Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When witnesses testify that a person violated a transgression that is punishable by a fixed sin-offering, but they did not warn him, instead, they told him: "We saw that you performed forbidden labor on the Sabbath" or "...that you partook of forbidden fat" and he replied: "I know that I did not perform that act," he is not liable for a sin-offering. The rationale is that since he would be exempt from bringing the sacrifice if he said: "I acted intentionally," when he says: "I did not eat" or "I did not perform," it is as if he said: "I did not eat inadvertently, but rather intentionally," in which instance, he is exempt from bringing the sacrifice and did not contradict the witnesses.

If the alleged transgressor remained silent and did not contradict the witnesses - indeed, even if a woman told him: "You partook of forbidden fat" or "...performed forbidden labor on the Sabbath" and he remained silent - he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If one witness told him: "This is forbidden fat" and he remained silent and then he partook of it inadvertently, he must bring a sin-offering. If he warned him, he is liable for lashes, even though the essence of the testimony depends on one witness.

We already explained in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim that a person who set aside a sin-offering for eating forbidden fat should not bring it for the desecration of the Sabbath or for partaking of blood, as implied by Leviticus 4:28 which states: "And he shall bring his sacrifice, a she-goat... for the transgression that he committed." The sacrifice must be for the sake of the particular sin; one should not offer one designated for one sin for another. If he offered it, he disqualifies it.

In addition, our Sages said that if one set aside a sin-offering for forbidden fat that he ate on the previous day, he should not bring it for fat that he eats on the present day. Nevertheless, if he brings it for that purpose, he finds atonement. Needless to say, if a father sets aside a sin-offering and dies and the son was liable for that same transgression, the son should not bring his father's sacrifice for his transgression, as explained there.

When a person brings an animal as a sin-offering for two transgressions, it should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish and be sold. Half of the proceeds should be used to bring a sin-offering for one transgression and half for a sin-offering for the second transgression.

Similarly, if two people bring one animal as a sin-offering for two transgressions, it should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish and be sold. One should bring his sin-offering with half of the proceeds and the other should bring his sin-offering with the other half.

If one brings two animals as sin-offerings for one transgression, he should sacrifice whichever one he desires. The second should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish and be sold. A freewill offering should be brought with the proceeds.

If, however, a person brings two animals for sin-offerings for two transgressions without specifying the transgression for which each sacrifice is being brought, he should make that determination and slaughter one for one transgression and the other for the second.

We already explained in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, that no sacrifices at all are accepted from an apostate who worships idols or desecrates the Sabbath in public. When a person is an apostate with regard to a particular sin, we do not accept a sin-offering for him for that sin.

What is implied? If a person was an apostate with regard to partaking of forbidden fat and then he inadvertently partook of fat and brought a sin-offering for this transgression, it is not accepted until he repents.

Even if he was an apostate with regard to partaking of forbidden fat to fulfill his desires and once he accidentally partook of forbidden fat instead of permitted fat and he brought a sacrifice in atonement, it is not accepted from him. Since he partook of the forbidden fat willfully, whether to purposefully anger God or merely to fulfill his desires, he is considered as an apostate with regard to that transgression.

If a person was an apostate with regard to partaking of forbidden fat and then he inadvertently partook of blood, we accept a sin-offering he brings for partaking of blood, as we explained.

When a person committed a transgression punishable by karet inadvertently and set aside an animal as a sin-offering, and afterwards, became an apostate and then repented or he lost control of his intellectual or emotional faculties and then regained control, that animal may be brought as a sacrifice even though there was a time when it was not to be offered. The rationale is that living animals are not deemed unacceptable forever, as we explained in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim. Therefore that animal itself should be sacrificed. Just like if it contracted a temporary blemish and was healed, it returns to an acceptable state, so too, if the owners became disqualified and then became acceptable, it should be sacrificed.

Those liable for sin-offerings and definitive guilt-offerings remain obligated to bring those offerings even after Yom Kippur passed. Those liable for tentative guilt-offerings, by contrast, are exempt after Yom Kippur passes, as indicated by Leviticus 16:30: "From all of your sins before God will you be purified." According to the Oral Tradition, it was taught: Any sin that only God recognizes will be granted atonement. Therefore if a person enters a situation where he is in doubt of whether he transgressed on Yom Kippur, even at nightfall, he is exempt from the obligation to bring a tentative guilt-offering, for the entire day of Yom Kippur generates atonement.

