Enter your email address to get our weekly email with fresh, exciting and thoughtful content that will enrich your inbox and your life.
ב"ה

Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Ishut - Chapter Eleven, Ishut - Chapter Twelve, Ishut - Chapter Thirteen

Video & Audio Classes
Show content in:

Ishut - Chapter Eleven

1

[The following laws apply when a man] weds a virgin who was widowed or divorced or who underwent the rite of chalitzah.1If she was widowed or divorced or underwent the rite of chalitzah after erusin alone, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 200 zuz. If, however, she had been wed, the ketubah [to which she is entitled from her second husband] is 100 zuz. Once she is wed, she is considered to be a non-virgin.2

Similar [rules apply when a man] weds a virgin [bride] who is [a Canaanite maidservant] who has been freed, who is a convert, or who was held captive [by gentiles and freed]. If the maidservant had been freed, the convert had converted, or the women held captive had been redeemed before they reached the age of three years and one day,3 they are entitled to a ketubah of 200 zuz. If [this took place after they reached that age, their ketubah is [only] 100 [zuz].

א

הַנּוֹשֵׂא בְּתוּלָה שֶׁנִּתְאַלְמִנָה אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְגָּרְשָׁה אוֹ נֶחְלְצָה. אִם מִן הָאֵרוּסִין נִתְאַלְמְנָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אוֹ נֶחְלְצָה כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם. וְאִם מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מֵאָה. שֶׁמִּשֶּׁנִּשֵּׂאת הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְעוּלָה. וְכֵן הַנּוֹשֵׂא בְּתוּלָה מְשֻׁחְרֶרֶת אוֹ גִּיֹּרֶת אוֹ שְׁבוּיָה אִם נִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה הַשִּׁפְחָה וְנִתְגַּיְּרָה הַכּוּתִית וְנִפְדֵית הַשְּׁבוּיָה וְהֵן פְּחוּתוֹת מִבַּת שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד כְּתֻבָּתָן מָאתַיִם. וְאִם הָיוּ בְּנוֹת שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד וָמַעְלָה כְּתֻבָּתָן מֵאָה:

2

Why did our Sages ordain that these women receive a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz] even though they are virgins? Because it is a presumption that can be accepted as fact that a woman who is wed will engage in marital relations, and similarly, that a maidservant, a gentile woman and a woman held captive by gentiles will have engaged in relations. Hence, they ordained that such women would be entitled to [only] 100 [zuz],whether they engaged in relations or not. With regard to all matters, they are considered to be non-virgins.

ב

וּמִפְּנֵי מָה תִּקְּנוּ חֲכָמִים לְאֵלּוּ כְּתֻבָּה מֵאָה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵן בְּתוּלוֹת. הוֹאִיל וְחֶזְקַת הַנְּשׂוּאָה שֶׁתִּבָּעֵל וְחֶזְקַת הַשִּׁפְחָה וְהַכּוּתִית וְהַשְּׁבוּיָה שֶׁתִּבָּעֵל תִּקְּנוּ לְאֵלּוּ מֵאָה בֵּין נִבְעֲלוּ בֵּין לֹא נִבְעֲלוּ וַהֲרֵי הֵן כִּבְעוּלוֹת לְכָל דָּבָר:

3

A mukat etz4 [is granted] a ketubah of 100 [zuz]. Even if [her husband] wed her under the presumption that she was a virgin and then he discovered that she was a mukat etz, she is entitled to a ketubah of 100 [zuz].5

When a girl of less than three years of age engages in sexual relations, even when her partner is an adult male, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz]. Ultimately, she will heal and be a virgin like all others.

Similarly, when a boy below the age of nine engages in sexual relations with an adult woman, she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz], as if she had never engaged in relations.6 For it is only after a boy reaches the age of nine years and one day that relations with him are of consequence. Before that age, they are of no consequence.

ג

מֻכַּת עֵץ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מֵאָה אֲפִלּוּ נִשֵּׂאת עַל מְנָת שֶׁהִיא בְּתוּלָה שְׁלֵמָה וְנִמְצֵאת מֻכַּת עֵץ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מֵאָה. קְטַנָּה מִבַּת שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים וּלְמַטָּה שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה אֲפִלּוּ בָּא עָלֶיהָ אָדָם גָּדוֹל כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם, סוֹפָהּ שֶׁתַּחֲזֹר בְּתוּלָה כִּשְׁאָר הַבְּתוּלוֹת. וְכֵן גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ קָטָן מִבֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וּלְמַטָּה כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם כְּאִלּוּ לֹא נִבְעֲלָה כְּלָל. שֶׁבִּיאַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד בִּיאָתוֹ בִּיאָה, פָּחוֹת מִזֶּה אֵין בִּיאָתוֹ בִּיאָה:

4

Whether a virgin is a bogeret,7, blind,8 or an aylonit,9 she [is entitled to] a ketubah of 200 [zuz]. By contrast, no provision was made for a ketubah for a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent. [The rationale is] that no provision has been made for the marriage of a mentally incompetent woman at all.

With regard to a woman who is a deaf mute, although our Sages made provision for her marriage, they did not entitle her to a ketubah, so that a man would not refrain from marrying her. Just as she is not entitled to a ketubah, so too, [her husband] is not [obligated to provide] her with her livelihood or grant her any other [of the ordinary] conditions of the marriage contract.

If one wed a woman who was a deaf mute and her difficulty was remedied, she is entitled to a ketubah and to the other conditions of the marriage contract. [The amount of] her ketubah is 100 zuz.10

ד

בְּתוּלָה שֶׁהִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת אוֹ סוּמָא אוֹ אַיְלוֹנִית כְּתֻבָּתָן מָאתַיִם. אֲבָל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת וְהַשּׁוֹטָה לֹא תִּקְּנוּ לָהֶן כְּתֻבָּה. הַשּׁוֹטָה לֹא תִּקְּנוּ לָהּ נִשּׂוּאִין כְּלָל. וְהַחֵרֶשֶׁת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ נִשּׂוּאִין מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם לֹא תִּקְּנוּ לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִמָּנְעוּ מִלָּשֵׂאת אוֹתָהּ. וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה כָּךְ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וְלֹא תְּנַאי מִתְּנָאֵי כְּתֻבָּה. וְאִם כָּנַס הַחֵרֶשֶׁת וְנִתְפַּקְּחָה יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה וּתְנַאי כְּתֻבָּה וּכְתֻבָּתָהּ מֵאָה:

5

When a man marries a woman who is a deaf mute or mentally incompetent and writes her a ketubah for 10,000 [zuz], the obligation is binding; it was he who desired to diminish his assets.

ה

נָשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת אוֹ שׁוֹטָה וְכָתַב לָהֶן מֵאָה מָנֶה כְּתֻבָּתָן קַיֶּמֶת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרָצָה לְהַזִּיק נְכָסָיו:

6

[The following rules apply when] a deaf mute or a mentally incompetent man married a woman who was mentally competent. Even if afterwards the deaf mute's disability disappears and the mentally incompetent person gains stability, they are under no obligation to their wives. If, however, [the men] desire to remain [married] to [the women] after their own wellbeing has been restored, [the wives] are entitled to a ketubah, and its value should be 100 zuz.

If the deaf mute's marriage was made by the court, and they write [his wife] a ketubah against his assets, she is entitled to everything that the court has prescribed for her. A court will not arrange a marriage for a mentally incompetent person at all. Since the sages' injunction will not be maintained in his instance,11 they did not ordain marriage for him at all.

Similarly, our Sages did not ordain marriage for a male below the age of majority; [the rationale is that] ultimately he will gain the potential to enter into a comprehensive marriage bond.

Why then did they ordain marriage for a girl below the age of majority12 although she too will ultimately gain the potential for a comprehensive marriage bond? So that she will not be treated in a wanton manner.13

A youth should not be [allowed to] marry until he has been examined, and it has been determined that he has manifested signs of physical maturity.

ו

חֵרֵשׁ אוֹ שׁוֹטֶה שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ נָשִׁים פִּקְחוֹת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְפַּקֵּחַ הַחֵרֵשׁ וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה הַשּׁוֹטֶה אֵין לִנְשֵׁיהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם כְּלוּם. רָצוּ לְקַיְּמָן אַחַר שֶׁהִבְרִיאוּ יֵשׁ לָהֶן כְּתֻבָּה וּכְתֻבָּתָן מֵאָה. וְאִם בֵּית דִּין הֵם שֶׁהִשִּׂיאוּ הַחֵרֵשׁ וְכָתְבוּ לָהּ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ עַל נְכָסָיו נוֹטֶלֶת כָּל מַה שֶּׁכָּתְבוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין. אֲבָל הַשּׁוֹטֶה אֵין בֵּית דִּין מַשִּׂיאִין אוֹתוֹ בְּכָל מָקוֹם. וּמִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין תַּקָּנַת חֲכָמִים עוֹמֶדֶת בּוֹ לֹא תִּקְּנוּ לוֹ נִשּׂוּאִין. וְכֵן הַקָּטָן לֹא תִּקְּנוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים נִשּׂוּאִין הוֹאִיל וְסוֹפוֹ לָבוֹא לִידֵי נִשּׂוּאִין גְּמוּרִין. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה תִּקְּנוּ נִשּׂוּאִין לִקְטַנָּה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִיא בָּאָה לִידֵי נִשּׂוּאִין גְּמוּרִין. כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ בָּהּ מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר. וְאֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הַקָּטָן עַד שֶׁבּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ וְיוֹדְעִים שֶׁהֵבִיא סִימָנִין:

7

When a male below the age of majority marries a woman, she is not entitled to a ketubah, even if he is already nine years and one day old. If he attains majority and remains [married] to her, she is entitled to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah.14

Similarly, when a man converts together with his wife, she is entitled to a ketubah [of 100 zuz]. It was with this intent that he maintained their marriage.15

ז

קָטָן אֲפִלּוּ בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁנָּשָׂא אִשָּׁה אֵין לָהּ כְּתֻבָּה. וְאִם הִגְדִּיל וְקִיְּמָהּ אַחַר שֶׁהִגְדִּיל יֵשׁ לָהּ עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה. וְכֵן גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּר הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָנֶה שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְּמָהּ:

8

Whenever a virgin bride is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz], there is [the possibility of issuing] a claim against her, [denying] her virginity. Whenever, by contrast, a bride is entitled to a ketubah of [only] 100 [zuz],16 or the Sages did not entitle her to a ketubah at all,17 there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity. [Similarly,] if [a groom] enters into privacy with his arusah before their wedding, there is no [possibility of issuing] a claim against her [denying] her virginity.18

ח

כָּל בְּתוּלָה שֶׁכְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם יֵשׁ לָהּ טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. וְכָל שֶׁכְּתֻבָּתָהּ מֵאָה אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּקְּנוּ לָהּ חֲכָמִים כְּתֻבָּה אֵין לָהּ טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. וְהַמִּתְיַחֵד עִם אֲרוּסָתוֹ קֹדֶם נִשּׂוּאִין אֵין לָהּ טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים:

9

What is meant by a claim [denying a woman's] virginity? [A man] married a woman on the assumption that she was a virgin, and [after the wedding] claims that he did not find signs of virginity. For there are two signs of virginity: a) [hymenal] bleeding at the conclusion of her first sexual experience; b) tightness that is felt during sexual relations at that time.19

ט

וּמַה הִיא טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. זֶה שֶׁנָּשָׂא אִשָּׁה שֶׁחֶזְקָתָהּ שֶׁהִיא בְּתוּלָה וְטוֹעֵן וְאוֹמֵר לֹא מְצָאתִיהָ בְּתוּלָה. וּשְׁנֵי סִימָנִין הֵן לִבְתוּלָה. הָאֶחָד דָּמִים שֶׁשׁוֹתְתִין מִמֶּנָּה בְּסוֹף בִּיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. וְהַשֵּׁנִי הַדֹּחַק שֶׁיִּמָּצֵא בָּהּ בְּבִיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה בִּשְׁעַת תַּשְׁמִישׁ:

10

When [a man] weds a virgin who is granted a ketubah of 200 [zuz], and claims that he did not discover signs of her virginity, the woman is questioned [regarding the matter]. If she says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, but this is because I fell, and I was struck by a piece of wood or the ground, and my hymen was damaged," her word is accepted and she is entitled to a ketubah of [100 zuz].20

Although [her husband] claims: "Perhaps you engaged in intercourse, and I am under no obligation to you,"21 his claim is not accepted, for his claim is not absolute.22 He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued, conditional on her having engaged in relations with another man.

י

הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הַבְּתוּלָה שֶׁכְּתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם וְטָעַן וְאָמַר לֹא מְצָאתִיהָ בְּתוּלָה. שׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתָהּ אִם אָמְרָה אֱמֶת הוּא לֹא מְצָאַנִי בְּתוּלָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנָּפַלְתִּי וְהִכַּנִי עֵץ אוֹ קַרְקַע וְהָלְכוּ בְּתוּלַי הֲרֵי זוֹ נֶאֱמֶנֶת וְתַחֲזֹר כְּתֻבָּתָהּ לְמָנֶה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא טוֹעֵן אוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּא אִישׁ בָּא עָלַיִךְ וְאֵין לָךְ כְּלוּם אֵין מַשְׁגִּיחִין בְּטַעֲנָתוֹ. וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְהַחֲרִים סְתָם שֶׁלֹּא בָּא עָלֶיהָ אִישׁ שֶׁאֵין הַדָּבָר וַדַּאי לוֹ:

11

If [the woman] says, "It is true that he did not find me a virgin, for another man raped me after I had been consecrated by him," her word is accepted, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200 [zuz] as before.23

If [her husband] claims: "Perhaps you were raped before you were consecrated, and the agreement I entered was based on false premises. Or perhaps you willingly engaged in relations after you were consecrated" [his claim is not accepted]. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally against anyone who makes a false claim to have him incur a financial obligation for which he is not liable.

