Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In contrast to Rabbinic Law as defined by the following halachah.

The Turei Zahav 190:1 interprets the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh as stating that even if we are certain that a woman experienced uterine bleeding, if she did not experience the physical sensations that accompany menstruation, she is not impure according to Scriptural Law.

The physical sensation described here is not the heaviness, nausea, or stomach contractions which sometimes precipitate a woman's menstrual bleeding. [These sensations are also halachicly significant, but are related to another aspect of the niddah laws - the determination of vesetos, the time when her menstruation could be expected to begin (see Chapter 8, Halachah 2).] Instead, here the intent is either: a) an awareness of the opening of the uterus, or b) shivers or shudders as in a state of shock. Certain authorities also speak of a third sensation: that of a flow of moisture in the uterine channel. See the commentaries to Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 183:1). It must be emphasized that today, many authorities rule that a woman is unable to identify these sensations.

Chapter 5, Halachah 2.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, she does not become impure retroactively.

Carrying out the internal examination, however, prevented her from feeling that sensation.

Chapter 5, Halachah 5, which states that the discovery of bleeding in the vaginal channel renders her impure.

As clarified in Halachah 8.

As clarified in Halachot 9-11.

We do not say that the fact that she did not discover any internal signs of bleeding indicates that the bleeding originated elsewhere.

Since we are speaking about a Rabbinic institution and there is doubt involved, there is some room for leniency as will be explained.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why we do not consider this a question of multiple doubt (s'fek s'feika) in which case we rule leniently. In this instance, it is possible that the blood came from her flesh and it is possible that it came from an outside source. And even if it came from her flesh, it is possible it came from the uterus and it is possible it came from the ovaries.

The Kessef Mishneh offers two resolutions: a) because of the serious nature of the prohibition involved, our Sages were stringent despite the multiple doubt;

b) when the woman has no outside factors to which the blood can be attributed, our Sages ruled stringently and maintained that it is considered as if the bleeding is definitely from her flesh. Thus there is only one doubt: whether the bleeding comes from the uterus or the ovaries.

Kin'at Eliyahu offers a third resolution: Essentially, there is one question involved? Did the bleeding originate in the uterus or elsewhere? Where elsewhere - the ovaries or an outside source - does not multiply the doubt involved.

If she discovers bleeding at the time of her veset, we assume that she began menstruating then, since that is when she ordinarily menstruates, as stated in the following halachah. Otherwise, we assume she began menstruating beforehand.

I.e., any articles that she touched within that time are considered as if they are ritually impure. We assume that she began menstruating before she discovered the bleeding and therefore consider her impure retroactively.

I.e., we reduce the time of impurity from 24 hours, because she conducted an internal examination in the interim. Nevertheless, we still follow the basic premise that she is considered impure retroactively.

Chapter 8, Halachah 13. Note Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 3:8 which states that although the man who engages in relations with her is not governed by the severe rules that apply to one who had relations with a niddah, he is still considered ritually impure for touching the woman.

As stated in Chapter 8, a woman must calculate the day on which she is expected to begin menstruated. In this instance, she cannot do so, for she does not know whether to begin counting anew from the time she discovered the stain or perhaps her original cycle has not changed.

These terms are defined in this and the following halachah. The rationale is that these women are not expected to menstruate. Hence, we do not show concern for the possibility that they menstruated at an earlier time.

Even if she discovers her pregnancy earlier, she must take the bleeding into consideration until three months.

Conversely, although a woman continues nursing beyond this times, she is not granted this leniency (Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 4:1).

I.e., hymeneal bleeding.

As stated in Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav 4:3, this principle applies the first two times she menstruates.

I.e., once three months pass without her menstruating, we assume that she will no longer menstruate according to a set pattern.

She becomes impure no matter how small it is.

A gris is half a bean. Cilik is a place where beans grow very large [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 17:112)]. Most contemporary experts consider this to be the size of an American dime.

It is possible that the blood came from a louse that was inadvertently killed (see Halachah 23). Since the question is one of Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently and consider the woman pure. When, however, the stain is on her flesh, we rule stringently, because lice are not usually found on one's flesh (Kessef Mishneh).

The distinction between a stain on one's body and on one's clothes is not accepted by all authorities. Ra'avad, Ramban, and Rashba differ and maintain that there is no difference between the two. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:6) quotes both opinions without stating which one is favored.

I.e. unless one of the spots is the size of a gris, the woman is considered pure. We are not concerned with the combined area of the spots.

In this instance, if the combined area of the stain is the size of a gris, the woman is considered as impure.

All of the following are examples of articles that are not susceptible to ritual impurity. The Rambam discusses all of these types of utensils in Hilchot Keilim. Commenting on the citation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:10), the Rama (and Pitchei Teshuvah 190:19) also give the example of a toilet seat as an article that is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

For an earthenware utensil only contracts ritual impurity from its inside.

