Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Eretz Yisrael is singled out because Jewish courts frequently held sessions there, and it was feasible to verify the signatures of the witnesses to the get. In contrast, the courts in the Diaspora held sessions less frequently and verifying the signature of witnesses was a far more formidable task. Therefore, different laws apply, as stated in Halachah 5. In the present age, the laws applying to sending gittin in the Diaspora are also followed in Eretz Yisrael. (See Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Even HaEzer 142:1.)

More particularly, according to the Rambam, only one witness is necessary, because the agent himself may serve as the second witness.

If the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, the husband’s protests are ignored. Once the witnesses sign the get, it is considered as if they have testified in court, and the husband’s statements are of no avail.

See the Beit Shmuel 142:5, which quotes a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether or not the Rambam maintains that the husband’s protest causes the get to be considered void. The consequence of this difference of opinion is the status of the children born out of a second marriage. Are they definitely considered to be illegitimate, or is this a point of doubt?

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the get to be unacceptable because the fact that the husband protests the authenticity of the get and the woman is unable to verify the signatures causes us to question the matter. Since the woman was regarded as married, her status cannot be changed until she receives a get that is not of doubtful status.
The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 141) explains that although we assume that the woman has not been divorced, we do not know this with absolutely certainty. Hence, if she is consecrated by another man after receiving this get, she must be divorced by this second husband. Similarly, there are other authorities who maintain that the status of the divorce is doubtful.

For in this instance there is no way to verify the signature of the witnesses.

I.e., if the woman remarries, she will be committing adultery, and hence, she will be forbidden to remain married to her first husband. Nor will she be permitted to remain married to her second husband. Since they were involved in an adulterous relationship, they are forbidden to marry.

I.e., just as a mother-in-law may not bring a get for her daughter-in-law, a daughter-inlaw may not bring a get for her mother-in-law.

Despite the fact that this woman has been divorced and remarried, we assume that she still harbors bad feelings towards the woman with whom she shared her previous husband and might desire to create difficulties for her.

I.e., a woman who is married to her husband’s brother. If the woman’s husband died without children, her husband’s brother would be obligated to marry her to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum. Thus, the two women could ultimately become married to the same man.

Although in this instance the mitzvah of yibbum would not apply because the two sisters are forbidden to marry the same man, our Sages did not differentiate when imposing this restriction.

If, however, there is nothing preventing the agent from carrying out his agency, he may not appoint another agent. For we assume that a husband would object to the substitution (Gittin 29a).

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 6, Halachah 4, there are opinions that differ and require the appointment of an agent to be observed by witnesses. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:11) favors the Rambam’s view with regard to the appointment of the agent himself, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) follows the other opinions with regard to the agent’s appointment of a second agent. In practice, the present custom is to have the appointment witnessed.

For the husband, and not the previous agent, is the source of empowerment for the final agent.

Generally, the verification of the signature of witnesses on a legal document requires two witnesses. In this instance, however, an exception was made, and the statements of one individual are accepted. The rationale for this exception can be explained as follows: According to Scriptural Law, there is no need for the signatures of the witnesses to a legal document to be verified. This requirement was instituted by our Sages. And in order to prevent a woman from having difficulties in obtaining a divorce, they relaxed that requirement and accepted the statements of the agent (Gittin 3a).

I.e., we do not suspect that the witnesses were gentiles and that the get is void. For it has been customary for Jews living in the Diaspora to adopt gentile names (Tosafot, Gittin 11b). If, however, the probability is small that a Jew would use such a name, e.g., Nickolas or Patrick, there are authorities who are more stringent. See Beit Shmuel 130:30.

Once the statements of the agent are accepted by the court, they are given the same weight as if they had been made by two witnesses. Therefore, the protest of the husband is of no consequence (Gittin 9a). If, however, the husband brings two witnesses who testify that the get is a forgery, their word — and not that of the agent — is accepted (Halachah 9).

Our suspicion is that these women would forge a get to cause the wife to be forbidden to remain married to both husbands, and that the forgery will be easily discovered, because her first husband will protest the legitimacy of the get. When the agent herself must say ‘‘The get was written and signed in my presence,’’ the first husband’s protest will not be accepted, and the woman will be allowed to remain married to her second husband. As such, the forgery will not achieve its desired result.

Our Sages accepted the statements of the agent as equivalent to those of two witnesses even when he was not required to have made them (Gittin 6b). Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, who questions whether this also applies with regard to questions of monetary law — e.g., the payment of the woman’s marriage contract.

The woman might think that the divorce is effective upon receipt of the get and may remarry, without being aware of the difficulties involved.

More particularly, in this matter the agent can serve in three capacities: a) as the agent to give the get, b) as a witness to verify the signatures of the witnesses, and c) as a judge declaring that the signatures have been verified. This is possible because, as explained above, the verification of the get by witnesses is a requirement of Rabbinic Law. In matters of Scriptural Law, a witness may not serve as a judge. (See also Halachah 19.)

