Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, this statement has raised the attention of the commentaries concerned with how the Rambam defines the scope of the positive commandment to cease activity on the Sabbath. Many authorities explain that this positive commandment is merely a restatement of the prohibition against performing forbidden labors. Others (see the commentary of the Ramban on Leviticus 23:24) understand the command as requiring a person to refrain from any and all activities that will disturb the Sabbath atmosphere of serene rest. The Rambam's wording in this halachah appears to support the latter view.

Support for this opinion can also be drawn from the phraseology chosen by the Rambam in Chapter 24, Halachah 12, the conclusion of the discussion of this issue in the Mishneh Torah:

Lest the day be like a weekday in the person's eyes, and he come to repair [articles,] lifting them up from corner to corner.... For he is sitting idle, and he will seek something to do. Thus, he will not have "ceased activity" and will have negated the motivating principle for the Torah's commandment [Deuteronomy 5:14], "Thus... will rest."

In this quote as well, the Rambam emphasizes that the commandment to rest in Exodus 23:12 encompasses holding back from performing any activity that will disturb the atmosphere of rest and peace that characterizes the Sabbath.

The Rambam uses the next four chapters to delineate various activities that were forbidden because of the two reasons he mentions above. In his discussion of this matter, he gives examples of activities that are related to each of the categories of forbidden labor.

This refers to a person who levels crevices in a field (Chapter 8, Halachah 1). If one performs such an activity in a home, one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of building (Chapter 10, Halachah 12).

See Chapter 26, Halachah 15.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:1), the Rambam elaborates on this concept, explaining that a person who removes the contents of a storeroom is likely to discover cracks and crevices in the ground. Our Sages, therefore, imposed this restriction lest he level the floor. Indeed, the only reason the person is allowed to empty the storeroom is that he intends to perform a mitzvah.

Or shoes (Ramah, Orach Chayim 302:6).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions an opinion that forbids wiping the mud on a stone wall, lest it appear that one is replastering the wall.

See the Mishnah Berurah 316:49, which questions whether this restriction applies to a paved or unpaved floor. (In this context, see also the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 7:2.)

The Maggid Mishneh cites the use of a similar expression in Chapter 11, Halachah 4. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that there are two interpretations of the phrase: a) that one may intentionally step on the substance in question and merely make it appear that one is doing so accidentally; b) that one may proceed without worrying whether one steps on the substance or not. (See also the restatement of this law in Chapter 26, Halachah 13.)

When mentioning this law, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 338:5) cites the Rambam's statements in Chapter 23, Halachah 17, which forbid gambling on the Sabbath. Thus, to avoid redundancy, we are forced to say that the play mentioned here is obviously mere sport. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for the reasons mentioned above.

The Rambam appears to forbid sweeping the floor, lest in the process of doing so, one decides to level the floor. Since both sweeping and leveling are intended to make one's floor look attractive, it is likely that while a person is involved in one activity, he will also perform the other (Rav Yitzchak ben Sheshet, Responsum 394).

Other commentaries explain that the reason is that it is inevitable that a person will level an earthen floor while sweeping it. Therefore, sweeping is forbidden even though the person does not intend to level the floor, based on the principle the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 337:2) follows the Rambam's ruling and allows one to sweep a paved floor. The Ramah, however, differs and maintains that it is forbidden. (See the Be'ur Halachah 337, which cites many opinions that encourage leniency.) Even those opinions that allow one to sweep emphasize that one must be careful regarding the type of broom used. A broom whose bristles are likely to break may not be used.

This refers to sprinkling water in a house to keep the dust from rising. Although there is a possibility that the water and the dust will collect and cause the floor to become level, there is no prohibition because this is not the person's intent. As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, a person may perform an act that causes a forbidden labor to be accomplished if he does not intend for that labor to be accomplished, and there is not an absolute certainty that it will be accomplished.

In Talmudic times, oil was frequently applied to the floor of a bathhouse. (See Shabbat 40b.)

Sweeping a floor is considered a necessary act to maintain an atmosphere of cleanliness on the Sabbath. These other activities, however, are not as essential (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 337:4; Mishnah Berurah 337:17).

Note, however, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, which states that after the Paschal offerings had been sacrificed, the floor of the Temple courtyard was washed, even when the celebration of Pesach began on the Sabbath. All the prohibitions of the category of sh'vut were not enforced in the Temple.

Straw is acceptable for this purpose since it is fit to be eaten by an animal. Hence, it will not be considered as having been made a permanent part of the courtyard. If, by contrast, earth, pebbles, or sand are used, they would be considered as having been permanently incorporated into the floor of the courtyard. This is considered as building and is, hence, forbidden (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:24; Mishnah Berurah 313:55).

When quoting this halachah (which is based on Eruvin 104a), the Shulchan Aruch uses a different verb, זורה, which means "toss into." This difference also leads to a variation in the manner in which the concept mentioned in our halachah's final clause is interpreted there.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

Eruvin 104a relates that water was drawn from a cistern by a pulley in the Temple, but that this is forbidden outside the Temple premises.

The location of the cistern clearly indicates that its water is intended to be used for household purposes. In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that even if a cistern is not located in a courtyard, as long as it is distant from a place where the water might be used for commercial purposes, one may draw water with a pulley. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:6), he mentions further leniencies.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

If, however, the honey has oozed or has been removed from the beehive before the commencement of the Sabbath, it may be used. (See the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah [Orach Chayim 321:13].)

Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:7).

This prohibition, as all the others mentioned in this halachah, was also instituted lest one detach fruit from a tree. (Note also the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 372:15], which mentions an exception to this principle.)

The commentaries question whether the Rambam's intent is that one is liable for detaching wood from a dried tree, or that this is merely a safeguard. (See Magen Avraham 336:1.)

See Halachah 9 regarding whether or not a person who climbs a tree is allowed to descend on the Sabbath.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:6), which mentions an exception to this principle.

Rav Moshe Cohen differs with the rationale given by the Rambam and explains that the reason these fruits are forbidden is that they are considered muktzeh, i.e., since picking them would involve transgressing a prohibition, one does not consider using them on the Sabbath. Others explain that they are forbidden, because they are nolad, i.e., the potential to use them did not come about until after the commencement of the Sabbath. Accordingly, it is forbidden to move them on the Sabbath. From the location in the Shulchan Aruch in which this law appears, Orach Chayim 322:3, one might infer that Rav Yosef Karo follows Rav Moshe Cohen's opinion.

The Rambam accepts the principle of nolad only in regard to the festivals, and not in regard to the Sabbath (see Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17) and does not consider the concept of muktzeh applicable here.

The Rambam follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version of Sukkot 37b. Rabbenu Chanan'el and others reverse the laws and grant the leniency regarding smelling an etrog and the like, but not a myrtle. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:10) quotes the Rambam's view.

This is considered equivalent to climbing a tree (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 10:8).

Based on the principle of l'vud.

I.e., the portion that is within three handbreadths of the ground.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:2) mentions that it is even forbidden for them to sit on the side of the roots that is level with the ground. The difference between this law and the previous one is that in the previous law, the roots themselves descended within three handbreadths of the ground. In this law, a portion of the ground is upraised and is level with the roots.

Although one is forbidden to cause an animal to carry a burden, riding an animal is not forbidden according to the Torah, because of the principle, "a living being carries itself." Nevertheless, there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, as the Rambam explains.

Beitzah 36b mentions another reason: perhaps one will ride beyond the Sabbath limits. Apparently the Rambam does not see these two positions as mutually exclusive.

Note, however, the Chatam Sofer (Vol. VI, Responsum 96), who writes that our Sages were motivated by a desire to have animals rest on the Sabbath, and the rationales mentioned in the Talmud were of secondary importance. Sefer HaKovetz notes that, in fact, the Jerusalem Talmud mentions the desire that animals rest as the source for this law.

When our Sages forbade riding on an animal, they also forbade using an animal for any other purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:23; Mishnah Berurah 305:62). These prohibitions apply in all places, even in a desert where there are no trees from which one might detach a branch.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this prohibition applies also regarding articles hanging from trees. Support for this position can be derived from the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Sukkah 4:6, which prohibit use of both a sukkah constructed in a tree as well as one on an animal's back on the first day of the holiday.

If, however, a utensil was placed in a tree on or before the Sabbath, it may not be removed (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah [Orach Chayim 336:1]).

If, however, he climbed the tree before the commencement of the Sabbath, he may descend on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh). Although the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions a more stringent opinion.

Although the person makes use of the tree in his process of descent, this is not forbidden. For the alternative available to him, staying in the tree for the entire Sabbath, also involves making use of the tree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:2; Mishnah Berurah 336:6).

See Chapter 25, Halachah 26, for added leniencies granted in consideration of suffering endured by an animal. (See also the commentaries on Hilchot Rotzeach 13:9,13, which discuss the halachic ramifications of this principle. Note also The Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, chapter 17.)

The restrictive process of unloading an animal's burden described by the Rambam in this halachah is necessary only when the articles the animal is carrying are muktzeh (forbidden to be moved on the Sabbath day). If the articles are not muktzeh, they may be unloaded in an ordinary manner, provided one does not lean on the animal.

From this, the Mishnah Berurah 305:65 derives that the prohibition against causing an animal's suffering is not strong enough to supersede the prohibition against muktzeh.

Although the grain is muktzeh, as long as one does not move it with one's hands, one is not violating the prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:24). See also Chapter 24:14-15.

There are commentaries that emphasize that this is also a leniency. It is forbidden to nullify the possibility of using a utensil even temporarily. Hence, the only reason that putting the pillows under the sacks is permitted is that there is a substantial loss involved (Mishnah Berurah 266:27).

Note, however, the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions opinions that explain that since one can remove the pillows one by one at any time, one is never nullifying a utensil from being used.

Rashi (Shabbat 154b) offers a slightly different interpretation of the type of glass used and the purpose for which it was intended.

I.e., although the larger pieces will break when they fall, the broken pieces that will remain will also be able to be used for the original purpose. Only a small quantity of glass will be totally useless.

Although unloading the glass utensils slowly will inevitably involve lifting the forbidden articles slightly, the Sages permitted this because of the loss involved (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:24).

Note also Shulchan Aruch Harav 266:25, which grants a further leniency and allows pillows and covers to be placed under large utensils in the case of a substantial loss, if there is no other alternative. Even though there is no way to remove the pillows from under the utensils on the Sabbath, this leniency is permitted because of the potential loss. The Be'ur Halachah 266 explains that this is a matter of controversy among the halachic authorities.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

The commentaries note that the Rambam's words seem to indicate that one is liable for collecting produce even when one does so far from the place where the produce originally grew. This issue is a point of disagreement among the commentaries. (See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 5.)

Significantly, Tosafot, Shabbat 143b, suggests omitting the phrase "and partake of them." (Note the Be'ur Halachah 335.)

Although the prohibition against gathering produce is explicitly stated in Shabbat 143b, the rationale for the prohibition is a matter of debate among the halachic authorities. The reason suggested by the Rambam is not accepted by most, and other reasons are offered:

a) it is possible that pebbles might be mixed in with the produce and thus one might come to perform the forbidden labor of separating (Rashba);

b) gathering produce is a weekday activity and its performance runs contrary to the atmosphere of peace and rest prevalent on the Sabbath (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 335). These are the rationales reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 335:5).

According to the Torah, the forbidden labor of collecting food applies only with regard to the produce of the earth (Shabbat 73b; Chapter 8, Halachah 5). Nevertheless, the Rabbis extended the scope of the prohibition and forbade collecting other foods as well.

See Chapter 8, Halachot 7 and 10. Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose that grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.