A cloth of this size is considered too small to serve any purpose and hence, is not considered as a garment or utensil.

And found there were no bloodstains on it.

As mentioned above, the designation of a woman as impure because of a stain that is discovered is a Rabbinic decree. When our Sages instituted the decree, they allowed for leniency in certain instances.

Niddah 61b relates that originally our Sages thought to prohibit women from wearing colored garments as part of the mourning customs introduced because of the destruction of the Temple. Afterwards, they reconsidered and recommended that they wear such garments as the Rambam explains.

On days other than her seven "spotless" days.

In the Talmudic era, people would sit on rugs on cushions on the ground and when sitting in this manner, it is possible that a woman's foot will touch her genital area.

And it is possible that unknowingly, she touched a place on her body where there was menstrual blood (Maggid Mishneh).

When restating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:11) uses the wording "if it is found above her genital area." It also states that if a woman lifted her legs above her waist, she is impure even if a stain is found on the upper portion of her body.

I.e., we assume that the blood came from an external source. For it is not ordinary that her menstrual blood would spatter to these portions of her body.

I.e., the shape of the stain appeared to indicate that the blood was spattered upward, rather than dripped downward.

I.e., even when the shape of the stain appears to indicate that it came from an external source, as long as its position leaves open the possibility that it came from uterine bleeding, we rule stringently.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:12) rules that this law applies even when the stain is found on only the external part of her garment.

For the possibility exists that it came as a result of uterine bleeding. See Halachot 19-20 which explain that when there is justified reason to suspect that the stain came from an external source, she is pure, even though the stain is found on the lower portion of her garment.

Even when she bends (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba).

Because it is possible that she and the blanket both shifted position while she was sleeping.

I.e., it is three times the size of a gris.

She must wait seven "spotless" days before engaging in relations. She brings the sacrifice required of a zavah, but because of the doubt concerning her status, it is not eaten.

Three stains are sufficient to render her a major zavah. She is not, however, definitely given this status, for it is possible that the three stains came on one day.

I.e., she wore the three garments at the same time, one on top of the other.

For it is possible that she experienced bleeding on three successive days.

And thus it is likely that the three stains came from the same bleeding. Nevertheless, since we are not certain of this, she is considered a zavah because of the doubt.

I.e., it is smaller than three times the size of a gris.

Bein hashamashot refers to the time between sunset and the appearance of the stars. The intent is not that a woman should continue to inspect herself throughout this entire time. Instead, what is meant is that she should insert a small cloth into her vagina and leave it there for this entire time.

For she will have verified that she had not experienced bleeding on the first day.

Since she was wearing the garment for three days, the possibility exists that she experienced bleeding for three days, but all the stains were in the same place.

Since on one of the days, she became impure because of a stain without feeling the physical sensations associated with menstruation, her impurity is not of Scriptural status. For to be considered as a zavah according to Scriptural Law, she must experience these physical sensations.

If the bleeding was discovered within 24 hours of the stain, we assume that the stain came about because of the subsequent bleeding and therefore she is governed by the same laws that would apply had she experienced only the bleeding as stated in Halachah 16.

The Rambam's ruling is dependent on his understanding of Niddah 53b. The Ra'avad does not accept the Rambam's interpretation of this passage and harshly dismisses the Rambam's conclusions. The Maggid Mishneh both supports and explains the Rambam's position.

But if she does not discover blood on Monday, she is not a major zavah, i.e., we pay no attention to the stain that she discovered on Friday.

(Any time the term zavah is mentioned subsequently in this chapter, she is considered as a major zavah.)

She is not definitely placed in that category, because one of the days is associated with a stain, as stated in Halachah 14.

Because she experienced either a stain or bleeding on three consecutive days..

Because she experienced either a stain or bleeding on three consecutive days..

I.e., instead of being concerned that she discovered stains on three consecutive days, she associates the stain of the Sabbath and that of Sunday and counts them only as one.

For each of the stains is considered individually.

The principles mentioned in this halachah are illustrated in the halachot that follow.

Since the impurity associated with a stain is a matter of Rabbinic Law, we follow the principle: Whenever there is a doubt involved a matter of Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:18)].

Since the stain is found on her flesh and not on her clothes, we assume that it is more likely to come from the uterus than from an external factor.

E.g., she has a wound on her flesh.

Provided the stain is found on a portion of her body from which the blood could have dripped from the uterus as stated in Halachah 8.

This phrase was not found in the texts of the Mishneh Torah possessed by the Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh. Therefore they raised objections to the Rambam's ruling.

Ordinarily, however, such a stain does not alter her status even though it is found on her flesh alone.

E.g., if it was scratched [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:18)].

And thus her status does not change. Note, however, Halachah 25.

For we can assume that it came from the outside first to her garments and then to her flesh. Hence she may attribute the blood to any of the factors mentioned in Halachah 20, as if the blood was found on her garments alone.

