Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As explained immediately below.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

Note, however, Halachah 4.

Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:1, 5.

Even though he possessed items for which customs duty was due. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:2.

I.e., one might think that since he was not compelled to mention the other substances, the vow would take effect with regard to them. Hence, the Rambam explains that since he was compelled to take the vow, his additions do not change its status.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:3.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 232:14) emphasizes that the statement he makes may not be a direct contradiction to the intent in his heart. He also emphasizes that the vow may not be broken in a way that the gentile who forced the vow to be taken will be become aware of its violation. For this would lead to the desecration of God's name.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:12.

The laws of this halachah do not apply with regard to oaths. Since an oath involves the mention of God's name, taking an oath for this purpose would be taking God's name in vain. A vow does not require the mention of God's name. Hence, this is permitted (Radbaz).

I.e., two dinarim which are half a sela.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 232:2) quotes opinions that maintain that each one can fluctuate slightly past the midway point, but may not accept the other's position completely. He also quotes other more lenient views.

For neither definitely meant what he said. Taking the vow was just a bargaining technique. See the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 232:2) which states that this applies when they continue negotiating after taking the vow. Then it is clear that they were merely bargaining. If, however, they broke off negotiations, the vow is considered binding.

Thus it could be said that his heart and his mouth were not in concord (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:1.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:1.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:4.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14.

Nevertheless, it is undesirable to do so. One should seek their release only in a pressing situation. See Chapter 13, Halachah 25.

Since ultimately, the person did not desire to make the vow, it is as if the article were consecrated in error. In such an instance, the consecration is not effective (Radbaz, based on Ketubot 78a).

The rationale is that the release of vows is based on the principle that after the person changes his mind and regrets having made the vow, it is as if the vow was made in error. Since the transfer of holiness from a sacrificial animal to another animal is binding even if it is done in error (Temurah 17a), there is no reason why a release is possible after such a transfer has been effected (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, if one regrets the original consecration, that can be nullified and then, as a matter of course, the animal to which the holiness was transferred will also lose its status (see Mishneh LeMelech).

See chs. 11-13.

The latter two are bound by the vow taken by the first, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

For the vows of the latter individuals are dependent on the vow of the first. Once the first vow is nullified, they no longer have any basis on which they can stand.

For their vows are not dependent on his.

For his vow serves as the basis for theirs.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

For it is dependent on the prohibition against bread.

For it is not dependent on the prohibition against meat.

I.e., at the outset, his intent was that the oath or vow include all the individuals in the group, once that intent is no longer valid, it is as if the entire vow or oath was taken in error. Hence, it is no longer binding. The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:1) derives this concept from the exegesis of Numbers 30:3: "He should act according to everything that he uttered from his mouth." Since "everything" he uttered from his mouth need not be fulfilled, nothing must be fulfilled. If part of a vow is nullified, the entire vow is nullified.

Since the person said "and" between each one, he made the latter individuals dependent on the first. Nevertheless, in contrast to the first clause, all of the individuals are not considered as being included in the same vow.

Since he did not associate them by saying "and," it is considered as if he took a vow concerning each person individually. See also Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

They are all considered as one vow. Hence, as in the previous halachah, once a portion of a vow is nullified, the entire vow is nullified. Even if he only has a reason to regret the last portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Radbaz).

As the Rambam states in Chapter 7, Halachah 9, initially, it is forbidden for the person to ask such a sage to release his vow, for in this way, he is benefiting from the people of the city. After the fact, however, the vow is released, because retroactively, it is as if the vow were never taken.

In this instance, he may initially ask a Jewish sage to have his vow released, for he has no alternative. Only a Jewish sage can release a vow. In the previous instance, by contrast, he can ask a sage from another city to release the vow (Radbaz).

And then the vow would take effect retroactively.

As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:16, to be liable for lashes, one must be given a warning. This law indicates that even if the warning was delivered conditionally, the person can be held liable for lashes.

Despite the fact that he violated the advice of our Sages, since he did not violate a Scriptural commandment, he is not liable for lashes.

Hence, we do not fear that he will partake of the produce on the following day.

Therefore, in the previous halachah, he is forbidden to partake of the produce at the outset.

I.e., not consecutively.