(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered to be liquids, but rather food. See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these to be two separate rationales.)

This prohibition includes all fruits that are frequently used for juice (Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1). Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:6) states that one may squeeze lemons. The Mishnah Berurah 320:22, however, questions that decision, because it is customary in many places to use lemons for juice. A similar question applies regarding many other fruit juices that are now far more popular than they were in previous generations.

The basis for this opinion is that even if a person desires to squeeze the fruit juice for use as a beverage, since the popular practice is not to do so, his individual intent is of no consequence. There are, however, opinions that maintain that a person is forbidden to squeeze juice from fruit if he desires to use it as a beverage.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:1 states that, even though the halachic basis of the first view is sounder, in places where it is customary to follow the second view, the stringency should be maintained. (See also the Be'ur Halachah 320.)

Or to prepare them to be used as food in any other way. For example, to squeeze the oil from noodles (Mishnah Berurah 320:24,25).

As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 10, even when one squeezes a food with the intent of removing its liquid, there is no prohibition involved if one squeezes the liquid directly into food. The rationale is that when a liquid is absorbed in food, its own identity is of no consequence. Hence, it is as if one is separating food from food. This concept is reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:7).

The prohibition is, however, only Rabbinic in origin. This follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 145a. Rabbenu Chanan'el rules that a person who squeezes these foods for the sake of their liquids is liable for transgressing a Torah prohibition.

For this resembles crushing grapes or olives to produce wine or oil (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba). The Maggid Mishneh continues, explaining that other commentaries (see Rashi, Shabbat 51b, Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320) maintain that the prohibition stems from the fact that one is bringing into existence a new entity (nolad) on the Sabbath. It appears that the Rambam and the Rashba do not accept that rationale.

Rashi, Rabbenu Nissim, and others state that this refers to a cup or a bowl filled with liquid. They explain that this is permitted because the water from the snow will flow directly into this other liquid and will never exist as a separate distinct entity. The Rambam does not make such a distinction, and appears to allow squeezing the snow into an empty cup. It is possible that, according to the Rambam, this leniency also applies to the pickled and cooked foods mentioned in the first clause of this halachah. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:9) states this law slightly differently: "One may place [snow] into a cup of wine or water so that it melts." Here, also, the Rambam is being more lenient, allowing the person to crush the snow by hand. The later authorities follow the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

Note the Maggid Mishneh's treatment of this subject in his gloss on Chapter 3, Halachah 2. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, the leniency of this halachah is that one may perform an act to continue grinding these substances.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that this refers to mixing meat, grain, and soup into a single mixture.

It is, however, forbidden to perform this activity while the pot is on the fire. Inevitably, one will stir the pot's contents, and this is considered part of the cooking process (Chapter 9, Halachah 4).

See Chapter 8, Halachah 10.

We have quoted the view of Tosafot (Yevamot 113a). Sucking milk fresh from an animal is considered a cure for pain felt in one's heart. The Rabbis question if this leniency also extends to a person groaning from hunger.

An animal is generally milked into a container.

I.e., without any human activity being performed on the Sabbath day. As opposed to the following halachah, this applies to fruit that was not crushed before the Sabbath.

Since the primary purpose for which these fruits are used is to produce beverages, the Rabbis instituted the following prohibition even when the person purchased these fruits to eat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 320:1).

Which are often used to produce juice, as mentioned in Halachah 12. As mentioned in that halachah, the Rambam allows one to squeeze other fruits for juice. Surely there are no prohibitions against liquids that flow from them.

As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that whenever it is customary to drink a fruit's juice, the situation is governed by the laws that apply to pomegranates and berries.

Since the person intended to eat the fruit, he does not appreciate the fact that liquid has flowed from them and is not likely to squeeze them to produce more (Mishnah Berurah 320:6).

If the person brought them home with no specific intention, any liquid that flows from them is prohibited (ibid.).

There is another opinion in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), which forbids using liquid that flows from crushed honeycombs, lest one come to crush other ones on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in practice, the more lenient view is accepted.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11.

See Halachah 14.

By blowing the air over them, he causes the husks to fall. Alternatively, this prohibition can be interpreted to refer to fanning the grain with one's hand or sifting it in the air. This appears to be the conception of the Shulchan Aruch which employs the word מנפה, "sift," rather than מנפח, "blow."

Although blowing away the chaff is part of the forbidden labor of winnowing, it is permitted, because one's intent is to partake of the food directly afterwards. See a parallel in Chapter 8, Halachah 12, in regard to the forbidden labor of separating.

Implied is that using two hands is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 319:7)

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 12, our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Most commentaries follow other interpretations. (See Ramah, loc. cit..)

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11, which states that three forbidden categories of labor - winnowing, selecting, and sifting - are very similar. Nevertheless, "every labor that was performed in the Sanctuary is counted as a separate category."

In Chapter 8, Halachah 14, the Rambam speaks of filtering wine and water, mentioning several of the points touched on in this halachah.

But not wine or water that is filled with dregs.

See, however, Chapter 22, Halachah 33, where the Rambam mentions how one must hold the Egyptian basket lest one violate a Rabbinic prohibition against erecting a tent.

Significantly, there are authorities who associate this prohibition with the prohibition against erecting a tent. (See also the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:14 and the Mishnah Berurah 319:49, which explain that the prohibition against hanging a filter was instituted to prevent involvement with "mundane activity.")

This refers to hanging the filter over a container in the manner in which one filters beverages. There is no prohibition, however, against hanging the filter in the open air (Mishnah Berurah 315:36).

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11.

Note the gloss of Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil and the Magen Avraham 319:19, who question the connection between mixing nuts into honey and making cheese. The Tosefta, Shabbat 13:12, mentions mixing nuts and honey in connection with the forbidden labor of kneading. Kinat Eliyahu explains that the Rambam's intent might be that just as when curdling milk for cheese one makes a single block of food from liquid, so too, one accomplishes the same objective by making such a candy.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo notes that the Rambam's wording here (and in Chapter 7, Halachah 5) appears to indicate that one is liable for grinding only when cutting produce with the intention of cooking it. If, however, one intends to eat the produce raw - e.g., in a salad - one is not liable.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo concludes by stating that this interpretation is not absolutely imperative. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12), however, he states that one who cuts produce is liable for grinding without any qualification. The Ramah, in his gloss, clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use. If one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.

The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:10; Mishnah Berurah 321:45) mention opinions that question the leniency mentioned by the Ramah. They also emphasize that the Ramah granted permission to cut the vegetables only with a knife. Even he forbids using a grater or similar utensil.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:2), the Rambam explains that this refers to stalks of grain or beans that are harvested as animal fodder, before their produce matures.

The Mishnah Berurah 324:23 states that this refers to soft carobs that can be eaten without difficulty even when they are not cut. Carobs that have already hardened are forbidden to be cut. There is, however, room for questioning whether the Rambam would make such a distinction.

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 324:7), Rav Yosef Karo differs with the Rambam and states that the reason for these prohibitions is that it is forbidden to undertake any unnecessary effort to prepare food for animals. Since these foods could be eaten without being shredded, it is forbidden to shred them on the Sabbath.

This refers even to an animal that died on the Sabbath itself. It is not considered muktzeh and may be served to dogs. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 324:17, which questions whether this leniency applies if the animal was healthy before the commencement of the Sabbath. In this context, note Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17, 2:16.

In this instance, we have translated the word פירות as "fruit," rather than "produce" in order to avoid a difficulty mentioned by the commentaries. The Maggid Mishneh states that he has seen texts of the Mishneh Torah that read "for grinding applies only regarding produce." Although he favors that version over the one found in the standard texts, he finds neither to be fully satisfying.

The Kessef Mishneh explains the Maggid Mishneh's equivocation as follows. The standard text is problematic, since straw and carobs are also produce, and if there were no prohibition against grinding produce, there would be no reason to forbid shredding them. The amended version, however, is also somewhat difficult, since gourds are also produce.

Rav Yosef Karo himself favors the standard text and states that the phrase "there is no concept of grinding regarding..." is the rationale for the prohibition against shredding carobs.

To explain: The word פירות in this instance has a more restricted meaning, meaning "fruit" rather than "produce." The concept of grinding applies only with regard to grains and vegetables, but not with regard to fruit. Therefore, the prohibition against shredding carobs is only Rabbinic in origin. Although the clause pertaining to gourds and animal carcasses interposes between the clause regarding carobs and the rationale explaining it, that is not an insurmountable difficulty.

With the palms of one's hands (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:2).

Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), which interprets all the terms in the relevant clause as referring to sheaves of straw, in contrast to Rashi and others, who interpret one term as referring to cedar bows. (See also the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, who struggle to explain how the Rambam's ruling is derived from Shabbat 155a, the source for this halachah.)

This refers to the principle stated in Shabbat (ibid.) and quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4), which states that we are able to lay out food for an animal to eat. We may not, however, undertake any extra difficulty to make the food more attractive and more accessible for the animal.

From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 8:1), it appears that all three of these terms refer to species of hyssop. Hyssop is often used as animal fodder, but is occasionally employed as food for humans, and at times is used as kindling wood.

If, however, they are stored for use as kindling wood, it is forbidden to take them, as stated in Chapter 26, Halachah 18.

Note the slight difference in the manner in which this law is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:1).

Compare to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:12, which states that one may crush peppers with a mortar and pestle.

Thus, one must depart from one's ordinary process in two ways, using the handle of a knife instead of a mortar, and using a bowl instead of a pestle.

This refers to a person who feels discomfort, but whose life is not in danger, nor would he be classified as being חולה, "sick." Therefore, the various leniencies mentioned in Chapter 2 do not apply to him.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) states that these restrictions apply only to a person who feels discomfort. A person who is totally healthy may partake of foods that are usually eaten only for medicinal purposes. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:43 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:120, however, qualify this leniency and state that if the person's intent is to enhance his health, it is forbidden even when he has no signs of illness.

A plant with red roots, used for dyeing or for medical purposes.

Even one suffering from discomfort.

As reflected by a comparison to the previous halachah, there are several species of hyssop, some eaten by healthy people and some used primarily for medicinal purposes.

When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) mentions that even if it is obvious that the person is partaking of the food for medicinal purposes, since this food is also frequently eaten for other reasons, there is no prohibition.

A plant known as asafetida, possessing a resin that is bitter tasting, and which is used as a remedy for chest pains (Meiri).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:3), the Rambam states that a beverage produced from this plant is often drunk by people in cold lands because of the warm sensation it produces.

As indicated by Chapter 22, Halachah 7, once a person has begun drinking chiltit, he should continue. Otherwise, he risks the possibility of falling sick. Therefore, even though most healthy people in a community do not partake of this beverage, a person who has become accustomed to it may continue.

This is the text recommended by the Maggid Mishneh according to the explanation given in the previous note. There are, however, versions of the Mishneh Torah that read, "A person who has drunk chiltit... may drink it in places where it is not customary for healthy people to drink chiltit." According to this version, chiltit is being given as an example of the concept stated in the first clause of this halachah.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 3:1), the Rambam defines this as a beverage made from water, into which salt, barley flour, and wild saffron are mixed. Shabbat 101a explains that this beer helps people with stomach discomforts.

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 327:1), who writes that at present it is not common for healthy people to apply oil to themselves. Therefore, it is forbidden to apply oil to oneself with any oil on the Sabbath for therapeutic purposes.

These liquids are not usually applied to the body. Therefore, when one applies them, it is obvious that one's intent is for medicinal purposes. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 327:1), which states "one may not apply a mixture of oil and vinegar" and does not mention the application of vinegar alone.