Thus we learn that a conditional guilt-offering is not brought for a situation concerning which one does not know which occurred on Yom Kippur, unless Yom Kippur will not generate atonement for that person, as will be explained.

Yom Kippur, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings do not generate atonement unless one repents and believes in the atonement they grant. If, however, one rebels against them, they do not generate atonement for him.

What is implied? A person was in a state of rebellion, but brought a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, saying or thinking in his heart that these will not generate atonement. Accordingly, even though they were offered as commanded, they do not generate atonement for him. When he repents from his rebellion, he must bring another sin-offering and/or guilt-offering.

Similarly, when one is in a state of rebellion on Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur does not atone for him. Therefore if he was obligated to bring a tentative guilt-offering and Yom Kippur passed while he was in a state of rebellion, Yom Kippur does not generate atonement for him. When he repents after Yom Kippur, he is obligated to bring all the tentative guilt-offerings for which he is liable.

All of the guilt-offerings required by the Torah hold back atonement with the exception of the guilt-offering of a nazirite. A person who is in doubt whether he or she is required to bring a nazirite offering or an offering brought by one lacking atonement and a sotah who bring an offering because of doubt must bring their offerings after Yom Kippur.

The following laws apply when a person is obligated to bring a sin-offering or a guilt-offering and he is being taken out of the court to be executed. If the animal to be offered had already been slaughtered, we let him tarry until the blood is cast on the altar and then he is executed. If, however, the animal to be offered has not been slaughtered, we do not let him tarry until it is offered on his behalf.

When a person performs many transgressions for which one is required to bring a sin-offering in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for a sin-offering for every individual transgression. Even if he performs all the 43 transgressions that we listed in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for 43 sin-offerings.

Similarly, if a person performed one deed for which he is liable for many transgressions, he is liable for every transgression, provided all of the prohibitions involved take effect at once, the latter prohibition causes the entity to be forbidden to additional people, or the scope of the latter prohibition encompasses other entities together with the entity that was originally prohibited.

What is implied? A person who slaughters consecrated animals outside the Temple, on the Sabbath, for the sake of a false divinity is liable for three sin-offerings, one for slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple Courtyard, one for desecrating the Sabbath, and one for serving false divinities, for the three transgressions take effect at the same time.

When does the above apply? When the person serving the false divinity states that he is serving it at the conclusion of the slaughter of the animal. If, however, this was not his intent, as soon as he performed a portion of the slaughter for the sake of a false divinity, it becomes forbidden. Since he is not liable for slaughtering an animal outside the Temple Courtyard until he slits the two organs, necessary to slit for ritual slaughter or the larger portion of these two organs, when he completed the slaughter, he will have slaughtered an animal that is forbidden to be offered as a sacrifice, in which instance, he is not liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple Courtyard, as we explained.

If it was a sin-offering of fowl and half of its windpipe was cut and a person increased the slit even the slightest amount on the Sabbath for the sake of a false divinity, he is liable for three sin-offerings, for the three prohibitions take effect at the same time.

Similarly, a person who performs forbidden labor on Yom Kippur when it occurs on the Sabbath, is liable to bring two sin-offerings, because the two prohibitions take effect at the same time. Also, a person who is intimate with the wife of his brother who is alive while she is in the niddah state, he must bring three sin-offerings: one because he was intimate with a married woman and one, because she was his brother's wife; these are two prohibitions that take effect at the same time; and one, because she was in the niddah state, which is a prohibition that forbids additional entities besides the entity that was originally prohibited. Since this prohibition would apply with regard to her husband, it also applies to her brother-in-law.

In the same vein, one who sodomizes his father is liable for two sin-offerings, one because of the prohibition, Leviticus 18:7: "Do not reveal the nakedness of your father" and one because of the prohibition, ibid.:22: "Do not lie with a man." Similarly, one who sodomizes his father's brother is liable for two sin-offerings, one because it is written ibid.:14: "Do not reveal the nakedness of your father's brother" and one because of the general prohibition against sodomy.

When one sodomizes a male and has a male sodomize him in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering, even though there are two bodies involved. This is derived from the prohibition: "Do not lie with a man" which makes both positions equally liable. Similarly, when one sodomizes an animal and has an animal sodomize him in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering. One is deemed equally liable for either position of intimacy when engaging in relations with an animal or a male.

It is possible that there be an instance where a person engages in a single act of intimacy and he is liable for eight sin-offerings.

