Ishut - Chapter Four
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A woman may be consecrated only voluntarily. If one forces a woman to be consecrated, she is not consecrated. When a man, by contrast, is forced to consecrate [a woman], she is consecrated.1
A man may consecrate many women at one time, provided that he does so by [transferring] money, and there is enough money to give each one a p'rutah. One of these [women] or another person may accept the money on behalf of them all, [provided] they consent.
אאין האשה מתקדשת אלא לרצונה והמקדש אשה בעל כרחה אינה מקודשת. אבל האיש שאנסוהו עד שקידש בעל כרחו הרי זו מקודשת. ויש לאיש לקדש נשים רבות כאחת והוא שיהיה בכסף אם קידש בכסף פרוטה לכל אחת ואחת. ויש לאחת מהן או לאחר לקבל הקידושין ע"י כולן מדעתן:
When a person [desires to] consecrate a woman, and with her consent gives the kiddushin to another woman, and tells the latter "And you as well," or uses another similar expression, they are both consecrated.2
When, however, the man places [the kiddushin] in the hand [of the second woman] and says, "And you," there is doubt whether or not the kiddushin are valid. Perhaps his intent was only to clarify her feelings. It was as if he asked her, "What would you say about this?" Therefore, she accepted the kiddushin, for she thought he was still asking her about her intent. For this reason, [the question is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
בהמקדש את האשה ונתן הקידושין מדעתה ביד חבירתה ואמר לחבירתה כשנתן הקידושין בידה ואת נמי. או וכן גם את וכיוצא בזה. הרי שתיהן מקודשות. אבל אם נתן בידה וא"ל ואת. הרי זו שקבלה הקידושין מקודשת בספק. שמא לא נתכוון אלא לראות מה בלבה וכאילו אמר לה ואת מה תאמרי בדבר זה. ולפיכך קיבלה הקידושין היא שהרי זה עדיין שואלה לראות מה בלבה ומפני זה היא ספק מקודשת:
If he told her, "Become consecrated to me with this dinar," and she took it and threw it in front of him or to the sea, into a fire or into anything that will cause it to be destroyed, she is not consecrated.3
If she told him, "Give it to my father," "...to your father" or "...to so and so," she is not consecrated.4 If she told him, "Give it to him, so that he will accept it on my behalf,"5 she is consecrated.
גא"ל התקדשי לי בדינר זה נטלתו וזרקתו לפניו או לים או לאור או לדבר האבד אינה מקודשת. אמרה לו תנהו לאבא או לאביך או לאיש פלוני ונתן אינה מקודשת. ואם אמרה לו תנהו לו שיקבלהו לי ונתן הרי זו מקודשת:
[In the above instance, if] the woman told the man, "Place [the kiddushin] on [this] rock," she is not consecrated. If the rock belonged to her, she is consecrated. If the rock belonged to both of them, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
If he told her, "Be consecrated to me with this loaf of bread," and she told him, "Give it to a poor person," she is not consecrated. [This applies] even if she supports the poor person in question.
[If she told him,] "Give it to a dog," she is not consecrated.6 If the dog belonged to her, she is consecrated. If [the dog] was chasing after her and she told him, "Give it to this dog," [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
דאמרה הניחהו על הסלע אינה מקודשת ואם היה סלע שלה מקודשת. היה סלע של שניהם הרי זו מקודשת בספק. אמר לה התקדשי לי בככר זה אמרה לו תנהו לעני אפילו היה עני הסמוך עליה אינה מקודשת. תנהו לכלב הרי זו אינה מקודשת ואם היה הכלב שלה מקודשת. ואם היה רץ אחריה לנשכה ואמרה לו תנהו לכלב זה הרי זו ספק מקודשת:
[The following laws apply when a man] was selling produce, utensils or the like, and a woman came and asked him: "Give me some of these." If he asked her, "If I give them to you, will you be consecrated to me?" and she said, "Yes," she is consecrated when he gives [the items] to her. If, however, she replied to him: "[Just] give them to me," "Heave them over," or another reply that means "Don't fool around with me regarding such matters, just give me [what I asked for]," she is not consecrated although he gave her [what she asked for].