I.e., disqualified by the Rabbis. It is not, however, void according to Scriptural Law (Maggid Mishneh). According to the general principles mentioned by the Rambam (Chapter 10, Halachah 2), if the woman remarries in such an instance, she is not obligated to leave her second husband. The Tur (Even HaEzer 142) quotes opinions that differ and require her to leave her second husband, even if her first husband does not protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:1) follows the Rambam’s ruling.

See the notes on Halachah 1.

E.g., two witnesses who testify that the get is a forgery.

In Hilchot Terumah 1:7, the Rambam writes: ‘‘With regard to the islands in the sea, we consider their [status dependent] on an [imaginary] line extended from the Samnum Mountains until the River of Egypt. Those within this line are part of Eretz Yisrael. Those outside this line are part of the Diaspora.’’ The Rambam understands the Samnum Mountains as being located in the southeastern corner of Eretz Yisrael, near Ashkelon. Most of the other commentaries understand this term as referring to the Umenum Mountain range in Northern Lebanon.

In the Talmudic era, Babylonia was a center of Torah study and there would be students traveling from all the cities to and from the central yeshivot in Sura, Neharde’a and Pumbedita. Hence, it was possible to find witnesses to verify the authenticity of the signatures on a get (Gittin 6a).

Regardless of whether the get was given in another place in the Diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael, the signature of the witnesses cannot be easily verified, and hence the agent is required to make these statements.

If the get is given in Eretz Yisrael, the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, and hence the agent is not required to make these statements.

The fundamental element to be observed by the agent is the signature of the get by the witnesses. For as long as the scribe wrote a portion of the get lishmah, for the sake of the man and the woman getting divorced, it is sufficient (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:1).
Note the Yadav Shel Moshe, who questions why the Rambam concerns himself with the issue of lishmah. On the difference of opinion between Rabbah and Ravva regarding the reason for the agent having to say: ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence,’’ the Rambam follows the opinion of Ravva, who states that the problem is not lishmah, but rather the verification of the signatures of the witnesses.

Rashi, Gittin 15a, interprets this as referring to the line that contains the man’s name, the woman’s name and the date. Tosafot interprets it as referring to the first line of the get. The Beit Shmuel 142:28 explains that the Rambam accepts neither of these opinions, but means any given line of the get.

If that were the case, the get would not be written lishmah.

For the confirmation of the get must follow the directives outlined by our Sages in their entirety or rely on the verification of the signatures of the witnesses (Tosafot, Gittin 15b).

Since the decree of our Sages was not fulfilled, the only alternative is to verify the signatures of the witnesses.

I.e., the agent says that the get was written, and one signed in his presence, and he and another person verify the signature of the second witness.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 142) differs with this ruling. He agrees that in contrast to a get brought by one agent, a get brought by two agents may be given to the woman without their saying, ‘‘It was written and signed in our presence.’’ Nevertheless, the Tur maintains that if the husband protests the authenticity of the get, the signatures of the witnesses must be verified. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:18) follows the Rambam’s ruling, while the Rama quotes that of the Tur.

This law applies only when the agents are able to serve as witnesses in court. If, however, they are related to the husband or the wife, or would be disqualified for other reasons, they are required to say, ‘‘It was written and signed in our presence.’’

Rashi (Gittin 16b) appears to imply that both agents must be physically holding the get together. The Rashba differs [and this opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:18)] and states all that is necessary is for the agents to state that they were both appointed by the husband and given the get. The Rashba extends this leniency and states that even if only one agent was appointed by the husband, if another person witnessed his appointment and traveled with him, it is not necessary for the agent to say ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence.’’

As mentioned above, according to the interpretation accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, we are not speaking about a second agent, but another person who accompanied the agent.

This is referring to a third individual and not one of the agents.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the statement, ‘‘It was written in my presence,’’ is unnecessary. Since two witnesses testify that they observed the signing of the get, they have verified the signatures of the witnesses. The Rambam mentions this instance only because he is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Gittin 2:1). And the Mishnah mentions this only as a literary device, so that the wording in its different clauses are parallel.

Even if the two individuals who speak with regard to the signing of the get are not agents, their statements verify the authenticity of the signatures, making it a valid legal document.

This wording implies that if the woman remarried after this divorce, she may remain married to her second husband. Rabbenu Asher and others rule more stringently and maintain that in such a situation, the woman must be divorced by her second husband.

Even after the signatures of the witnesses have been verified, the get should be taken from the woman and returned to her in the presence of witnesses, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 15.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that it is not sufficient for the witness to write these words out. Although a person who cannot speak and who witnessed the death of a woman’s husband is allowed to write out his testimony (Chapter 13, Halachah 28), there is no alternative in that situation. In these circumstances, there is an alternative: to have the signatures of the witnesses verified (Kessef Mishneh).