The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) records an opinion that states that only "the sons of kings" may apply rose oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, grants this license universally, for "all Jews are the sons of kings." Shabbat 111b, however, restricts this leniency to places where this oil is freely available.

Shabbat 66b mentions that soaking one's hands and feet in a mixture of oil and salt is a remedy for intoxication.

To stop the flow of blood. This refers to a wound that was not caused by an iron utensil, nor one that is located in a place where bleeding might be dangerous. In these instances, one may dress the wound in a normal manner even if it is necessary to violate the Sabbath laws (Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:34; Mishnah Berurah 328:91).

Nor in beverages with high alcoholic content (Mishnah Berurah 328:92).

The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) gives another alternative: Dipping one's food in vinegar.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:39 mentions opinions that permit this only when the oil is mixed with vegetable juice, since otherwise it is not the usual practice to drink oil.

This refers to raw gum taken from trees, and not to commercially prepared chewing gum.

Some authorities forbid brushing one's teeth if one's gums are likely to bleed. Similarly, using toothpaste is forbidden.

The same principles apply to the use of mouthwash.

Based on Rashi, Shabbat 108b, the Shulchan Aruch 328:20 forbids opening and closing one's eye to let the wine in, even when the wine was applied to one's eyelids.

Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 3, Halachah 2, which states that one may leave eye salve on one's eye on Friday, implying that the salve must be applied before the commencement of the Sabbath, and not afterwards.

From a comparison to the quotation of the laws in the Shulchan Aruch 252:5 and 328:21, the following resolution may be offered. When one applies an eye salve itself to one eye, it must be applied before the Sabbath. If, however, the salve is mixed with water and is no longer a distinct entity, one may rinse one's eyes with it on the Sabbath.

From the manner in which the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:24) and others state this law, it would appear that the intent is not that the reed be used as a bandage, but that it has other therapeutic qualities as well.

Eruvin 10:14 mentions that this was permitted in the Temple, because it was not necessary to observe the prohibitions classified as sh'vut there. (See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 10:9.) From this statement, the Rambam derived that this is forbidden outside the Temple's premises.

Although this appears to be the Rambam's intent, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:22) quotes this prohibition as referring to oil and hot water mixed together.

Here there is an added difficulty. One may squeeze the liquids from the wadding when applying them to the wound and it is forbidden to squeeze liquids from a cloth.

Note the differences between the manner in which this law is stated by the Rambam and by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:23).

As long as the bandage has not fallen on the ground, it is considered as if it merely slipped off the wound, and therefore it may be returned to its place.

It must be emphasized that the bandages referred to here are those to which salves or other liquids have been applied. Applying such a bandage resembles smearing substances. There is no restriction against placing a bandaid or other dry bandage on a wound on the Sabbath. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:23-24).

Eruvin 102b and the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:25) interpret this prohibition as a safeguard, lest one come to spread a salve. Since the bandage was applied on Friday, there is no reason for a safeguard lest one grind herbs.

Outside the Temple, there is a prohibition against placing a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath, lest one grind herbs, and lest one spread the salves. Nevertheless, since both these prohibitions are considered in the category of sh'vut, they are waived in the Temple.

This is the explanation according to the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, and this text is accepted by Rav Kapach and Rav Frankel in their texts of the Mishneh Torah. The Maggid Mishneh, however, questions this version of the text based on the Eruvin 10:13, which states, "We may return a bandage [to a wound] in the Temple, but not elsewhere." Indeed, his question is reinforced by the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, which states that outside of the Temple, one may not return a bandage to its place after it has fallen to the ground. In the Temple, however, this is permitted. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to place a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath even in the Temple.

Nevertheless, several of the later commentaries (Seder HaMishneh; Or Sameach) attempt to justify the standard text of the Mishneh Torah, basing their explanations on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, where the Rambam states that when Pesach was celebrated on the Sabbath, the priests would wash the floor of the Temple Courtyard on the Sabbath to clean away the blood and refuse from the Paschal sacrifices.

In the source for that halachah, Pesachim 65a, there is a difference of opinion on this matter among the Sages. Rabbi Natan maintains that the only time a prohibition that is in the category of sh'vut is suspended in the Temple is when transgressing it is necessary for the Temple service. Therefore, he rules that it is forbidden to wash the Temple floor on such an occasion, for doing so is an expression of respect for the Temple, but is not a necessity for its service to continue.

From the fact that the Rambam rejects Rabbi Natan's view, it is clear that he maintains that - as he says simply in this halachah - "The prohibitions classified as sh'vut do not apply in the Temple" - i.e., they do not apply at all. The Mishnah in Eruvin follows Rabbi Natan's opinion. Therefore, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains Rabbi Natan's position. This explanation does not reflect the Rambam's own view; that is expressed in our halachah.

For the priests were careful and would not come to violate a Torah prohibition (the gloss of Rabbenu Yehonatan, Eruvin 102b).

Significantly, when the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:26 cites this law, it changes the wording slightly and states, "for one is spreading [a salve]." Spreading a salve is a derivative of the forbidden labor of smoothing, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 6.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6).

The Tosefta (Shabbat 17:22) states, "One may not run for exercise on the Sabbath, but one may walk leisurely the entire day." Note also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:2), which grants license for youths to perform calisthenics on the Sabbath if they enjoy doing so. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which emphasizes that the license is granted only when one enjoys the physical activity, and not when one does so for health purposes.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that these two phrases refer to alternate explanations offered by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi of the expression, "We do not go down to Kordima (alt. Poltima)," in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6). Although in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that Mishnah differently, both the interpretations given by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi represent valid halachic points.

One may, however, bathe in the pleasant waters of the Mediterranean, even though they are salty (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:44).

For it appears that one has entered these bodies of water to cool off (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

Rashi, Shabbat 147b, explains that this prohibition was instituted to prevent "ordinary activity." On this basis, the Magen Avraham 327:1 relates that if one has a utensil designated for use on the Sabbath, this would be permitted. It is questionable, however, whether the Rambam accepts that rationale and that leniency.

The bracketed additions are based on Rashi's commentary, Shabbat 53b. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:28) which states that this leniency applies only in places where it is common for people to annoint themselves with oil.

I.e., even when the wound has begun to heal and the scabs have dried (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:22).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 332:2) is slightly more specific regarding this law, explaining that one may not treat an animal's scabs when they have already dried out and have begun to heal. When, however, the scabs are fresh and the wound still smarts, the scabs may be treated.

Literally, "was taken by blood."

Although a person is forbidden to perform any activity that is solely therapeutic in nature for the sake of a human being who is in discomfort, this restriction is not imposed regarding an animal's discomfort. The rationale is that a person generally is not disturbed about his animal's discomfort to the extent that he might be motivated to grind herbs for medication on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 332:3; Mishnah Berurah 332:5).

It must, however, be emphasized that when an animal is very seriously afflicted, greater leniency is allowed. For example, one may have a gentile perform forbidden labors to save the animal. This is allowed because our Sages feared that when an animal's life was in danger, its owner would not hesitate to perform the forbidden labors himself to save the animal if he were not given any other alternative (ibid.).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:39), which states that because this is a wasteful activity, it is forbidden during the week as well, unless one is suffering discomfort.

This is one of the instances where the commentaries have difficulty discovering the Rambam's source. There is no explicit statement to this effect in the Talmud, and the Rabbis have offered several possible references from which it is possible that this concept could have been derived.

Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) permits placing hot cups to cure a stomach ailment.

The latter practice involves tying a newborn baby's limbs with cloth so that they grow straight. This practice is still followed in several Yemenite communities.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

To relate the Rambam's decision to terms of our contemporary experience: Medication may not be given on the Sabbath. Physiotherapy, by contrast, is permitted.

See Chapter 8, Halachot 11 and 16.

I.e., exposing the straw to the wind so that the chaff will be blown away.

Rashi explains that this act is permitted, because although it is possible that a forbidden labor, sifting, might be performed, it is done unintentionally. Hence, there is no prohibition involved. Kinat Eliyahu adds that here we are speaking about an activity that resembles sifting and which is forbidden by the Rabbis for that reason, but not about the forbidden labor of sifting itself. Therefore, forbidding carrying the straw in a sieve because some might unintentionally be sifted would be "a safeguard for a Rabbinic decree." Hence, there is no prohibition.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 16.

According to the Rambam, mixing roasted flour with water is forbidden by the Rabbis, but does not violate the Torah's prohibition against making a mixture of solid particles and water. The Torah's prohibition involves adding water to a collection of granular substances - e.g., flour or cement - and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass.

Other authorities [Tosafot (Shabbat 18a), the Ra'avad (see Chapter 18, Halachah 15), the Ramban, and the Rashba] differ and maintain that according to the Torah, one is liable for mixing any substance with water, even if its particles do not stick together. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:16 and Be'ur Halachah 321.)

Mixing even small amounts of unroasted flour, by contrast, is forbidden (Mishnah Berurah 321:53).

Rashi (Shabbat 155b) does not differentiate between shatit and roasted flour.

I.e., free-flowing as opposed to viscous.

During the week, by contrast, the vinegar is usually put in first (Shabbat 156a).

When bran is mixed into water, the particles remain separate and do not stick together, as mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah.

I.e., substances whose particles do adhere to each other when mixed with water.

But not in circular movement, lest it appear that one is kneading (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 324:3).

This ruling relates to another difference of opinion among the Sages which was not resolved and was, therefore, perpetuated by the later Rabbis. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one's hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour.

The Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's opinion is, however, accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot), is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16), and is preferred by the Ramah. According to this view, we may not stir a mixture of bran and water on the Sabbath unless the water was added before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., one is allowed to mix as large a quantity as one needs for that Sabbath. One may not, however, mix bran that one does not need on that Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:9).

Note the Levush (Orach Chayim 324), which offers a different reason for this prohibition: It represents an expenditure of effort that is not necessary to provide the animal with food for the Sabbath.

Before a camel-driver set out on a journey with his beast, he would force-feed it enough food to last several days, to minimize the amount of fodder he would have to carry (Meiri).

This refers to calves that are force-fed to fatten them for slaughter.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

The Mishnah Berurah 324:28 emphasizes that even if one is allowed to force feed-animals, one must do so without moving the animal, for an animal is muktzeh.

This issue has import within the context of the socio-economic history of the Jewish people. In Eastern Europe, one of the main sources of income for the Jewish people was raising fattened geese. These geese were force-fed during the week to the extent that they were unable to consume enough food to satiate themselves on the Sabbath unless they were force-fed. Some Rabbis allowed force-feeding them on the Sabbath, while others forbade it. (See Mishnah Berurah 324:27.) There are authorities who forbade the practice entirely, because of cruelty to animals, and because of the problems in kashrut that might arise.

Note the Be'ur Halachah 324, which draws attention to the following question: Is one Jew allowed to feed animals that another Jew is responsible to feed? Seemingly, since their owner is allowed to feed them, that same license is granted to other Jews. The Be'ur Halachah favors granting this leniency.

Even if the pigs belong to a Jew, he is forbidden to feed them on the Sabbath. This decree was imposed because the Rabbis prohibited raising pigs (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 409). Therefore, if one possesses pigs in a manner that does not violate this prohibition - e.g., a gentile pays one a debt with a pig - one may feed them on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:30).

In this instance, even though a person owns these animals, since they usually are left to find their own food, providing them with food is considered to be an unnecessary expenditure of effort (Shulchan Aruch Harav 324:7; Mishnah Berurah 324:29).