I.e., to participate in a feast celebrating the observance of a mitzvah, e.g., a circumcision or the completion of a Talmudic tractate (Mishnah Berurah 568:9).

Since he did not stipulate the day on which he would fast, even though he began fasting on a particular day, he can change his mind and switch the fast to another day.

Since he took a vow against eating that day, the fact that he broke his fast does not make it permissible for him to eat afterwards. This applies even if he is willing to fast another day instead. Compare to Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:14. the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 568:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling. The Rama adds that there are some who accept upon themselves to fast another day to compensate for the fast he did not keep.

Nevertheless, since he did not specify a particular day at the time of his vow, once he ate, he may eat on the day he began fasting.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 14; Chapter 2, Halachah 8.

It is as if Reuven designated his property as consecrated with regard to Shimon (Or Sameach).

And the prohibition which Reuven established does not make Shimon liable. If, however, Shimon said Amen, he would be liable, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 12, from which it is apparent that if Reuven voluntarily allows Shimon to benefit from his property, Reuven is liable for lashes, for he is desecrating his own vow.

As indicated by Hilchot Meilah 4:9, even though the person is not liable for lashes, he is liable to bring a sacrifice for atonement, since with regard to him, it is as if he benefited from consecrated property.

Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

For there is no way that he can acquire it in a permitted manner.

I.e., once he dies, the loaf no longer belongs to him.

The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 216) states that this applies when the person taking the vow says: "During my lifetime and after my death." From the Rambam's words and a comparison to Halachah 6, it is apparent that he need not make such a specification. See Turei Zahav 216:10 which discusses these two perspectives.

For that is the implication of the term "my." Compare to Chapter 8, Halachah 11.

See Halachah 8 which explains that the estate does become the son's property and he may use it in certain ways.

And specifies that this applies after his death as well, as in the previous halachah.

This is speaking about a situation in which the grandson is not born yet or is still a minor in which instance, the grandfather cannot transfer the property to him directly Alternatively, he is not yet a Torah scholar (Radbaz).

The Ra'avad and others question the Rambam's ruling, for seemingly, it does not involve any new concept. The son becomes the owner of the estate regardless. Although he is forbidden to benefit from it, he has the right to give it to his son whether he is a Torah scholar or not as stated in the following halachah. The Kessef Mishneh explains that ordinarily, the son may use the estate to pay a debt or to give it to his brother as a present. If, however, the grandson is a Torah scholar, this is forbidden and it is as if the estate was transferred to him directly and the father cannot use it for other purposes. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation where the father had two sons and if this son's son was not a Torah scholar, he would give his entire estate to the other son.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that the estate will be given to the grandson. The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 223) explains that implicit in the grandfather's statement is the stipulation that if the grandson is not a Torah scholar, he - like his father - will be forbidden to benefit from the estate. See Siftei Cohen 223:4.

Rabbenu Nissim explains that the intent is not that he actually gives the money to the recipients, but he informs them of where it is and allows them to take it. See Siftei Cohen 223:3.

Here also, the son must tell the recipients that they are receiving property that he is forbidden to benefit from. Implied is that the estate becomes the son's property. He is forbidden to benefit from it. Nevertheless, as indicated here, he may receive indirect benefit, for certainly the recipients of his gifts will be thankful to him and repay him in some way or other.

For this also considered as another debt.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4. The person is not considered to have received benefit from the payment of his debt, since holding back a creditor from pressing claim is not considered as benefit (Radbaz).

The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 223) questions the Rambam's ruling, explaining that although the father would have been permitted to pay the son's debt, for the son to pay his own debt with the estate's money is considered as benefiting from the estate. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:4) accepts the Rambam's ruling.

For his vow involved only the food itself - i.e., something that people would have in mind when using that term - but not its flavor. It does not become like forbidden food, in which case, even the flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

That produce is considered as if it was inherently forbidden and hence, even its flavor is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., a person who had not taken the vow tasted the food and said that the flavor of the forbidden food could not be detected. Alternatively, there was more than 60 times the amount of the forbidden food.

I.e., designating a particular piece of meat or quantity of wine.

For these other entities will derive the flavor of the meat.

The Or Sameach emphasizes that the Rambam is speaking about a vow which a person made himself, for he can have such a vow released. If, however, he responds to another person, he cannot ask for the vow's release.