This applies even if she did not see that she killed a louse. If she knows that she killed an insect and it is possible that it produced a stain larger than a gris, she may attribute the stain to that [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 8:2)].

For it is an accepted principle that a louse contains no more than a gris of blood. Hence if the stain is larger, that is an indication that the blood came from another source. Note Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:28) which rules leniently and explains that it is possible that there were two lice here, one which she killed previously and the one which is found crushed on her garment.

As indicated by the Rambam's explanation, even if she did not know that they touched her with soiled hands, if their hands were soiled, she may assume that this is the fact. For it is likely for a husband to touch his wife and a child to touch his mother.

If, however, their hands are not soiled, we do not attribute a stain to them unless the blood could have spattered upon her [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:19)].

It is highly improbable that blood dripped from her shoulder to her calf.

There are instances where we postulate that a person's hands are active and the possibility exists that one transferred impurity from one place to another. Nevertheless, this concept is used only to lead to a stringency, not as a source for leniency.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if it is possible that the garment passed over the wound when it was removed, we can attribute a stain on a garment to such a wound. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:16) quotes this conclusion.

Since the fowl did not contain enough blood to produce two stains of this size, we assume that one came from another source and attribute it to menstrual bleeding. Since we don't know which of the women was soiled by the fowl and which was not, we rule that they are both impure.

The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 190) rules that this law applies only when the two women come to inquire about their status together. If they come one after the other, he rules that they are both considered pure. The Turei Zahav 190:17 differs, maintaining that although the ruling of the Bayit Chadash has parallels in other contexts, the logic should not be applied in this instance. The Nekudot HaKessef, however, accepts the ruling of the Bayit Chadash.

As stated in Halachah 23. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 190:26) states that although there are opinions which rule that a woman is impure in such an instance, we follow the more lenient view, for the entire issue is one of Rabbinic Law.

Although there is reason to say that if the stain came from the outside, it would certainly be found on the outer garment as well, we still rule leniently, because there is the possibility that the outer garment was raised up at the time the blood was spattered.

Thus had the stain come from the woman's body, it would be far more likely to be found on the lower garment.

Although we rule leniently in questions involving stains, that is when we know that there is definitely a factor that could cause a stain involved. In this instance, we are not certain that there is indeed such a factor involved.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:22) adds that this ruling applies only in a city where there is a set place for butchering and the like. In places where these activities are carried out in many different places, a woman can attribute a stain to such a factor even if she is not certain that she passed such a place.

For the pigs eat small crawling animals and spatter their blood on passersby. Needless to say in most modern cities, this law does not apply.

According to Scriptural Law, the laws of niddah do not apply to gentile woman, but according to Rabbinic Law, every gentile women is considered as if she is a niddah. The Maggid Mishneh quotes opinions which maintain that even if the gentile woman is not known to be a niddah, the stain can still be attributed to her, because her halachic status is that of a niddah. This opinion is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:41). Even according to this conception, the gentile woman must be of the age that it is possible that she will experience menstrual bleeding. See Halachah 33 for further clarification regarding the fundamental principle on which this halachah is based.

The Rambam's wording teaches us another concept: We are not concerned about stains on clothing unless the clothes were checked first (Maggid Mishne).

Since the niddah and the gentile woman are already impure and will not suffer any difficulty if the stain is attributed to them, we indeed consider them as the source of the bleeding.

The day on which she experienced uterine bleeding.

This was the law in the era of the Talmud when the laws of "the blood of purity" were observed after childbirth. As will be explained in Chapter 11 and notes, at present, this leniency is no longer observed.

In all these instances, attributing the stain to the borrower does not change her halachic status. The minor zavah is impure and the woman after childbirth and the virgin are pure regardless of the stain.

As stated in Chapter 11, the concept of a minor zavah does not apply in the present age and instead, she is considered as equivalent to a major zavah. Hence a stain can certainly be attributed to her. The laws concerning a woman with hymeneal bleeding or a woman after childbirth are different, for in the present age, we do not consider such woman as ritually pure. Instead, uterine bleeding - and even a stain - renders them ritually impure. Accordingly, since the status of these woman will be impaired because of the discovery of the stain, there is reason to assume that it should not be attributed to them alone, but instead, both the borrower and the lender should be considered impure as in the following clause. {See the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 190) which cites such views.} The commentaries explain, however, that according to the Rambam, this law applies even in the present era. Indeed, it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:42) and the Shulchan Aruch only quotes laws that apply in the present era.

The Siftei Cohen 190:54 explains that even though the halachic status of these women changed in the present era, their physical tendency did not change. They frequently experience uterine bleeding and hence, we attribute the stain to them.

