Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When a person admits that he owes a maneh to a colleague in the presence of two witnesses, and makes his statement as an admission and not as a casual matter of conversation, his remarks serve as the basis for testimony. This applies even if he did not charge the witnesses to serve in that capacity, and the plaintiff was not present. If the plaintiff lodged a claim against him and he denied making these statements, his words are not heeded, and he is required to make restitution on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses. If there was only one witness present when he made his statements, he is required to take an oath, for he made his statement as an admission.

If, after the witnesses came and testified, the defendant claimed: "I made the admission in order not to appear wealthy," his word is accepted, but he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset. If the plaintiff was with the witnesses at the time the defendant made the admission, he cannot claim that he made the admission so as not to appear wealthy. If, however, he claims that he paid the debt afterwards, his word is accepted, but he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset.

Whenever a person makes an admission in the presence of two witnesses, he cannot claim again: "I was speaking facetiously." Needless to say, this applies if he made the admission before three people. Instead, he is obligated to pay the sum that he admitted. For whenever a person makes a statement as an admission, it is as if he charges them with serving as witnesses.

Nevertheless, a legal record of his statements is not composed unless he charges them: "Compose a record, sign it and give it to the plaintiff." Even if he charged them, they must consult with him a second time before they give it to the plaintiff, as we have explained.

Similarly, if a person makes an admission in the court after he was summoned, a legal record may be composed, as will be explained in the following halachah. This applies provided the court knows the identity of both principals, so that two people will not perpetrate deception to obligate another person.

The following rule applies when a court of three judges were sitting on their initiative in the place fixed for their sessions, and the plaintiff came and lodged a complaint in their presence. If they sent a messenger summoning the defendant, he came and admitted owing the debt in their presence, they may compose a legal record and give it to the plaintiff.

Different rules apply, however, if they were not in their fixed place, and they did not summon him, but instead, he collected them and caused the three judges to sit in session, admitting his debt in their presence and telling them: "Act as judges with regard to my issue." If the plaintiff comes afterwards and says: "Write down the admission for me," we do not compose the document. The rationale is that we suspect that the defendant paid him, and despite that, the plaintiff will try to lodge a claim against the defendant with the legal document. When does the above apply? With regard to a claim involving movable property. If, however, a person admitted an obligation involving landed property, the witnesses may compose a legal record and give it to him even though the admission was made only in the presence of two witnesses, the defendant did not affirm his statement with a kinyan, and the defendant did not instruct them: "Compose a document and give it to him." The rationale is that we need not worry that the defendant will give the defendant the land and then the plaintiff will lodge a claim against him again.

Despite the fact that a legal record of a debtor's admission produced by the plaintiff does not state: "The defendant told us: 'Write down this record, sign it, and give it to the plaintiff,'" it is acceptable. For it is an accepted presumption that if the defendant had not given the witnesses such instructions, they would not have composed a legal record and given it to the plaintiff.

A question may arise if a legal document states only: "So-and-so acknowledged a debt in our presence in court." If the document does not state that there were three judges present or state information that would indicate that there were three judges present, we suspect that there were only two people present, and they erred and thought that an admission made in the presence of two people is considered an admission made in court. Therefore, we do not regard such a record as a legal document.

We have already explained that an admission made in court or testimony given by witnesses in court has the same legal power as a loan supported by a promissory note.

When does the above apply? When the defendant did not accept the judgment until he was summoned and brought to court, as we have explained. If, however, two people come to a judgment and one lodges a claim against the other saying, "You owe me a maneh" and the defendant acknowledges the debt, his word is accepted if, after he departs, he claims to have paid the debt. He must, however, affirm that claim with a sh'vuat hesset.

The above applies whether the judges said: "You are obligated to pay him," or "Go out and pay him." Therefore, if the plaintiff comes back and says:

"Write down the admission he made," we do not write it down, for it is possible that the defendant paid him.

Similarly, if a person who was obligated to take an oath in court leaves the court and then returns and said: "I took the oath," his word is accepted. He is not required to take an oath that he took an oath. If there are witnesses who testify that he did not take an oath, a presumption that the defendant is lying with regard to that oath is established. His word is not accepted if he states that he took an oath unless the other litigant acknowledges - or he brings witnesses - that he took the oath in their presence.