If, however, the wine becomes mixed with a liquid of another type, its presence becomes nullified if its taste is no longer detectable (Turei Zahav 216:13).

Chapter 15, Halachah 10. The rationale is that since the prohibition can be released, it is preferable to do that rather than have the prohibition nullified.

I.e., just as he may not partake of a sacrifice with his mouth, he may not partake of this produce.

I.e., if the produce forbidden because of the vow was sown and other produce grew from it, that produce is also forbidden.

Since the produce forbidden by the vow is equated to a sacrifice, like a sacrifice, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from it (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad (in his gloss to Halachah 16) asks: Why is the produce that grows from the forbidden produce prohibited. Seemingly, we should follow the principle: Zeh vizeh goraim mutar, when an entity is produced by two factors, one permitted and one forbidden, it is permitted. Here as well, since the second generation produce was produced by the forbidden produce and also by the earth, it should be permitted.

The Radbaz explains that since a vow is involved, we follow the principle mentioned in Halachah 12, that since the prohibition involved can be released entirely, we do not consider it nullified because another factor is also involved.

For his vow specified only eating or tasting the produce, not benefiting from it. Nor is there any taste of the original produce in the produce that grows from its seeds.

For the second generation produce is not the same substance concerning which the vow was taken.

The onion or the garlic head is put in the ground and a new plant grows from it.

For ultimately, even the third generation produce has the flavor of the first generation produce. As the Rambam explains at the conclusion of Halachah 15, we do not say that its flavor will be nullified because the greater portion of the substance of the new produce is permitted, because, as stated in Halachah 12, the forbidden fruit is an entity whose prohibition could be released.

Nedarim 52b leaves unresolved the question whether in this context the juice produced from the fruit is considered as the fruit or not. Hence, because of the doubt, one is forbidden to partake of it, but cannot be held liable for punishment. This refers to fruits other than grapes or olives. In the latter instances, the liquid is considered as the fruit.

The Siftei Cohen 216:8 states that we are referring to an instance that the husband uses wording similar to that suggested in Chapter 3, Halachah 11; alternatively, that he is referring to work which his wife already performed. Otherwise, there would be a difficulty because a vow is not effective unless the object concerned already exists.

I.e., if she planted a tree, he is forbidden to partake of its fruit. The Rambam (based on Nedarim 57a) is restating the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah in a different context.

See Halachah 12 which explains that he has the potential to have his vow released.

The Ra'avad protests the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that based on Nedarim 47a, it appears that the produce grown from the fruits of his efforts is definitely forbidden. The Radbaz, however, explains that the Rambam has a different way of understanding that Talmudic passage.

Nedarim, loc. cit., explains that the question is: Since these entities have not come into existence as of yet, can he cause them to be forbidden to his colleague.

I.e., he is not liable. Firstly, lashes are not given when an unresolved question is involved. Also, as stated in Halachah 1, when a person becomes forbidden because of another person's vow, he is not liable for lashes unless he responds Amen.

For this also leads to him deriving pleasure from food.

For the money that he saved by not paying the fee could be used to purchase food.

E.g., he lent him attractive clothing which created a favorable impression on others who gave him gifts as a result.

To attend a feast, but not when going to his business as stated in the notes to the following halachah.

In both cases, he did not give him direct benefit, but he did enable him to receive benefit.

I.e., to tend to his business. If he took a vow against benefiting from him, he may not pass through the property, for he is deriving some benefit. Nevertheless, that benefit does not lead to food. Hence, one who prohibits all benefit is forbidden, but one who forbids benefit that leads to food is permitted. If, however, he wishes to pass through his property to attend a feast, he is forbidden in all instances, as stated in the previous halachah (Radbaz).

This is benefit, but not benefit that leads to food.

I.e., the half-shekel which every Jew is obligated to pay to the Temple treasury as his share in the communal sacrifices. See Hilchot Shekalim 1:1.

See Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 26:6 where the Rambam states that if "a person pays a promissory note of a colleague without that colleague's knowledge, even if it is a debt for which security was given, the borrower is not required to pay him anything. The borrower may take his security.... The other person forfeits his money. [The rationale is that] perhaps the borrower would have been able to appease the lender and have him waive the debt." Thus by paying Reuven's debt, Shimon is not considered to have given him anything.