יא

אָמְרָה הִיא אֱמֶת אָמַר שֶׁלֹּא מְצָאַנִי בְּתוּלָה וְאִישׁ בָּא עָלַי בְּאֹנֶס אַחַר שֶׁנִּתְאָרַסְתִּי לוֹ. הֲרֵי זוֹ נֶאֱמֶנֶת וּכְתֻבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם כְּמוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה. וְאִם טָעַן וְאָמַר שֶׁמָּא עַד שֶׁלֹּא אֵרַסְתִּיךְ נֶאֱנַסְתְּ וּמִקָּחִי מִקַּח טָעוּת אוֹ אַחַר שֶׁאֵרַסְתִּיךְ נִבְעַלְתְּ בִּרְצוֹנֵךְ. הֲרֵי זֶה מַחֲרִים סְתָם עַל מִי שֶׁטּוֹעֵן שֶׁקֶר כְּדֵי לְחַיְּבֵנִי מָמוֹן שֶׁאֵינִי חַיָּב בּוֹ:

12

If he claims, "I did not find her a virgin," and she claims, "He has not had intercourse with me and I am still a virgin," she should be examined. Alternatively, he should have relations with her under the surveillance of witnesses [and the truth will be clarified].24

If she claims, "He had relations with me and he found me a virgin like all others, and his claim is false," he is questioned [and asked to clarify his statements]. We ask him: "Why do you say that she was not a virgin?" If he answers: "Because she did not have hymenal bleeding," we check her family [history]. Perhaps [the women of] this [family] are known not to have [vaginal] bleeding at all: neither menstrual bleeding nor hymenal bleeding. If this was found to be true, we presume [that she was a virgin, and she is entitled to a ketubah of 200 zuz].

If the women in her family are not known to have such a condition, we check her [physical state]; perhaps she is afflicted by a serious infirmity that has parched her body's natural fluids, or [perhaps] she was afflicted by hunger. Therefore, we have her bathe, eat and drink until she becomes healthy. At which point, [the couple] engage in relations again to see if she manifests hymenal bleeding or not.

If she is not hampered by sickness, hunger or the like, the [husband's] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted]. [This applies] even if he felt tightness during relations. Since there was no hymenal bleeding, her hymen was not intact. For every virgin will manifest hymenal bleeding, whether she is a minor or above the age of majority, whether a na'arah or a bogeret, unless [this is prevented by an external factor,] illness or the like, as explained.

If [the husband] said: "[I claim that she was not a virgin,] because I did not feel tightness [during intercourse]. Instead, I found an open passageway," we inquire with regard to [the woman's] age. Perhaps she is a bogeret, and most bogrot do not have tightness that can be felt substantially [during intercourse], for as she grew older [the adhesion of] her limbs lessened, and the virginal [tightness] disappeared.

If she had not become a bogeret yet, we ask him: "Perhaps you leaned on the side or [entered] gently25 during intercourse, and therefore you did not feel any tightness?" If he replies: "No. I found an open passageway," [his] claim that she was not a virgin [is accepted] with regard to any woman who has not reached the age of bagrut, regardless of whether she was a minor or a na'arah, or whether she was healthy or sick. For the vaginal channel of every virgin is closed. Even if she manifests hymenal bleeding, she is not considered to be a virgin, because the vaginal channel was open.26

יב

טָעַן וְאָמַר לֹא מְצָאתִיהָ בְּתוּלָה וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא בָּא עָלַי וַעֲדַיִן אֲנִי בְּתוּלָה. בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ אוֹ חוֹזֵר וּבוֹעֵל בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים. אָמְרָה בָּא עָלַי וּבְתוּלָה מְצָאַנִי כְּכָל הַבְּתוּלוֹת וְשֶׁקֶר הוּא טוֹעֵן. שׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ מֶה הָיָה הַדָּבָר עַד שֶׁאָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵינָהּ בְּתוּלָה. אִם אָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא מָצָאתִי לָהּ דָּם בּוֹדְקִין בְּמִשְׁפַּחְתָּהּ שֶׁמָּא אֵין לָהֶם דָּם כְּלָל לֹא דַּם נִדָּה וְלֹא דַּם בְּתוּלִים אִם נִמְצְאוּ כֻּלָּן כֵּן הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּחֶזְקָתָהּ. לֹא נִמְצְאוּ בְּנוֹת מִשְׁפַּחְתָּהּ כֵּן בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ שֶׁמָּא חלִי גָּדוֹל יֵשׁ בָּהּ שֶׁיָּבַשׁ לַחְלוּחִית הָאֵיבָרִים אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה מִתְעַנֵּית בָּרָעָב. מַרְטִיבִין אוֹתָהּ וּמַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ וּמַשְׁקִין אוֹתָהּ עַד שֶׁתַּבְרִיא וְתִבָּעֵל שֵׁנִית וְנִרְאֶה אִם תּוֹצִיא דָּם אִם לָאו. וְאִם אֵין שָׁם חלִי וְלֹא רָעָב וְלֹא כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ הֲרֵי זוֹ טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמָּצָא דֹּחַק בְּעֵת תַּשְׁמִישׁ הוֹאִיל וְלֹא יָצָא דָּם אֵין כָּאן בְּתוּלִים. שֶׁכָּל בְּתוּלָה יֵשׁ לָהּ דָּם בֵּין קְטַנָּה בֵּין גְּדוֹלָה בֵּין נַעֲרָה בֵּין בּוֹגֶרֶת אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי הַחלִי כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וְאִם אָמַר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא מָצָאתִי דֹּחַק אֶלָּא פֶּתַח פָּתוּחַ מָצָאתִי שׁוֹאֲלִין עַל שְׁנוֹתֶיהָ שֶׁמָּא בּוֹגֶרֶת הִיא שֶׁרֹב הַבּוֹגְרוֹת אֵין לָהֶן דֹּחַק שֶׁמַּרְגִּישִׁין בּוֹ הַרְבֵּה שֶׁהֲרֵי גָּדְלָה וְנִתְרַפּוּ אֵיבָרֶיהָ וְכָלוּ בְּתוּלֶיהָ. וְאִם לֹא בָּגְרָה עֲדַיִן אוֹמְרִין לוֹ שֶׁמָּא הִטֵּיתָה אוֹ בָּעַלְתָּ בְּנַחַת וּלְפִיכָךְ לֹא הִרְגַּשְׁתָּ בַּדֹּחַק. אִם אָמַר לֹא כִּי אֶלָּא וַדַּאי פֶּתַח פָּתוּחַ הָיָה הֲרֵי זוֹ טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים לְכָל בְּתוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא בָּגְרָה בֵּין קְטַנָּה בֵּין נַעֲרָה בֵּין בְּרִיאָה בֵּין חוֹלָה שֶׁכָּל נַעֲרָה בְּתוּלָה פִּתְחָהּ סָתוּם הוּא. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא הַדָּם הוֹאִיל וּמָצָא פֶּתַח פָּתוּחַ אֵין כָּאן בְּתוּלִים:

13

There are geonim who rule that for a bogeret, the claim that she did not have hymenal bleeding is not valid, but the claim that her vaginal channel was open is valid. This does not appear [to be based on the proper text of] the Talmud. They had inaccurate versions of the text. I have investigated many texts, including those of an early era,27 and I have discovered the version to be as I ruled. For a bogeret, the only valid claim is [that she did not manifest] hymenal bleeding.28

יג

יֵשׁ גְּאוֹנִים שֶׁהוֹרוּ שֶׁהַבּוֹגֶרֶת אֵין לָהּ טַעֲנַת דָּמִים וְיֵשׁ לָהּ טַעֲנַת פֶּתַח פָּתוּחַ. וְאֵין דֶּרֶךְ הַגְּמָרָא מַרְאָה דָּבָר זֶה וְטָעוּת הָיָה בַּנֻּסְחָאוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶם. וּכְבָר בָּדַקְתִּי עַל סְפָרִים רַבִּים וְקַדְמוֹנִים וּמָצָאתִי שֶׁהַדָּבָר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ שֶׁאֵין לְבוֹגֶרֶת אֶלָּא טַעֲנַת דָּמִים בִּלְבַד:

14

Our Sages were those who instituted the fundamental requirement of a marriage contract for a woman and they also instituted [the following consideration]: Whenever [a man] makes a claim that his wife was not a virgin, and the woman disputes his claim, [the husband's claim] is accepted. It is the woman's responsibility to bring support for her claim, not the man's. [The rationale is] that we assume that a man will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it, turning his celebration into mourning.29

יד

חֲכָמִים הֵם שֶׁתִּקְּנוּ עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה לְאִשָּׁה וְהֵם הִתְקִינוּ וְאָמְרוּ שֶׁכָּל הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים וְהָאִשָּׁה מַכְחֶשֶׁת אוֹתוֹ נֶאֱמָן וְעָלֶיהָ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה לֹא עַל הָאִישׁ. שֶׁחֲזָקָה הִיא שֶׁאֵין אָדָם טוֹרֵחַ בִּסְעֻדָּה וּמַפְסִידָהּ וְהוֹפֵךְ שִׂמְחָתוֹ אֵבֶל:

15

Until when may a husband issue a claim denying his wife's virginity? If [the couple] went into privacy, only immediately [thereafter].30 If they did not enter into privacy, he has this option even after 30 days.

טו

וְעַד מָתַי יֵשׁ לוֹ לִטְעֹן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. אִם נִסְתְּרָה מִיָּד. וְאִם לֹא נִסְתְּרָה אֲפִלּוּ לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם:

16

All the geonim have ruled that our Sages' statement that the husband's statements are accepted even though his wife disputes his claim applies only with regard to nullifying the obligation for the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. Nevertheless, the woman is entitled to the additional amount [to which her husband committed himself]31 unless there is clear proof that she was not a virgin, or she admitted that she was not a virgin before she was consecrated and that she deceived him.

Therefore, [the husband] may require her to take an oath while holding a sacred article,32 as must be done by all others who must take oaths before they collect [the money due them].33 Afterwards, she may collect the additional sum.

She, by contrast, does not have the option of requiring him to take an oath that he did not discover her to be a virgin, before she must forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, for it is a presumption accepted as fact that a person will not labor to prepare a [wedding] feast and then mar it. She may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued conditionally, applying to anyone who lodges false claims against her.

טז

הוֹרוּ כָּל הַגְּאוֹנִים שֶׁזֶּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן אִם הִכְחִישָׁתוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ. לְהַפְסִידָהּ עִקַּר הַכְּתֻבָּה. אֲבָל הַתּוֹסֶפֶת יֵשׁ לָהּ. אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נוֹדַע בִּרְאָיָה בְּרוּרָה שֶׁהָיְתָה בְּעוּלָה אוֹ שֶׁהוֹדְתָה לוֹ שֶׁהִיא בְּעוּלָה קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּתְאָרֵס וְהִטְעַתּוּ. לְפִיכָךְ יֵשׁ לוֹ לְהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ בִּנְקִיטַת חֵפֶץ כְּדִין כָּל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין וְנוֹטְלִין וְאַחַר כָּךְ תִּגְבֶּה הַתּוֹסֶפֶת. וְאֵין לָהּ לְהַשְׁבִּיעוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מְצָאָהּ בְּתוּלָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ תַּפְסִיד עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה שֶׁחֲזָקָה הִיא שֶׁאֵין אָדָם טוֹרֵחַ בִּסְעֵדָּה וּמַפְסִידָהּ. וְיֵשׁ לָהּ לְהַחֲרִים סְתָם עַל מִי שֶׁטָּעַן עָלֶיהָ שֶׁקֶר:

17

If [the husband] desires to remain married to [his wife] after causing her to forfeit the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, he must write her [a new ketubah for] 100 [zuz]. For it is forbidden for a man to live with his wife for even one moment without a ketubah, as we have explained.34

יז

הֲרֵי שֶׁרָצָה לְקַיְּמָהּ אַחַר שֶׁהִפְסִידָה עִקַּר הַכְּתֻבָּה חוֹזֵר וְכוֹתֵב לָהּ מֵאָה. לְפִי שֶׁאָסוּר לָאָדָם לִשְׁהוֹת עִם אִשְׁתּוֹ שָׁעָה אַחַת בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

Footnotes
1.

I.e., the woman had been consecrated or wed, but before she and her husband engaged in marital relations, she was either widowed or divorced.

2.

Even if there are witnesses to the fact that her husband died directly after they entered the chuppah (Ketubot 11a).

3.

The rationale is that even if a woman engaged in sexual relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, as stated in Halachah 3, based on Ketubot 11b.

4.

Literally, "one struck by a piece of wood," a woman who claims that she did not have hymenal bleeding at the time of her first sexual experience, because she had previously been "struck by a piece of wood" and caused to bleed at that time. As mentioned in Halachah 10, the term is used to refer to any woman who claims that her failure to have hymenal bleeding resulted from causes other than intercourse.

5.

Although one might think that the marriage would be annulled, because the husband was operating under a misconception (מקח טעות), Ketubot 11b rules that this is not so. As long as she had not engaged in sexual relations previously, their marriage is binding.

6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:4) follows the ruling of Tosafot, Ketubot 11b, who explain that this law applies only when the woman's hymen remains intact despite these relations.

7.

This point is necessary to mention because of the factors stated in Halachah 12.

