Hilchot Geneivah 2:2, et al.

A promissory note itself is not worth money. It is valuable because of the debt that it records.

There is no such verse in the Tanach. The Rambam is referring to wording used by our Sages in Kiddushin 5a. They are also referring to a verse, but have shortened and edited Leviticus 27:19.

This principle also applies in many aspects of Jewish business law. Objects that are worth silver may be used for the same purposes as silver (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:10).

I.e., an object of minimal value.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 5; Chapter 5, Halachah 3, and notes. As explained there, we are speaking of a fifth of the new total, a fourth of the original amount.

Our Sages did not desire that his failure to pay the fifth prevent him from partaking of the entity, for this would reduce his Sabbath pleasure.

Since the treasurers demand payment of the fifth the person is not likely to forget. Nevertheless, this rationale itself is not sufficient reason for leniency. Hence, during the week, when the mitzvah of delighting in the Sabbath does not apply, the treasurers' reminder is not sufficient reason to permit use of the entity (see Bava Metzia 54a).

See Chapter 5, Halachah 11, which speaks of the redemption of such animals.

This is reflected by Leviticus 27:13.

See Halachah 2.

I.e., if a person was obligated to bring a sacrifice and a colleague set aside an animal from his own resources for him to offer, that person required to bring the sacrifice is not required to pay an additional fifth if he redeems the animal.

I.e., it was consecrated in the process of redeeming another article, as the Rambam proceeds to explain in the following halachah. See Halachah 11 for details regarding the redemption of an article by transferring its holiness to a second article.

In which instance, it must be redeemed whether blemished or unblemished. See Chapter 5, Halachot 5 and 12; see also Hilchot Temurah 1:12.

Since it is blemished, it is necessary to redeem it, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachot 11-12.

The Rambam is speaking about a practice, temurah, that involves transferring the holiness of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice to another animal. Leviticus 27:10 states that it is forbidden to make such an exchange, but if one does so both the animal originally consecrated and the one exchanged for it remain consecrated (ibid.:33; see Hilchot Temurah 1:1).

Because the animal to which the holiness was transferred was lost or unable to be used for a sacrifice for other reasons.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:14-15.

For he is no longer obligated to bring a guilt offering, but must offer the worth of the animal as a sacrifice.

I.e., it is not the same animal that was originally consecrated. Our translation represents a slight variation from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah that was made based on authentic manuscripts and early printings.

Hence although the person is not obligated to pay the additional fifth, if the Temple treasurer seizes it, he cannot be required to relinquish it.

The Rambam is speaking about a practice, temurah, that involves transferring the holiness of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice to another animal. Leviticus 27:10 states that it is forbidden to make such an exchange, but if one does so both the animal originally consecrated and the one exchanged for it remain consecrated (ibid.:33; see Hilchot Temurah 1:1).

Temurah 13a relates that the concept of temurah, exchange, applies only with regard to sacrifices and an animal consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple is not considered a sacrifice.

For these expressions imply temurah, exchange.

I.e., using statements that indicate that he desires to redeem the animal and not exchange it.

A coin of minimal worth.

With regard to transactions between men, the laws of ona'ah (unfair gain) apply and a transaction can be nullified if it is sold for more or less than a sixth of its value (Hilchot Mechirah 12:4). These principles do not apply, however, with regard to consecrated property.

I.e., to carefully evaluate its worth. See Halachah 11.

While it is consecrated, both of these activities are forbidden according to Rabbinic Law (Hilchot Meilah 1:12).

With regard to transactions between private individuals, by contrast, as long as the difference between the article's value and the price for which it is sold is less than a sixth, the transaction is allowed to stand (Hilchot Mechirah 12:3).

See Halachah 8.

We are speaking about a cow consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple. If it were consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, even after its holiness were transferred to another animal, it would remain consecrated itself (Radbaz).

See Halachah 8.

As mentioned above, the fifth is one fifth of the new total including the fifth and the amount for which the article is redeemed. Since he stated the value of the article he was giving as ten selaim, the value of the fifth is calculated accordingly even though he is paying more than would actually have been required.

Halachah 4.

Performing meshichah, an act that would complete the kinyan (formal act of acquisition) of the article.

100 zuz.

As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 1, the Rambam is not referring to an explicit verse in the Torah, but rather our Sages' restatement of the relevant verses in Kiddushin 28b.

And not when it enters his possession. Hence, he must pay the value at the time he redeems it.

See Hilchot Mechirah 9:2. As mentioned above, when an ordinary person completes meshichah, the transaction is completed and he must pay its price then. When it lost value, it was already in his possession.

One might ask: Why must he actually pay the money? Seemingly the very fact that he pledged to redeem it from the Temple treasury at 200 should be sufficient to make him liable in accordance with the principle (Kiddushin 28b, et al): "A person's statements to the Temple treasury are equivalent to an ordinary person drawing the article into his possession." The Radbaz explains that in this instance, that principle is not applied, because it is possible to say that the pledge was made in error. He did not expect that the article would depreciate in value. Hence, unless he paid the money, he is not liable for the higher sum.

And the depreciation is considered to have taken place in his possession as above.

Since the transaction is not completed until the purchaser draws it into his possession, with regard to ordinary transactions, the purchaser would have the right to nullify the transaction. Nevertheless, were he to do so, he is liable to have the admonition mi shepara administered to him by the court (Hilchot Mechirah 7:1). As the Rambam continues to explain, it is not appropriate to have this admonition administered to the Temple treasurers.