The following rule applies when two people come to judgment, one is obligated to the other, and the judges tell him: "Go out and pay him." If he leaves the court and then returns and said: "I paid," but there are witnesses who testify that he did not pay, a presumption that the defendant is lying with regard to that money is established.

Different rules apply if the judges tell him: "You are obligated to pay him." If he leaves the court and then returns and said: "I paid," but there are witnesses who testify that he did not pay, we do not say that a presumption that the defendant is lying is established. The rationale is that we assume he is procrastinating until the judgment is researched.

Therefore, if on another occasion he claimed that he paid the money that he was obligated to pay by these judges and there are no witnesses who deny his statements this second time, he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset and is then released from all obligations. For this reason, the trained men of wisdom of Spain would, in the presence of the court, tell the judges and a borrower who admitted a debt or who was obligated to take an oath in court: "Serve as witnesses that he should not pay me or take an oath for me outside the presence of witnesses."

When a person acknowledges in court that he owes a plaintiff a maneh and then says: "I now remember paying him the debt that I acknowledged and here are witnesses who substantiate my present claim," their testimony is effective, and the appropriate action is taken. The rationale is that he did not contradict the testimony of the witnesses, and it is not considered as if he said: "I never took this loan."

A litigant who advanced a claim in court can return and issue a second claim that contradicts the first one. We rely on the second claim even though he did not provide an explanation why he originally lodged a different claim. Even if he left the court and returned he may change and reverse any claims he desires, until witnesses come and testify.

After witnesses come and contradict the final claim on which he relied, he cannot change it to another claim, unless he provides an explanation for the claim on which he relied that could extend its meaning to include also the claim that he made afterwards.

The above applies provided he did not depart from the court. If, however, he departed from the court, he cannot come back and issue a different claim after witnesses came and testified. This is not acceptable; we fear that perhaps wicked people taught him to issue false claims. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is an accepted presumption that all movable property belongs to the person who is in physical possession of it. This applies even if the plaintiff brought witnesses who testify that the movable property in question was known to belong to the plaintiff.

What is implied? A plaintiff lodges a claim against a defendant: "This garment..." or "This utensil that is in your possession..." or "... that is in your house belongs to me..,", "... I entrusted it to you for safekeeping...", or "... I lent it to you. Here are witnesses who knew that it was previously in my domain."

The defendant responds: "That is not so. You sold it to me," or "...You gave it to me as a present," the defendant is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset and is freed of responsibility.

If the defendant claims that the movable property he is holding is security, he may claim up to its value. He must, however, take an oath while holding a sacred object. Afterwards, he may collect his due, as explained.

When does the above apply? To articles that are not made to lend out or rent out - e.g., garments, produce, household articles, merchandise and the like. Different rules apply with regard to articles that are made to lend out or rent out. Although they are found in the possession of a particular person and there are no witnesses that the original owner lent or rented out this article to this person, it is an accepted presumption that they belong to their original owner.

What is implied? Reuven owned a utensil that was made to lend or rent out, and he has witnesses who know that such an article belonged to him. This utensil is presently in the possession of Shimon. Reuven claims that he lent it or rented it to him, while Shimon claims that Reuven sold it to him, gave it to him as a present or entrusted it to him as security. We do not accept Shimon's claim. Instead, Reuven may take his utensil after taking a sh'vuat hesset in response to Shimon's claim.

Even if Shimon died, Reuven may take his utensil. The Geonim ruled that Reuven must take a sh'vuat hesset, for we advance claims on behalf of an heir.

When does the above apply? When the utensil can be seen in the possession of Shimon.

Different rules apply when, however, Reuven lodges a claim against Shimon saying: "You have this-and-this utensil of mine. You rented it. Give it back to me. I have witnesses who know that it belongs to me." If Shimon responds: "You sold it to me" or "You gave it to me," his word is accepted. He must take a sh'vuat hesset and then he is released of all obligations. The rationale is since he could say: "Nothing like this ever happened. I do not have anything that belonged to you," we accept his word if he claims: "I have the article, but you sold it to me."