Both the lender and the borrower are not likely to experience uterine bleeding and for both, it will impair their halachic status. Since we do not know which one is responsible for the stain, both share the resulting halachic liability.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, loc. cit.) differ with the Rambam's ruling and maintain that the owner of the garment is pure. Since the status of the woman who is seeking to attain ritual purity is already impaired when compared to that of the owner, the stain is attributed to her alone despite the fact that her status will become further impaired by this ruling.

Although a woman is considered impure because of a stain, we do not consider it a certain enough sign of uterine bleeding to attribute another stain to it.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:40) omits mention of the fact that the woman inspected herself as well as her garment.

I.e., the owner is definitely impure; in this instance, the borrower is also impure, because it is possible that the stain comes from her.

Since there is no reason to attribute the stain to one more than the other and they all share the same halachic status, they are all considered as impure.

With their bodies intertwined [see Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:50) based on Niddah 61a].

Based on Niddah, loc. cit., the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) interpret this as referring to an instance when the woman all climbed into the bed from the same side. See Halachah 34.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret this as meaning that she inspected herself within the same day or night as the stain was discovered. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:51) states that the inspection must be made immediately thereafter.

For we assume that the woman who found herself impure is the source of the stain.

The commentaries question if this clause applies only with regard to the bed or also with regard to the garment. The Maggid Mishneh asserts that it applies to the garment as well. The Kessef Mishneh, however, argues against his position.

See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.

For she is unlikely to experience uterine bleeding.

For we assume that the woman who found herself impure is the source of the stain.

The commentaries question if this clause applies only with regard to the bed or also with regard to the garment. The Maggid Mishneh asserts that it applies to the garment as well. The Kessef Mishneh, however, argues against his position.

See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.

See Halachah 5 for the definition of this term in the present context.

See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.

This is the meaning of the term betulah in this context. See Halachah 5.

See Halachah 4 for the definition of this term in the present context.

Since there is no reason to favor one over the other, we rule stringently with regard to all of them.

And thus each one did not pass over the place where the other slept. See the notes to Halachah 32.

Because either of the woman on the sides could have shifted position slightly and the blood have come from her.

If, however, the stain was discovered on the top sheet, they are all impure, because the top sheet is likely to shift position during their sleep.

For it is unlikely that one twisted and turned to that degree.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's words as follows: If a stain that appears to be blood is discovered, a woman must consider herself impure. If, however, there is a question in the minds of the experts whether or not she is truly impure, they could verify the woman's status through the test the Rambam mentions. It is not, as the Ra'avad appeared to understand that the Rambam maintained, that a woman should not consider herself impure unless she verified that the stain was blood through the process described. This interpretation is quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:31). See also Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav, ch. 4.

I.e., the sages to whom women would turn to determine whether a stain was blood or not.

See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 9:6).

The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam concerning this point, maintaining that the seven cleansing agents are used to help purify a garment, not to determine whether a woman is pure. As explained in Hilchot Mitamei Mishkav UMoshav, loc. cit., the Rambam also appreciates the role of these cleansing agents in restoring the ritual impurity of a garment. If, however, the cleansing agents are not effective, it becomes obvious that the stain is not blood. Hence, not only the garment, but also the woman is considered as pure.

We have given the popular translation. In his edition of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 9:6), Rav Kappach identifies the Arabic term used by the Rambam as a cleaning agent made from the plant "althaea officinalis."

Again, we have used the common translation. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 2:1), the Rambam defines the term is referring to a blue stone that becomes dissolved in water easily and which is used to clean hair and garments.

Again, we have used the common term. Rav Kappach (loc. cit.) defines the Arabic term used by the Rambam as referring to a plant known as anabis setifera.

Rav Kappach (loc. cit.) defines the Arabic term used by the Rambam as referring to a plant known as saponaria officinalis.

I.e., the fact that the stain remains is not considered evidence that it is not blood.

Note Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 190:31) which states that because we are unsure of the identity of some of these seven cleansing agents, we do not employ this examination process in the present age.

Halachot 12-18.

Halachah 2.

The punishment given for violating a Rabbinic commandment.

If he engaged in relations with her inadvertantly.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 5, Halachah 13, the Rambam rules that when a woman discharges a piece of flesh from the vagina, it must be accompanied by bleeding. For discharging that piece of flesh is not considered as giving birth. With regard to giving birth (or miscarrying), however, the Torah deems a woman is impure, whether or not the birth is accompanied by bleeding.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 2.

A miscarriage is usually accompanied by uterine bleeding. Thus the woman will become impure (as a niddah or as a zavah). However, the unique laws that apply to childbirth do not apply to her.

Even if she had conceived previously, until she reaches the fortieth day, the embryo is not given the halachic status of a fetus and none of the laws applying to childbirth apply.

I.e., the forty-first day after she immersed herself in the mikveh and engaged in relations that night.

I.e., it is possible that she conceived after engaging in relations that night, but we are not certain. Hence, her status is doubtful.