8.

Ketubot 36b explains that we are afraid that such a woman might have suffered hymenal bleeding from causes other than intercourse, but will not have noticed the fact.

9.

Rashi (Ketubot 36a) explains that since an aylonit is considered a bogeret, this point must be clarified, as it must with regard to a bogeret. The above ruling applies only when the husband was aware that the woman was an aylonit. If he was not aware of that fact, the woman is not entitled to a ketubah at all, as explained in Chapter 24, Halachah 2.

10.

Even if she was a virgin at the time of their original marriage, at present she is not a virgin.

11.

I.e., a marriage between a mentally incompetent man and an ordinary woman will constantly be pained by strife and will not last. In contrast, a deaf mute is more passive, and his household will not necessarily be characterized by friction (Yevamot 112b).

12.

This refers to a girl who has been orphaned of her father, or who was divorced after being wed. The Torah - and not our Sages - gives a father the right to consecrate his daughter before she becomes a na'arah.

13.

If the girl remains unmarried, the prohibitions against relations with her are not as severe, and the Sages feared that they would not be upheld. If she were allowed to marry, the prohibition against adultery would be respected, and she would be treated differently. Moreover, her husband will guard against her association with other men.

14.

I.e., only the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, but not any additional amount that the youth added to the marriage contract, unless he renews that commitment after he reaches majority. Otherwise, that commitment - like any commitment made by a minor - is of no substance. Moreover, he is obligated for the fundamental requirement of the ketubah only when he engaged in marital relations with his wife after he attained majority. If not, the marriage - and thus the marriage contract - is of no consequence.

With regard to the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, the Rambam writes in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:8) that she is entitled to either 200 or 100 zuz, depending on her status at the time of the wedding.

15.

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the laws applying to a convert are the same as those applying to a minor. Both opinions are alluded to by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:11). (See the Beit Shmuel 67:12, which explains the Rambam's position: Even if a convert made a commitment of more than 100 zuz to his wife, any sum above 100 zuz is considered to be an addition to the ketubah and is therefore no longer binding when the convert accepts his new status as a Jew.)

16.

I.e., even a woman who was widowed after the wedding, before engaging in relations with her husband. Even though her second husband marries her under the impression that she is a virgin, there is no possibility of issuing such a claim against her.

17.

The obligation to grant a virgin bride a ketubah of 200 zuz is Rabbinic in origin. At the same time that our Sages instituted that obligation, they granted the husband a safeguard: that his word would be accepted with regard to a claim denying the woman's virginity. In these instances, since the woman was not granted the additional money, the safeguard provided by the Sages also does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).

18.

We suspect that the groom had relations with her and later forgot the matter (Rashi, Ketubot 9b). See also note 30.

19.

As stated in the following halachot, unless there are other factors that support the woman's position, as will be explained, the husband's claim is accepted. We assume that the husband would not go to the time and expense of preparing a wedding feast and then mar the celebration by denying his wife's virginity unless the claim were true (Ketubot 10a).

20.

Unless there are witnesses who can testify that the woman engaged in relations previously, the only question before the court is the amount of the woman's ketubah. She is permitted to remain married to her husband, because there is no proof that she willingly engaged in sexual relations with another person after she was consecrated. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:10.)

An exception to the above is a woman married to a priest. Issuing a claim questioning her virginity places the entire foundation of their marriage in doubt.

21.

I.e., the husband claims that he has entered into a mekach ta'ut, an agreement based on false premises. He had desired to marry a virgin, and he was not prepared to marry a woman who had had relations with another man. Therefore, he desires to have the marriage annulled entirely.

22.

I.e., he is not certain that she had engaged in relations with another man. In all matters of Torah law, whenever one person has a claim that is absolute (bari, in this instance the woman's claim that her hymen was damaged by factors other than intercourse) and one that is not absolute (shema, the man's claim), the claim that is absolute is accepted.

23.

Since she was raped against her will, she is not forced to suffer a loss and is entitled to the full amount of the ketubah.

24.

The intent is not that witnesses should observe the couple engaging in relations. This is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16. Instead, the intent is that they should inspect the sheet before and after the couple engage in relations for signs of hymenal bleeding.

25.

Other authorities (and their opinion is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:6) state: "Maybe you did not enter gently?" - i.e., because of the husband's hurry to complete the sexual act, he did not feel the tightness.

The Ramah (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the claim: "I discovered an open passageway," can be made only by a man who has been married before. If he was not married before, he would not have the experience to know the difference between virginal tightness and a non-virgin's state.

26.

The Ramban and the Rashba state that the claim that the woman's vaginal channel was open can be made only in an instance in which the sheet on which the couple had relations was lost. If, however, the sheet is available, it should be inspected. If it has signs of blood, she is considered a virgin; and if not, she is not. This opinion is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but does not appear to have been accepted.

27.

See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 15:2, where the Rambam states that he had available texts of the Talmud that were almost 500 years old. These would have been written approximately 200 years after the time of the Talmud's composition.

28.

The Rambam's ruling is substantiated by our text of the Talmud (Ketubot 36b) and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 68:3). The differing opinion mentioned by the Rambam is that of Rabbenu Chanan'el.

29.

Based on this rationale, the Maggid Mishneh mentions opinions that state that the man's word is accepted only when he prepared the wedding feast. If he did not, the woman's word is accepted.

30.

We assume that the couple had relations and he discovered her to be a virgin. The fact that he issued a claim against her afterwards stemmed from discontent for other reasons, without any connection to her personal state.

31.

Although there are authorities (among them Rabbenu Asher) who offer reasons why the husband's word should be accepted in this instance as well, the prevailing view (and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:8) follows the Rambam's decision. The rationale is that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract is a Rabbinic injunction, and the same authority that obligated the husband to meet this requirement rescinded it when he lodged a claim denying her virginity. The additional amount, by contrast, is a present to which the husband voluntarily obligated himself, and that obligation may be nullified only if it is proven that it was made under false premises.

32.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8, which states that such an oath is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll. Significantly, the Rambam's ruling here represents a change of mind from his statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 1:3), where he states that in such a situation the woman is required to take merely a sh'vuat hesset, a less severe oath.

33.

I.e., the situation is analogous to a person who holds a promissory note and may be asked to take an oath that it is valid before he can collect it, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:2-3.

34.

Chapter 10, Halachah 10.

Ishut - Chapter Twelve

1

When a man marries a woman, whether she is a virgin or a non-virgin, whether she is above the age of majority or a minor, and whether she was born Jewish, is a convert or a freed slave, he incurs ten responsibilities toward her and receives four privileges.1

א

כְּשֶׁנּוֹשֵׂא אָדָם אִשָּׁה בֵּין בְּתוּלָה בֵּין בְּעוּלָה בֵּין גְּדוֹלָה בֵּין קְטַנָּה אַחַת בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאַחַת הַגִּיֹּרֶת אוֹ הַמְשֻׁחְרֶרֶת יִתְחַיֵּב לָהּ בַּעֲשָׂרָה דְּבָרִים וְיִזְכֶּה בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים:

2

With regard to his ten responsibilities: three stem from the Torah. They include sha'arah, kesutah v'onatah.2 Sha'arah means providing her with subsistence.3 Kesutah means supplying her with garments, and onatah refers to conjugal rights.

The seven responsibilities ordained by the Rabbis are all conditions [of the marriage contract] established by the court. The first is the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract. The others are referred to as t'na'ei ketubah, the conditions of the marriage contract. They are:

a) to provide medical treatment if she becomes sick;

b) to redeem her if she is held captive:

c) to bury her if she dies;

d) to provide for her from his possessions;

e) the right for her to continue living in his home after his death as long as she remains a widow;

f) the right for her daughters to receive their subsistence from his estate after his death until they become consecrated;

g) the right for her sons to inherit her ketubah in addition to their share in her husband's estate together with their brothers [borne by other wives, if she dies before her husband does].

ב

וְהָעֲשָׂרָה שְׁלֹשָׁה מֵהֶן מִן הַתּוֹרָה וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. (שמות כא י) "שְׁאֵרָהּ. כְּסוּתָהּ. וְעוֹנָתָהּ". שְׁאֵרָהּ אֵלּוּ מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ. כְּסוּתָהּ כְּמַשְׁמָעוֹ. עוֹנָתָהּ לָבֹא עָלֶיהָ כְּדֶרֶךְ כָּל הָאָרֶץ. וְהַשִּׁבְעָה מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְכֻלָּן תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין הֵם. הָאֶחָד מֵהֶם עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה. וְהַשְּׁאָר הֵם הַנִּקְרָאִין תְּנָאֵי כְּתֻבָּה וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. לְרַפֹּאתָהּ אִם חָלְתָה. וְלִפְדּוֹתָהּ אִם נִשְׁבֵּית. לְקָבְרָהּ אִם מֵתָה. וְלִהְיוֹת נִזּוֹנֶת מִן נְכָסָיו. וְיוֹשֶׁבֶת בְּבֵיתוֹ אַחַר מוֹתוֹ כָּל זְמַן אַלְמְנוּתָהּ. וְלִהְיוֹת בְּנוֹתֶיהָ מִמֶּנּוּ נִזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסָיו אַחֲרֵי מוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁתִּתְאָרֵסְנָה. וְלִהְיוֹת בָּנֶיהָ הַזְּכָרִים מִמֶּנּוּ יוֹרְשִׁין כְּתֻבָּתָהּ יוֹתֵר עַל חֶלְקָם בַּיְרֻשָּׁה שֶׁעִם אֲחֵיהֶם:

3

The four privileges that the husband is granted are all Rabbinic in origin. They are:

a) the right to the fruits of her labor;

b) the right to any ownerless object she discovers;

c) the right to benefit from the profits of her property during her lifetime;

d) the right to inherit her [property] if she dies during his lifetime. His rights to her property supersede [the rights of] all others.4

ג

וְהָאַרְבָּעָה שֶׁזּוֹכָה בָּהֶן כֻּלָּם מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. לִהְיוֹת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְלִהְיוֹת מְצִיאָתָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְשֶׁיִּהְיֶה אוֹכֵל כָּל פֵּרוֹת נְכָסֶיהָ בְּחַיֶּיהָ. וְאִם מֵתָה בְּחַיָּיו יִירָשֶׁנָּה. וְהוּא קוֹדֵם לְכָל אָדָם בַּיְרֻשָּׁה:

4

Our Sages also ordained that the fruits of a wife's labor should parallel her subsistence, [the obligation to] redeem her should parallel [the right to] the benefit from her property, and [the obligation to] bury her should parallel [the right to] inherit [the property mentioned in] her ketubah.

Therefore, if a woman says: "I will not [hold you obligated for] my subsistence, but I will not work,"5 she is given this option, and she cannot be compelled to work.6 If, however, her husband says: "I will not provide for your subsistence, and I will not receive the right to the fruits of your labor," he is not given this option, lest the woman be unable to earn her subsistence.7 Because of this institution, [the obligation to provide for a woman's] subsistence is considered to be one of the t'na'ei ketubah.8

ד

וְעוֹד תִּקְּנוּ חֲכָמִים שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מַעֲשֵׂה יְדֵי הָאִשָּׁה כְּנֶגֶד מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ. וּפִדְיוֹנָהּ כְּנֶגֶד אֲכִילַת פֵּרוֹת נְכָסֶיהָ. וּקְבוּרָתָהּ כְּנֶגֶד יְרֻשָּׁתוֹ לִכְתֻבָּתָהּ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם אָמְרָה הָאִשָּׁה אֵינִי נִזּוֹנִית וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ וְאֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר הַבַּעַל אֵינִי זָנֵךְ וְאֵינִי נוֹטֵל כְּלוּם מִמַּעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ שֶׁמָּא לֹא יְסַפְּקוּ לָהּ מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ. וּמִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנָה זוֹ יֵחָשְׁבוּ הַמְּזוֹנוֹת מִתְּנָאֵי הַכְּתֻבָּה:

5

Whether or not these matters were written in the marriage contract - indeed, even if a marriage contract was not written and the couple merely married - once they marry, the husband is granted the four privileges mentioned, and the woman is granted the ten rights mentioned. There is no need to state them explicitly.9

ה

כָּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלּוּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתְּבוּ בִּשְׁטַר הַכְּתֻבָּה וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא כָּתְבוּ כְּתֻבָּה אֶלָּא נָשָׂא סְתָם כֵּיוָן שֶׁנְּשָׂאָהּ זָכָה בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁלּוֹ וְזָכְתָה הָאִשָּׁה בַּעֲשָׂרָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁלָּהּ וְאֵינָן צְרִיכִין לְפָרֵשׁ:

6

If the husband made a stipulation that he would not be responsible for one of these obligations - or the wife made a stipulation that [her husband] would not be granted one of these privileges - [and the other party agreed,] the stipulation is binding,10 with the exception of three matters with regard to which it is impossible for a stipulation to be made. Indeed, if a stipulation is made with regard to these three matters, it is of no consequence. These [three] are: [the woman's] conjugal rights, the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract and [the husband's right] to inherit [his wife's property].