The above-mentioned concepts apply only when the owner of the utensil claims: "I entrusted it to you" or "I lent it to you." Different laws apply if, however, he claims: "This article is mine. It was stolen, lost or taken by robbery." Although he brings witnesses who testify that the article was known to be his, if the person in possession of the article says: "I do not know what you are talking about. Someone else sold it to me or gave it to me as a present," we allow it to remain in that person's possession although it is an article that is made to be lent out or rented out. He is not required to take an oath at all, because there is no claim against him.

If a well-founded report has circulated that utensils belonging to the original owner have been stolen, the person in possession of the article may take an oath while holding a sacred article, stating how much he spent on the article. The original owner must reimburse him for this expense and may then take his article, as stated in Hilchot Geneivah.

If the defendant claims: "You sold it to me" or "You gave it to me as a present," he must take a sh'vuat hesset, and he is then allowed to maintain possession of the article, even though a well-founded report has circulated that utensils belonging to the original owner have been stolen, provided the article was not made to be lent or rented out.

From these laws, the following concept can be derived: A person has movable property in his possession and another person claims that it belongs to him. The defendant could claim that he purchased it. Thus, he would be required to take a sh'vuat hesset and would then be released of all obligations. Nevertheless, if the defendant says: "It belongs to you, but you owe me this-and-this," he must take an oath while holding a sacred object. Afterwards, he collects his claim from the property in his possession, as is the law applying to all those who take oaths and collect their due.

When a person has in his possession articles that were made to lend or rent out, he is allowed to maintain possession even though he acknowledged the plaintiff's ownership, telling him: "I know that this property was yours, but so-and-so sold it to me," or "... gave it to me as a present," we do not expropriate it from the defendant's possession.

The above applies even if the plaintiff brings witnesses who testify that the property was known to belong to him. The rationale is that a person is wont to sell his personal property.

If, however, the plaintiff claims: "I rented it to you," or "I lent it to you," we expropriate it from his possession. If the object in question was not one that was made to lend or rent out, the defendant may retain possession of the article. He must, however, take a sh'vuat hesset that the plaintiff did not lend or rent the article to him, but that he purchased it from so-and-so.

Do not err and interpret the phrase "entities made to lend out or rent out" as meaning "entities that are wont to be lent out or rented out" as did many [including great sages]. For all articles are fit to be lent out and are wont to be lent out. Even a person's cloak, mattress, and bed are fit to be lent out.

The phrase "articles made to lend out or rent out," by contrast, refers to utensils that people in that country make initially with the intent that they be lent out or rented out, so that they can receive a fee for them. They are considered to belong to their owners like landed property, concerning which benefit is derived from its produce, but the land itself remains. Similarly, these utensils are made primarily to benefit from renting them out - e.g., large brass pots used for cooking at party halls, bronze jewelry inlaid with gold that are rented for brides to wear. Such articles are not made to be sold, nor for the owner to use them in his own home. Instead, they are lent out to others with the expectation of receiving benefit in recompense or of renting them out for a fee.

Similarly, if a person has ordinary utensils, but there are witnesses who will testify that he rents them out at all times and lends them, and it is an accepted presumption that he lends them and rents them, they are considered utensils that were made for the sake of being lent or rented.

When the possible damage to an article is greater than the fee one would receive for renting it out, and people are therefore careful not to lend such articles - e.g., a ritual slaughterer's knife - it is an accepted presumption that it was not made with the intent of being lent or rented out. Therefore, even if people came and testified that a person lent out or rented out such an article on several occasions, their testimony does not negate this presumption, and these utensils are considered to be all other utensils.

Proof of this position can be brought from the fact that Ravva expropriated tailor's scissors used to make a cloak, and an Aggadah scroll as articles that were made to be lent or rented out. Had it not been clarified to him through the testimony of witnesses that these were entities that were lent out, he would not have expropriated them from the orphans. It is evident that other scissors and other scrolls are not placed in this category even though they could be lent or rented out.

This concept is a fundamental principle of law and a point of logic that may be relied upon in judgment. It is clear to those who give forth knowledge. It is appropriate for a judge to keep it in mind at all times and not to sway from it.

We do not accept it as a presumption that the utensils in the possession of a craftsman belong to him. This applies both to articles that are made to lend and rent out, and to other articles.