Since it is possible that the fetus was male, it is possible that it was female, and it is possible that it was not considered a fetus in the halachic sense at all, the woman must take all these possibilities into consideration. See Halachah 21 which defines the laws incumbent on a woman in this situation.

In this instance, it is clear that the embryo had developed into a fetus. Hence the laws that apply to ordinary uterine bleeding need not be considered. Nevertheless, since we are uncertain whether the fetus is male or female, the woman must take both of these factors into consideration. See Halachah 20 which describes the laws that a woman must follow in such a situation.

Rekem, the root of the term merukam, means "embroidered." Implied is that the form of the embryo is beginning to take shape.

Alternatively, as two drops of a fly's discharge.

For ultimately, the male organ will grow there.

For we assume that the mass was a dead fetus. The fact that it contains a bone indicates that it had developed sufficiently to acquire the features mentioned in the previous halachah. Obviously, certain factors had caused the fetus to be crushed and the features obliterated.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 3:3) which interprets the Hebrew as referring to "flesh that appears to be cut in the form of worms."

I.e., developed to the point it possesses the features mentioned in the previous halachah.

Moreover, if there is no apparent blood on the discharge, she is not impure as a niddah (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.; see also Chapter 5, Halachah 13).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3) states that in the present age, we follow the approach of the Rashba who rules that we are not knowledgeable enough to make the fine distinctions necessary to define when an embryo is developed or not. Hence, a woman should always consider herself impure because of birth.

Depending on the day of her cycle on which the blood emerged.

Although the Torah considered the blood that emerges during birth pure (Chapter 6, Halachah 1), that apples when the woman gives birth in an ordinary manner, and not when she gives birth by Cesarean section (Rashi, Niddah 41a).

The blood itself is impure, because the uterus itself is impure and it conveys impurity on the blood. Therefore anyone who touches the blood is impure until the evening. The blood does not, however, convey impurity on the woman unless it comes into contact with her after it emerges from her body.

Niddah, loc. cit., derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 20:18.

I.e., the woman was unable to birth the baby and the doctors saw that to save the woman's life, the fetus would have to be killed and taken out limb by limb.

I.e., the point brought out by this halachah is not whether the woman becomes impure, but when the impurity takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 194:9 states that the law stated by the Rambam applies according to Scriptural Law. According to Rabbinic decree, she is impure as soon as one limb emerges.

Although the Mishnah (Niddah 3:5) uses the phrase "the majority of the head," the Rambam maintains that the entire head must emerge for this law to apply. See the Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., complications arose and it was necessary to cut up the fetus to remove it from the womb entirely.

The Maggid Mishneh questions whether the same laws apply with regard to a foot. The Tur states that they do, while the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:11) quotes the Rambam's ruling verbatim.

Although Genesis 38:28 states: "And when she was giving birth, he stuck out a hand," Niddah 28a rules that this should not be interpreted as an implication that sticking out a hand is considered as giving birth. Instead, according to Scriptural Law, the woman does not become impure until the majority of the body of the fetus emerges.

I.e., as implied by the previous halachah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 3:2), the Rambam explains that although it is abnormal for a woman to discharge a fetus with such an appearance, there are exceptional situations from time to time. These and the forms mentioned in the following halachot are definite possibilities.

As defined in the following halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this law also applies in the present era, as indicated by Chapter 11, Halachah 12. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro differs, citing the Ra'avad and the Ramban and explaining that the Rabbis of the present era did not feel that they were expert enough to determine if the face of a fetus resembled that of a man or not. Hence they ruled that woman is impure. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3), he follows this approach.

Note also Halachah 17 which states that if the discharge of such a fetus is accompanied by bleeding, the woman is impure even if the fetus does not resemble a human.

The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that in the previous two halachot, he stated that for a fetus to be considered as having a human form, it must have the majority of a human facial form intact, not merely the eyes. The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the eye of a snake resembles that of a human much more closely than that of other animals. Hence, there is room for the Rambam's ruling.

This ruling is based on Niddah 23b which states that any fetus that is created in a manner that is not fit for its soul to be created (i.e., it is not viable) does not cause the mother to be impure due to birth. Since a fetus with these defects would not live, the mother is not impure. See the Kessef Mishneh which questions the details of certain of the examples cited by the Rambam.

As stated in Halachah 6, when the majority of the limbs of a fetus emerge, the mother is considered as impure due to birth. The present halachah is stating that if previously many of the limbs of a fetus emerged and then the mother discharged this cut off hand or foot, it is not considered as part of a separate fetus, but instead, part of the fetus that already emerged. Hence, if together with the limbs that previously emerged, it equals the majority of the fetus, the woman is impure (Maggid Mishneh).

From Rabbi Akiva Eiger's interpretation of Niddah 28a, the source for this halachah, the following explanation can be given. When a woman discharges a cut off hand or foot, even if we have not seen the remainder of the fetus, we assume that she discharged them already. Hence, she is considered impure. We do not suspect that maybe the fetus she discharged was not viable.