Gittin 23a states that when an agent is blind, he must be able to recognize the woman by the sound of her voice. It is not sufficient for others to identify her for him. When an agent can see, however, he need not know the woman’s identity and may rely on the statements of others (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:11).

Hilchot Edut 9:12 states that a blind person may not serve as a witness and Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9 states that such a person may not serve as a judge. Hilchot Edut 9:2 states that a woman may not serve in these capacities. Similarly, if the agent is related to the man or the woman, he is incapable of serving as a judge and three witnesses are necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:4).

See Halachot 5 and 7 and notes.

It is sufficient for him to appear before two judges, because he can serve as the third judge himself (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:9).

As opposed to the situation described in Halachah 4, the agent cannot appoint a second agent himself, because he is required to state in a court of law that the get was written and signed in his presence.

The wording of the Rambam might be understood as implying that the agency is entrusted to the second agent by the court. This, however, is an incorrect inference, for it is the first agent who appoints the subsequent agent. This appointment must, however, be performed in a court to ensure that everything necessary to validate the get is performed. (See Rivash, Responsum 318.)

The Rama (Even HaEzer 142:9) quotes the Rivash as ruling that, if sending a second get would be difficult, it is acceptable for the second agent to bring the get, even though he was not appointed in court, provided he brings a writ of authorization from the first agent.

The reason the appointment of the latter agents must be made in a court is that the signatures of the witnesses have not been verified. By stating that his appointment was made in a court of law, every agent assures the court that the correct process has been followed regarding this get.

If, however, there are no factors preventing the agent from discharging his agency, he may not appoint another agent unless the husband explicitly gave him the authority to do so (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rivash (Responsum 53) differs with this ruling and maintains that if the second agent does not hear the first agent say: ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence,’’ he must be given a writ of appointment. Otherwise, he may not serve in this capacity. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:10) quotes the Rambam’s ruling — and indeed expands upon it, allowing the agent to give the court the authority to appoint any agent they desire. The Rama quotes the ruling of the Rivash.

She must, however, make these statements for the divorce to be effective. Our Sages made this requirement in order not to differentiate between one agency and another (Rashba, commenting on Gittin 24a).

It is likely that a forgery would ultimately be discovered. She would then be forbidden to remain married to her second husband, nor would she be permitted to return to her first husband.
The Maggid Mishneh draws a connection between this halachah and Chapter 12, Halachah 2, which states that the statements of a woman who produces a get are accepted, even though the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses to the get has not been verified. The Ra’avad in his gloss on Hilchot Avadim 6:7 differs (see also his gloss to Chapter 12, Halachah 2). The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:13-14) quotes the opinions of both the Rambam and the Ra’avad. See the Rivash (Responsum 385).

With regard to financial transactions, a person’s statements are not accepted if he has an interest in the matter, unless he substantiates them with proof. Therefore, if a person gives a servant a deed of release that states that he has been freed and has been granted his master’s possessions, his word is accepted with regard to his freedom. With regard to the possessions, however, he is required to substantiate his statements by verifying the authenticity of the witnesses to the deed (Hilchot Avadim 7:2).

See Halachah 2 of that chapter, which explains that there are four rules that govern all conditional agreements: a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement]; b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect; c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the action that one desires to make conditional; d) the stipulation must be something with which it is possible to comply. If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there were no condition at all.

This is relevant if the couple is childless and the woman is obligated to fulfill either the rite of yibbum or of chalitzah.

With regard to the first clause, a get can be effective only when the husband granting the divorce is still alive. If he dies, the marriage bonds are already rent by his death. With regard to the latter clause, since the get takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled, the get itself must be intact at that time. If it is not, there is no medium through which the divorce takes effect (see Gittin 74a).

Lest the husband die or the get be destroyed, and thus the divorce be nullified.

The Rambam’s ruling is clarified by his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, in which he states that a conditional divorce begins when the get is given and is not concluded until the condition is fulfilled. This conception has aroused objections among the commentators who maintain that the woman is like any other married woman until the condition is fulfilled. She cannot be consecrated, and marital relations with her are considered adulterous.

E.g., her husband made a condition that she give an article to his father and his father dies.

I.e., the husband uses this expression rather than saying: ‘‘If you do such-and-such, the divorce is effective. If you do not do such-and-such, the divorce is not effective.’’ The Rama (Even HaEzer 144:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4) mention opinions that do not equate ‘‘on the condition that’’ with ‘‘from now onwards.’’

The Rama (Even HaEzer 143:2) quotes opinions that maintain that even when a condition is stated using the wording ‘‘on the condition that,’’ the husband has the right to nullify the get until the condition is fulfilled.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this ruling and declares that the woman should not remarry until the condition is fulfilled. There is, however, one exception: a condition that requires the woman to refrain from performing a particular activity before the divorce takes effect.