ו

הִתְנָה הַבַּעַל שֶׁלֹּא יִתְחַיֵּב בְּאֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בָּהֶן. אוֹ שֶׁהִתְנַת הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁלֹּא יִזְכֶּה הַבַּעַל בְּאֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁהוּא זוֹכֶה בָּהֶם הַתְּנַאי קַיָּם חוּץ מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הַתְּנַאי מוֹעִיל בָּהֶן. וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. עוֹנָתָהּ. וְעִקַּר כְּתֻבָּתָהּ. וִירֻשָּׁתָהּ:

7

What is implied? If [the groom] made a stipulation with his bride that he is not obligated to give her conjugal rights, his stipulation is of no substance. For he has made a stipulation against what is written in the Torah, and the stipulation does not concern financial matters.11

ז

כֵּיצַד. הִתְנָה עִם הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עָלָיו עוֹנָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל וְחַיָּב בְּעוֹנָתָהּ. שֶׁהֲרֵי הִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה וְאֵינוֹ תְּנַאי מָמוֹן:

8

When a man makes a stipulation to reduce the amount of the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - or he writes a ketubah for either 200 or 100 [zuz], but she writes that she has already received a portion of the sum, when in fact she did not12 - his stipulation is of no substance.13 For whenever a person establishes a marriage contract with a virgin for less than 200 [zuz] or with a non-virgin for less than 100 [zuz], the sexual relations [he conducts with his wife] are considered promiscuous.14

ח

הִתְנָה עִמָּהּ לִפְחֹת מֵעִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה אוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב לָהּ מָאתַיִם אוֹ מֵאָה עִקַּר כְּתֻבָּה וְכָתְבָה לוֹ שֶׁנִּתְקַבְּלָה מֵהֶן כָּךְ וְכָךְ וְהִיא לֹא נִתְקַבְּלָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל שֶׁכָּל הַפּוֹחֵת לִבְתוּלָה מִמָּאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מִמֵּאָה הֲרֵי בְּעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת:

9

If he makes a stipulation after he weds her15 that he will not inherit her property, his stipulation is of no consequence. Although the husband's [right to] inherit [his wife's property] is a rabbinic institution, [our Sages] reinforced their edict, [giving it the power of a statute of] the Torah.

With regard to [the Torah's statutes of] inheritance, all stipulations that are made are of no consequence, despite the fact that financial matters are concerned, as [derived from Numbers 27:11]: "the statutes of judgment."16

With regard to other [aspects of the marriage contract], a stipulation [made by the husband and accepted by his wife] is binding. For example, if he made a stipulation that he is not obligated to supply her with her subsistence or with clothing, or that he would not receive the benefits from her property, his stipulation is binding.

ט

הִתְנָה עִמָּהּ אַחַר שֶׁנְּשָׂאָהּ שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיְּרֻשַּׁת הַבַּעַל מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים עָשׂוּ חִזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם כְּשֶׁל תּוֹרָה. וְכָל תְּנַאי שֶׁבַּיְרֻשָּׁה בָּטֵל וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מָמוֹן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בָּהּ (במדבר כז יא) "לְחֻקַּת מִשְׁפָּט". וּבִשְׁאָר הַדְּבָרִים תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּם, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִתְנָה עִמָּהּ שֶׁאֵין לָהּ שְׁאֵר וּכְסוּת, עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל פֵּרוֹת נְכָסֶיהָ, וְכָל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּם:

10

What is the amount that is designated for a woman's subsistence? We allot her bread for two meals every day, according to the norm of the people of her town, for a person who is neither sick nor a glutton.

The allotment is also made according to the type of bread eaten as a staple in that locale, be it wheat or barley, or rice, millet, or other grains, as is customary [in that locale]. Similarly, she is allotted other foods that are eaten together with bread - i.e., legumes, vegetables and the like. [She is also allotted] oil for food and to light a lamp and also fruit. She is also [allotted] a small amount of wine, if it is the local custom for women to drink wine.

On the Sabbath, she is allotted three meals,17 and meat or fish according to the local custom. And she is given a me'ah18 of silver for her private needs - e.g., a p'rutah for laundry, or for the bath and the like.

י

כַּמָּה מְזוֹנוֹת פּוֹסְקִין לָאִשָּׁה. פּוֹסְקִין לָהּ לֶחֶם שְׁתֵּי סְעֻדּוֹת בְּכָל יוֹם סְעֻדָּה בֵּינוֹנִית שֶׁל כָּל אָדָם בְּאוֹתָהּ הָעִיר כְּאָדָם שֶׁאֵינוֹ לֹא חוֹלֶה וְלֹא גַּרְגְּרָן וּמֵאוֹתוֹ מַאֲכָל שֶׁל אַנְשֵׁי אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר. אִם חִטִּים חִטִּים וְאִם שְׂעוֹרִים שְׂעוֹרִים. וְכֵן אֹרֶז וְדֹחַן אוֹ מִשְּׁאָר מִינִין שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ בָּהֶן. וּפוֹסְקִין לָהּ פַּרְפֶּרֶת לֶאֱכל בָּהּ אֶת הַפַּת כְּגוֹן קִטְנִית אוֹ יְרָקוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וְשֶׁמֶן לַאֲכִילָה וְשֶׁמֶן לְהַדְלָקַת הַנֵּר וּפֵרוֹת וּמְעַט יַיִן לִשְׁתּוֹת אִם הָיָה מִנְהַג הַמָּקוֹם שֶׁיִּשְׁתּוּ הַנָּשִׁים יַיִן. וּפוֹסְקִין לָהּ שָׁלֹשׁ סְעֵדּוֹת בְּשַׁבָּת וּבָשָׂר אוֹ דָּגִים כְּמִנְהַג הַמָּקוֹם. וְנוֹתֵן לָהּ בְּכָל שַׁבָּת וְשַׁבָּת מָעָה כֶּסֶף לִצְרָכֶיהָ כְּגוֹן פְּרוּטָה לְכִבּוּס אוֹ לְמֶרְחָץ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן:

11

To whom does the above apply? To a poor Jewish man. But if the husband is wealthy, [the support he is required to provide his wife is apportioned] according to his wealth. If he is wealthy enough to provide her with several dishes of meat each day, he is compelled to do so, and she is allotted [subsistence] commensurate with his wealth.

If he is extremely poor and is unable to provide his wife with even the bread that she requires,19 he is compelled to divorce her.20 He remains indebted for her ketubah until he finds the means to provide payment for it.

יא

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָל אִם הָיָה עָשִׁיר הַכּל לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ. אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה מָמוֹנוֹ רָאוּי לַעֲשׂוֹת לָהּ כַּמָּה תַּבְשִׁילֵי בָּשָׂר בְּכָל יוֹם כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וּפוֹסְקִין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת כְּפִי מָמוֹנוֹ. וְאִם הָיָה עָנִי בְּיוֹתֵר וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִתֵּן לָהּ אֲפִלּוּ לֶחֶם שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לוֹ כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא וְתִהְיֶה כְּתֻבָּתָהּ חוֹב עָלָיו עַד שֶׁתִּמְצָא יָדוֹ וְיִתֵּן:

12

When a husband desires to provide his wife with subsistence as befits her, on condition that she should eat and drink alone,21 and that he should eat and drink alone, he is given this prerogative, provided he eats together with her on Friday night.22

יב

בַּעַל שֶׁרָצָה לִתֵּן לְאִשְׁתּוֹ מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ הָרְאוּיוֹת לָהּ וְתִהְיֶה אוֹכֶלֶת וְשׁוֹתָה לְעַצְמָהּ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה וְאוֹכֵל לְעַצְמוֹ הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיֹּאכַל עִמָּהּ מִלֵּילֵי שַׁבָּת לְלֵילֵי שַׁבָּת:

13

When a woman has been allotted subsistence, and [the entire allotment was not used], the remainder belongs to her husband.23

If her husband is a priest, he is not entitled to provide her with all her provisions from terumah. [He is not given this option] because it is very difficult for her to protect [the terumah] from contacting ritual impurity, and to eat it while ritually pure [herself].24 Instead, he should give her half her provisions from ordinary [food] and half from terumah.

יג

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁפָּסְקוּ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וְהוֹתִירוּ הַמּוֹתָר לַבַּעַל. הָיָה בַּעְלָהּ כֹּהֵן אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן לָהּ כָּל מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ תְּרוּמָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁטֹּרַח גָּדוֹל הוּא לָהּ לְשָׁמְרָן מִדְּבָרִים הַמְטַמְּאִין וּלְאָכְלָן בְּטָהֳרָה אֶלָּא נוֹתֵן לָהּ מֶחֱצָה חֻלִּין וּמֶחֱצָה תְּרוּמָה:

14

Just as a man is required to provide his wife with her subsistence, he is required to provide for the maintenance of his children, both male and female, until they reach the age of six.25Afterwards, he should continue to provide for their maintenance until they reach majority, as ordained by our Sages.26

If, however, he does not, he should be rebuked and embarrassed publicly, and appeals should be made to him. If he [persists in his] refusal, a public announcement is made with regard to him: "So and so is cruel and does not desire to provide for the maintenance of his children. He is worse than an impure bird, which does provide for its chicks." Nevertheless, he should not be compelled to provide for the maintenance [of children] six and older.

יד

כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאָדָם חַיָּב בִּמְזוֹנוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ כָּךְ הוּא חַיָּב בִּמְזוֹנוֹת בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו הַקְּטַנִּים עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ בְּנֵי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ מַאֲכִילָן עַד שֶׁיִּגְדְּלוּ כְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים. וְאִם לֹא רָצָה גּוֹעֲרִין בּוֹ וּמַכְלִימִין אוֹתוֹ וּפוֹצְרִין בּוֹ. וְאִם לֹא רָצָה מַכְרִיזִין עָלָיו בַּצִּבּוּר וְאוֹמְרִים פְּלוֹנִי אַכְזָרִי הוּא וְאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לָזוּן בָּנָיו וַהֲרֵי פָּחוּת הוּא מֵעוֹף טָמֵא שֶׁהוּא זָן אֶת אֶפְרוֹחָיו. וְאֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְזוּנָם אַחַר שֵׁשׁ:

15

To what does the above apply? To a person who is not known to have resources, and it is not known whether or not he is capable of giving charity. If, however, he has resources and he possesses the means to give an amount to charity that would provide for [his children's] needs, his property is expropriated against his will27 for the purposes of charity,28 and [his children's] needs are provided for until they reach majority.

טו

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּאִישׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ אָמוּד וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם רָאוּי לִתֵּן צְדָקָה אוֹ אֵינוֹ רָאוּי אֲבָל אִם הָיָה אָמוּד שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מָמוֹן הָרָאוּי לִתֵּן מִמֶּנּוּ צְדָקָה הַמַּסְפֶּקֶת לָהֶן מוֹצִיאִין מִמֶּנּוּ בַּעַל כָּרְחוֹ מִשּׁוּם צְדָקָה וְזָנִין אוֹתָן עַד שֶׁיִּגְדְּלוּ:

16

When a person travels to another country [and leaves his wife behind], [the following rules apply] should his wife come to court to place a claim [against her husband] for her subsistence. For the first three months from the day her husband departed, she is not given an allotment for her subsistence. [The rationale is that] it is an accepted assumption that a person does not depart without leaving provisions for his household.29

Afterwards,30 an allotment is made for her subsistence. If her husband owns property, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide for his wife's subsistence. [When doing so,] no account is made for his wife's earnings until her husband comes.31 If it is discovered that she earned [money during the time that he was away], he is granted that sum.

Moreover, even if the matter is not taken to court, and instead the woman sells [her husband's property] on her own32 in order to pay for her subsistence, the sale is binding. There is no need for a public announcement [regarding the sale of the property].33 Similarly, the woman is not required to take an oath [that her husband did not leave her money] until her husband comes and lodges a claim [against her], or until she comes to claim [the money due her, as stated in her] ketubah in the event of her husband's death. [In the latter instance, together with the oaths she is required to take to collect her ketubah,]34 on the basis of the principle of gilgul shevu'ah,35 [she is also required to take an oath] that she did not sell [any more of her husband's property than] was necessary for her subsistence.

טז

מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינָה אַחֶרֶת וּבָאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ לְבֵית דִּין לִתְבֹּעַ מְזוֹנוֹת. שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים מִיּוֹם הֲלִיכָתוֹ אֵין פּוֹסְקִין לָהּ בָּהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁחֲזָקָה שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מַנִּיחַ בֵּיתוֹ רֵיקָן. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ פּוֹסְקִין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. וְאִם הָיוּ לוֹ נְכָסִים בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וּמוֹכְרִין לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ. וְאֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין עִמָּהּ עַל מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ עַד שֶׁיָּבוֹא בַּעְלָהּ, אִם מָצָא שֶׁעָשְׂתָה הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְכֵן אִם לֹא עָמְדָה בַּדִּין אֶלָּא מָכְרָה לְעַצְמָהּ לִמְזוֹנוֹת מִכְרָהּ קַיָּם וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הַכְרָזָה וְלֹא שְׁבוּעָה עַד שֶׁיָּבוֹא בַּעְלָהּ וְיִטְעֹן אוֹ עַד שֶׁתָּבוֹא לִגְבּוֹת כְּתֻבָּתָהּ אַחַר מוֹתוֹ מְגַלְגְּלִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא מָכְרָה אֶלָּא לִמְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לָהֶן:

17

Just as the court [expropriates and] sells [the property of] a husband who travelled [to another country to provide for] the subsistence of [his] wife, so too, it [expropriates and] sells property to provide for the subsistence of his sons and daughters who are six years old or less. If, however, they are more than six [years old], [the court] does not provide for their subsistence from his property when he is not present, even when he is reputed to have means.36

Similarly, when a person loses his mental faculties, the court expropriates his property and sells it to provide subsistence and other necessities for his wife and his children below the age of six.37

יז

וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁבֵּית דִּין מוֹכְרִין לִמְזוֹן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ כָּךְ מוֹכְרִין לִמְזוֹן בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו כְּשֶׁהֵן בְּנֵי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים אוֹ פָּחוֹת. אֲבָל יֶתֶר עַל שֵׁשׁ אֵינָן זָנִין אוֹתָן מִנְּכָסָיו שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא אָמוּד. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּטָּה בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וּמוֹכְרִים וְזָנִין אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו שֶׁהֵן בְּנֵי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים אוֹ פָּחוֹת וּמְפַרְנְסִין אוֹתָן:

18

Some geonim ruled that an assessment should not be made for the subsistence of a woman whose husband journeyed overseas, or who died, unless she evinces possession of her ketubah document. If she does not evince possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to subsistence. Perhaps she has already received payment for her ketubah from her husband, or perhaps she forfeited her ketubah in his favor, as will be explained.38 Others maintain that an assessment is made on her behalf for her subsistence, for we accept it as a presumption that she neither received payment for nor forfeited [her ketubah]. Hence, she is not required to show her ketubah [when presenting her claim].