Implied is a leniency. If a woman discharges something resembling a placenta, but which is smaller than a handbreadth, she is not impure due to birth. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Ramban and Rashba who rule that in the present age, we are stringent and rule her impure even if it is smaller than a handbreadth lest an error be made.

Based on Niddah 27a, it appears that this is the maximum number of days granted between a birth and the emergence of the placenta.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro notes that there are authorities who maintain that the 23 days include the day of the birth, while the Rambam maintains that the day of the birth is not included. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3), he quotes the Rambam's ruling.

I.e., the woman had been carrying two fetuses. The emergence of the fetus indicates that she had miscarried and discharged one previously.

Since the fetus is carried within the placenta, in a viable birth, the placenta will never emerge before the fetus carried within it.

I.e., as soon as the first portion of the placenta emerges, the woman becomes impure. Nevertheless, her days of purity do not begin until the appropriate time (7 or 14 days) passes after the second day. And they end after 40 or 80 days from the first day, not from the second day.

As stated in Halachah 8, the discharge of these type of creatures does not render the woman impure. When she discharges a placenta that is connected to them, we assume that they were carried within the placenta. Hence, just as they do not render the woman impure, the placenta also does not.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:7) cites this law without qualification, the Siftei Cohen 194:7 states that just as we are stringent in the present era with regard to the law stated in Halachah 8, we are stringent with regard to this law and rule that the woman is impure.

I.e., we are concerned with the possibility that the woman was carrying two fetuses. Although only one fetus - the animal-formed one - and one placenta emerged, we suppose that originally there was another fetus and another placenta and they were effaced. We assume that the fetus that was effaced was ordinary and hence, the woman is considered as impure.

I.e., the forty or eighty day period when uterine bleeding does not render a woman impure is not granted in this situation, for we suspect that perhaps the woman never in fact gave birth.

As mentioned in Halachah 8.

As mentioned in Halachah 2.

The ruling depends on the day of her personal cycle on which the woman miscarries: Is it one of the days of niddah or one of the days of zivah?

This ruling depends on our Sages' statement (Niddah 21a) that it is possible for the uterus to open without the woman experiencing any bleeding.

This statement is the subject of a difference of opinion in the Talmud and there are some Rishonim who follow the other position and therefore rule that the woman is impure. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:2) follows this view and rules that even if the woman does not notice any bleeding, she must assume that bleeding did in fact take place.

I.e., she must observe 14 days of impurity and then is given 66 days of purity. We do not restrict her to 26 days because of the birth of the boy.

A person whose genital area is covered by a mass of flesh and thus it is impossible to determine his or her gender.

A person who has both male and female sexual organs. There is an unresolved halachic question with regard to the classification of such a person's gender.

Since there is a doubt concerning the issue, the woman must observe the stringencies resulting from either option.

Since it is possible that the tumtum or the androgynus is - or is considered as - a female, the woman must also take the laws governing the birth of a female into consideration.

For even if the tumtum or androgynus was considered as a male, there would be no need for any further severity as stated at the beginning of the halachah.

In particular, there is a difference between the two. With regard to a tumtum, the child has a specific gender, we simply are not able to identify it. With regard to an androgynus, by contrast, the doubt involves the child's halachic status.

And not one of the forms mentioned in Halachah 8.

Because we do not know the gender of the fetus, she must take both possibilities into consideration.

For it is possible that she was less than 40 days pregnant, in which instance the fetus is not considered as being born, and she is governed by the laws applying to a niddah, as stated in Halachah 2.

For even if the fetus was male, she would be impure for this time.

For we do not know that the fetus was female.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 3:3), the Rambam explains the rationale for this ruling. There is a question of Scriptural Law involved. Whenever doubt arises in such a situation, we follow the more stringent approach.

As would be the ruling was she to have given birth to a female. As explained in Chapter 11, Halachah 6, today

In Chapter 7, Halachah 12, the Rambam writes that "that any bleeding that a woman discovers after the completion of the days associated with childbirth marks the beginning of her days of niddah." Accordingly, the first time a woman in such a situation discovers uterine bleeding between the fortieth and eightieth day after birth, there is a doubt whether she is a niddah. If she discovers bleeding a second time, the question of whether the doubt involves the niddah or zivah state depends on the day when the bleeding is discovered.

I.e., she is not merely a minor zavah.

Apparently, the Rambam's intent is speaking about a woman who discovered uterine bleeding between the fortieth and eightieth day after birth and then a second time on the eighty-first day and according to the niddah-zivah cycle, the eighty-first day is a day of zivah. (For example, she discovered uterine bleeding previously on the seventieth day.). In that instance, there is a doubt whether she is considered a niddah, for if the fetus was female, this would be considered the beginning of the niddah cycle, or a zavah, for if the fetus was male, her cycle would have begun earlier. See the following halachah and notes.