I.e., we do not suspect that she will fail to do what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of her second marriage because of the severe consequences this will bring upon her.

For entering into privacy with a woman in the presence of witnesses is considered equivalent to actual relations. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 18.)

See Chapter 10, Halachah 19, which explains that when there is a possibility that a man has had marital relations with his divorcee, we assume that he consecrated her again, rather than conducting these relations in a licentious manner. (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 25.)

This is unacceptable, as explained in the following halachah.

See the Beit Shmuel 147:1, which states that in a situation of difficulty in which the husband cannot wait until the get is written, we rely on more lenient views that differ with the Rambam. According to these views, the husband may instruct the scribe and the witnesses to write a get in the usual manner and to give it to the agent and before it is written, instruct the agent to give it to the woman conditionally.

I.e., a condition that is acceptable (Beit Shmuel 147:2).

I.e., the man’s name, the woman’s name, the date and the sentence: ‘‘Behold, you are permitted [to marry] any man,’’ as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 17.

I.e., using acceptable wording, as opposed to the wording described in the following halachah.

This ruling is questioned by the commentaries. Gittin 84b states that such a get is pasul, ‘‘unacceptable.’’ Unlike the Rambam, for whom this term has an explicit meaning (see Chapter 10, Halachah 20), in the Talmud, the interpretation of the term is somewhat ambiguous. In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that since — as mentioned in the previous halachah — the difficulty concerns a point of Scriptural Law, and yet the Talmud did not rule the get to be void, he maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam interprets the ruling as dependent on the principle of bereirah, that retroactively, when the condition is fulfilled, it becomes apparent that the get did sever the connection between the husband and the wife. Since our Sages did not determine whether or not the principle of bereirah applies with regard to questions of Scriptural Law, the status of the divorce is in doubt.
Other authorities differ and maintain that if the condition was stated properly before the essential portion of the get was written and fulfilled, the get is acceptable. If the condition was written in the get itself, Tosafot, the Ramban and the Ra’avad maintain that the get is acceptable, while Rabbenu Nissim states that such a get is deemed unacceptable by Rabbinic decree.
At the outset, all the authorities maintain that the rules stated by the Rambam should be followed. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 147:2) also quotes the Rambam’s ruling that the status of the divorce is in doubt. In a case of hardship, however, the Beit Shmuel 147:2 states that the more lenient views can be relied upon.

Needless to say, according to the Rambam, when any of the following conditions is binding, it invalidates the get if it was made or stated before the essential portion of the get was written. The difference between these conditions and those stated in the previous halachah is that those conditions can be fulfilled through a specific activity, and once they are fulfilled the marriage bond is severed entirely. The conditions mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, remain binding throughout the woman’s life. Thus, her connection to her husband is never severed entirely.
The authorities which differ with the Rambam in the previous halachah, also differ in this instance, and maintain that if this condition is written in the get itself, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, but disqualified by Rabbinic decree. See Beit Shmuel 137:3.

Because of the prohibitions involved, there is no possibility of the woman’s establishing a marriage bond with these individuals (see Hilchot Ishut 4:14-15), and therefore, her husband’s statements are of no consequence.

Note, however, Chapter 10, Halachah 1. Rabbenu Nissim and other authorities rule more leniently and maintain that such a get is acceptable according to Scriptural Law and was deemed unacceptable only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.

In such instances, even though marital relations violate a prohibition, a marriage bond can be established (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

For ultimately, the minor will attain majority. Rabbenu Chanan’el differs and states that with regard to a minor, the status of the divorce is doubtful. The difference of opinion is dependent on the text of Gittin 85b, of which two versions exist.

In all these cases, the divorce does not totally sever the relationship between the husband and the wife. Nevertheless, our Sages were not certain that the rights retained by the husband were sufficient to render the divorce void.

I.e., the husband is a priest, and while married his wife may partake of terumah, although she is the daughter of an Israelite.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where the husband takes the get back from the woman and gives it to her again, making the latter statement. This conception is also reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:1).
The Tur (Even HaEzer 137) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in this instance the status of the divorce is in doubt. We suspect that perhaps the intent of his latter statement was to permit her to Reuven and Shimon, but to forbid her to everyone else. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:4) accepts the Tur’s ruling. All authorities agree that if the husband says: ‘‘You are also permitted [to marry] Reuven or Shimon,’’ the get is acceptable.

Rabbenu Asher and the Rashba differ and maintain that in such an instance, the divorce is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 137:5) follows the view of Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the status of the divorce is in doubt.

There is a factor, the prohibition against drinking wine, that always maintains the connection between them.