See also Hilchot Ishut 12:19 which states that when a husband traveled to a distant country and left his wife without resources, if another person gives the woman money without clearly specifying that he is extending a loan to her, he forfeits his money. Even though the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's provisions, as long as a debt is not formally established, the person who pays the money has no claim upon him.

The qualifier "even" is mentioned for the Canaanite servants, because it is not as great a mitzvah to sustain them as the others who are full-fledged members of the Jewish people.

This applies even though the non-kosher animal may not be eaten by the Jew, he may sell it to a gentile and will receive a greater payment because of its increase in weight.

And thus he is not considered as having performed a favor for the person bringing the sacrifice.

For then, she is considered as having carried out the marriage. Her father is merely acting as her agent and thus is not considered as offering Reuven benefit.

A girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half who has manifested signs of physical maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:1-2). Needless to say, this applies if the girl is a minor, in which instance, her consecration is dependent entirely on her father.

For at this age, she cannot marry without her father's consent, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 3:11.

If, however, Reuven does not consent, the separation of the terumah is not effective (Bava Metzia 22a).

Since Shimon is forbidden to receive a wage from teaching Reuven, he is not giving him tangible benefit. Although he is enabling him to observe a mitzvah, the mitzvot were not given for our satisfaction (Eruvin 31a).

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:7, 3:10 where the Rambam issues such a ruling and explains that this is derived from Deuteronomy 4:5: "Behold, I [Moses] have taught you laws and statutes, as God commanded me." On this basis, Nedarim 37a teaches that Moses was implying: "Just as I learned at no cost, so, too, you have been instructed at no cost by me. And so, too, should you teach the coming generations at no cost."

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 4:3), the Rambam writes:

According to our Torah, there is no way that it is permitted to take a wage for teaching any of the Torah's professions....

I am amazed at the men of stature who aroused by desire, denied the truth had wages designated for themselves for giving Torah rulings and instruction, citing flimsy support.

See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah Avot 4:7. It must, however, be noted that most authorities [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 246:5) allow a teacher to charge for the time he spends teaching Torah on the basis of the principle of sechar batalah, i.e., he could have spent the time he spends teaching working at another profession which would bring him an income. He is allowed to be reimbursed for the money he loses by choosing to teach Torah instead. For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:2) does not accept the Rambam's ruling and forbids Shimon from teaching Reuven.

Nedarim 37a gives two reasons why it is permitted for a teacher of young children to charge a wage for his services: a) he is not charging for teaching; he is charging for being a disciplinarian; b) he is not charging for teaching the wordings of Torah; he is charging for teaching the cantillation notes. (For at that time, there were no texts with vowels and the Written Law was studied by memorizing its chants.) The first rationale does not apply with regard to adults, but the second does.

A father is obligated to teach his son the Torah. Hence, by instructing Reuven's son, Shimon is freeing him of an obligation. Nevertheless, this is not considered as providing him with benefit, for teaching his son is a mitzvah. And as stated above, the mitzvot were not given for our satisfaction. Moreover, it is possible that Reuven could find another person to teach his son without charge.

For this is also a mitzvah. Even though the sick person derives benefit from the person's visit, the benefit is not granted him directly (see Nedarim 39a).

I.e., pay a short visit and leave promptly. Since sitting with the sick person is worth money in that community, it is forbidden, by doing so, he will be providing the sick person with a tangible benefit. Payment is not given for visiting while standing. Therefore, there is no prohibition against doing so. See Siftei Cohen 221:19 who writes that if he charges for his time, he may sit and pay the sick person a longer visit.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 4:4), the Rambam states that it is a mitzvah of Scriptural origin for a doctor to heal a sick person.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:4) states that when medical attention is given without charge, he may treat him without charge. If, however, it is customary for a doctor to charge, he must also do so.

In certain manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this clause is included as the conclusion of the previous halachah rather than at the beginning of this one.

I.e., he may give him advice with regard to which treatments to employ, but may not treat the animal himself. The rationale is that treating a colleague's animal is not considered a mitzvah (Tosafot, Nedarim 41b). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 221) explains that if there is no one else capable of treating the animal but Shimon, Shimon may do so, because the mitzvah of returning a lost object also includes doing what is necessary to save a colleague's livestock. The Radbaz also adds the rationale that Scriptural Law requires us to alleviate an animal's discomfort.