Rav David Arameah explains that this is a decree imposed lest one pick up the food that has been set aside and feed it to the animal.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 18, and Chapter 5, Halachah 19, where this subject is discussed at length. As the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:5) states, if one places the loaf of bread into the oven in time for it to form a crust, there is no prohibition against removing it on the Sabbath. When, however, there was not enough time for a crust to form, one must follow the instructions mentioned by the Rambam.

Note the parallel in Chapter 23, Halachah 24.

I.e., according to the Torah, there is no prohibition against bathing.

Even one without attendants (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:1).

As Shabbat 40a relates, a series of Rabbinic decrees were passed regarding bathhouses. When the Sages saw that the bath attendants would heat up water on the Sabbath, they forbade bathing, but allowed the people to enter a bathhouse to use as a steam bath. Afterwards, they saw that because of this leniency their original prohibition was not being observed, and they forbade entering a bathhouse altogether.

The Rambam permits bathing in cold water, and this ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:1). Nevertheless, most of the later Ashkenazic halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:6; Mishnah Berurah 326:21) state that it is customary not to bathe on the Sabbath at all, even in cold water. As is mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachah 8, an exception to the above rules is made regarding immersion in the mikveh.

I.e., even when one does not enter a bath.

Or other select portions of the body. A woman may wash her vaginal area in preparation for a hefsek taharah.

Similarly, leniency is granted regarding open bodies of water that have been heated by the sun, as stated in Halachah 9.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 326:11, which favor opinions that do not accept this restriction.

See the following halachah and notes, which deal with the question whether this restriction applies after rinsing, not only one's entire body, but even a single limb.

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that in this instance, it is not heating the water in itself that is forbidden, since one is heating it to a minimal temperature. (See the following halachah.) Rather, the problem stems from the resemblance to bathing in warm water.

I.e., a duct or pipe containing cold water passes through a body of hot water and thus becomes warm. Even if one does not take the water from the duct itself, but has the duct flow into a pool, the water is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:3). Shabbat 3:3 relates that the inhabitants of Tiberias actually had such a heating system constructed, but the Sages forbade its use.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions that even if the pipe was brought into the hot water on Friday, the water may not be used on the Sabbath.

The Rambam's intent is that the water or the oil may be heated to the point that it becomes hot enough to burn a infant's belly.

This decision is questioned by the Rabbis. Rashi and the Rambam interpret the Talmudic passage (Shabbat 40b) that serves as the source for this halachah as meaning that one may not allow the temperature of the liquid to reach the point where it could burn an infant's belly. The Rashba, Tosafot and others, however, follow a more stringent ruling and forbid placing a liquid in a place where the potential exists for it to become hot enough to burn a infant's belly, even if one removes it before that time. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:14) accepts the latter view.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:5) mentions opinions that differ and maintain that the restriction mentioned in the previous halachah applies not only after rinsing one's entire body, but after washing a single limb. For example, a person who washes his hands should not warm them by a fire. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:4 counsels following this stringency.

This is the halachic definition of the term יד סולדת בו. In contemporary measure, this is defined as 42 to 45 degrees centigrade by contemporary authorities.

With this statement, the Rambam emphasizes that the tub is very hot and contains a large amount of water. Therefore, even though it is a כלי שני - i.e., not a vessel that was itself heated on a fire, but a vessel into which hot water was poured - there are still restrictions, as the Rambam explains. Implied is that even though we generally follow the rule that the heat of a כלי שני is not sufficient to cook something placed within, a tub in a bathhouse is an exception.

The above represents the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh. In the Kessef Mishneh, by contrast, Rav Yosef Karo explains that the tub we are speaking about is a כלי ראשון, a vessel in which water was heated. Were it to be a כלי שני, there would be no restrictions. His ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:11), appears to reflect this same view. The Ramah differs and clarifies in his gloss that the tub here is a כלי שני, adopting the explanation of the Maggid Mishneh.

The Ramah 318:12 states that if the amount of cold water the person adds at one time is so great that the it will not become hot, there is no prohibition against adding it, even to a כלי ראשון.

Shabbat 40b mentions that oil that is placed in a כלי שני does not cook. The Kessef Mishneh thus uses this as a support for his thesis that the Rambam is speaking about a tub that is a כלי ראשון. Others explain that, as stated above, even though in most instances we follow the rule that the heat of a כלי שני is not sufficient to cook something placed within, a tub in a bathhouse is an exception.

See also Hilchot Ma'aser 3:15, where it appears that the Rambam maintains that if a כלי שני is hot enough to burn a person's hand, oil that is placed inside will be cooked. The Radbaz, however, explains that the laws applying to cooking on the Sabbath are different from those applying to cooking regarding ma'aser.

Even according to the opinions that the Rambam is referring to a כלי ראשון, this is permitted. Although there are restrictions against pouring water from a כלי ראשון onto spices and the like, these restrictions do not apply when water is poured into other water. The rationale is that the waters mix and there is no time when the heat of the water from the כלי ראשון will be concentrated in a single space (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:20; Mishnah Berurah 318:78).

According to Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch 318:12), this refers to a heating urn that was emptied entirely of hot water. One might think that pouring cold water in it would be forbidden, since the possibility exists that by doing so one will refine the metal of the urn. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 2, and notes.) Nevertheless, since this is not one's intent (אינו מתכוין), nor is it absolutely certain that this will take place (i.e., it is not a פסיק רישא), this is permitted (Chapter 1, Halachah 6).

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah accept this law, but they explain that it is also possible to interpret the Rambam's words as referring to an urn that was partially emptied of the water that was cooked in it, and then cold water was added. Even though the urn is a כלי ראשון, as long as so much cold water is poured in that it cannot become hot enough to burn an infant's belly, there is no prohibition involved.

I.e., even hot water that is in a כלי ראשון.

Which is in a כלי שני.

The Mishnah Berurah 318:82 emphasizes that if there is a small quantity of cold water, the restriction against using water from a כלי ראשון applies in both instances. One may not pour a small amount of cold water into a large amount of hot water, nor may one pour a large amount of hot water into a small amount of cold water. This ruling is not, however, accepted by all authorities. As mentioned above, according to the Ramah, one may pour hot water into a large amount of cold water, and a large amount of cold water into hot water, even if the hot water is in a כלי ראשון.

This law applies to most other substances, for most substances will cook in a כלי ראשון even after it is removed from a fire.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter among the Rabbis. The Tur (Orach Chayim 318) and Tosafot (Shabbat 40b) differ and maintain that salt requires only a minimal amount of cooking and should not even be placed in a כלי שני. The later authorities emphasize that this depends on the type of salt used. In many communities, it is common to follow the more stringent ruling.

It must be emphasized that our Sages mention that there are certain substances that do not require much cooking and can be cooked even in a כלי שני. For that reason, some authorities maintain that we should be stringent and not place any uncooked articles in a כלי שני, for we are unsure of which substances are included in the category of foods that do not require much cooking. See Ramah, Orach Chayim 318:5.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 22.

From the Rambam's placement of this halachah in this chapter, it would appear that he sees this as falling into the category of prohibitions instituted as a safeguard against cooking on the Sabbath, and not as one of the prohibitions instituted because it is forbidden to prepare remedies on the Sabbath.

Since soaking chiltit in cold water is forbidden only because of a Rabbinic prohibition, this prohibition is overridden because of the possibility of the person's becoming ill.

This law touches on the principle, אין בישול אחר בישול, "One is not liable for cooking something that is already cooked." Although this principle is accepted by all authorities, the scope of its application varies. To focus on the approach of the Rambam and to compare it to the perspective of other authorities, it is worthy to focus on each point in particular:

When food has been cooked before the Sabbath - According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:4), this refers only to food that has been thoroughly cooked.

or soaked in hot water before the Sabbath - In contrast to the Rambam's decision, the Mishnah Berurah 318:31 rules that food that was soaked in hot water before the Sabbath may be placed in hot water in a כלי שני, but should not be placed in hot water in a כלי ראשון.

one is permitted to soak it in hot water - This refers to water in a כלי ראשון that was removed from its cooking surface. It is forbidden to place any food in a pot on a cooking surface after the Sabbath has commenced (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:9; Mishnah Berurah 318:33).

on the Sabbath even though it is presently cold. - The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that this leniency applies only to cooked food that is dry. If the food is liquid, placing it in a כלי ראשון that is hot is considered to be cooking. From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:2), it would appear that he also accepts this limitation. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 318), however, maintains that the Rambam does not hold one liable, even when one reheats foods that are not dry.

From the Rambam's wording, it is unclear if this refers to water that was in a כלי ראשון or in a כלי שני. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:4), it would appear that he maintains that it is permitted to pour water from a כלי ראשון directly on foods.

According to the Ashkenazic authorities, we are permitted to pour hot water on uncooked foods only from a כלי שני (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:11; Mishnah Berurah 318:35). Hot water from a כלי ראשון will cook the surface of the food onto which it is poured.

This clause comes to eliminate foods like aged salted fish or sole, whose preparation is completed by washing them with hot water. As the Rambam writes in Chapter 9, Halachah 2, one is liable for violating the forbidden labor of cooking merely by rinsing these foods with hot water.

The prohibition applies only to soaking the food in hot water. One may soak it in cold water (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:11; Mishnah Berurah 318:37).

See Chapter 9, Halachah 3. This prohibition was instituted lest one err and think that just as it is permitted to cook using articles heated by the sun, it is permitted to cook using articles heated by fire.

I.e., the leniency of placing water in the sun will not cause one to think that it is permitted to place food on a fire.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this law is mentioned because one might think that placing the water in the sun is forbidden, lest one place food in hot ashes.

On this basis, many authorities allow the use of water that has been heated by solar energy units on the Sabbath. Even the more stringent opinions, which object to such use, have no difficulty with the concept of using water heated by the sun. They base their objections on other rationales, among them:

That water heated by the solar energy units is heated by an object heated by the sun and not by the sun itself.

The water in the urn of the solar energy unit is very hot. When cold water enters that unit, it will be heated by the water and produce a situation resembling that of the tub mentioned in Halachah 5.

The bracketed additions are taken from Rashi's commentary (Shabbat 146b).

Rashi (loc. cit.) explains that were the food left in the sun, it might spoil. By placing it in the cistern, one preserves it.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit., based on Shabbat 146b), the Rambam emphasizes that this law is mentioned because one might think that placing the food in the cistern is forbidden lest one smooth out the cistern's floor.

Enough for one meal (Ba'er Heteiv 321:4).

Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 108b) explains that the rationale for all the laws in this halachah is that salting or pickling foods is comparable to processing leather. This rationale is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:2). The Rambam, however, maintains that the forbidden labor of processing does not apply with regard to food (Chapter 11, Halachah 5).

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo states that it is forbidden to make even a small amount of such a mixture.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that usually fish-brine is preserved. Hence, it would appear that one is pickling food.

Included in the latter category are any vegetables that salt softens or makes less bitter. This includes onions, cucumbers, and most vegetables used for salads (Magen Avraham 321:7).

The Rambam's intent is not that pickling is forbidden as a derivative of cooking, but that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against doing so (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:3; Mishnah Berurah 321:16). Note, however, Karti Ufalti 105:2, which maintains that the Rambam considers that there is a Torah prohibition involved.

Similarly, a mixture of salt, vinegar, and oil (or other substances used for salad dressings) may be placed on these vegetables, because it no longer appears that one is salting the vegetables to pickle them (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:4; Mishnah Berurah 321:14).

Note the Mishnah Berurah 321:69, which permits making this mixture only when one does not undertake much effort in doing so.

Hence, this mixture, like any other remedy, may not be drunk on the Sabbath even if it was prepared before the Sabbath.