I favor [the latter view] with regard to [a woman] whose husband has departed,39 since her claim to her subsistence stems from the Torah itself.40 With regard to a woman whose husband died, however, she is not entitled to her subsistence until she brings her ketubah, for she [derives her subsistence] by virtue of a rabbinic enactment. Furthermore, her subsistence is paid from property belonging to [her husband's] heirs, and [the court] always advances claims in support of the interests of an heir.41

יח

יֵשׁ מִן הַגְּאוֹנִים שֶׁהוֹרָה שֶׁאֵין פּוֹסְקִין מְזוֹנוֹת לְאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת בַּעְלָהּ עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא שְׁטַר כְּתֻבָּה יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יָדָהּ. וְאִם לֹא תּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר כְּתֻבָּה אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁמָּא נָטְלָה כְּתֻבָּתָהּ מִבַּעְלָהּ אוֹ מָחֲלָה לוֹ כְּתֻבָּתָהּ שֶׁאֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר. וְיֵשׁ מִי שֶׁהוֹרָה שֶׁפּוֹסְקִין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁלֹּא נָטְלָה וְלֹא מָחֲלָה וְאֵין מַצְרִיכִין אוֹתָהּ לְהָבִיא כְּתֻבָּה. וְדַעְתִּי נוֹטָה לָזֶה בְּמִי שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת מִן הַתּוֹרָה. אֲבָל אִם מֵת בַּעְלָהּ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת עַד שֶׁתָּבִיא כְּתֻבָּה. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא אוֹכֶלֶת בְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים וְעוֹד שֶׁנִּזֹּנֶת מִנִּכְסֵי יוֹרְשִׁים וּלְעוֹלָם טוֹעֲנִין לְיוֹרֵשׁ:

19

If [a woman's] husband departed on a journey, and she borrowed money for her subsistence, [her husband] is required to pay [the debt] when he returns.42

If a person voluntarily took the initiative of providing for her subsistence, when [her husband] returns the husband is not required to pay [that person]. The other person forfeited his money, [the rationale being] that [the husband] did not instruct him to provide for her, nor did she [request the assistance] as a loan.43

יט

הָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וְלָוְתָה וְאָכְלָה כְּשֶׁיָּבוֹא חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם. עָמַד אֶחָד מִדַּעַת עַצְמוֹ וְזָנָהּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ אִם יָבוֹא הַבַּעַל אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם לוֹ וַהֲרֵי זֶה אִבֵּד אֶת מְעוֹתָיו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא צִוָּהוּ לְזוּנָהּ וְהִיא לֹא לָוְתָה מִמֶּנּוּ:

20

When a husband [who plans to] depart on a journey tells his wife: "Use your earnings to purchase your subsistence," she has no [right to demand] her subsistence [from him afterwards]. For if she had not accepted this agreement, and she had not felt confident, she could have issued a claim against him, or told him, "My earnings are not sufficient for me."44

כ

הַבַּעַל שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁהָלַךְ טְלִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁאִלּוּ לֹא רָצְתָה בְּדָבָר זֶה וְלֹא סָמְכָה דַּעְתָּהּ הָיָה לָהּ לְתָבְעוֹ אוֹ לוֹמַר לוֹ אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַי מַסְפִּיקִין לִי:

21

[The following rule applies if] the woman took the matter to court and was awarded an assessment for her subsistence, the court sold [her husband's landed property] and gave her [the proceeds] - or she sold [the property] herself - and afterwards, the husband came and claimed that he left provisions for her. She is required to take an oath, while holding a sacred article, that he did not make provisions for her [and then she is not held liable].

[The following rule applies when a husband departed on a journey, and the woman] did not take the matter to court, nor sell his property, but instead waited until he returned. [If upon his return there is a dispute,] he claims: "I made [provisions for you]," while she claims, "You did not make provisions. Instead, I borrowed money from this person to provide for myself," he is required to take a rabbinic oath45 that he left provisions for her, and then he is not held liable. She remains responsible for the debt.46

כא

הֲרֵי שֶׁעָמְדָה בַּדִּין וּפָסְקוּ לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת וּמָכְרוּ בֵּין דִּין וְנָתְנוּ לָהּ. אוֹ שֶׁמָּכְרָה הִיא לְעַצְמָהּ וּבָא הַבַּעַל וְאָמַר הִנַּחְתִּי לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. הֲרֵי זוֹ נִשְׁבַּעַת בִּנְקִיטַת חֵפֶץ שֶׁלֹּא הִנִּיחַ לָהּ. לֹא תָּבְעָה וְלֹא מָכְרָה אֶלָּא שָׁהֲתָה עַד שֶׁבָּא הוּא אוֹמֵר הִנַּחְתִּי וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא הִנַּחְתָּ אֶלָּא לָוִיתִי מִזֶּה וְנִתְפַּרְנַסְתִּי. נִשְׁבָּע שְׁבוּעַת הֶסֵּת שֶׁהִנִּיחַ לָהּ וְנִפְטָר וְיִשָּׁאֵר הַחוֹב עָלֶיהָ:

22

[In the above instance,] if she sold movable property, claiming that she sold it to provide for her subsistence, and her husband claimed that he had left provisions for her, she is required to take a rabbinic oath that he did not leave her any provisions.47

If she did not issue a claim against him, did not borrow money, and she did not sell his property, but instead strained herself during the day and during the night and earned her livelihood, she is not entitled to any recompense.48

כב

מָכְרָה מִטַּלְטְלִין וְאָמְרָה לִמְזוֹנוֹת מָכַרְתִּי וְהוּא טוֹעֵן וְאוֹמֵר מְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ הִנַּחְתִּי נִשְׁבַּעַת שְׁבוּעַת הֶסֵּת שֶׁלֹּא הִנִּיחַ. הֲרֵי שֶׁלֹּא תָּבְעָה וְלֹא לָוְתָה וְלֹא מָכְרָה אֶלָּא דָּחֲקָה עַצְמָהּ בַּיּוֹם וּבַלַּיְלָה וְעָשְׂתָה וְאָכְלָה אֵין לָהּ כְּלוּם:

23

[The following rules apply when] a man takes a vow that his wife should not derive any benefit from him [or his property]. Whether he specified the span of the vow or did not specify the span of the vow, we grant him an interval of thirty days.49 If the span of his vow is concluded, or even though it is not concluded, but he has his vow annulled, this is acceptable. If not, he must divorce his wife,50 and pay her [the money due her because of] her ketubah.

During those thirty days, she should work and [attempt to] sustain herself [through her labor]. One of [her husband's] friends should provide her51 with those things she needs that she cannot purchase through the fruits of her labor, if the fruits of her labor are not sufficient for her.

כג

הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִלֵּהָנוֹת לוֹ בֵּין שֶׁפֵּרֵשׁ עַד זְמַן פְּלוֹנִי בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא פֵּרֵשׁ אֶלָּא סְתָם מַמְתִּינִין לוֹ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. אִם תַּמּוּ יְמֵי נִדְרוֹ אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תַּמּוּ וְהִתִּיר נִדְרוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מוּטָב וְאִם לָאו יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. וּבְאוֹתָן הַשְּׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם תִּהְיֶה הִיא עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת וְיִהְיֶה אֶחָד מֵחֲבֵרָיו מְפַרְנֵס אוֹתָהּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לָהֶן יֶתֶר עַל מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ אִם אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ מַסְפִּיקִין לַכּל:

24

When a person makes a vow [preventing] his wife from tasting one of the species of produce,52 he should be given an interval of thirty days. [If he prolongs the situation] beyond this time, he is required to divorce [his wife] and pay [her the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [This ruling applies] even when his vow prevents her from eating undesirable food, or a species that she has never tasted in her life.

[The following rules apply when a woman] took a vow not to partake of a particular species of produce, and [her husband] allowed the vow to stand, or she took a Nazarite vow and he did not annul it.53 If he desires to remain married to her and for her not to partake of this species or to be a Nazarite, he may.54 If, however, he says: "I do not desire a woman with vows," he may divorce her, but he is required to pay her the money due her because of her ketubah. [The rationale is that] he had the option to nullify [her vow], and instead, he willingly allowed the vow to stand.

כד

הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּטְעֹם אֶחָד מִכָּל הַפֵּרוֹת מַמְתִּינִין לוֹ עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. יֶתֶר עַל כֵּן יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. אֲפִלּוּ הִדִּירָהּ שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל מַאֲכָל רַע. אֲפִלּוּ הִדִּירָהּ מִמִּין שֶׁלֹּא אָכְלָה אוֹתוֹ מִיָּמֶיהָ. יוֹצִיא אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. נָדְרָה הִיא שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל אֶחָד מִכָּל הַפֵּרוֹת וְקִיֵּם לָהּ הוּא אֶת נִדְרָהּ אוֹ נָדְרָה בְּנָזִיר וְלֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ. אִם רָצָה שֶׁתֵּשֵׁב תַּחְתָּיו וְלֹא תֹּאכַל פֵּרוֹת אוֹ תִּהְיֶה נְזִירָה תֵּשֵׁב. וְאִם אָמַר אֵינִי רוֹצֶה בְּאִשָּׁה נַדְרָנִית יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה שֶׁהֲרֵי הָיָה בְּיָדוֹ לְהָפֵר וְהוּא קִיֵּם לָהּ בִּרְצוֹנוֹ:

Footnotes
1.

These ten responsibilities and four privileges are all explained in detail in the chapters that follow, through Chapter 23.

2.

These requirements are mentioned in Exodus 21:10. The verse forbids a husband from denying his wife these rights. Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 262) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 46) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

3.

Note the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus (loc. cit.), which interprets sha'arah and kesutah as also referring to conjugal rights and maintains that the obligation to provide a wife with her subsistence and with garments is Rabbinic. Most authorities, however, follow the Rambam's understanding.

4.

The Ra'avad and others maintain that the husband's right to inherit his wife's property stems from the Torah itself. The matter is the subject of a difference of opinion between our Sages (Ketubot 83b), and there is no explicit resolution of the question in the Talmud. Rav Kapach maintains that the early manuscripts of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:1; Bava Batra 8:1) indicate that the Rambam himself originally subscribed to the view mentioned by the Ra'avad and changed his mind later in life. (See also Halachah 9.)

5.

With regard to the other two matters that are linked the husband's obligation to redeem her and to bury her, the woman does not have this option. Although this arrangement was instituted for the woman's benefit, our Sages did not give her a choice regarding these matters, because they desired to ensure that the woman would not be forced to remain in captivity among the gentiles and that she would be buried (Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Even HaEzer 69:5).

6.

Our Sages instituted this arrangement for the woman's benefit, since a woman's income could not ordinarily provide for her subsistence. Accordingly, the option of whether or not to forego the arrangement is in the woman's hands. If a woman can earn more than her subsistence, she is also entitled to forego the above arrangement.

Even in such a situation, the woman is still responsible for taking care of the household tasks (Maggid Mishneh).

7.

The husband may, however, tell his wife: "Endeavor to earn your subsistence, and I will compensate for whatever deficiency remains" (Ramah, Even HaEzer 69:4).

8.

I.e., although the t'na'ei ketubah are rabbinic in origin, and the obligation to provide for the woman's subsistence is from the Torah, since the linkage of it with her wages is rabbinic, the obligation is considered to be part of the t'na'ei ketubah.

9.

I.e., they are obligations that apply universally and are not dependent on the consent of a particular couple.

10.

The principle upon which this statement is based is that any stipulation to which both parties agree that concerns monetary rights - even those that are granted to a person by the Torah - is binding (Kiddushin 19b). For a person has the option to waive his right to property or privileges that justly belong to him (Rashi, loc. cit.). Therefore, a woman may waive even the rights to her subsistence or clothing that the Torah itself grants her.

11.

Instead, the failure to provide a woman with conjugal rights is considered to cause her physical anguish (Rashi, loc. cit.). Although the Mordechai maintains that conjugal rights can also be considered monetary matters, for it is possible to give a woman enough money that she would be willing to forego her rights, the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities.

12.

I.e., the woman writes a receipt for part of the sum on her ketubah.

With regard to this instance, the Tur (Even HaEzer 66) differs and maintains that the man is not obligated to pay her the full sum.

13.

Although this is a situation that concerns financial matters, our Sages desired that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract be a binding institution, and therefore did not allow any modification of this obligation. Hence, the stipulation is nullified.

Note the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions views that differ with that of the Rambam and maintains that if the man desires to divorce the woman, he is not obligated to give her the sum for which the Sages obligated him. It is only when he wants to remain married to her that our Sages enforced their requirement.

14.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 66:9) states that even though the man's stipulations are of no consequence, the sexual relations he conducts with his wife are considered promiscuous, because she may be unaware of the law and not know the amount due her.

15.

A different ruling applies if the stipulation is made between erusin and nisu'in, as explained in Chapter 23, Halachah 6.