What is implied? A person sees his utensils in the possession of a craftsman. He brings witnesses who testify that they know that the article belongs to him and claims that he gave it to the craftsman to repair. The craftsman, by contrast, maintains that he purchased it, or that it was given to him as a present. Or he claims: "After it was given to me to repair, you sold it to me or gave it to me as a present." Although the owner of the utensil did not give it to the craftsman in the presence of witnesses, his word is accepted and the article is expropriated from the craftsman. The owner must however, take an oath to support his claim.

There are Geonim who ruled that even though the owner did not bring witnesses to testify that the article was his, since he saw his article in the craftsman's possession and the craftsman admits that the article belonged to him, but claims that he sold it to him, the owner's word is accepted. If, however, the craftsman claimed: "This never happened; the article is mine," the craftsman's word is accepted, provided that he takes a sh'vu'at hesset. If, however, the owner brings witnesses who testify that the article was known to belong to him, the craftsman's word is not accepted. This decision is incredulous in my eyes.

Different rules apply if the owner did not see his utensil in the possession of the craftsman, but instead claimed: "I gave you this-and-this utensil to repair." If the craftsman claims: "You came back and sold it to me" or "... gave it to me as a present," the craftsman is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset and is then released of responsibility. The rationale is that he could claim that the article was never given him.

Moreover, even if the owner gave the article to the craftsman to repair in the presence of witnesses, the craftsman's word is accepted, because he could claim: "I returned it." For although an article is entrusted to a person in the presence of witnesses, he is not required to return it to him in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, the craftsman is required to take only a sh'vu'at hesset; we do not require him to produce the article.

If, however, he does produce the article, since it becomes visible, the owner may bring witnesses who testify that it belongs to him. He may then expropriate it even though he did not entrust it to the craftsman in the presence of witnesses, as explained in the previous halachah.

Based on the above, the following rules apply if the craftsman claimed: "You agreed to pay me two dinarim as a wage," and the owner responded: "I agreed to pay you only one." If the utensil was visible before them, since the craftsman's possession does not bring about an accepted presumption of ownership, and we would not accept his claim that he purchased the article, the owner's claim regarding the promised wage is accepted, provided that he takes a sh'vu'at hesset, as we stated in Hilchot Sechirut. He must pay that amount.

If, however, the utensil is not visible, since the craftsman could claim that he purchased the article, he can also claim a wage equal to its value. He must take an oath holding a sacred article. Then he may collect his claim, as do all those who take an oath and collect, as we have explained.

A craftsman who gave up his profession, and a craftsman's son are like any other person. When movable property is in their possession, we presume that it belongs to them, as we have explained.

The following rules apply when a person enters a colleague's house in the presence of the owner and leaves with utensils hidden under the corners of his garments, and witnesses see him. Afterwards, the owner lodges a claim against him, saying: "Return the utensils that I lent you; here are witnesses." Although the defendant claims: "I purchased them," his word is not accepted. Instead, the owner must take a sh'vu'at hesset to support his claim that he did not sell or give away the utensils. The court returns the utensils to the owner.

When does the above apply? With regard to an owner who is not accustomed to sell his property, when the person who removed the utensils under his cloak does not normally hide them, and when the utensils are not of the type that people would ordinarily hide. Therefore, the defendant is obligated to return the articles. We assume that he hid them only so that he could deny taking them.

If, however, an owner frequently sells his personal property, even though the person who took the utensils would not ordinarily hide them, and it is not ordinary practice for these utensils to be hidden under one's cloak, the defendant may take a sh'vu'at hesset that he purchased the articles.

Similarly, if he took the articles out so that they were visible for the witnesses to see, even when the owner does not frequently sell his personal property, the defendant's word is accepted when he says that he purchased the utensils, provided that the articles are not of the type that are made with the intent of being lent or rented out. For it is possible that the owner needed money, and hence sold his property.

If, however, the articles are of the type that are made with the intent of being lent or rented out, our presumption is always that they belong to their original owner, as we have explained. Even if the person took out such utensils in a visible manner and the owner was accustomed to selling his personal utensils, if he has witnesses that this utensil that was made with the intent of being lent or rented out was known to belong to him, he may expropriate the utensils from the defendant immediately, unless he brings proof that he sold it to him or gave it to him as a present, as is the law with regard to landed property.