The Rashba differs with this ruling, explaining that since the other person may die, this can be compared to an instance where the husband makes a condition that his wife not drink wine during the duration of another person’s life. Just as that condition is considered to be having a limit, so too, should this condition be considered to be limited.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro defends the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that in the instance at hand, the woman will never be able to marry the man specified in the condition. As such, the condition is not considered limited. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:22), he quotes both opinions and states that the stringencies required by both views should be observed.

I.e., the condition is one that binds a woman to her husband for her entire life.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum of the Rashbatz that states that the intent is that the marriage will be forbidden for a period longer than the woman is expected to live. Thus, though the husband has in effect prohibited the woman from marrying the other man forever, since this is not explicitly stated, the condition is considered to be limited in scope.

According to the Rambam, it appears that the woman is free to marry another man immediately, for we assume that she will abide by the condition, rather than place herself in a compromising situation. There are, however, other opinions that state that she is not allowed to remarry until the person specified dies. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:16) quotes both opinions without appearing to favor either one.

I.e., it is considered as if the original marriage bond had never been severed. Any children born to her between the divorce and its nullification are deemed illegitimate.

This would compromise the entire image of Jewish divorce. (See Rashi, Gittin 84a.)

The requirement for the woman’s second husband to divorce her is a Rabbinic decree, instituted lest people see a woman who appears married leave her husband without a get. According to Scriptural Law, a get is not necessary (Maggid Mishneh).

Since the husband maintains possession of the paper on which the get is written, the couple’s marriage relationship has not been totally severed. Rashi (Gittin 75b) offers a different interpretation of this ruling.

When she receives the get, the paper belongs to her. Afterwards, she willingly gives it back. This follows the principle that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered to be a valid present (Rashi, Gittin 20b).

Gittin 20b explains that the fact that the same article serves two purposes — bringing about the divorce and providing remuneration for the woman’s marriage contract — does not prevent it from being effective.

Since the get was written in an unacceptable manner, there is reason to maintain that the get can never be acceptable. This applies when the unacceptable condition was written before the essential portion of the get.
The wording used by the Rambam is, however, questionable. The Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 9:1) and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on this halachah use the word pasul ‘‘unacceptable,’’ rather than ‘‘the status of the divorce is in doubt’’ to describe such a get. Perhaps here, the Rambam uses the term ‘‘the status of the divorce is in doubt,’’ because, as cited above from the Rambam’s responsa, according to the Rambam, the question in these situations is whether the get is written for the sake of severing the marriage bond. And a question of Scriptural Law is involved (Rav Kapach).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to a condition stated after the essential portion of the get was written. If such a condition was stated before the essential portion was written, the get is unacceptable, because it was not written with the intent of severing the marriage relationship. See Halachah 4 and notes.

The Sages decreed that unless the get is returned, it not effective, even if the condition was nullified. Since the original giving of such a get has a permanent effect — the woman is forbidden to marry a priest (or to remain married to her husband, if he is a priest), as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 1 — the only way such a condition can be nullified is by returning the get to the husband, and having him give it again without any condition.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to an instance where the condition was stated in a twofold statement: ‘‘If you do such-and-such, the get is effective, but if you do not do such-and-such, the get is not effective.’’ In such instances, since the divorce is not effective until the condition is fulfilled, the husband may alter the condition. When, however, a get is given ‘‘on condition that...,’’ the divorce is retroactively effective from the time the get was given. Hence, the condition cannot be changed.
Rashi (Gittin 76a) offers a different interpretation of this passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:10) follows the Rambam’s interpretation, while the Rama follows that of Rashi.

For each of the conditions is considered to be a separate matter.

This ruling reflects an interesting halachic judgment on the Rambam’s part. Gittin 75b explains that the ruling cited by the Rambam was authored by Rav Ashi. Although the Gemara poses questions on Rav Ashi’s view that are left unresolved, since his position was not refuted, according to the Rambam, the halachah follows his view.
The Tur follows a different view and maintains that the woman must serve her husband’s father for the duration of the father’s life and nurse the son for the entire two-year period. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama cites that of the Tur.

For the condition has not been fulfilled.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and states that since the woman did not prevent the condition from being fulfilled, the get is effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:8) does not accept this view. The Rama states that the more stringent view should be followed.

As reflected in Halachah 23, a husband can nullify a condition that he makes to a get. In this instance, however, he is not nullifying the condition, but rather trying to have it satisfied in a way other than that which he originally intended. This is not acceptable; the divorce is not effective unless he nullifies the condition entirely (Gittin 74b; Maggid Mishneh).

Thus, if the husband dies without children, she is required to perform either the rites of yibbum or chalitzah.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 143) differs and explains that the husband has the option of accepting the money in lieu of the object originally mentioned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 143:6) mentions both views, it appears to favor that of the Rambam.

I.e., he tells the woman, ‘‘This is your get; there are no conditions attached.’’ He does not have to take the get back from the woman.

The Beit Shmuel 146:5 states that this applies when the husband gave the get ‘‘on the condition that...,’’ for in such an instance the divorce is effective retroactively from the time the get was given. (With regard to other conditions, see the notes on Halachah 1.)