The Rambam appears to be saying that one may stir the mixture. The Mishnah Berurah 321:58, however, quotes this law as meaning that one may add water or wine to the mixture. Although the Rambam would probably accept that ruling as well, based on his conception of the Rabbinic prohibitions against kneading (see Chapter 21, Halachot 33-34 and notes), this is not likely his intent here.

The Hebrew word כלי can be rendered as either "utensil" or "container." On this basis, the Kessef Mishneh mentions the interpretation of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 53), which explains that one may shake a container to blend the mixture, but one may not stir it by hand. He does not, however, accept this as reflecting the Rambam's intent.

I.e., whip it forcefully by hand to produce a smooth, evenly flowing mixture.

A leafy vegetable that is used as a spice or dip when mixed with the abovementioned substances.

As explained in Chapter 9, Halachot 8-9.

A fragrant spice, noted for its cleansing powers.

This follows the principle of פסיק רישא stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6 - i.e., since one's act will surely result in the performance of a prohibited act, it is considered as if this is one's intent. Although a Rabbinic prohibition is involved here, the same principle still holds.

This decision is based on the principle of אינו מתכוין, that an act that results in the performance of a forbidden labor is permitted if it is not a certainty that the forbidden labor will indeed come about. Indeed, the Rambam uses this law to exemplify this principle in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.

This is the version in the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The Maggid Mishneh notes that there is another version of the text which reverses the order in this clause, stating, "If the majority was a substance that will not necessarily remove hair, it is permitted." There is a difference in the rulings resulting from these two versions of the text when the amount of both substances is equal. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:9) follows the version of the standard text.

Sefer HaKovetz questions why such a leniency is allowed, and explains that all prohibitions based on the principle of פסיק רישא are merely Rabbinic in origin. Accordingly, since the substances that undoubtedly remove hair are not in the majority, leniency is granted. (It must be noted that it is difficult to reconcile the statements of Sefer HaKovetz with the Rambam's own statements, Chapter 1, Halachah 6, that one is liable for performing such an act.)

I.e., as Shabbat 149b emphasizes, the difficulty is because a metal mirror can serve as a cutting article itself.

The Sages desired that their decrees be applied uniformly.

This includes a glass mirror, as is used today (Maggid Mishneh; Mishnah Berurah 302:63).

See Chapter 9, Halachah 11.

Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil questions the Rambam's ruling, since one's intent is not to wring out the liquid, but to plug the flask. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:22 states that when one plugs the opening firmly, one will certainly squeeze water from it. Hence, this is considered a פסיק רישא. Furthermore, our Sages forbade plugging the opening loosely, lest one plug it firmly.

The Kessef Mishneh (in the gloss on Chapter 9, Halachah 11) uses this law to refute the Maggid Mishneh's thesis that, according to the Rambam, the prohibition against wringing out liquids applies only to water, since it is generally beverages other than water that are contained in a flask.

As evident from his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 21:3), the Rambam explains that if the sponge does not have a handle, it is a פסיק רישא that one will squeeze water from it when cleaning with it. If it has a handle, that is not a certainty. This interpretation is also reflected in Rashi's commentary, Shabbat 143a.

Although the Ra'avad accepts the law, he objects to this explanation, maintaining that whether or not the sponge has a handle, one will squeeze water out when cleaning with it. Why then is one allowed to use it? Once the handle is attached, it is no longer considered to be a piece of fabric, but rather a container that is made to hold water. By using it, one is not squeezing the water directly, but merely causing it to be squeezed.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:21, which states that this decree applies only to a jug of water, but not to one containing other beverages. See, however, the Kessef Mishneh's statements cited in note 63.

I.e., unless the cloth was designated for this purpose, it is possible that if it gets wet, one will wring out the water so that one can use it for another purpose. If, however, one has set aside the cloth for this use, one will not be concerned with its getting wet.

Based on the ruling of Tosafot (Shabbat 143b), the Ramah (Orach Chayim 335:1) emphasizes that this law applies only when the cask breaks. If it has a slow leak, there are no restrictions. Since there is no possibility of the person's losing the entire contents of the cask at once, our Sages did not fear that he would panic and violate the Sabbath laws to save his property.

The Ramah also mentions the ruling of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 196) that these restrictions apply only when one desires to bring containers from one courtyard to another. There are, however, no restrictions on using different containers within one's own property. This leniency is accepted by the later Ashkenazic authorities.

According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 335:1), one may save enough for one's Sabbath needs and the needs of one's guests, even if it is necessary to use several containers. As Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes in his gloss, the Rambam's wording does not appear to fit this interpretation.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that this restriction applies even when a sponge has a handle. (See the previous halachah.) Since the person is distressed about the loss of his property, our Sages fear that he might violate the Sabbath laws in this instance.

I.e., there are two restrictions: that one may save only a limited amount of wine or oil, and that the manner in which one saves these liquids must differ from one's ordinary practice.

According to the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), there is no restriction on the size of this container. Any container may be used, regardless of the amount it can hold. As mentioned, the Rambam's wording does not appear to fit this interpretation.

I.e., invite guests who he knows will not want to partake of the liquids. In this way, he will be able to save the liquids because of them, even though they will not partake of them. (See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:17, where the Rambam mentions a similar instance where the Sages permitted one to act with guile.)

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) states that it is forbidden to invite guests with this intent. If, however, one does so, it is permitted to use the wine. It is possible that this is the Rambam's intent. (The Shulchan Aruch's leniency is actually even more encompassing, and allows one to use the wine if one invites the guests after collecting it.) Based on the Maggid Mishneh, the Magen Avraham 335:2, however, states that according to the Rambam, one is permitted to act with guile in this manner.

(Kinat Eliyahu objects to this interpretation, noting the difference in the Rambam's wording in this halachah, "If one acted with guile in this matter, it is permitted," and his wording in Chapter 23, Halachah 3, "It is permitted to act with guile in this matter.")

Since the person rubs it from the inside, it is not obvious that his intent is to launder the garment (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:7).

Even from the outside.

Or with a knife (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:17; Mishnah Berurah 302:34).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of the Tur, which states that both rubbing the inside of a garment and scraping off mud are permitted only when the mud is moist. When the mud has dried, these acts are forbidden, because it is as if one is grinding the mud.

The Ramban and the Ra'avad follow a different version of the text of Shabbat 140a, and therefore rule that it is also permitted to rub a scarf. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit:5) follows the Rambam's decision, explaining that when rubbing a scarf, one's intent is to make it glistening clean.

The Be'ur Halachah cites support for the Rambam's ruling from Mo'ed Katan 10b, which states that it is permitted to rub clean one's garments on Chol HaMo'ed (see Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 8:14). This indicates that such an act is forbidden on the Sabbath.

I.e., a cloak becomes stiff after being laundered, and before putting it on one generally rubs it (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

Note Chapter 9, Halachah 11, where the Rambam states that one is not liable for wringing out leather. Similarly, the fact that he mentions the prohibition against laundering leather in this chapter appears to indicate that he considers it to be merely a Rabbinic prohibition. This perspective is also quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:19. The Be'ur Halachah 302, however, explains that one is liable for laundering leather.

The Rambam appears to allow one to scrape old shoes. The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh object to this ruling, based on Shabbat 141a-b, which states that it is forbidden to scrape both new and old shoes.

The commentaries offer several resolutions of this difficulty. Some point to manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah that omit the word "new" entirely (Radbaz, Vol. V, Responsum 1628). Others explain that the Rambam mentions "new" shoes for specific reasons, but not to imply that scraping old shoes is permitted (Rabbenu Meir of Padua). Others find sources to substantiate the Rambam's ruling (Sefer HaKovetz).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:8) forbids scraping both old and new shoes. Significantly, however, the prohibition is associated with the forbidden labor of removing hair. Note also the Magen Avraham 302:17 who emphasizes that the prohibition applies only when using a knife. Using dull metal is permitted.

See Chapter 23, Halachah 10, which appears to contradict this ruling. Similarly, the Ra'avad and others question the text here. Significantly, Rav Kapach mentions that the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah follow an alternate version of the text, which does not present a difficulty.

Care must be taken not to press the rag firmly, lest one squeeze out water from it (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:9).

One may not, however, rub them under water to remove the stain (Maggid Mishneh). Washing a cloth in water would be considered as laundering, even according to Torah law (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:20).

The Mishnah Berurah 302:57 states that one may also use a rag that is of no importance.

I.e., the prohibition was not instituted because of the act of washing one's hands with the cloth, but because one might wash the cloth later.

The Magen Avraham 301:58 focuses on this law as an example of the relation of the principles of Rabbinic authority to the changes in the cultural conditions under which Jews lived. Originally, this leniency was granted, because in the Talmudic era washing every day was considered a necessity, and a person who washes himself must dry himself. In his own time, washing was not considered as great a necessity. Hence, some thought of ruling that using a towel would be prohibited. Nevertheless, since the Sages of the Talmud did not institute a prohibition in this regard, the later Rabbis left the status quo unchanged. The Magen Avraham, however, concludes that it is preferable to dry oneself with a towel that one would not normally wring out during the week.

I.e., from rain, or because he fell into a body of water.

He must, however, be careful not to shake the water from them.

We are not, however, obligated to remove clothes that were hanging on a clothesline before the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:45).

The Mishnah Berurah 301:165 cites authorities who maintain that this applies only with respect to a safeguard instituted because of the possibility that an observer might think a prohibition from the Torah was violated. When the question revolves around a Rabbinic prohibition, there is room for leniency.

For the Sages wanted to established a uniform standard, applicable at all times.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that since the person desires to connect the two mikvaot, he will not insert the plug firmly to the extent that he will squeeze water from it.

In this instance, the person's concern is to prevent the food and utensils from being inundated by the flow of water. Accordingly, his intent will be to plug the drain in a manner that will prevent a great flow. He, however, is not concerned that there will be a slight leak and will not necessarily plug the drain tightly (Kessef Mishneh).

Merkevet HaMishneh offers a different interpretation. The Rambam is referring to a plug for a hole in a cistern. The person sees that the drain pipes leading to the cistern are full and soon the water level will reach the hole. He therefore plugs the hole so that the water will not flow out and flood the courtyard. Although he plugs the hole tightly, since the water level has not yet reached this height, there is no possibility that he will squeeze out water in the process.

I.e., there is a drain-pipe that leads in two directions. By plugging one end, the water can be directed into a cistern.

Since in this instance, the person wants to direct the flow of the water and preserve all of it, he will plug the other end of the pipe tightly. When doing so, the possibility exists that he will squeeze water from the plug.

Our translation is based on Rashi's commentary, Beitzah 23a.

See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 8:14, which states that this is forbidden on Chol HaMo'ed because it requires professional expertise.

This appears to refer to folding a garment with the intent of smoothing out wrinkles that already exist. Similarly, one may fold a garment after removing it, in order that it remain uncreased so it can be worn again on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:8).

One may fold and refold a garment several times on the Sabbath (Shabbat 15:3). If, however, there is no need to wear a garment again on the Sabbath, one may not fold it so that it will remain uncreased for the following day. For this reason, it is forbidden to fold one's tallit on the Sabbath after the morning prayers (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:8; Mishnah Berurah 302:13).

Note Rashi (Shabbat 113a), who offers a different explanation of the Talmudic passage that serves as the source for the Rambam's ruling.

When two people fold a garment, the possibility exists that one will smooth out the creases by hand. This is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:9).

See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.

Similarly, the application of other forms of makeup is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 303:25 and commentaries).

See Chapter 10, Halachah 9.

Note Rashi (Shabbat 48a), who offers a different rationale for this restriction: that this resembles making a utensil.

The Mishnah Berurah 340:32 emphasizes that one may return them to the same pillow or blanket, but may not transfer them to another one on the Sabbath.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.