16.

See Hilchot Nachalot 6:1.

17.

For a woman is obligated to eat three meals on the Sabbath as a man is (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 291:6).

Note the slight difference between the Rambam's statements here and those in Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:13.

18.

A me'ah is one sixth of a dinar (Kiddushin 12a). Based on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 1, it is evident that this is a coin of relatively small value, approximately 1.5 grams of pure silver.

19.

The Beit Shmuel 70:7 states that if he can provide her with bread, even if he cannot provide her with other food, he is not obligated to divorce her. (See, however, Chelkat Mechokek 70:12.)

The Chatam Sofer (Even HaEzer, Responsum 131) states that the Rambam's words imply that if the husband cannot support his wife from his own earnings, he is compelled to divorce her, even if she herself has the means to provide herself with subsistence.

20.

The rationale is that since he cannot provide her with subsistence, he is obligated to give her the opportunity to find another husband who can.

The Hagahot Maimoniot question whether the husband can be compelled to seek to hire himself out as a laborer, or the court's only resort is to compel him to divorce his wife. Although that text does not favor either approach, the latter opinion is quoted by the Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:3). The Ramah also mentions the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 63a), which states that a husband who has no resources is not compelled to divorce his wife.

21.

I.e., even in a separate dwelling (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Ketubot 5:9).

22.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that this prerogative may in no way infringe on the husband's obligation to provide his wife with conjugal rights. In addition, he must share the Friday night meal with her, implying that this is for the sake of communication, not only as preparation for marital relations, as understood by some commentaries.

Note the Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:2), who objects to the Rambam's ruling, and states that a man is given this prerogative only if his wife consents.

23.

Note Mishneh LaMelech and the Dagul MeRevavah (Even HaEzer 70), which state that this applies only when the woman purchased her food at a lower price than was originally estimated. If, however, she starved herself and consumed less than was allotted her, she, and not her husband, is entitled to the remainder.

24.

Food that is terumah may not be eaten if it contracts ritual impurity, nor may it be eaten by a person who is himself ritually impure.

25.

Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this obligation is incumbent on a father from the Torah itself, as an extension of his obligation to provide for his wife. Rabbenu Asher, however, maintains that the father's obligation is independent of the marriage bond. Even if he fathers children outside marriage, he is liable for their support.

26.

The obligation to provide for one's children's subsistence until majority was one of the enactments instituted by the Sanhedrin after this body was relocated in Usha in the Galilee after the destruction of Jerusalem. At that time, several enactments were passed to direct the functioning of the Jewish community in this new phase. (See Ketubot 49b.)

Today, most rabbinic authorities maintain that because of changes in the socio-economic system, it is proper for a father to continue supporting his children well past the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah.

27.

As evident from Halachah 17, this applies only when the father is present. The Rambam maintains that a person's property may not be expropriated for this purpose outside his presence.

28.

See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10:16, which states:

Although he is not obligated, when a person provides subsistence for his older sons and daughters, so that the males can study the Torah and the females will follow the straight path, . . . it is an act of charity, and indeed, a great act of charity.

And Chapter 7, Halachah 10, of that source, states:

When a person does not desire to give charity, . . . the court compels him, and administers stripes for rebelliousness until he meets the assessment made for him. [Moreover,] when he is present, his property is expropriated [for this purpose].

29.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:5) quotes opinions that state that this ruling applies only when the husband left home in an atmosphere of peace. In such a situation, we can be sure that he has provided for his family. If, however, he left home annoyed with his wife, it is plausible to assume that he did not provide for her needs.

30.

I.e., after three months, or after she approaches the court. If she waits longer than three months, she is not given any payment for the previous period (Ramah, ibid.).

31.

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the court should consider the amount the woman can earn when deciding on the size of her allotment. His rationale is that before expropriating a person's property, we should try to act in his interests. Although many authorities speak in favor of Rabbenu Asher's logic, they rule according to the Rambam's decision. (See Chelkat Mechokek 70:20.)

The Avnei Milu'im 70:3 explains the Rambam's position, stating that the husband is granted the right to his wife's earnings only when he provides for her subsistence willingly. When he forces her to approach the court to receive her subsistence, he has no claim on her earnings.

32.

There is a debate among the authorities whether or not she must consult experts with regard to the evaluation of the object. (See Chelkat Mechokek 70:21.)

33.

Generally, when property is sold by the court, it is necessary that a public announcement be made informing people of the sale, to attract customers and assure competitive bidding. (See Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 22:6.) In this instance, no such requirement is made, in order that the woman will not have to wait to receive the funds she requires.

34.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 4.

35.

Whenever a person is required to take an oath, the plaintiff can obligate him to take an oath on another claim. In this instance, since the woman is obligated to take an oath to her husband's heirs to collect the money due her for her ketubah, she can be required to take an additional oath regarding the sale of his property for her subsistence.

36.

We do not expropriate his property and provide for his children as an act of charity, because it is possible that he is giving charity in the place to which he has journeyed.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 71:2) states that if the person had supported his older children before leaving on his journey, provisions should be made for his children while he is away. It can be assumed that this would be his desire. The Ramah also mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim, which states that if he possesses means, support should be provided for his children from his property as an act of charity. This view is not, however, accepted by most later authorities.

37.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's wording appears to imply that no provision is made for his older children, even when he has the means to support them. The Maggid Mishneh, however, refers to Hilchot Nachalot 11:11, which states that when a person who has means loses control of his faculties, the court levels an assessment for charity on his estate. Accordingly, it would appear that if the man has the means to give charity, his property is expropriated to pay for his children's subsistence, even if they are over six.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 71) states that in such an instance, the court should expropriate funds for the subsistence of the person's older children even if the person's estate is not large enough for an assessment for charity to be leveled against it. The rationale is that we assume that, like the majority of people, this person would also desire to support his children. The Chelkat Mechokek 71:6 maintains that the Shulchan Aruch follows this view, and not that of the Rambam.

38.

See Chapter 17, Halachah 19.

39.

Rabbenu Asher and others do not accept the Rambam's distinction, and maintain that the court should also protect the interests of a person who is in another country and cannot defend himself. Nevertheless, in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's decision, explaining that in contrast to an heir, the husband has the potential to take his claim to court when he returns. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 70:5), he quotes the Rambam's ruling. This ruling is also accepted by the later authorities.

40.

See Halachah 2.

41.

Since the heir himself was not aware of the details of his benefactor's affairs, he cannot necessarily advance claims in his own interests. Therefore, the court acts to protect them. (See Bava Batra 23a.)

42.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 70:8) states that the benefactor must lodge a claim against the wife, who in turn must lodge a claim against her husband.

43.

Although the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's subsistence, our Sages rule that when a person pays a debt on behalf of a colleague without being instructed to do so, the debtor is not at all obligated to his patron.

44.

Although our Sages associated a woman's earnings with her subsistence, they made this association for the woman's sake and gave her the prerogative of accepting or declining such a request. In a responsum, the Rambam writes that if it is not logical to assume that she could earn the funds required for her subsistence, for her to forfeit her rights, she must explicitly consent to her husband's stipulation.

45.

I.e., a less severe oath instituted by the Rabbis. (See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 1:3.)

46.

She, however, does not have the opportunity of paying the debt until she is divorced or becomes widowed, because all her property is under lien to her husband, and he is entitled to her earnings.

47.

Since it was movable property and not landed property that was sold, the oath that the woman is required to take is more lenient than that mentioned in the previous halachah. The rationale is that had she desired to lie, she could have claimed that the goods were stolen or lost.

48.

I.e., she cannot demand reimbursement for the difference between her earnings and the amount she would ordinarily be entitled to for her subsistence (Chelkat Mechokek 70:41). If she earned more than her subsistence, the additional funds belong to her, not to her husband (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 70:11).

49.

Based on Ketubot 59b, Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim object to the Rambam's ruling. Since the husband is liable to provide for his wife's subsistence, the vow he takes cannot override that obligation, except in specific instances. In both the Kessef Mishneh, and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 235:2), Rav Yosef Karo follows these views.

50.

After thirty days, the matter will become public knowledge and the woman will suffer ridicule. Therefore, her husband is obligated to divorce (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Ketubot 7:1).

51.

The Mishnah (Ketubot, op. cit.) states that her husband should appoint a person to provide for her. As the Talmud explains (Ketubot 71a), this does not mean that he should appoint this person as an agent, for this is forbidden by his vow. Instead, he should say, "Whoever provides for my wife will not suffer a loss."

52.

As the Maggid Mishneh explains, this refers to a situation in which the husband took a vow that if his wife partakes of a particular species of produce, she will be forbidden to benefit from his property (or according to the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 235:3, that sexual relations between them will be forbidden). If, however, the husband takes a vow that his wife may not eat a particular type of produce, that vow is nullified. For a person cannot take a vow to restrict the actions of another person.

53.

For, as Numbers 30:8-9 relates, a husband has the right to nullify or uphold the vows his wife takes.

54.

As Rav Yosef Karo mentions in both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), other opinions require the husband to divorce his wife in such a situation.

Ishut - Chapter Thirteen

1

To what extent is he required to provide her with garments? Annually, he must purchase for her clothes that were worth 50 zuz in the coinage prevalent [in the Talmudic period], these being worth six and one fourth dinarim of pure silver.1

He should provide her with new [garments] during the rainy season. After these garments become worn, she should wear them in the summer. Frayed garments - that which remains from her garments from the previous year - belong to her; she should wear them while she is in the niddah state.

She is granted a belt for her loins, a cap for her head and new shoes on each festival.

א

כַּמָּה הַכְּסוּת שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לִתֵּן לָהּ. בְּגָדים שֶׁל חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז מִשָּׁנָה לְשָׁנָה מִמַּטְבֵּעַ אוֹתָן הַיָּמִים שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ הַחֲמִשִּׁים שִׁשָּׁה דִּינָרִין וּרְבִיעַ דִּינַר כֶּסֶף. נוֹתְנִין לָהּ חֲדָשִׁים בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים וְלוֹבֶשֶׁת בְּלָאוֹתֵיהֶן בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה. וְהַשְּׁחָקִים וְהֵם מוֹתַר הַכְּסוּת הֲרֵי הֵן שֶׁלָּהּ כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּתְכַּסֶּה בָּהֶם בִּימֵי נִדָּתָהּ. וְנוֹתְנִין לָהּ חֲגוֹרָה לְמָתְנֶיהָ וְכִפָּה לְרֹאשָׁהּ וּמִנְעָל מִמּוֹעֵד לְמוֹעֵד:

2

When does the above apply? In [the Talmudic period,] and in Eretz Yisrael, but in other ages or in other countries, there is no fixed amount of money [determined for this purpose]. For there are some places where garments are very expensive, and others where they are inexpensive.

The fundamental principle is2 that he is obligated to provide her with appropriate clothes for the winter and the summer, the minimal that are worn by a married woman in that country.

ב

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים וּבְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר זְמַנִּים וּשְׁאָר הַמְּקוֹמוֹת אֵין הַדָּמִים עִקָּר. יֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שָׁם הַבְּגָדִים בְּיֹקֶר הַרְבֵּה אוֹ בְּזוֹל הַרְבֵּה. אֶלָּא הָעִקָּר שֶׁסּוֹמְכִין עָלָיו שֶׁמְּחַיְּבִין אוֹתוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ בְּגָדִים הָרְאוּיִים בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים וּבִימוֹת הַחַמָּה בְּפָחוֹת שֶׁלּוֹבֶשֶׁת כָּל אִשָּׁה בַּעֲלַת בַּיִת שֶׁבְּאוֹתָהּ הַמְּדִינָה:

3

Included in the [obligation to provide her with] garments is the requirement to provide her with household goods and a dwelling place.3

With which household goods is he obligated to provide her? With a bed and its spreads, a reed or woven rug to sit on, and utensils with which to eat and drink - e.g., a pot, a plate, a cup, a bottle and the like.

With regard to her dwelling? He must rent a dwelling at least four cubits by four cubits. It must have a yard outside for her use and a latrine [nearby].

ג

וּבִכְלַל הַכְּסוּת שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לִתֵּן לָהּ כְּלֵי בַּיִת וּמָדוֹר שֶׁיּוֹשֶׁבֶת בּוֹ. וּמַה הֵן כְּלֵי בַּיִת מִטָּה מֻצַּעַת וּמַפָּץ אוֹ מַחְצֶלֶת לֵישֵׁב עָלֶיהָ. וּכְלֵי אֲכִילָה וּשְׁתִיָּה כְּגוֹן קְדֵרָה וּקְעָרָה וְכוֹס וּבַקְבּוּק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וְהַמָּדוֹר שֶׁשּׂוֹכֵר לָהּ בַּיִת שֶׁל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וְתִהְיֶה רְחָבָה חוּצָה לוֹ כְּדֵי לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהּ. וְיִהְיֶה לוֹ בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא חוּץ מִמֶּנּוּ:

4

Similarly, he is obligated to provide her with ornaments - e.g., colored cloths to wrap her head and forehead, eye-makeup, rouge and the like - so that she will not appear unattractive to him.

ד

וְכֵן מְחַיְּבִין אוֹתוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ תַּכְשִׁיטִים כְּגוֹן בִּגְדֵי צִבְעוֹנִין לְהַקִּיף עַל רֹאשָׁהּ וּפַדַּחְתָּהּ וּפוּךְ וְשָׂרָק וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְגַּנֶּה עָלָיו:

5

When does the above apply? With regard to a poor Jewish man. Concerning a rich man, by contrast, all [of his obligations are judged] according to the extent of his wealth.4 If it would be appropriate for him to buy her silk and embroidered clothing and golden articles, he is compelled to provide her with these.