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s decision and maintains that since it was possible for the woman to have fulfilled the condition, we suspect that perhaps she did in fact fulfill it. Therefore, she is forbidden to remain married to her first husband. It is the Rambam’s view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4).

See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

If the husband dies she is not divorced, because a divorce must take effect before death. If the get is destroyed, she is not divorced because it is the get that serves as the medium of divorce, and at the time when the get must take effect, it no longer exists.

The public domain was a marketplace with pillars on either side. At the side of the pillars, there was space that though ownerless, could be used to acquire property, because it was not common for people to walk in that space.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Kessef Mishneh and others contrast the Rambam’s ruling here, that the divorce is not retroactively effective from the time the husband gave the get, to his ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 2:9. That source states that a sale can be effective when made with the stipulation that it take effect after 30 days, only when the stipulation is that it take effect retroactively. The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the two instances, explaining that a sale requires an act of contract to bring about a transfer, and that act took place when the sale was originally made, not 30 days afterwards. In contrast, with regard to a get, the fundamental aspect of the divorce is brought about by the writing of the get.

Had the get been placed by the woman in the public domain itself, it would not be effective even if it existed when the time specified by the husband arrived. Since it left the woman’s domain entirely, the giving of the get originally performed by the husband is no longer considered significant. And, as stated at the beginning of these laws, one of the requirements of a divorce is that the get be given to the woman by her husband.

I.e., in this instance as well, there is a resemblance to the laws of a conditional divorce. Nevertheless, since different wording is used, the laws vary.

Moreover, the action specified by the husband may be something that does not require anything to be done by his wife. For example, he may tell her that the divorce will take effect after the first rainfall (Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 3:3).

Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

Halachah 3. If the get is not in the woman’s possession at this time, the divorce is not effective according to the Rambam. Nevertheless, other authorities have a different conception of these laws, and according to them, the status of the divorce would be doubtful (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 146:3).

For their relations are considered adulterous.

For he did not preface his statements by saying: ‘‘This is your get,’’ or ‘‘You are divorced....’’ Hence, he is not considered to have given the get for the sake of divorce. Although such an intent could be deduced from his words, since his statements were not explicit, they are of no consequence.

I.e., he desires that the get not take effect until a specific time, but does not want the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah to apply. This is not merely a theoretical situation. Such gittin were given frequently in previous generations when a man undertook an overseas journey and wished to spare his wife from having to remain unmarried if he was killed, kidnapped by pirates or in other ways prevented from returning against his will.

Gittin 30a cites an example of a man who divorced his wife on condition that he not return within 30 days. A river washed away the bridge leading to his city. Although he stood on the river banks and called to his townsmen: ‘‘See, I have returned,’’ our Sages ruled that he is not considered to have returned, and they considered the divorce binding.

According to Scriptural Law, a person who is prevented from fulfilling a condition by forces beyond his control is not considered as having failed to fulfill it. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the laws of divorce are an exception to this principle, because modest women might presume that their husbands were prevented from fulfilling their condition by forces beyond their control and never remarry (Ketubot 2b). The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 2b) and others, who state that this principle applies only with regard to events beyond mortal control that one could possibly foresee — e.g., illness or flood. It does not apply with regard to events beyond a person’s control that are totally unlikely — e.g., earthquakes. The Maggid Mishneh cites statements by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 19, which indicate that he would also accept this restriction.

As will be explained, this law applies when the husband stated ‘‘on condition that...’’ when giving the get.

Since ultimately the condition was fulfilled.

If he entered into privacy with her, the get would be nullified. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5; Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

In such an instance, if the woman were to say that she never agreed to her husband’s spending more than 30 days away from her, the get would be effective after the condition is fulfilled.

The husband gave his wife the get because he was going away on a journey and knew that she would not desire to be alone. If he was able to appease her and she was willing to remain alone for 30 days, he is able to nullify the get. Usually, once a get is given ‘‘on condition that...,’’ it cannot be nullified once it has been given. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the condition was made for the sake of the woman, if she is willing to forego seeing her husband, the husband may nullify the get (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, since the condition was fulfilled, and there is no evidence that the couple resolved their differences, the get is binding. Our Sages, nevertheless, disqualified the get for the reasons stated above.

Hence, the divorce is unacceptable.

And we assume that because of their familiarity, he knows how to appease her, and she is more willing to accept his overtures.

The Rambam’s decision is based on his interpretation of Gittin 76b. The Ra’avad interprets that passage more stringently and requires the husband to have accepted his wife’s statements as to whether or not he came as binding. Otherwise, we suspect that he came in secrecy. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:7) follows the Rambam’s view, but states that a priori, it is customary to include the condition mentioned by the Ra’avad.