Our translation has parallels in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, D'mai 6:6 and Kilayim 9:5. The Merkevet HaMishneh, however, renders this word as "modestly" - i.e., so others will not see him and think that he is tearing.

As mentioned several times, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor without intention. In this instance, there is an even greater reason for leniency, since the concept of intent is particularly important regarding this category of forbidden labor. As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 10, the forbidden labor of tearing consists of tearing for the sake of resewing.

See Chapter 10, Halachot 12-14.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's statements here, noting that from the halachot cited above, it would appear that by returning the doors to their place one would be liable for performing the forbidden labor of building.

According to the Ramah (Orach Chayim 314:1), this law applies only to small cabinents and chests, those smaller than 40 seah, approximately .375 square meters in modern measure.

In a related matter, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:34-35 emphasizes that in contrast to the doors of a building, the doors of cabinets, chests, and the like are not considered muktzeh on the Sabbath. Since they were part of a utensil before they were removed, they are still considered to be utensils afterwards. In contrast, the doors of a building were not considered utensils before the commencement of the Sabbath. Hence, if they are removed on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to carry them.

If, however, it slips off entirely, it may not be returned outside the Temple (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 313:5).

Since the prohibitions in the category of sh'vut need not be observed in the Temple.

I.e., even in the Temple. This is an exception to the principle mentioned in the previous note, because, in this instance it is very likely that one will perform a forbidden labor (Tosafot, Eruvin 102b).

There is a greater concern that one will attach the upper hinge firmly, because if it becomes detached the door will fall. If, by contrast, the upper hinge remains attached but the lower hinge slips off, the door will still remain hanging.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:7). Rashi interprets this term to refer to "parting the hair." Note also the Mishnah Berurah 303:83, which discusses whether this restriction applies regarding only a woman's natural hair, or also regarding a wig.

See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:5), which - albeit in a different context - allows the use of folding chairs on the Sabbath. One may add a leaf to a table, but one may not construct a table by placing the table board on its legs.

Many other authorities differ and explain that the prohibition was instituted lest one firmly attach the parts to each other. Were one to do so, one would be liable for performing the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 313:6).

It appears that according to the Rambam, even if a person were to attach the parts firmly to each other, he would not be liable. As mentioned, others differ.

The Rambam's perspective on this issue requires clarification: Beitzah 22a states, "There is no [concept of] building regarding utensils."

The Rambam explains that this refers only to putting together a utensil that is made up of several component parts. Fashioning a new utensil, by contrast, is surely considered building, as explained in Chapter 10, Halachah 13 and notes. As mentioned, others differ and maintain that a person who fashions a new utensil is liable for performing the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil.

According to the Rambam, the rationale for the leniency appears to be that since the parts hang loosely, one would not confuse assembling such a structure with erecting a building. According to the other authorities, the rationale is that since the parts of the utensil hang loosely, there is little likelihood that one will attach the parts firmly to each other.

This refers to adjusting the child's limbs by hand. As mentioned in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, one may tie clothes around the child to adjust his limbs. Furthermore, on the day of a child's birth, it is permitted to adjust his limbs (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:10; Mishnah Berurah 330:34). Even afterwards, many authorities allow the adjustment of other limbs, with the exception of the backbone.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 13.

In this context, the word "temporary" is defined as "not constructed to remain for a prolonged period" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:1). It would appear that, according to the Rambam, even if a tent has a roof that is a handbreadth wide, its classification as permanent or temporary depends on the intent of the person who erects it. (See the Noda BiY'hudah, Vol. II, Orach Chayim, Responsum 30.)

Based on this restriction, the Noda BiY'hudah (loc. cit.) forbids opening an umbrella on the Sabbath. Similarly, because of the appearance that might be created, he forbids carrying an umbrella on the Sabbath even when: a) it was opened before the Sabbath, and b) the community possesses an eruv that makes it permitted to carry.

If, however, the overhang was not at all extended before the commencement of the Sabbath, it may not be extended on the Sabbath. Although it was suspended above the wall before the Sabbath, since it was completely rolled up, it may not be used.

Similarly, it is permitted to place a table-top on its legs (Maggid Mishneh). Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:3), which forbids placing a table-top on legs that appear as walls.

I.e., a space is covered by a surface supported by four legs.

Since one does not use the space below them (Maggid Mishneh).

Note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:15, and the resolution offered by the Lechem Mishneh there.

I.e., the walls of the tent slant downward, and it does not have a straight roof that is a handbreadth wide.

Based on the principle of l'vud, the space within three handbreadths is considered to be a single entity. Thus, were it to be a handbreadth wide, the tent would be considered as having a roof of significant size (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:15).

This follows the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Chanan'el. Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, maintain that since the tent does not have a roof that is a handbreadth wide, it can never be considered even a temporary tent, and there is no prohibition in constructing it. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:8) follows the Rambam's ruling.

I.e., there is a beam in the middle of a room on which a cloth is rolled that will be spread out to serve as a cover for a bed. Cords are attached to the cloth, and when they are pulled it is extended to form the canopy. Needless to say, such a canopy must meet the criteria mentioned in the first clause of this halachah regarding the width of its roof (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:16; Mishnah Berurah 315:37).

As implied by the first clause, had the cloth not been hanging before the commencement of the Sabbath, hanging it on the Sabbath itself would have been forbidden. Nevertheless, since it was hanging before the Sabbath and the cords that extend it are already in place, it is considered already to have been extended the length of a handbreadth. Therefore, extending it further is permitted, as mentioned in Halachah 27 (ibid.).

Since spreading out the cloth is not considered to be building a tent, closing it is not considered to be demolishing one (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:16; Mishnah Berurah 315:38). This and all the other leniencies associated with a temporary tent apply when the roof of the temporary tent is less than a handbreadth wide (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:17; Mishnah Berurah 315:38). This ruling is also reflected in the following halachah.

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 315:1), who states that one may hang a curtain on the Sabbath, even if one intends to leave it hanging permanently, provided there is no halachic significance to its being hung - e.g., to hang a curtain in front of a toilet so that one could pray in that same room.

Note also the Mishnah Berurah 315:38, which states that the wording of this halachah indicates that the cords from which a curtain hangs must be prepared before the commencement of the Sabbath, as the cords of the cloth mentioned immediately before. There are, however, other authorities who do not accept this view. (See also Halachah 32, which describes the manner in which a curtain may be hung.)

Thus, it meets the criteria of a temporary tent mentioned in the previous halachah.

This represents a greater leniency than the previous halachah. In that halachah, leniency was granted only because the ends of the canopy were hanging from the curtain rods and attached by strings. In this instance, the canopy was not hanging before the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since it was prepared to serve this purpose, it is permitted.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the interpretation of the Rashba, who explains that this refers to a canopy that hangs down a handbreadth below the bed. The part that hangs down is thus considered to be a wall - and the slanted portion of the canopy, a roof.

Based on this interpretation, he finds it necessary to differentiate between such a canopy and a sheet or blanket extended over a bed that is used at present. In the latter instance, even though the sheet or blanket extends more than a handbreadth on either side of the bed, it is not considered a tent, since it was not spread out with the purpose of enclosing space. The canopy, by contrast, was spread out for that purpose and hence is considered a tent in certain instances.

Although this interpretation is accepted by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:18; Mishnah Berurah 315:42), Rav Kapach notes that it does not fit the wording used by the Rambam, "provided it does not hang more than a handbreadth above the bed." He thus explains that if the canopy hangs more than a handbreadth above the bed, that open space is considered a wall, and the canopy, its roof.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:7). Others render this as "a shutter." It would, however, appear that the Rambam would not object to the use of a shutter for this purpose. Indeed, as indicated by Shabbat 24:5, it is permitted to use any utensil for this purpose. Compare also to Chapter 26, Halachah 10.

The rationale for this leniency is that this is considered equivalent to closing a window or a door which is permitted on the Sabbath (Shabbat 125b).

The same rules apply regarding an aperture in the roof (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:1; Mishnah Berurah 313:1).

In this instance, we have adopted the version of this halachah found in the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The version of the standard published texts would be rendered "on one's garments."

The Maggid Mishneh and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:40), interpret this as referring to a hat with a brim less than a handbreadth. According to their interpretation, putting on such a hat is forbidden even in one's home. The Noda BiY'hudah (Vol. II, Orach Chayim, Responsum 30), however, explains that there is no prohibition against putting on a hat, regardless of how wide its brim is.

Note the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1450), who explains that both of these stipulations are derived from the Hebrew word מהודק used in Shabbat 138b, the source for this halachah. מהודק means "firm," and in this context, the use of the word implies both "firmly attached" and that the brim is firm. When both these stipulations are fulfilled, the garment resembles a tent.

Note Rashi, however, who explains that the head-covering must be firmly attached to one's head. Otherwise, one may not wear it in the public domain, lest the wind blow it from one's head. Rashi's interpretation is followed by most later commentaries and accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:41).

I.e., there is no prohibition against hanging the curtain if one holds it upright. This, however, is difficult when hanging a large curtain. Inevitably, one will hold one portion of the curtain with one's left hand and fold at least a handbreadth or more over with one's right hand while hanging it. Thus, a temporary tent will have been created.

This represents the Rambam's conception of the passage in Shabbat 138b, the source for this halachah. Although the Ra'avad and others interpret that passage differently, the Rambam's view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:12). (See also the final clause of Halachah 29 and notes.)

I.e., in contrast to the canopy described in Halachah 29.

Similarly, removing the cover is forbidden, since it is considered to be demolishing a tent (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:19).

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this restriction applies only when there is a handbreadth or more of empty space in the jug. This qualification is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:13).

The Maggid Mishneh also mentions that the Rashba and the Ra'avad interpret Shabbat 139b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore reach a more lenient decision. Although their view is mentioned by the later authorities, the general consensus is to follow the Rambam's ruling.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 17, and notes.

Rashi (Shabbat, loc. cit.) interprets the passage that serves as the source for this halachah as the Rambam does. Others, however, explain that this restriction was instituted to make one deviate from one's ordinary practice as a safeguard associated with the forbidden labor of sifting.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 16. Note, however, Halachah 14 of that chapter, which mentions making a hole in a chicken coop in connection with the forbidden labor of building.

Accordingly, many authorities forbid opening cans or bags on the Sabbath. The more lenient opinions, which allow this, base themselves on the concept that after the contents are removed from the can or bag, it is no longer considered a useful article. Alternatively, these opinions maintain that the can is considered to be a utensil even before it is opened, and the cover is not at all significant.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1) states that this restriction applies only when the person has the intent to widen the hole. If he does not have this intent, there is no prohibition. As an example, that text mentions a knife inserted into a barrel, even though the hole may be widened when the knife is removed; since that is not one's intent, there is no prohibition involved. The Ramah emphasizes, however, that this leniency applies only when it is not a certainty (פסיק רישא) that the hole will be opened further.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) quotes the opinion of the Kolbo, which states that this leniency applies only regarding barrels of earthenware. A hole made in a wooden barrel which is tightly plugged may not be opened.

Shabbat 146a mentions three levels where holes might be made: a) a hole above the level of the wine. This is intended merely to protect the fragrance of the wine.

b) a hole in the middle of the wine. Since the wine is not entirely above the hole, it needed not be fastened so tightly. This is the subject of the present clause.

c) a hole below the dregs. This is the subject of the following clause.

Since the entire weight of the wine rests on this hole, it must be fastened very tightly. Accordingly, opening it is considered tantamount to opening a new hole.

Barrels would be sealed closed with clay that was spread out and hardened at their opening.