What is implied? Jacob begat a daughter whose name was Timna from his wife Zilpa. Lavan married Timna and begat a daughter named Serach from her. Lavan does not have any daughters other than Rachel. Thus Serach is the daughter of Jacob's daughter, and his wife's sister on her father's side. These are two prohibitions that take effect at the same time. Serach married Reuven. She became forbidden to Jacob's other sons and thus became forbidden to Jacob as well, as his son's wife. If Reuven died or divorced her and Serach married Jacob's maternal brother, since she became forbidden to Jacob's other brothers through this marriage, she becomes forbidden to Jacob on another count, because she is the wife of his brother. If her husband died or divorced her and Serach married Yishmael, since she becomes forbidden to Yishmael's other brothers, a further prohibition takes effect with regard to Jacob, the prohibition against relations with the wife of his father's brother. If Yishmael died and Serach became eligible to undergo yibbum with Isaac and Isaac transgressed and performed yibbum with her even though she is forbidden to him as a secondary relation, since she became forbidden to Jacob's other paternal brothers, she also became forbidden to Jacob because she is his father's wife and because she is a married woman, for these are two prohibitions that take effect at the same time.

Now if Jacob acted inadvertently and was intimate with Serach when she was in the niddah state, during the lifetime of Isaac, her husband, and during the lifetime of Rachel, Jacob's wife, he is liable for eight sin-offerings because of his relations with her. She is his daughter's daughter, his wife's sister, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father's brother, the wife of his father, a married woman, and in the niddah state. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

In all situations when a woman who is forbidden as a relative becomes forbidden again due to a prohibition that causes the entity to be forbidden to additional people, those additional people must be alive at that time, so that she will be forbidden to them. Then, as a result, since she becomes forbidden to them, a prohibition is also added applying to this individual. If, however, they are not alive, we do not say that since, would this man have had brothers or sons, she would have been forbidden to them, hence she is forbidden to the elder person. For at present, he has neither a son, nor a brother. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The following laws apply when a man is married to three woman and he is intimate with the mother of one of them, and she is the mother of the mother of his second wife and the mother of the father of his third wife. Even though this elderly woman is his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law, and these are three distinct prohibitions and they all took effect at the same time, he is liable for only one sin-offering. The rationale is that the Torah uses the same phrase, Leviticus 18:17: "They are close relatives; it is a depraved design" with regard to relations with a woman and her daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter. Thus the Torah considered the three as one body. Therefore the three prohibitions are considered as one.

If, however, one is intimate with his sister who is also the sister of his father and the sister of his mother, he is liable for three sin-offerings, as implied by Leviticus 20:17: "He revealed the nakedness of his sister." One might infer that he is liable for relations with his sister independently even though she is also the sister of his mother and the sister of his father.

How is such a situation possible? A man was intimate with his mother and begat two daughters with her. He was intimate with one of these daughters and begat a son. If this illegitimate child will be intimate with the other daughter, who is the sister of his illegitimate mother, who is his paternal sister, who is also the maternal sister of his father, he will be liable for three sin-offerings. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a man is intimate with a woman who is forbidden to him as an ervah many times in a single period of lapse of awareness, it is all considered as one inadvertent violation and he is liable only for one sin-offering. Even though there were many times between each experience of intimacy, since he did not become aware in the interim, and she is only one person, he is only liable once.

If, by contrast, one inadvertently engaged in relations with her, the transgression became known to him afterwards, and then he inadvertently engaged in relations with that same woman, the transgression became known to him afterwards, and then he inadvertently engaged in relations with that same woman again, he is liable for a sin-offering for every time he engaged in relations. For his awareness separates between the inadvertent transgressions.

When a man engages in relations with a woman forbidden as an ervah many times in one ongoing state of lapsed awareness, but the woman with whom he engaged in relations became aware of the transgression between each experience of intimacy, thus from her perspective, the relations involved several lapses of awareness, he brings one sin-offering and she brings a sin-offering for every time they engaged in relations.

If he had knowledge of the transgressions in the interim and she acted in one ongoing state of lapsed awareness, he brings many sin-offerings and she brings one sin-offering.

When a man engages in relations with many women forbidden to him as ariyos in one ongoing state of lapsed awareness, he is liable for a sin-offering for every one of them. This applies even if they are all forbidden because of the same prohibition, because they are separate persons.

What is implied? A man was intimate with five women in the niddah state, he was intimate with five of his sisters or five of his daughters in one ongoing state of lapsed awareness, he is liable for a sin-offering for every person.