Similarly, the dwelling [he is required to give her] is judged according to his wealth, as are the ornaments and the household goods. If he does not have the means to provide her with the minimum required of a poor Jewish man, he is compelled to divorce her.5 The money due her by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be a debt that he is required to pay when he gains the means.

ה

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָל בְּעָשִׁיר הַכּל לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ. וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה רָאוּי לִקְנוֹת לָהּ כְּלֵי מֶשִׁי וְרִקְמָה וּכְלֵי זָהָב כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְנוֹתֵן. וְכֵן הַמָּדוֹר לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ וְהַתַּכְשִׁיט וּכְלֵי הַבַּיִת הַכּל לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ. וְאִם קָצְרָה יָדוֹ לִתֵּן לָהּ אֲפִלּוּ כְּעָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְהוֹצִיא וְתִהְיֶה הַכְּתֻבָּה עָלָיו חוֹב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשִׁיר:

6

[A man] is obligated to provide the necessary clothing, dwelling and household goods, not only for his wife, but also for his sons and daughters who are six years old or less.6 He is not, however, required to provide for them according to his wealth; all that is necessary is that he provide for their needs.

This is the governing principle: whenever a husband [or his estate] is required to provide for a person's subsistence - whether the husband is alive or deceased - the husband [or his estate] is also obligated to provide for the person's clothing, household goods and dwelling. Whenever a court must sell [a person's property] to provide for [a dependent's] subsistence,7 they also sell [his property] to provide [the dependent] with clothing, household goods and a dwelling.

ו

וְלֹא הָאִשָּׁה בִּלְבַד אֶלָּא בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו הַקְּטַנִּים בְּנֵי שֵׁשׁ אוֹ פָּחוֹת חַיָּב לִתֵּן לָהֶם כְּסוּת הַמַּסְפֶּקֶת לָהֶם וּכְלֵי תַּשְׁמִישׁ וּמָדוֹר לִשְׁכֹּן בּוֹ. וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן לָהֶם לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ אֶלָּא כְּפִי צָרְכָּן בִּלְבַד. זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו מְזוֹנוֹת בֵּין בְּחַיָּיו בֵּין אַחַר מוֹתוֹ יֵשׁ לוֹ כְּסוּת וּכְלֵי בֵּית וּמָדוֹר. וְכָל שֶׁבֵּית דִּין מוֹכְרִין לִמְזוֹנוֹתָיו כָּךְ מוֹכְרִין לִכְסוּתוֹ וּכְלֵי בֵּיתוֹ וּמְדוֹרוֹ:

7

When a woman's husband has departed on a journey, and the court allots [money from his property] for her subsistence, her clothes, her household goods and the renting of a dwelling, they do not allot her money for ornaments. For she does not have a husband [present] for whom to make herself attractive. If, by contrast, a woman's husband loses his mental faculties or becomes a deaf mute, she is granted an allotment for ornaments.8

The laws that apply to the claims and counterclaims between a woman and her husband with regard to garments, clothing and the rental of a dwelling [in the event of the husband's departure on an extended journey] are the same as those that apply with regard to her subsistence. If he claims to have provided for her and she denies [his claim], the same rulings apply to all claims.

ז

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וּפָסְקוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין מְזוֹנוֹת וּכְסוּת וּכְלֵי בַּיִת וּשְׂכַר מָדוֹר אֵין פּוֹסְקִין לָהּ תַּכְשִׁיט שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין לָהּ בַּעַל שֶׁתִּתְקַשֵּׁט לוֹ. אֲבָל מִי שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּטָּה בַּעְלָהּ אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְחָרֵשׁ פּוֹסְקִין לָהּ תַּכְשִׁיט. וְדִין הַבַּעַל עִם אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּטַעֲנַת הַכְּסוּת וְהַכֵּלִים וּשְׂכַר הַמָּדוֹר כְּדִינָם בְּטַעֲנַת הַמְּזוֹנוֹת אִם אָמַר הוּא נָתַתִּי וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא נָתַתָּ דִּין אֶחָד לַכּל:

8

[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents9 his wife from wearing any type of ornament. If the couple are poor, they may remain married for a year while the vow is in effect.10 If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

If the couple are wealthy, they may remain married for a month while the vow is in effect. If [it remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

ח

הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט בְּאֶחָד מִכָּל הַמִּינִין. בַּעֲנִיּוּת שָׁנָה אַחַת יְקַיֵּם. יֶתֶר עַל כֵּן אוֹ יַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ אוֹ יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. וּבַעֲשִׁירוּת שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יְקַיֵּם. יֶתֶר עַל כֵּן יַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ אוֹ יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְתוּבָה:

9

[The following rules apply if a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to the bathhouse. [The couple may remain married for only] one week in a large city and two weeks in a village [if the vow remains in effect]. If he takes a vow that prevents his wife from wearing shoes [the couple may remain married for only] three days11 in a village and one day in a large city.12 If [the vow remains in effect] for a longer period, he must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

ט

הִדִּירָהּ שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵךְ לְמֶרְחָץ. בִּכְרַכִּים שַׁבָּת אַחַת בִּכְפָרִים שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת. שֶׁלֹּא תִּנְעל מִנְעָל. בִּכְפָרִים שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים וּבִכְרַכִּים מֵעֵת לְעֵת. יֶתֶר עַל זֶה יַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ אוֹ יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה:

10

If [a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from borrowing or lending household goods that are frequently lent and borrowed between neighbors - e.g., a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like - he must either absolve himself of the vow, or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.13 [The rationale is that his vow] causes her to have a bad reputation among her neighbors.

Similarly, if she takes an oath14 not to borrow or lend [neighbors] a sifter, a sieve, a mill, an oven or the like, or not to weave attractive garments for her sons in places where it is customary to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that her vow] causes him to have a reputation as a miser among his neighbors.

י

הִדִּירָהּ שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁאַל וְלֹא תַּשְׁאִיל מִכְּלֵי הַבַּיִת שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ כָּל הַשְּׁכֵנוֹת לִשְׁאל אוֹתָן וּלְהַשְׁאִילָן כְּגוֹן נָפָה וּכְבָרָה רֵחַיִם וְתַנּוּר וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם. יַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ אוֹ יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיאָהּ שֵׁם רַע בִּשְׁכֵנוֹתֶיהָ. וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁנָּדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁאַל וְלֹא תַּשְׁאִיל נָפָה וּכְבָרָה וְרֵחַיִם וְתַנּוּר וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם וְשֶׁלֹּא תֶּאֱרֹג בְּגָדִים נָאִים לְבָנִים בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לֶאֱרֹג אוֹתָם לְבָנִים תֵּצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיאָתוֹ שֵׁם רַע בִּשְׁכוּנָתוֹ שֶׁהוּא כִּילַי:

11

In a place where it is customary for a woman not to go out to the market place wearing merely a cap on her head, but also a veil that covers her entire body like a cloak, her husband must provide at least the least expensive type of veil for her. If he is wealthy, [he must provide her with a veil whose quality] is commensurate with his wealth.

[He must give her this veil] so that she can visit her father's home, a house of mourning or a wedding celebration. For every woman should be given the opportunity to visit her father and to go to a house of mourning or a wedding celebration as an expression of kindness to her friends and relatives, for [this will have a reciprocal effect], and they will return the visits. For a woman [at home] is not confined in a jail, from which she cannot come and go.

Nevertheless, it is uncouth for a woman always to leave home - this time to go out and another time to go on the street. Indeed, a husband should prevent a wife from doing this and not allow her to go out more than once or twice a month, as is necessary.15 For there is nothing more attractive for a woman than to sit in the corner of her home, as [implied by Psalms 45:14]: "All the glory of the king's daughter is within."

יא

מָקוֹם שֶׁדַּרְכָּן שֶׁלֹּא תֵּצֵא אִשָּׁה לַשּׁוּק בְּכִפָּה שֶׁעַל רֹאשָׁהּ בִּלְבַד עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה עָלֶיהָ רְדִיד הַחוֹפֶה אֶת כָּל גּוּפָהּ כְּמוֹ טַלִּית נוֹתֵן לָהּ בִּכְלַל הַכְּסוּת רְדִיד הַפָּחוּת מִכָּל הָרְדִידִין. וְאִם הָיָה עָשִׁיר נוֹתֵן לָהּ לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁתֵּצֵא בּוֹ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ אוֹ לְבַיִת הָאָבֵל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה. לְפִי שֶׁכָּל אִשָּׁה יֵשׁ לָהּ לָצֵאת וְלֵילֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ לְבַקְּרוֹ וּלְבֵית הָאָבֵל וּלְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה לִגְמל חֶסֶד לְרֵעוֹתֶיהָ אוֹ לִקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבוֹאוּ הֵם לָהּ. שֶׁאֵינָהּ בְּבֵית הַסֹּהַר עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּצֵא וְלֹא תָּבוֹא. אֲבָל גְּנַאי הוּא לְאִשָּׁה שֶׁתִּהְיֶה יוֹצְאָה תָּמִיד פַּעַם בַּחוּץ פַּעַם בָּרְחוֹבוֹת. וְיֵשׁ לַבַּעַל לִמְנֹעַ אִשְׁתּוֹ מִזֶּה וְלֹא יְנִיחֶנָּהּ לָצֵאת אֶלָּא כְּמוֹ פַּעַם אַחַת בְּחֹדֶשׁ אוֹ כְּמוֹ פַּעֲמַיִם בְּחֹדֶשׁ לְפִי הַצֹּרֶךְ. שֶׁאֵין יֹפִי לָאִשָּׁה אֶלָּא לֵישֵׁב בְּזָוִית בֵּיתָהּ שֶׁכָּךְ כָּתוּב (תהילים מה יד) "כָּל כְּבוּדָּה בַת מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה:"

12

[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to her father's home. If he lives in the same city, [the husband] is granted a respite of one month. [If he desires to maintain his vow at the beginning of] the second month, he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If [the wife's father lives] in another city, [the husband] is granted respite until the first festival.16 [If he desires to maintain his vow until] the second [festival], he must divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.

יב

הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ. בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא עִמָּהּ בָּעִיר חֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד מַמְתִּינִין לוֹ שְׁנַיִם יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. וּבִזְמַן שֶׁהוּא בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת רֶגֶל אֶחָד מַמְתִּינִין לוֹ שְׁנַיִם יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה:

13

[The following rules apply when a husband] takes a vow that prevents his wife from going to a house of mourning or to wedding celebrations. He must either absolve himself of the vow or divorce [his wife] and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. For this is like placing her in jail and locking her in.

If [the husband] claims: "[I forbade her from going] because of indecent people who were present at that house of mourning or wedding," and it was discovered that indeed, indecent people were present, he is given the prerogative [of making that vow].

יג

הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵךְ לְבַיִת הָאָבֵל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה. אוֹ יַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ אוֹ יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה שֶׁזֶּה כְּמִי שֶׁאֲסָרָהּ בְּבֵית הַסֹּהַר וְנָעַל בְּפָנֶיהָ. וְאִם הָיָה טוֹעֵן מִפְּנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם פְּרוּצִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּאוֹתוֹ בֵּית הָאָבֵל אוֹ בְּבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה וְהֻחְזְקוּ שָׁם פְּרוּצִים שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ:

14

When a person tells his wife, "I do not desire that your father, your mother, your brothers and your sisters come into my domain," he is given that prerogative. Instead, she should visit them when an [unusual] event occurs to them. And she should visit her father's house once a month and on each festival. They, by contrast, should visit her only when an unusual event of great import occurs - e.g., sickness or birth. For a person should not be forced to have others enter his domain.

Similarly, if [the wife] says: "I do not want your mother and your sisters to visit, nor will I live together with them in one courtyard, because they cause me difficulties and distress," she is given that prerogative.17 For a person should not be forced to have others dwell with him in his domain.

יד

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיָּבוֹאוּ לְבֵיתִי אָבִיךְ וְאִמֵּךְ אַחַיִךְ וְאַחְיוֹתַיִךְ שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ וְתִהְיֶה הִיא הוֹלֶכֶת לָהֶם כְּשֶׁיֶּאֱרַע לָהֶם דָּבָר. וְתֵלֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ פַּעַם בְּחֹדֶשׁ וּבְכָל רֶגֶל וְרֶגֶל. וְלֹא יִכָּנְסוּ הֵם לָהּ אֶלָּא אִם אֵרַע לָהּ דָּבָר כְּגוֹן חלִי אוֹ לֵדָה. שֶׁאֵין כּוֹפִין אֶת הָאָדָם שֶׁיִּכָּנְסוּ אֲחֵרִים בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁאָמְרָה אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיִּכָּנְסוּ אֶצְלִי אִמְּךָ וְאַחְיוֹתֶיךָ וְאֵינִי שׁוֹכֶנֶת עִמָּהֶם בְּחָצֵר אַחַת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרֵעִין לִי וּמְצֵרִין לִי שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ. שֶׁאֵין כּוֹפִין אֶת הָאָדָם שֶׁיֵּשְׁבוּ אֲחֵרִים עִמּוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ:

15

When a husband says: "I will not dwell in this home, because there are wicked or indecent people or gentiles in this neighborhood, and I fear them," he is given that prerogative. This applies even if it has not been established that there are indecent people living there. For our Sages ordained:18 "Keep away from a bad neighbor." Even if the dwelling belongs to the woman, she is forced to leave it, and they should establish their dwelling among worthy people.19

The same law applies if the woman makes such a demand. Although [the husband] says, "I do not object to them," her will is followed. [The rationale is that] she can say, "I do not want to get a bad reputation in these neighborhoods."