If she desires to marry within the twelve months, she must undergo the rite of chalitzah first.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:8) quotes the Rashba, who states that even if a sick person does not specify that he die from the illness afflicting him, we assume that this is his intent.

I.e., the advantage of such a get would be to free his wife of the obligation of yibbum or chalitzah. Similarly, the subsequent halachot refer to gittin given for this purpose.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling. He maintains that the date of the get indicates that the husband desires that the get take effect retroactively. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:1) quotes the Rambam’s view, but mentions a minority opinion that takes the Ra’avad’s view into consideration.

The Hagahot Maimoniot quote Rabbenu Tam as stating that it is preferable for the person to say: ‘‘from the present time,’’ rather than ‘‘from the present day,’’ lest he die before the conclusion of the day. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:2) quotes this suggestion.

Therefore, if childless, she must perform the rite of chalitzah before marrying, and may not perform the rite of yibbum. As stated in Hilchot Ishut 18:25, such a woman is not entitled to receive support from her husband’s estate after his death.

For the get does not become effective until the morning. Since he died beforehand, a get cannot be effective after death.

For a get given ‘‘on the condition that’’ becomes effective retroactively from the time it was originally given, once the condition is fulfilled.

A get given according to the rules of conditional agreements is not effective until the condition is fulfilled.

As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:14, when a person who is mortally ill gives away all of his property as a present and then recovers, the present is automatically retracted, for we assume that his intent was solely to distribute his property after his death.

Thus, the two laws are in direct contradiction. A present given by a dying man does not take effect until after he dies and a divorce that he grants cannot take effect after he dies.

For the condition that he stated was not fulfilled (Gittin 73a).

On the one hand, he did not arise from his sickbed. On the other hand, there is reason to assume that his intent was that he is giving the get on the condition that he die from the illness afflicting him and this was not the case (Gittin 73a).

This applies even if he walks in the marketplace without any support. Since he did not regain his health entirely, it is necessary to determine whether or not he died from the first illness. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:26.

Note the Beit Shmuel 145:14, who states that, according to the Rambam, the man must still be afflicted with the first illness when he dies for the divorce to be effective. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:27.

I.e., he has none of the privileges of a husband — e.g., he is not entitled to her earnings, he may not nullify her vows, and if he is a priest, he may not become impure because of her in the event of her death. With regard to paying for the woman’s support, most authorities maintain that the husband is liable. There is no explicit statement from the Rambam regarding this issue.

In such an instance, we suspect that the couple may have engaged in marital relations and the husband nullified the get beforehand.

I.e., the requirement is not that the positive factor be stated first, but that it be stated before the negative factor. This is accomplished by restating the condition that would negate the get.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that fromhis previous decisions, it appears that unless the man says that the get will take effect retroactively me’achshav, ‘‘from this time onward,’’ the get is not effective, because it does not take effect until after the man’s death. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that the restatement of the condition resolves that difficulty, but this concept is not accepted by many other authorities. When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:5) quotes the Rambam’s wording, but adds the word me’achshav.

I.e., the colleague was not appointed by the wife to serve as an agent to receive the get. The husband appointed him as her agent, because he felt that she would not desire to marry her yavam. According to Torah law, one may perform an action on a person’s behalf without his knowledge if it is to his advantage — e.g., one may take possession of an ownerless object on behalf of a colleague without asking him. Hence, it is possible to assume that the agent can act on behalf of the woman without her knowledge (Yevamot 118b).

Because by writing it within this time, they deviated from the instructions with which they were charged (Gittin 76b).

I.e., although the wording of the Hebrew original could possibly be interpreted otherwise, the commentaries agree that the Rambam’s intent is that the get may be written immediately after the time specified and should not be written after a prolonged period has elapsed from that time.

The get is unacceptable because the husband’s words also imply a restriction, that the get should be written directly afterwards and not after a prolonged period.

The Rambam is referring to his statements in Chapter 8, Halachah 2. There, however, he uses the expression, ‘‘the status of the get is in doubt.’’

The commentaries question the Rambam’s decision, explaining that although there is a possibility that the couple engaged in marital relations and the husband consecrated her at that time (see Chapter 10, Halachah 18), it is also possible that this did not take place. Indeed, in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, with reference to a get given by a husband after he entered into privacy with his wife, the Rambam rules that after the fact, the get is acceptable.
[It is possible to differentiate between the two instances, because in that halachah, the husband himself gave the woman the get. This is a greater indication that he did not nullify it (Maggid Mishneh). Even after that explanation, however, the Rambam’s ruling in this halachah raises questions.]
When referring to this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:7) accepts the ruling that at the outset, the witnesses should not have such a get written, but follows the ruling of the Ramban and the Rashba, who maintain that if they had the get written and gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

This is the ruling according to Scriptural Law. See, however, Halachah 28.