Opening the seal in this irregular manner clearly indicates that one did not intend to fashion an opening. An opening is generally not located on the top of a cask (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:6).

A careful reading of the Rambam's wording indicates the need for this bracketed addition (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, this represents a reversal of the Rambam's approach in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:3), where he mentions making a hole in the side of the barrel.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that it is forbidden to break a complete barrel. Just as one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of building when fashioning a vessel, one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of demolishing when destroying one. Although one is not liable unless one breaks the barrel as a constructive act, even when one's intent is destructive, doing so is forbidden by Rabbinic decree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 314:1; Mishnah Berurah 314:7). There are, however, later authorities who follow the Rambam's ruling, which permits destroying a utensil if one does not fashion it into a different utensil in the process.

Were one to make a carefully perforated hole, one would be fashioning it into a utensil (Rashi, Shabbat 146a).

Although a sword may not usually be carried on the Sabbath, it may be handled to perform a task that is permitted (Mishnah Berurah 314:24).

The Mishnah Berurah 314:25 states that this leniency applies only when guests are present.

This is also a restriction imposed, lest one complete the construction of a utensil.

See Halachah 11 of this chapter and also Chapter 11, Halachah 6.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 15.

Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:11) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and others, who maintain that one is allowed to close a barrel with a stone or a piece of wood, provided that one does not close it when wine is flowing out. The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 314:20; Mishnah Berurah 314:47), however, differ, and rule that the Rambam's decision should be followed.

Based on Shabbat 139b, many other authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), grant this leniency only to a Torah Sage, but not to a common person. Moreover, since Torah Sages of the caliber of those of the Talmudic era do not exist at present, there are authorities who do not permit this leniency at all in the present era.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 16.

See the Hagahot Maimoniot, which states that one may knock on a door, because this is not a musical tone. Although there are stringent opinions, common practice is to follow the more lenient view.

Our translation is taken from the Mishnah Berurah 339:9. (See also the Be'ur Halachah, which mentions that some versions of the Mishneh Torah omit the Hebrew word או. According to this version, the meaning would be "to bang rhythmically on a board as singers do.")

Note the Mishnah Berurah (ibid.), which cites authorities who interpret the phrase "rhythmically as singers do" as an exclusion. These opinions maintain that snapping one's fingers to catch a colleague's attention is not forbidden. Nevertheless, it is common practice to act stringently and not to snap one's fingers at all.

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 339:3), who states that it is customary to allow clapping one's hands and dancing on the Sabbath and holidays. The rationale for this leniency is that today most people are not able to repair a musical instrument, and thus the rationale for our Sages' decree is no longer applicable.

It must, however, be noted that this leniency is granted only with regard to dancing and clapping hands, not playing drums or performing any of the activities mentioned in the previous halachah. Even dancing and clapping hands is allowed only in rejoicing associated with a mitzvah (Mishnah Berurah 339:10).

Although bathing is permitted, as above (Chapter 22, Halachah 20), swimming is not.

If the pool is located in the public domain, it is forbidden to swim within it for another reason: It is possible that one will spray water for more than four cubits (Mishnah Berurah 339:4).

As the Rambam continues to mention, the reed serves as a spigot through which water flowing from a cask can be directed.

Opened at the ends so that the wine can flow through it like a pipe.

Measured and trimmed to fit the barrel. This leniency is granted even if this reed has never been used for this purpose before (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:5).

In contrast to the reed mentioned above, which must merely be inserted into the barrel, it is necessary to fold the leaf and adjust it so that the wine will flow through (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

Rabbenu Asher and others follow the opinion of other Sages (Shabbat 146b), who explain that the reason for this decree is concern that one might pick a leaf on the Sabbath to use for this purpose. According to that opinion, if before the commencement of the Sabbath one has available many leaves that have been picked, one may use them for this purpose.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's ruling, and he quotes it in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). The Ramah, however, quotes Rabbenu Asher's view.

The Maggid Mishneh and others cite Beitzah 4:4, which states that these items were used as makeshift frying pans. (Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah and Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:8.) Rav Kapach, however, raises the question: Since frying is forbidden on the Sabbath, of what use would these articles be?

A white powder, referred to as alum or tartar which serves as a natural polish.

Rashi (Shabbat 50a) and other commentaries differ and state that the prohibition stems from the forbidden labor of removing hair.

See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:11 and the Mishnah Berurah 323:38, which mention several restrictions regarding the use of sand for this purpose.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 2:1), the Rambam describes neter as a blue pumice stone used for detergent purposes. (See also Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 9:37.) It must noted that sodium is called natrium in Latin. This has led some to think that the intent is sodium bicarbonate, a natural cleanser.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam concerning the rationale for this restriction, explaining that it is not associated with the forbidden labor of dealing the final blow. Instead, it is prohibited so that one does not prepare on the Sabbath for a weekday. This opinion is also quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:6.

The intent is that one may wash only those utensils that one intends to use again. Even when a person will serve another meal on the Sabbath, if he is not intending to use certain utensils, he may not wash them. One may, however, wash utensils on Friday night, even though one does not intend to use them until Saturday afternoon (Mishnah Berurah 323:27-28).

I.e., one may wash the glasses at any time, because it may be assumed that one will desire to drink later. If, however, a person knows that he will not drink again on the Sabbath, it is forbidden for him to wash pitchers and glasses as well (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:6; Mishnah Berurah 323:29).

Note, however, the Magen Avraham 302:6, who states that one may make a bed if the disorder in the room makes one extremely uncomfortable.

I.e., since the utensil was unfit for use before it was immersed, immersing it is equivalent to repairing it (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 2:2; compare to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:17). Based on Beitzah 18a, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher offer other rationales for this prohibition.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 323:7), which mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether it is permitted on the Sabbath to immerse a vessel that one has purchased from gentiles. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, this would be forbidden. Accordingly, the Pri Megadim questions why the Shulchan Aruch ignores the Rambam's ruling. The Be'ur Halachah, however, differentiates between the immersion of vessels purchased from a gentile and the immersion of impure vessels.

The Mishneh Torah also contains laws that will be relevant when the Temple is rebuilt, and the observance of all the laws of ritual impurity will be restored. At present this halachah is relevant in the following contexts: Women are permitted to immerse themselves in the mikveh on Friday night (with certain restrictions) and men are allowed to immerse themselves on the Sabbath for the sake of holiness (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:7; Mishnah Berurah 326:24). Care, however, must be taken when toweling oneself dry not to squeeze water from the towel.

Originally, the license to immerse oneself in the mikveh on the Sabbath was given before it was customary to heat mikvaot. At present, the leniency is continued in most communities, even when the mikveh has been heated.

This activity is necessary as part of the purification process for a person who became impure because of contact with a human corpse. Rashi (Pesachim 65b) explains that this is forbidden because it is obvious that one's intent is to purify oneself. Rav Kapach, however, points to Pesachim 69a, which states that the prohibition was instituted lest one carry in the public domain.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 2:2), the Rambam explains that if the utensil contracted ritual impurity, its immersion would be forbidden, since one would be purifying not only the water it contains, but also the utensil itself.

See Hilchot Keilim 1:6.

The Ra'avad mentions that terumah may not be separated even if one's intent is to give it to the priest to use on the Sabbath itself.

See Halachah 14, where the Rambam offers another reason for this same prohibition.

The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the Rambam does not mention Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with the forbidden labors of hunting, slaughtering, and skinning. The commentaries do note, however, that in Chapter 10 the Rambam mentions Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with hunting, and in Chapter 11 Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with slaughtering.

See Chapter 11, Halachot 5-6.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 21, Halachah 23, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 327:1) writes that at present, it is not common for healthy people to apply oil to themselves. Therefore, it is forbidden to apply any type of oil to oneself on the Sabbath for therapeutic purposes.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 18, and notes.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 26:5). Obviously, this bed-cover is made of leather. The Maggid Mishneh offers a different interpretation.

Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 327:12, which cites opinions that prohibit applying oil to used leather.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 6.

See Halachah 3, which prohibits closing a hole in connection with the forbidden labors of dealing the final blow or of building.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.

It must be emphasized that according to the text of Shabbat 94b, it would appear that applying eye-paint is associated with the forbidden labor of dyeing. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Rambam and many other Rishonim had a different version of the text, upon which he based his ruling in this halachah.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 323), which mentions several leniencies and restrictions regarding the acquisition of foodstuffs on the Sabbath.

One may, however, give a present to a colleague. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:11.)

Note, however, Hilchot Eruvin 2:12, which allows one to rent a gentile's property on the Sabbath in order to complete an eruv.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:2) offers another rationale for the restriction against hiring workers, the prohibitions stemming from Isaiah 58:13, "If you refrain... from [ordinary] speech" - i.e., that our speech on the Sabbath be distinguished from our speech during the week. The Rambam mentions prohibitions of this nature in Chapter 24.

See related matters in Chapter 6.

The difference between borrowing such commodities and lending objects is that when one borrows an object, one intends to return the same object. When one borrows a commodity, by contrast, one intends to use it and return a different one. Thus, it bears a far greater resemblance to a loan.

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi explains that "Give me as a loan" implies that the loan will be for an extended period. Hence, it is more likely that one will write it down.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:11) notes that in languages other than Hebrew, the difference between offering a loan and lending appears as one of semantics. Rather than say "Lend me" or "Give me as a loan," one should say merely "Give me."

The Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 323) follow a slightly more lenient approach and allow certain products to be sold by number and in vessels from which a measure can be obtained.

Compare to similar laws mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:19-24.

The ceremony through which a childless widow frees her brother-in-law from the obligation of yibbum. (See the following note and Deuteronomy 25:7-10.)

This refers to the rite in which the brother-in-law of a childless widow marries her in order to perpetuate the name of her dead husband. (See Deuteronomy 25:5-6.)

According to Torah law, marriage is a two-staged process, including erusin (betrothal) - when a bond between a husband and wife is established, but the two still live separately - and nisuin (marriage) - when the couple begin their lives together.

Betrothal is initiated by the act of kiddushin. At present, this is effected by the groom's giving the wedding ring to his wife. It must be added that it is also forbidden to carry out nisuin on the Sabbath, but for a different reason: lest one violate the Sabbath laws when preparing for the wedding feast. (See Hilchot Ishut 10:14.)

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 339:4) states that divorce proceedings may not generally be carried out on the Sabbath, even if the bill of divorce was written beforehand.

This refers to the dedication of property to the Temple treasury or the consecration of an animal to be offered as a sacrifice.

See Leviticus 27:1-27.

See Leviticus 27:28-29.

See Halachah 9, where this reason is mentioned in connection with this prohibition.

See Leviticus 27:32.

For this was the common practice, as the Rambam mentions in Hilchot Bechorot 7:1. As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 17, making a mark is considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of writing. Rabbenu Chanan'el, by contrast, explains that the prohibition against making this mark stems from the forbidden labor of dyeing.

Rav Moshe HaCohen of Lunil notes that, in contrast to produce, the Rambam does not mention the prohibition against tithing animals in connection with the forbidden labor of dealing the final blow. Unlike produce, according to Torah law, one is allowed to partake of meat from an animal even if it has not been tithed. Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against partaking of such meat, tithing a herd is not considered as making an object fit for use.

When the fourteenth of Nisan falls on the Sabbath.

Since these offerings are associated with a fixed time, they will stand out distinctly in one's mind and will not cause one to forget the Sabbath prohibitions (Shabbat 148b, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:19).

The laws associated with sprinkling the water that has been mixed with the ashes of the red heifer are described in Numbers 19:11-21.