For the entrance of one person into a large bath is not significant.

And that is considered as pleasurable.

Because the increase in warmth is not desirable.

The more people under the same bed clothes, the greater the warmth produced. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:5) states that this applies with regard to a small bed. If the bed is large, even in the winter, it is permitted.

This alone is not enough to create suspicion that he will offer him food.

The Meiri explains that even though the two are at odds - and for that reason one has taken a vow not to offer the other benefit - we fear that he might make such a gesture out of good manners.

The custom was that before passing the tray to another person, the host would fill it up again. Hence there would be no need for Shimon to worry about leaving a piece for Reuven [Radbaz; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:5)]. The Rama adds that if the serving plate contained a very large amount, there is no prohibition.

It was customary to drink wine in the house of mourners to help him overcome his sorrow (see Ketubot 8b).

A cup of hot water that was provided for bathers by the owner of the bathhouse (i.e., and not one belonging to Shimon).

Nedarim 38b states that Shimon may give Reuven "the cup of peace" and advances these two interpretations for the term. The Rambam does not consider the interpretations as mutually exclusive, for the same principle - that the satisfaction Shimon gives Reuven is minimal - applies in both instances (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation than the Rambam, explaining that the "cup of the bathhouse" is given to save the person's life, lest he dehydrate. Moreover, he explains that since the cup belongs to Reuven, there is no difficulty. And he states that giving the cup of comfort is a mitzvah.

For the coal is considered an entity of substance, while the flame is not (Siftei Cohen 221:57).

Since Shimon retains a certain dimension of ownership, when Reuven makes use of it, he is still considered as benefiting from Shimon's property.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Maaserot 1:7) the Rambam defines the term ekal as referring to a container made from ropes in which olives are placed and crushed.

Provided Shimon did not specifically forbid Reuven from entering these structures, as indicated by Halachah 14.

And once an entity has become forbidden because of a vow, it remains forbidden.

For that is ownerless and is not affected by the vow.

Although he is allowed to benefit from the produce, he is not allowed to set foot in Shimon's land, as stated in Halachah 3, and as the Rambam continues to explain.

For then, benefit from that particular field itself becomes forbidden to Reuven forever. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachah 5.

In which case, the prohibition involves only property actually owned by Shimon without applying to any particular property individually.

For the entrance of the Sabbatical year causes them to be considered as ownerless. Shimon cannot cause the produce to be forbidden for Reuven, for a person cannot cause food that does not belong to him to be forbidden to a colleague (Nedarim 42b). And when Reuven takes an oath or a vow not to benefit from Shimon's property, the oath or the vow does not pertain to this produce, for it does not belong to Shimon.

See Halachot 1 and 3.

Because in such a situation, he is not forbidden to enter Shimon's property.

Since the prohibition took effect before the Sabbatical year, it continues during the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 13.

Hence Shimon cannot cause it to be forbidden for Reuven, as above.

Reuven is not receiving any benefit from lending out either his articles or his money. Nevertheless, he is forbidden lest Shimon reciprocate and that would involve receiving benefit.

In a sale, even though the purchaser receives an article in return for his money, the seller is considered to have benefited. For if this was not so, he would not have sold the article.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, explaining the source for this law (Nedarim 38b) in another way. The Radbaz explains that halachically, both interpretations are acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:1) quotes the Ra'avad's interpretation, but not of the Rambam. Accordingly, the Bayit Chadash maintains that according to the Shulchan Aruch, the Rambam's interpretation is not accepted. See also Turei Zahav 223:1 and Siftei Cohen 223:1.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 10-11, for details on how a vow of this nature must be worded for it to be effective.

The Baer HaGolah 221:65 rules that he may not write a note specifically for that person. Instead, he should write on the wall with the intent that the person see. Others, however, do not accept this stringency.

He may not, however, speak to the wall, for in this instance, it is obvious that he is speaking to his colleague. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 221) is even more stringent, stating that when it is obvious that he is intending for the person to whom he is forbidden to speak to hear, he may not speak even to another colleague.