With regard to this admonition, ibid.:2 states: "He is cursed in court and told: 'May He who exacted retribution from the generation of the Flood, the generation of the Dispersion, the inhabitants of Sodom and Amorah, and the Egyptians who drowned in the sea, exact retribution from a person who does not keep his word.'

I.e., were the person to sell all his possessions to a private person, his wife and his creditors would be able to collect their due from the landed property in his domain. Since the property becomes the possession of the Temple treasury, those obligations temporarily need not be met.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the liens are in effect even when the property is in the possession of the Temple treasury. Our Sages' statement (Ketubot 59b) that consecration absolves prior liens applies only with regard to the consecration of articles that themselves will be used for the Temple or its sacrifices, not articles to be sold and the proceeds used.

One of the practical differences between the Rambam's position and that of the Ra'avad is whether a person will be liable for me'ilah, misappropriating consecrating property, for benefiting from this property. In Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 18:7, the Rambam states similar ideas as in this halachah. In his gloss to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh takes issue with the Rambam. Although, here, in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro defends the Rambam's position in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:7), it appears that he accepts the other view. The Tur and the Rama explicitly state that the Ra'avad's position should be followed.

I.e., the property is redeemed with the awareness that it is under lien and that lien will ultimately be collected. Its price is calculated accordingly, as stated in Halachah 16.

She had the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from this property, but she agreed not to press her claim against this individual.

For the field remains on lien to her. The promise she gave the first purchaser is not binding with regard to the second.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this point as well, maintaining that the woman does not have the right to expropriate the property from the second purchaser. For by purchasing the field, he purchased every right that the first purchaser had. Moreover, if forced to pay the woman, he could seek reimbursement from the first purchaser or nullify the sale. In his gloss to Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 19:8, the Maggid Mishneh supports the Ra'avad's view. The Kessef Mishneh, however, defends the Rambam's position.

Since it is on lien, obviously, no one will desire to pay its actual worth.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 16:10,20 and Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 22:10, we do not expropriate the field for the wife or the creditor until he or she takes an oath while holding a sacred object that the debt was not collected, waived, or sold to another person.

Chapter 3, Halachah 20; Chapter 4, Halachah 27.

Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text follows a slightly different version.

Although the initial preference is that consecrated property be redeemed for its full value (Halachah 8), that is not feasible in the present instance. Instead, the person is allowed to pay any sum he desires, for his profit may be small after paying the debt. Indeed, as the Rambam continues, he may even suffer a loss.

And the lien on the field is ignored.

This vow must be taken conditional to the consent of people at large. In this way, it can never be nullified. Note a parallel in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 6:9.

I.e., he would remarry her and retake possession of a portion of his property in this way. See Hilchot Ishut 17:9-10. Arachin 23a emphasizes that we are speaking about a healthy man. If a person on his death bed divorces his wife so that she will not have to undergo yibbum, he is not required to take such an oath, for we do not suspect that a person on his death bed will try to deceive the Temple treasury. See Halachah 19.

For a consecration made in error can be nullified, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 34.

If, however, he made such statements before consecrating his property, his word is accepted (Radbaz).

See the Siftei Cohen (Choshen Mishpat 255:5) who elaborates on the concept that even if he makes this statement directly after consecrating his property, it is not accepted. As support, he cites Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:1 where the Rambam writes that after a person consecrates an animal, even if he seeks to retract his consecration immediately, he cannot. The Radbaz (see his gloss to the following halachah) supports this view. The Kessef Mishneh, however, maintains that a healthy person can also retract his statement directly after making it.

I.e., the person claims to be holding it as an entrusted article.

And prevent a certain portion of his property from having to be redeemed.

For as stated in Halachah 14, consecration lifts liens on property.

See Halachah 16.

At such a time, when he will not derive any worldly benefit from sinning and is conscious of the retribution he will receive in the world to come, he will certainly not seek to deceive the Temple treasury.

I.e., his acknowledgement of the debt. If, however, the creditor does not have a promissory note whose authenticity has been verified, he cannot collect the debt, even though the debtor acknowledged it on his deathbed. The rationale is that (as stated in Hilchot To'ain ViNitan 6:7), a person is wont to state that he owes money even if he in fact does not so that his sons do not think of themselves as rich. His estate is not bound by these statements unless, as stated above, he explicitly instructed that the debt be paid or the creditor has a promissory note that has been verified. Even though in this instance, the money will be going to the Temple treasury and not to his sons, a similar rationale can still be applied. We say that he is admitting the debt so that people will not think of him as a person who hoarded money throughout his life (Sefer Meirat Einayim 255:12).

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, stating that the word of a person on his deathbed is accepted even he makes his statements after consecrating the article. For at the time he consecrates an article, the statements of a healthy person are also accepted.

In view of this objection, the Radbaz explains that there are three different time frameworks:

a) before the consecration is made - in which instance the statements of both a healthy man and one on his deathbed are accepted;

b) immediately after (toch k'dei dibbur) the consecration is made - in which instance the statements of a healthy man are not accepted and those of one on his deathbed are;

c) some time after the consecration is made - in which instance neither the statements of a healthy man nor those of one on his deathbed are accepted.

The Kessef Mishneh follows the same basic thrust in interpreting the Rambam, but differs regarding one point, maintaining that a healthy person can also retract his statement directly after making it. The difference between a healthy person and one on his deathbed is that when a person is on his deathbed, his word is accepted as long as he is still speaking of the deposition of his property even though it is not directly after he consecrated it.

That he has not received payment for the debt.

As stated, in Halachot 14, 16. The Ra'avad adds that if we are speaking about an entrusted article which the dying man acknowledged having received for safekeeping, it is returned to its owner without being redeemed. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would not necessarily differ on this point.

Through the testimony of witnesses or a contract that has been verified.