Note the Lechem Mishneh (in the gloss on Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:10), which states that this prohibition applies even when one has no other produce available. See also Sha'ar HaMelech, which questions whether the prohibition applies to others besides the person who violated the prohibition. Note also Chapter 3, Halachah 9, and Chapter 6, Halachah 23.

The participants in the transaction are, however, given stripes for rebelliousness, the prohibition instituted for the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Mechirah 30:7).

Although the Rabbis forbade partaking of such produce before tithing it, they considered this as merely a safeguard, for the majority of the common people did separate the tithes. Therefore, one is not considered to be making an article fit for use to the same extent as when one separates tithes from produce that has surely not been tithed (Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Shabbat 2:7). This law is also mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 10.

Produce purchased from a common person, which we are unsure whether or not it has been tithed.

But did not separate these portions (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, D'mai 4:5).

The tenth of the tithe, which the Levites were required to give to the priests.

Which was given instead of the second tithe in the third and sixth years of the seven-year cycle.

The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.). There the Rambam emphasizes that the prohibition centers on giving the designated portions. This is borne out by his rulings in Hilchot Ma'aser 9:8-11, where he mentions leniencies in regard to the separation of the designated portions on the Sabbath if one makes a condition before the commencement of the Sabbath.

If he does not inform them, it is as if he were using the designated gifts for his own personal purposes (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

This is forbidden even during the week, because the Rabbis deemed gambling to be theft, and also because this reflects conduct that does not contribute to the stability of society (Hilchot Gezeilah 6:7,11).

But not with outsiders, as reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:2) and his rulings in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:20.

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 322:6), Rav Yosef Karo follows the interpretation of Shabbat 148b by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher, and forbids casting lots, even among one's own household, unless the portions are equal.

See, however, Chapter 24, Halachah 4, which states that one should minimize one's involvement in such idle matters on the Sabbath. Indeed, as is evident from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avot 1:16) and Hilchot De'ot 2:4, the Rambam frowns on such conversation during the week as well. To quote Hilchot Gezeilah 6:11: "It is not for a person to spend any of his days involved in anything other than the words of wisdom and the matters that lead to the settlement of the world."

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:13) renders the Hebrew שטרי הדיוטות as "account sheets." Rashi (Shabbat 149a) interprets this as also referring to social correspondence. Based on the Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:2), the Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam follows Rashi's view.

[The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:14) permits reading a social letter on the Sabbath only if one is unaware of its contents.]

Erasing is one of the categories of forbidden labor, as the Rambam explains in Chapter 11, Halachah 9. Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss to Shabbat 149b) differs and explains that the restriction mentioned stems from the prohibitions derived from Isaiah 58:13, which distinguish between one's conduct on the Sabbath and one's involvement in mundane, weekday concerns.

Regarding this ruling, the Rambam writes (Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.), "On the Sabbath, it is forbidden to read anything other than the words of prophecy and their explanations [i.e., the Oral Law]. Among the matters excluded are [works of secular] wisdom and science."

Rashi (Shabbat 149a) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:15) interpret this as referring to descriptions written under works of art. Others explain that this refers to images of false deities. (In the Talmudic period, these two interpretations could easily be interrelated, because the subject matter of most gentile art was the false deities they worshiped.)

I.e., the Holy Writings, in contrast to the Torah and the prophets. This interpretation is obvious from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:1). Rashi (Shabbat 115a) mentions other opinions which forbid reading the works of the prophets as well.

See Chapter 30, Halachah 10, where the Rambam describes the attendance at the House of Study on the Sabbath.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the wording used by the Rambam indicates that a person in an adjoining courtyard where the fire has not yet caught may transfer all his property to a further removed courtyard if an eruv has been made. This concept is also mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:1).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:11) mentions a further leniency: One may transfer property from a house to an adjoining house or to another courtyard that one owns. There is, however, a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether this leniency is accepted or not.

Another example of a leniency granted because of this principle is found in Chapter 6, Halachah 22.

The particular laws stemming from this principle are described in Halachot 21-25.

As examples, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) mentions cups and pitchers. From the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:17, it would appear that permission is granted only to save utensils one needs for eating, but not other articles - e.g., pillows and blankets - that might be required on the Sabbath.

See Halachah 25.

This restriction applies even according to the authorities who maintain that the prohibition against carrying in a lane is Rabbinic in origin. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:10 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:26 mention that these restrictions do not apply with regard to saving clothes. Since one must wear them as garments, one may take them out to the public domain as well.

One may save enough for three meals for every member of his household. Regardless of whether a person eats a large amount or a small amount, a standard measure - and only that standard measure - of food may be saved for him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:5).

This indicates that one may save several different containers containing different types of food.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:6 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:16, which emphasize that, even though one may pour the contents of several containers into a garment, one must empty the containers. It is forbidden to place the containers themselves in a garment and remove them.

I.e., even though the person who owns the property may not save more than his household needs, all of his food stores need not be left to the flames. Other people may be invited to save for themselves.

Since our Sages forbade the person from saving it, he despairs of ever recovering it and relinquishes his ownership.

The above applies only when the person makes an explicit statement inviting others to save the property. If he does not issue such an invitation, we cannot assume that he has relinquished ownership. Although he is forbidden from saving more himself, others are not allowed to take for themselves, for the owner may yet hope to find friends who will save the food and return it to him at no cost (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:7; Mishnah Berurah 334:22).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 16:3 (based on Shabbat 120a)], the Rambam describes this as "God-fearing conduct," for it reflects an unwillingness to benefit from property that is not one's own. In this instance, this is particularly true, for the owner does not willingly abandon ownership of his property.

It is, however, pious conduct not to accept payment (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

The Maggid Mishneh and others draw attention to the Rambam's statements at the conclusion of Chapter 6, which forbid taking payment even for activities that are permitted on the Sabbath unless the wage is paid for a larger span of time. Rav David Arameah explains that the prohibition against taking payment for one's Sabbath activities is Rabbinic in origin. In this instance, because of the positive nature of the activity involved, the Sages did not impose any restrictions.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.) explains that the article rightfully belongs to the person who saved it. Although he relinquishes ownership in favor of his original owner, he does not relinquish ownership of that portion of the article that is equivalent to his wage. What he is receiving from the owner is, in fact, payment for property that he was entitled to take possession of.

Since one is required to partake of the finest foods on the Sabbath, one is permitted to return and take the loaf baked with fine flour. It is possible to explain that because of the confusion caused by the fire, one forgot to take the better loaf originally.

The Rabbis explained that one may act with guile in this matter and, at the outset, take a loaf of lesser quality so that one can return and take a better loaf afterwards. Since one is not even transgressing a Rabbinic prohibition and will always be able to excuse oneself afterwards that this choice was due to confusion, no restrictions were imposed.

This leads to a further leniency. One may save, for example, a meal of fish, and then return and save a meal of meat, excusing oneself saying, "At first, I desired to partake of the fish. Afterwards, my appetite changed and I preferred the meat" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:3; Mishnah Berurah 334:12).

According to the fixed calendar we follow at present, Yom Kippur will not fall on either a Friday or a Sunday. This law, as many of the other laws in the Mishneh Torah, will apply only after the coming of the Redemption.

If Yom Kippur falls on Thursday and one knows that it will be impossible to prepare one's Sabbath needs on Friday, one is permitted to save food on Yom Kippur for the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:4; Mishnah Berurah 334:13). Similarly, one may save food on Yom Kippur for the meal following the fast, regardless of the day of week (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:4).

It appears that, according to the Rambam, one may not return and save other clothes. This is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages in the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:4). Rabbi Yosse maintains that one may return and put on a second set of clothes. Since one is not carrying the garments, but wearing them, we rule more leniently than regarding foodstuffs. This ruling is followed by the Rashba and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:8).

Since our Sages forbade a person from saving any more clothes, we assume that he despaired of recovering any more of his property. As mentioned above, many authorities accept this rationale only when the person actually invites others to save the clothes.

Although the Rambam is speaking about saving sacred texts from fire, the same laws apply to another factor - e.g., a flood - that might cause their ruin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:19).

This term refers to the books of the Bible.

There is somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. He is quoting the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:1). Nevertheless, the teachings of the Mishnah were appropriate in the beginning of the Talmudic era, when it was only the Written Law and not the Oral Law that was written down. The composition of the Mishnah marked a turning point in Jewish history, and from that point onward, it was permitted to write down the teachings of the Oral Law. (See the Rambam's Introduction to the Mishneh Torah.) Texts containing such teachings are also considered sacred articles and may be saved from a fire, just like the books of the Bible (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:12; Mishnah Berurah 334:31). Since the Rambam wrote the Mishneh Torah after it became permitted to write down the Oral Law, seemingly, it would have been appropriate for him to refer to texts of the Oral Law as well.

According to the Rambam, such a lane is considered a private domain according to Torah law, and the prohibition against carrying within it is only Rabbinic in origin (Chapter 17, Halachah 2). Accordingly, this restriction is relaxed in order to save the sacred articles. Although some authorities differ with the Rambam regarding the above halachah, they also require a lane to have three walls and a pole in this instance (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:17; Mishnah Berurah 334:48).

I.e., the script in which tefillin, mezuzot, and Torah scrolls are written. (See Sanhedrin 22a; the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yadayim 4:5; and the Moznaim Mishneh Torah series, Hilchot Tefillin 1:19.)

I.e., and not a transliteration of other languages.

As explained above, the Rambam's ruling applied in the Talmudic period, before it became acceptable to write the Oral Law. Once that was permitted, translations of the Bible were also permitted, and the same laws apply to them. Similarly, siddurim and other similar texts may be saved.

As mentioned above, after permission was granted to write the Oral Law, this prohibition no longer applies.

Our translation is based on Rashi (Shabbat 115a) and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:12).

Which are not acceptable for writing a Torah scroll (Hilchot Tefillin 1:5).

See Hilchot Sefer Torah, Chapters 8 and 9, which mention how much empty parchment must be left for each of the situations mentioned by the Rambam.

This refers to an instance where these blank portions of parchment had been cut from the Torah scroll. When a portion of a scroll does not contain 85 letters (see the following halachah), it is no longer considered to be sacred articles (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:20; Mishnah Berurah 334:50). Surely this applies to the margins of the scroll that the Rambam is referring to in this halachah.

I.e., a text similar to our siddurim (Rashi, Shabbat 115b).

As mentioned above, after permission was granted to write the Oral Law, siddurim were also accorded the status of sacred articles (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12).

Regarding amulets containing verses, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in the present age, such amulets may be saved. Even though most of the later authorities follow the Rambam's ruling, the Pri Megadim suggests saving amulets with verses that contain God's name.

The expression "a total" implies that the letters need not be in the same word, but may be scattered throughout the scroll (Rashi, Shabbat 115b).

In certain contexts, the passage ויהי בנסוע הארון is considered a separate book of the Torah. (See Rashi's commentary on the verse.) Since that passage contains 85 letters, any parchment with 85 letters can be considered a scroll.

I.e., the scroll may contain more letters, but if the letters are in words that are partially torn or rubbed out, they are not included in this sum.

I.e., words whose origin is not Hebrew.

The commentaries question the Rambam's statements, since as stated above, the passage ויהי בנסוע הארון contains 85 letters. See also the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:15 which states that if a scroll contains God's name, it should be saved even though it contains less than 85 letters.

I.e., the carrying case is considered as subordinate to the scroll. Therefore, it is not considered an independent entity, but is rather governed by the more lenient laws that govern the Torah scroll.

Although the money is muktzeh, there is no need to shake it from the carrying case, and it may be taken to the same place as the tefillin. This leniency was granted so that a person would not be required to delay in saving the property that he was entitled to save (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:18).