There are many authorities who object to this ruling, maintaining that the scribe cannot sign as a witness to the get. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that even the Rambam agrees that at the outset, a scribe should not sign as a witness. After the fact, however, the Rambam maintains that his signature does not disqualify the get. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:18), Rav Yosef Caro writes: ‘‘One should be careful not to have the scribe sign as a witness, because there are authorities who disqualify this.’’

I.e., speaking to the people, he said: ‘‘One, two, three, four, write a get...’’ (Chelkat Mechokek 120:18).

According to the Rambam, it appears that not only must the signatures of the acceptable witnesses be first chronologically, but they must also appear first on the get. Other authorities do not make this requirement and maintain that it is only chronological precedence that is significant (Beit Shmuel 120:14).

The two witnesses whose signatures are required must sign the get on the day that it was written (Chapter 1, Halachah 25).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:9) states that they may sign the get to fulfill the condition even after it was given to the woman. The Rama adds that this may be done even after she has remarried.

Tosafot and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities differ and maintain that for the get to be valid, all the witnesses must be acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:10) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Rama follows Tosafot’s ruling.

Because the instructions that the husband gave concerning the get were not fulfilled.

See Hilchot Edut 5:6-7, which states that if persons who are unacceptable as witnesses signed a legal document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is disqualified, even if two acceptable witnesses signed it first. If, however, the persons who were unacceptable did not sign the document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is acceptable, even if the signature of the unacceptable person appears first.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15. With regard to other legal documents, the witnesses who sign the contract are of paramount importance, and they must all therefore be acceptable. The witnesses who observe its transfer are less significant. But with regard to gittin, it is the witnesses who observe the transfer who are of primary importance. Therefore, if the initial two signatures to the get are acceptable, we are not concerned with those who sign subsequently (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Edut).

These rules were instituted lest the husband tell a group of people that they all should write, sign or bring a get, and they not appreciate that they were all charged with this responsibility. Lest some of them fail to discharge this responsibility and thus cause the get to be void, our Sages required that whenever many people are instructed to be involved in a get, they all must take full participatory roles.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 24, based on Gittin 10b. If the witnesses do not sign in each other’s presence, the get is unacceptable (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 130:13).

The father and the son may not both sign as witnesses, because witnesses may not be related to each other.

The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s interpretation of Gittin 63b. Significantly, the standard published texts of the Talmud available to us follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s version. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s conception and rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt. (See the notes of the Beit Shmuel 141:99, which explain the Rambam’s interpretation.)

And thus the get is not signed by witnesses.

According to the Rambam (Chapter 6, Halachah 4), the appointment of such an agent need not be observed by witnesses.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 24.

As long as there are witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, the agent’s actions are considered to be equivalent to those of the husband himself. Hence, just as a get given by the husband is acceptable after the fact if its transfer was observed by witnesses, even if the get was not signed, this same ruling applies when his agent gives the get.

For the wording the husband used implies that he is stipulating that the get must be given in that place.

From the contrast with the following clause, the Beit Shmuel 141:63 and others rule that, in this instance, the get is binding if it is given after that date. Note, however, the Mishneh LaMelech who differs and rules that the divorce is disqualified by the Sages.

By accepting the get from the agent in the place she receives it, the woman shows that she is not particular about where she receives it (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 6, Halachah 4). The Rambam’s ruling indicates a slight textual difference from the popular version of Gittin 6:3, the source for this halachah. There is, however, no difference in principle between them.

If, however, the agent is not prevented from discharging his agency, he should not charge another person with that responsibility. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 4 and notes.)

For it is likely that he would not desire that anyone other than the person he designated be given his article to guard.

Since the second agent did not deviate from the husband’s instructions, the get is acceptable despite the fact that a person other than the one appointed by the husband gave the get to the woman.
Rabbenu Asher rules that even if the second agent takes the article before giving the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. Although Rabbenu Asher’s ruling is also mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:51) appears to follow the Rambam’s decision.

I.e., the husband was in effect saying, ‘‘Make sure you get the article before you give her the get.’’ Since the agent did not fulfill these instructions, the divorce is not valid. See the Beit Shmuel 141:66, who quotes opinions that state that if the husband’s wording does not indicate that he definitely wants the agent to secure possession of the article before giving the get, the divorce is binding.

For in this instance, there is no obvious advantage to the principal in having the agent give the get first.
As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban differs and maintains that for thedivorce to be binding the woman must give the agent the article first.

According to the Rambam, the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives the woman the get. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 31, other opinions differ and maintain that in this instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

Needless to say, the second agent should not give the woman the get until the original 30 days have passed.
Rav Meir HaLevi states that we suspect that the first agent will not convey these instructions clearly to the second agent. Therefore, the first agent should entrust the get to the court, which will appoint a second agent after the 30 days have passed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:37) mentions this view, it appears that the Rambam’s view is favored.

See Halachot 10 and 11.

See Halachah 9.