According to this interpretation, however, the word "alone" which the Rambam adds appears to be in error.

Chapter 7, Halachah 12.

The Rambam is speaking about a situation when a woman discovers uterine bleeding for the first time after a miscarriage. Ordinarily, her niddah cycle would start at that time. Nevertheless, since the possibility exists that her miscarriage did not involve a fetus, she must continue her previous reckoning of the "days of niddah" and the "days of zivah."

If the fetus was male, the bleeding on the seventy-fourth day would have been considered the beginning of her "days of niddah" and the eighty-first day, the beginning of her "days of zivah." Thus she would be only a minor zavah. Nevertheless, there is also a possibility that the fetus was female. In such an instance, any bleeding before the eighty-first day is insignificant and the eighty-first day begins the niddah cycle. Hence we rule more stringently and consider her a niddah, because of the doubt.

This would be the law were we certain that she had miscarried a male fetus. Her status is doubtful, for it is possible that her miscarriage is not considered a birth at all. In that instance, the bleeding would be either niddah or zivah bleeding, depending on her cycle.

I.e., were we to know for certain that she had given birth, there would be no concept of days of niddah and days of zivah. Hence, in the present situation, although the woman must observe the stringencies of niddah and zivah, it is only because of the doubt.

Depending on the day of her cycle on which the bleeding is discovered.

Either because of the miscarriage or because the bleeding is considered as blood of niddah. Either way, she is definitely impure for seven days.

In Halachah 20.

I.e., to the Temple in Jerusalem. See Hilchot Mamrim, chs. 1 and 4, which discuss the authority of the Supreme Sanhedrin and how it served as the final governing body for Jewish Law.

Chapter 4, Halachah 4.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 7-12, in the Talmudic era, our Sages felt capable of distinguishing between different shades of red and were able to identify some shades as pure and others as impure. In the Rambam's era and certainly in later ages, the Rabbis felt incapable of making such distinctions.

The Maggid Mishneh relates that the Rambam did not clarify his statements concerning this Rabbinic ordinance because it was only a temporary measure. It does not reflect Scriptural Law, nor does it reflect Rabbinic Law as practice, because it was later supplanted by the stringency Jewish women accepted upon themselves as stated in the following halachah.

To explain: Niddah 66a relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi ordained that any woman who discovers uterine bleeding should wait six "spotless" days before immersing herself . If, however, she discovers bleeding for three consecutive days, she must wait seven "spotless" days. Thus if the bleeding had come in her days of niddah, she would have waited the seven days required by Scriptural Law (the day she discovered the bleeding and the six "spotless" days). And if the bleeding had come in her days of zivah, all that is required by Scriptural Law is for her to wait one spotless day. This is the ordinance to which the Rambam referred.

The stringency implied by this practice is that even if bleeding is sighted for only one day, the woman counts seven "spotless" days.

According to Scriptural Law, there is no need for her to count seven "spotless" days in such a situation. Instead, she may immerse after the seventh day regardless. Nevertheless, women accepted this stringency upon themselves.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, a zavah may immerse herself during the day on the seventh day. She need not wait until evening. Nevertheless, since a niddah is required to wait until the evening to immerse herself, women standardized their conduct and ordained that all immersion be performed at night unless there are extenuating circumstances. Note, however, Halachah 17.

Chapter 4, Halachah 8.

Chapter 7, Halachah 5.

According to Scriptural Law, if a women is not a zavah when she gives birth, she may immerse herself after seven or fourteen days, even if she was bleeding the entire time. In the Talmudic era, however, it became customary to observe the stringency described by the Rambam. The rationale is that since every discovery of bleeding renders her a zavah, she is always considered as having given birth in that state (Maggid Mishneh).

When quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:1) emphasizes that this practice does not supplant Scriptural Law. Thus if a woman counts seven "spotless" days directly after giving birth to a girl, she must still wait the fourteen days required by the Torah before immersing.

Eretz Yisrael.

Morocco and North Africa.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam has a specific meaning, the days between the seventh and fortieth days after a woman gives birth to a male or the days between the fourteenth and eightieth days after she gives birth to a female.

Chapter 7, Halachah 7.

Whose halachic tradition differed from that of the Sephardic community in many particulars.

The Rambam is referring to one of the principles mentioned in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah: Laws ordained by the Sages of the Talmud must be accepted universally throughout the Jewish community. Laws ordained by later authorities are subject to the halachic review of the local authorities.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 194:1) writes that it has already become universal Jewish practice to forbid relations when a woman discovers bleeding during her days of purity.

