Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to Scriptural Law, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p’rutah.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.
From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.
In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Caro follows the opinion of
Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural Law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)
The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh’s interpretation of the Rambam’s view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural Law, the kiddushin are binding.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam’s perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.
Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p’rutah must be given. Since the article has intrinsic worth according to Scriptural Law, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.

For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)

Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.

As the Rambam states in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.

See Hilchot Me’ilah 1:3.

For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person’s private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me’ilah 6:3.)

For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person’s private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me’ilah 6:3.)

In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah’s decree — and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity — once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.

A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner’s despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner’s property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article — for she is a third party — the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rambam’s intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda B’Yhudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).

The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam’s own addition. The Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.
The Edut BiY’hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person’s taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.
The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object’s worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.

We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b).

For she merely accepted her own property.

Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p’rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.

I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender’s, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19.

Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam’s view, it also quotes the other opinion.

Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma’aseh Roke’ach) explain that the Rambam’s wording is precise. The expression ‘‘like interest’’ implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural Law.

The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra’avad. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam’s interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Rama, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam’s view.

Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p’rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt.
This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural Law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural Law.

Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: ‘‘If a p’rutah’s worth of the article remains...’’ — i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p’rutah’s worth remains — the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.

If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.
Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman’s property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.

Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.

I.e., it is not as if the man’s entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.

Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.
The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman’s suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman’s offer of kiddushin. The Rama (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.

Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two — because the servant’s owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself — the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.

Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by ‘‘an important person.’’ Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).

Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural Law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).
The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages’ decree (Or Sameach).

I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards, to be consecrated, she must explicitly express her consent.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh’vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning.
In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon’s view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic Law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.

Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but — in the Talmudic era — it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil — in the Talmudic era — was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.

See Halachah 14 and notes.

We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses’ granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses’ phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: sheyihiyeh hat’nai kodem hamaaseh. The Ra’avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., ’’If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated.’’ The Beit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra’avad’s interpretation and not that of the Rambam.

We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.

Kiddushin 19b.

An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters, the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.

Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin 19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.

Deuteronomy 21:11-14 grants permission to a soldier to have intimate relations with ‘‘an attractive woman,’’ a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.

The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.

The Ra’avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam’s reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard to kiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam’s view.

The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.
Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:2.)

In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.

Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.

This follows the Rambam’s interpretation of the Talmud’s wording sheyihiyeh hat’nai kodem hamaaseh, as explained in Halachah 2.

Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).

Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term ‘‘if,’’ rather than ‘‘from this time onward’’ or ‘‘on condition that’’ (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra’avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording ‘‘if’’ nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording ‘‘on condition that’’ or ‘‘from now onward’’ is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.

It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father’s consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra’avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam’s wording.

There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of ‘‘consent’’: a) to say ‘‘yes,’’ b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra’avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.

Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void.

I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.

Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people’s knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam’s decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:20) quotes the Rambam’s decision.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.

The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)
Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving inui nefesh, ’’the oppression of the soul’’ (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.
In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Caro mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving inui nefesh; they also includes those beino l’beinah, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, Chapter 234.)

Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).

An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1).

She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.
This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.

A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them.

The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: ‘‘Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes,’’ the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).

The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.
Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man’s nullification and a physician’s healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.

From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man’s kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman’s acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Rama and Tur, Even HaEzer 40:2.)

Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying the kiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying ‘‘after 30 days,’’ the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man’s kiddushin would be binding.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.

Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.

The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable.

For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Caro rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.

This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.

I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman’s sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.

Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is ‘‘something that has not come into the world,’’ for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.

I.e., when a woman’s husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.

For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.

The Ra’avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.

Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).

For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Rama, Even HaEzer 29:7.)

The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra’avad’s ruling.

The Rambam’s wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)
Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk:Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily — e.g., a precious stone — a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert’s appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.

For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.

Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.

Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.

Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person’s retraction is of no consequence.)

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam’s decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)
The Rashba accepts the Rambam’s ruling with regard to conditions involving money — e.g., ‘‘Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you giveme 200 zuz.’’ For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions — e.g., ‘‘Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows’’ — he does not accept the Rambam’s position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Rama, Even HaEzer 38:35).

In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)