In the above situation, if the person in whose possession the utensil was found died, we expropriate it from the heir. Moreover, the owner is not required to take an oath. An oath is not required because, since his father is not present to claim that that he purchased it or that it is security for a specific amount, the heir cannot require the owner to take an oath.

If the heir lodges a definite claim, saying: "He gave it to my father - or sold it to him - in my presence," the owner is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset, as required of all those who are obligated to take oaths. We explained that there are opinions that require the owner to take a sh'vu'at hesset in all instances before his utensil is returned by the heir, but I do not accept this approach.

When a person takes an ax and says: "I am going to chop down the palm tree belonging to so-and-so," if he in fact chops down the tree, we presume that it belonged to him. For a person would not be so bold as to cut down a tree that did not belong to him. If the owner claims that he did not sell it, the person who cut down the tree is required to take a sh'vu'at hesset that the tree belonged to him. He is then freed of responsibility. The rationale is that once the tree is cut down, it is like other movable property.

Similar laws apply when a person enters a colleague's field without permission and partakes of its produce for a year or two. If the owner claims that the person entered without permission, that he is a robber, and that he partook of the field's produce, and the owner brings witnesses who confirm that he partook of the produce, and the person claims that the owner gave him permission to partake of the produce, that person's word is accepted.

The rationale is that it is an accepted presumption that a person would not be so bold as to eat produce that does not belong to him. Although the land is presumed to belong to its original owner, the produce is not. For a person does not necessarily sell produce with a bill of sale, so that the purchaser could be told: "Present your bill of sale."

Needless to say, these laws apply if the squatter partook of a field's produce for many years. In such a situation, since he could claim that he had purchased the field, his word is accepted when he says that he has a right only to the produce. He must, however, take a sh'vu'at hesset.

The following laws apply when two people are holding one article, both are riding on one animal, one was riding the animal and one was leading it, or they were sitting next to an ownerless pile of wheat that was located in a lane or in a courtyard belonging to both of them. If each claims that the article belongs to him in its entirety, they should both take an oath holding a sacred article that they own no less than half the article. Afterwards, it should be divided between them.

This oath was ordained by the Sages so that everyone will not grab unto a garment belonging to a colleague and take it without having to take an oath.

If one says: "The entire article belongs to me," and the other says: "Half of it belongs to me," the one who claims the entire article must take an oath that he owns no less than three fourths of the article, and the one who claims half the article must take an oath that he owns no less than one fourth. They then divide the article accordingly.

From this, one can learn that all those who take an oath to expropriate property - whether a minor oath or a severe oath - should not take that oath concerning what they claim, but rather what they will receive even though they claim more.

When two people were both clinging to a garment, and each claims that the entire garment belongs to him, each is awarded the portion he is holding. The remainder is divided equally after they take the appropriate oaths. Based on the principle of gilgul sh'vu'ah, each of the litigants can require the other to take an oath that he is legally entitled to everything he collects.

If one was holding the strings on one side of the garment, and the other holding the strings on the other side, they should divide the entire garment equally, after they take the required oaths.

When the term "division" is used in this context, it refers to a division of the article's value, not that a utensil itself or a garment should be divided and ruined, or that an animal should be killed.

If one person was holding onto the article in its entirety, and the other was struggling with him and clasping it, the article is considered to belong to the person holding it in its entirety.

The following rules apply when two people came to court holding onto the garment, and one pulled it away from the other in our presence. If at first the person from whom the garment was taken remained silent, even though afterwards he protested, we do not expropriate it from the possession of the one who seized it. The rationale is that since he remained silent at the outset, it is as if he acknowledged the other's ownership.

If the second person came and grabbed it from the one who seized it, even though that person protested continuously, the garment should be divided between the two of them.

The following laws apply when two people come to court holding onto a garment, and the court instructs them to go out and divide its value. They depart and return, but the article is now in the possession of only one of them. The person in possession claims: "He acknowledged my claim and withdrew his claim from it," while the other person claims: "I sold it to him," or "He overcame me and seized it from me," we follow the principle: "A person who seeks to expropriate property from a colleague must prove his claim." If he cannot bring proof of his claim, the other litigant may take an oath that the article belongs to him and be released of liability. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.