From this ruling, we learned the following interpretation of our Sages' statement that a person who sodomized a male and was sodomized by a male in one state of lapsed awareness is liable for only one sin-offering. When does this apply? When the same male was involved. If, however, there were two other males involved, whether he sodomized both or sodomized one and one sodomized him, he is liable for each person. The same laws also apply when one sodomizes an animal and has an animal sodomize him.

When a women has many animals engage in relations with her in one period of lapsed awareness, she is liable for a sin-offering for every animal, for there are different bodies involved. It is like engaging in relations with many men in period of lapsed awareness in which instance, she is liable for a sin-offering for every man with whom she was intimate.

When a woman's husband went overseas and she heard that he died or witnesses came and testified that he died and she married, whether on her own initiative or according to the counsel of the court, and then she discovered that her first husband is alive, she is liable only for one sin-offering. If she married many men or was promiscuous with many men, she is liable for a sin-offering for every man with whom she was intimate, for they are different persons even though she acted in one state of lapsed awareness.

The following rules applies when a man was intimate with a woman in the niddah state inadvertently, then she became purified from her niddah state, immersed herself, then became a niddah again and they were intimate a second time in the same period of lapsed awareness. He is liable for a sin-offering for every span of time in which she is in the niddah state, even though it is in one state of lapsed awareness and only one person is involved. The rationale is that one span of time in which she is in the niddah state is distinct from another span of time in which she is in the niddah state. It is as if he was intimate with two different women in the niddah state.

When a man is intimate with his wife at a time when she is not expected to menstruate and she menstruates in the midst of relations, they are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. This is considered as a situation beyond their control and not an inadvertent transgression. For with regard to an inadvertent transgression, the transgressor carries a certain amount of culpability, for he should have checked and been careful. Had he examined the matter thoroughly and been careful in asking questions, he would not have transgressed. Since he did not take the trouble to examine and research the matter before acting, he requires atonement. In this situation, however, what should the person have done? She was pure and they were intimate at a time when menstruation was not expected. This is considered as a matter beyond their control. Therefore, whether the blood was found on her inspection cloth or his, they are exempt.

If, however, the man transgressed and was intimate with her close to the time when she could have been expected to menstruate, thinking that they could be intimate and separate before she would menstruate, and instead, she menstruated in the midst of relations, they are liable to bring a sin-offering, for this is an inadvertent transgression. Therefore, if blood is found on his inspection cloth, they are both impure and are obligated to bring a sacrifice. Slightly more lenient rules apply if blood was found on her examination cloth. If she cleaned herself immediately after separating from her husband, without waiting, they are both impure and are obligated to bring a sacrifice. If, however, she waited long enough so that she could have stretched her hand under the pillow or under the bolster and take an inspection cloth to examine herself and afterwards, she cleaned herself, they are both considered to have contracted impurity of doubtful status and are exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she waited long enough so that she could have descended from the bed and washed and afterwards, she cleaned herself and discovered blood, her husband is pure.

When a man transgressed and was intimate with his wife close to the time when she could have been expected to menstruate with the intent that he would complete relations before she began to menstruate and the woman felt that she became impure in the midst of relations and informed her husband of this, he should not withdraw while erect, as we explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah. If he did not know that it is forbidden for him to withdraw immediately and he withdrew while erect, he is liable for two sin-offerings: one for entering, for he was intimate with a niddah, and one, for withdrawing, since withdrawing also afforded him pleasure, as entering did.

When does the above apply? When he knew that it was forbidden to be intimate close to the time when she could have been expected to menstruate, but had the intent that he would complete relations before she began to menstruate and did not know that it is forbidden to withdraw while erect. Thus it is as if he has two lapses of awareness regarding two experiences of intimacy. If, however, he did not know that it was forbidden to be intimate close to the time when she could have been expected to menstruate and did not know that it is forbidden to withdraw from an impure woman immediately, he is liable for only one sin-offering even when he withdrew immediately, while erect. The rationale is that his entry and his withdrawal are considered as two experiences of intimacy performed during one lapse of awareness.

The same principle applies with regard to other forbidden sexual relations. If one inadvertently was intimate with a woman under the conception that she was permitted and, while in the midst of intimacy, he became aware that she was forbidden, he should not withdraw immediately, for withdrawing also affords him pleasure, as entering does. If he does not know that it is forbidden to separate immediately and separates while he is erect, he is only liable for one sin-offering, for the act is considered as one inadvertent transgression.