I.e., the first time the couple engage in relations. As explained in Chapter 5, Halachot 18-25, according to Scriptural Law, hymeneal bleeding does not represent any difficulty for it is not at all related to niddah or zivah. Hence, according to Talmudic Law, when the wife is a minor, the couple may engage in relations until the hymeneal bleeding ceases. Even a girl who gets married at the age of twelve is granted certain leniency. The later Rabbis, however, required all couples to separate because of hymeneal bleeding.

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that the groom may complete relations and withdraw while erect even if he knows that bleeding has commenced. Although our Rabbis ordained this stringency, they did not apply it to the first time the couple engaged in relations.

He also states that even if no bleeding is discovered, if the bride was a virgin, we assume that there was a slight amount of blood that was not noticed and rule that she is impure. These laws are quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 193:1).

I.e., if all the hymeneal blood was not released during the first time the couple engaged in relations and bleeding was discovered after subsequent relations.

The day after she consents is the first of these seven days. If she becomes engaged and there is a considerable time between the engagement and the marriage, the days are counted from the time wedding preparations are made in earnest (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 192:1-2).

This stringency applies to a young girl who never menstruated or an older girl who already experienced seven "spotless" days after her last menstruation.

The Kessef Mishneh and the Maggid Mishneh maintain that the Rambam would agree that not only relations, but also remaining alone with one's wife is forbidden in this situation. The Ra'avad and the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 192) infer that the Rambam is not paying heed to this prohibition. Hence, they differ with his ruling.

In Chapter 9.

The Rambam is saying that for a stain a woman is not required to make a hefsek taharah or count seven days. Instead, it is sufficient for her to count six "spotless" days as described in Halachah 3 and notes. For as he explains, the discovery of a stain is not the same as the discovery of bleeding.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the laws applying to the discovery of bleeding also apply with regard to the discovery of a stain. The Maggid Mishneh offers theoretical support for the Rambam's approach, but states that since other Rishonim follow the Ra'avad's view, we should be stringent and accept it. This opinion is followed by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 188:3, 190:1).

See Chapter 5, Halachah 15; Chapter 10, Halachah 8.

The Rambam maintains that the Rabbis did not issue a decree concerning such a situation, nor was this included in the stringency which Jewish women accepted upon themselves. The Ra'avad differs, explaining that in the present era, we are not knowledgeable concerning the distinctions between the forms which our Sages made. Hence, because of the doubt, we rule that a woman is impure after any miscarriage.

In this instance as well, the Ra'avad's view is accepted by the Ramban and the Rashba and is cited as halachah by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:3).

See Chapter 5, Halachah 6. This ruling is accepted by all authorities.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 13. This ruling is also disputed by the Ra'avad and other Rishonim. For they maintain that it is impossible for the uterus to open without there being any bleeding. This view is accepted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 194:2).

See Chapter 4, Halachah 20.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 17. Other Rabbis also do not require stringency with regard to these matters in the present age.

As stated in Halachah 3, the later Rabbis felt incapable of distinguishing between different shades of red as the Sages of the Talmud were capable of doing.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 196:11) also mentions the practice cited by the Rambam. He also negates it saying: "There is no reason for the practice. A person who is lenient earns a reward and hastens his [involvement in] the mitzvah."

Although the halachic authorities are unanimous in their support of the Rambam's ruling. The custom he quotes has a Rabbinic source in Midrash Tanchuma, Parshat Metzora, sec. 7.

The Rama (loc. cit.) mentions that the Ashkenazic custom is not to begin counting seven until the fifth day after the woman discovered menstrual bleeding.

By this practice, they distort the meaning of Leviticus, ch. 12, as interpreted in Chapter 4, Halachah 5.

For as indicated by the association with the Sadducees, they undermine the authority of the Oral Law.

A deviant sect which tried to sway our people from Jewish practice by denying the authority of the Oral Law.

For an immersion can be disqualified when there are substances intervening between one's flesh and the waters of a mikveh. See Hilchot Mikveot 1:7 and the laws that follow.

As explained in Halachot 3 and 4 and notes.

Since a niddah or a zavah does not change her state if she immerses herself before the required time, we apply this same ruling to a woman in the present age.

I.e., after sunrise.

We fear that she may discover uterine bleeding after engaging in relations, but before nightfall, and thus nullify the entire seven "spotless" days. In that instance, her immersion is of no consequence.

For according to Scriptural Law, a zavah may immerse at this time, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 11. And if the woman is a niddah, she may certainly immerse according to Scriptural Law, for the time of her impurity has passed.

This and the following restrictions were imposed lest they lead to relations, as the Rambam states in the following halachah.

The Ra'avad states: "Our custom is that [they may not eat] even on the same table." The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 195:3) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling, but offers the following leniency. One may place an object between the two to make a distinction.

In Halachah 16.

Implied is that if he is not present, she may make his bed. Outside his presence, making his bed is a household task. In his presence, it could suggest an invitation for intimacy. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, ch. 195) and commentaries for a further delineation of stringencies that must be observed until a woman purifies herself.

I.e., relations.