טו

הָאִישׁ שֶׁאָמַר אֵינִי דָּר בְּמָדוֹר זֶה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבְּנֵי אָדָם רָעִים אוֹ פְּרוּצִים אוֹ עַכּוּ''ם בִּשְׁכוּנָתִי וַאֲנִי מִתְיָרֵא מֵהֶם שׁוֹמְעִים לוֹ. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֻחְזְקוּ בִּפְרִיצוּת שֶׁכָּךְ צִוּוּ חֲכָמִים הַרְחֵק מִשָּׁכֵן רַע. וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה הַמָּדוֹר שֶׁלָּהּ מוֹצִיאִין אוֹתָהּ מִמֶּנּוּ וְשׁוֹכֵן בֵּין בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּשֵׁרִים. וְכָךְ הִיא שֶׁאָמְרָה כֵּן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר אֲנִי אֵינִי מַקְפִּיד עֲלֵיהֶם שׁוֹמְעִין לָהּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת אֵין רְצוֹנִי שֶׁיֵּצֵא עָלַי שׁוּם רַע בִּשְׁכֵנוּת אֵלּוּ:

16

All of the earth is divided into different lands - e.g., the Land of Canaan, the Land of Egypt, the Land of Yemen, the Land of Ethiopia, the Land of Babylonia and the like.20 Every land is subdivided into large cities21 and villages. With regard to the subject of marriage, the cities of Eretz Yisrael are considered to be divided into three different lands: Judea, Transjordan and the Galilee.

טז

כָּל הַיִּשּׁוּב אֲרָצוֹת אֲרָצוֹת הוּא. כְּגוֹן אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן וְאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וְאֶרֶץ תֵּימָן וְאֶרֶץ כּוּשׁ וְאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וְכָל אֶרֶץ וְאֶרֶץ מִמְּדִינוֹת וּכְפָרִים. וְעָרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְעִנְיַן נִשּׂוּאִין שָׁלֹשׁ אֲרָצוֹת הָיוּ. יְהוּדָה וְעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן וְהַגָּלִיל:

17

When a man from one of these lands marries a woman in another land, she is compelled to follow him to his land, or to accept a divorce without receiving [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. [The rationale is that,] although it was not specifically stated, [it can be assumed] that he married her on this condition.22

When, however, a person marries a woman in a particular land and he23 is from that land, he does not have the right to [compel] her to move to another land. He may, nevertheless, [compel] her to move from city to city and from village to village within that land.

He may not, however, [compel] her to move from a city to a village, or from a village to a city. For there are certain advantages to living in a city, and other advantages to living in a village.

יז

אִישׁ שֶׁהָיָה מֵאֶרֶץ מִן הָאֲרָצוֹת וְנָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאֶרֶץ אַחֶרֶת כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ וְיוֹצְאָה עִמּוֹ לְאַרְצוֹ אוֹ תֵּצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן נִשְּׂאָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא פֵּרֵשׁ. אֲבָל הַנּוֹשֵׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאַחַת מִן הָאֲרָצוֹת וְהִיא מֵאַנְשֵׁי אוֹתָהּ הָאָרֶץ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ לְאֶרֶץ אַחֶרֶת. אֲבָל מוֹצִיאָהּ מִמְּדִינָה לִמְדִינָה וּמִכְּפָר לִכְפָר בְּאוֹתָהּ הָאָרֶץ. וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ מִמְּדִינָה לִכְפָר וְלֹא מִכְּפָר לִמְדִינָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיְּשִׁיבַת הַמְּדִינָה טוֹבָה לָהֶם וְיֵשׁ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיְּשִׁיבַת הַכְּפָרִים טוֹבָה לָהֶם:

18

When he [compels] her to move from one city to another, or from one village to another within a particular land, he may not compel her to move from pleasant surroundings24 to unpleasant surroundings, nor from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones. [Although the latter move would seemingly be to her benefit, she still must consent,] because she must care for and check herself in the pleasant surroundings, so that she will not be considered inferior and unattractive.25

Similarly, [her husband] may not [compel] her to move from an area inhabited primarily by Jews to an area inhabited primarily by gentiles. Wherever [the couple lives], they should move26 from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.

יח

וּכְשֶׁמּוֹצִיאָהּ מִמְּדִינָה לִמְדִינָה וּמִכְּפָר לִכְפָר בְּאוֹתָהּ הָאָרֶץ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָהּ מִנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה לַנָּוֶה הָרַע וְלֹא מֵרַע לְיָפֶה. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לְהִטָּפֵל וְלִבְדֹּק עַצְמָהּ בַּנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּהְיֶה בּוֹ קַלָּה וּכְעוּרָה. וְכֵן לֹא יוֹצִיאָהּ מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמָקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ עַכּוּ''ם. וּבְכָל מָקוֹם מוֹצִיאִין מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ עַכּוּ''ם לְמָקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל:

19

When does the above apply? When moving from one place in the diaspora to another, or from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another. But if [the husband desires to move] from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael, the woman should be compelled to move.27 [This applies even when moving involves leaving] pleasant surroundings for unpleasant ones. Even [when it is necessary to leave] an area inhabited primarily by Jews for an area inhabited primarily by gentiles, one should [move to Eretz Yisrael].

One should not leave Eretz Yisrael for the diaspora,28 even if the move enables one to relocate from unpleasant [surroundings] to pleasant ones, and even when it enables one to move from an area inhabited primarily by gentiles to an area inhabited primarily by Jews.

יט

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים מִחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אוֹ מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲבָל מִחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ לַעֲלוֹת אֲפִלּוּ מִנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה לַנָּוֶה הָרַע וַאֲפִלּוּ מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמָקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ עַכּוּ''ם מַעֲלִין. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ וַאֲפִלּוּ מִנָּוֶה הָרַע לַנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה [וַאֲפִלּוּ מִמָּקוֹם] שֶׁרֻבּוֹ עַכּוּ''ם לְמָקוֹם שֶׁרֻבּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל:

20

When a husband desires to move to Eretz Yisrael and [his wife] does not desire to do so, he may divorce her without paying her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah. If she desires to move [to Eretz Yisrael] and he does not desire to do so, he must divorce her and pay her [the money due her by virtue of her] ketubah.29

The same laws apply with regard to moving from other places in Eretz Yisrael to Jerusalem. [Just as] everyone should move to Eretz Yisrael, and no one should leave there, [so too,] everyone should move to Jerusalem, and no one should leave there.30

כ

אָמַר הָאִישׁ לַעֲלוֹת לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהִיא אֵינָהּ רוֹצָה תֵּצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתֻבָּה. אָמְרָה הִיא לַעֲלוֹת וְהוּא אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתֻבָּה. וְהוּא הַדִּין לְכָל מָקוֹם מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עִם יְרוּשָׁלַיִם. שֶׁהַכּל מַעֲלִין לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֵין הַכּל מוֹצִיאִין מִשָּׁם. הַכּל מַעֲלִין לִירוּשָׁלַיִם וְאֵין הַכּל מוֹצִיאִין מִשָּׁם:

Footnotes
1.

For a zuz was only one eighth pure silver.

2.

See Halachah 5.

3.

I.e., the obligation to provide one's wife with household goods and a dwelling stems from the Torah itself and is not merely a Rabbinic ordinance.

4.

I.e., a man is obligated to provide his wife with the clothes appropriate for a woman of her social standing (or his social standing, if he is of higher social standing than she) in the country in which they dwell.

5.

For she should be given the opportunity to marry a man who can provide her with her basic necessities. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 11 and notes.)

6.

Similarly, if he is capable of giving charity, he should provide for his sons and daughters above the age of six, as explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 15 (Chelkat Mechokek 73:5).

7.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.

8.

Rashi, Ketubot 48a, explains the difference between the two instances. When the husband left on the journey, he decided to leave his wife without adornments. Hence, we may not expropriate the money for them from his property. When, by contrast, a man loses his mental faculties, the court attempts to support the man's wife as her husband would have liked to. And we assume that he would have preferred that his wife have ornaments to adorn herself.

9.

See the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 24.

10.

A poor woman does not wear ornaments very frequently and will not feel deprived if she does not adorn herself for a year. A rich woman, by contrast, cannot bear not to wear ornaments for such an extended period.

11.

This law is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 7:4). The standard printed text of that source, however, has a slightly different version, stating "three months" instead of three days.

12.

These rulings were dependent on the socio-economic conditions prevalent in the Talmudic period. If the norms are different in other societies, the rulings also change.

13.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the husband is given thirty days to consider absolving his vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 74:3) states he must divorce her immediately. If the husband makes the vow dependent on marital relations, he is given a week to consider the matter (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 74:3).

14.

Note the slight deviation between the wording chosen by the Rambam and that employed by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

15.

While the spirit of the Rambam's words is appreciated, in most communities the norm is for women to leave their homes far more frequently.

16.

For it is customary for a daughter to visit her parents during the festivals.

17.

Based on the views of the Ra'avad and others, the Ramah (Even HaEzer 74:10) explains that the woman's rights are different from her husband's. Since the dwelling belongs to him, he may invite his mother and sisters. Nevertheless, efforts should be made to mediate between them and his wife. If necessary, a man or a woman should be placed in the home to see who is the cause of the difficulty.

18.

Avot 1:7.

19.

See Hilchot De'ot 6:1, where the Rambam emphasizes the importance of eschewing an undesirable environment and dwelling in a favorable one.

20.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 75:1) states that it is a difference in language that divides one land from another. The Rivash (Responsum 177) states that the determining factor is the government of the land. This matter is discussed by the later authorities, particularly in light of the emergence of large countries comprising many times the area of Eretz Yisrael in the Talmudic period. Many commentaries define a land as a place inhabited by people who speak the same language and are governed by the same authority. Even that is common today.

21.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 13:10). The contemporary translation of מדינה as "state" or "country" is not appropriate in this context.

22.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 75:1) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Tam (Ketubot 110b), which states that when the two come from different lands and the marriage is held in one of these lands, the place where the couple marries determines their future dwelling. If, however, they each come from a different land from that in which the marriage is held, the woman may compel her husband to live in her native land. See also the opinion of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 416, quoted by the Ramah, loc. cit.), which states that if the man cannot earn a livelihood in the locale in which he is living, he may compel his wife to follow him to any place where he can.

23.

Our text follows the version found in many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah and that which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:1). The standard published version states "she" instead of "he."

24.

I.e., the neighborhood and its scenery. Our translation is based on the Ma'aseh Rokeach. Others translate נוה as "dwelling" - i.e., the home in which the couple reside.

25.

The Rambam appears to be saying that the woman must dress and present herself in an appropriate way in an attractive setting, and she might not desire to make such an effort. Rashi (Ketubot 110b) explains that the change in lifestyle may cause illness.

26.

Our translation is based on the Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 75), which states that the woman may compel her husband to make such a move. Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 75:12, which states that this interpretation need not be accepted.

27.

As reflected in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 5, the Rambam does not consider living in Eretz Yisrael a mitzvah [in contrast to the view of the Ramban (Hosafot l'Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Mitzvah 4) and others, who do]. Nevertheless, he states (Hilchot Melachim 5:12): "At all times... a person should dwell in Eretz Yisrael... rather than in the diaspora."

The commentaries interpret the expression "At all times" to include even the present age. Tosafot, Ketubot 110b, explains that because we are unsure how to fulfill the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation to live there in the present age. Others explain that because of the dangers that exist in Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 75:5.) As reflected in this ruling and in one of his responsa, the Rambam negates those views and advocates living in Eretz Yisrael, even in the present age.

28.

See Hilchot Melachim 5:9, which states that it is forbidden to leave Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of settling in the diaspora, unless there is a famine of extreme severity. Even then, abandoning the land is not considered desirable. In Hilchot Melachim 5:12, he states: "Whoever leaves [Eretz Yisrael] for the diaspora is considered as though he worships idols."

29.

As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that in the present age, there is no obligation to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. According to these views, this ruling does not apply. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4-5) also mentions the opposing view, it appears to follow the opinion stated by the Rambam. Nevertheless, many Ashkenazic authorities maintain (see Ba'er Heteiv 75:19) that at present one may not divorce a woman without paying her the money due her for her ketubah because she does not desire to move to Eretz Yisrael. Although the Pitchei Teshuvah 75:7 speaks extensively about the positive value of living in Eretz Yisrael in the present age, it mentions another factor - the difficulty of earning a living in Eretz Yisrael - and states that unless one is assured of being able to sustain himself through work - as opposed to receiving charity - one may not compel one's family to relocate.

30.

There are opinions (Mordechai, at the conclusion of Ketubot) that maintain that in the present age, when there is no Temple, there is no difference between Jerusalem and other cities in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, the fact that this law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4), a text that deals only with laws applicable at present, appears to imply that the Rambam's ruling should be applied in the present age as well.

Published and copyright by Moznaim Publications, all rights reserved.
To purchase this book or the entire series, please click here.
The text on this page contains sacred literature. Please do not deface or discard.
Vowelized Hebrew text courtesy Torat Emet under CC 2.5 license.
The Mishneh Torah was the Rambam's (Rabbi Moses ben Maimon) magnum opus, a work spanning hundreds of chapters and describing all of the laws mentioned in the Torah. To this day it is the only work that details all of Jewish observance, including those laws which are only applicable when the Holy Temple is in place. Participating in one of the annual study cycles of these laws (3 chapters/day, 1 chapter/day, or Sefer Hamitzvot) is a way we can play a small but essential part in rebuilding the final Temple.
Download Rambam Study Schedules: 3 Chapters | 1 Chapter | Daily Mitzvah