A similar [decision is rendered] if [a man] was drinking wine and [a woman] asked him, "Give me a cup," and he asks her, "If I do, will you be consecrated to me with it?" If she replies, "[Just] let me drink," "Give me," "Serve me drink," or "Dish it out," she is not consecrated. Her words imply: "Just give me a drink, and don't fool around with me regarding such matters."
ההיה מוכר פירות או כלים וכיוצא בהן באה אשה ואמרה לו תן לי מעט מאלו וא"ל אם אתן לך תהי מקודשת לי. אם אמרה הן ונתן לה הרי זו מקודשת אבל אם אמרה לו תן לי מהן או השלך לי או דברים שעניינם לא תשחק עמי בדברים אלו אלא תן לי בלבד ונתן אינה מקודשת. וכן אם היה שותה יין ואמרה לו תן לי כוס אחד ואמר לה אם אתן לך הרי את מקודשת לי בו ואמרה השקיני השקות או תן השקה השלך אינה מקודשת שאין הדברים נראין אלא השקיני בלבד ולא תשחק עמי בדבר אחר:
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of a single witness, his kiddushin] are of no consequence. [This applies] even when both [the man and the woman] acknowledge [that the kiddushin were given].7 Surely this applies when [a man] consecrates [a woman] without any witnesses at all [observing the act].
When [a man] consecrates [a woman] in the presence of individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Scriptural law, she is not consecrated. [When he consecrates her in the presence of] individuals who are disqualified from serving as witnesses by Rabbinic law,8 or in the presence of witnesses regarding whom there is doubt whether or not they are acceptable according to Scriptural law, [the following rules apply:] If he desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in the presence of acceptable witnesses. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him [to enable her to marry others], because of the doubt.9 [This ruling applies] even when the woman denies [the matter], contradicting the witnesses and saying that she was never consecrated.
This ruling applies with regard to all situations in which the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. If [the man] desires to consummate the marriage, he should consecrate the woman again in a manner that is unequivocally acceptable. If he does not desire to consummate the marriage, the woman must receive a get from him, because of the doubt.
והמקדש בעד אחד אין חוששין לקידושיו ואע"פ ששניהם מודין ק"ו למקדש בלא עדים. המקדש בפסולי עדות של תורה אינה מקודשת. בפסולי עדות של דברי סופרים או בעדים שהן ספק פסולי תורה אם רצה לכנוס חוזר ומקדש בכשרים ואם לא רצה לכנוס צריכה גט ממנו מספק. ואפילו כפרה האשה והכחישה את העדים ואמרה לא קדשתני כופין אותה ליקח גט. וכן דין כל קידושי ספק אם רצה לכנוס חוזר ומקדש ודאי ואם לא רצה לכנוס צריכה גט ממנו מספק:
When a minor consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are of no consequence. When, by contrast, a male past the age of majority consecrates a girl below the age of majority who is an orphan,10 or who has left her father's authority,11 [different rules apply]: If she is below the age of six, even if she is one who shows deep understanding of secret matters,12 and can differentiate and discern, she is not married, and there is no need for mi'un.13
If she is more than ten years old, even when she is very foolish, since she willingly accepted the kiddushin, she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law] and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]. If she is between the ages of six and ten, [the rabbis] must evaluate her ability to discern. If she is able to differentiate and discern with regard to matters of marriage and kiddushin, [the marriage is binding according to Rabbinic law] and mi'un is necessary. If she lacks [this degree of discernment], she is not consecrated [at all], and need not perform mi'un [to nullify the marriage].
זקטן שקידש אין קידושיו קידושין. אבל גדול שקידש את הקטנה היתומה. או קטנה שיצאה מרשות אביה אם היתה פחותה מבת שש אע"פ שהיא נבונת לחש ביותר ומכרת ומבחנת אין כאן שם קידושין ואינה צריכה למאן. ואם היתה מבת עשר שנים ולמעלה אע"פ שהיא סכלה ביותר הואיל ונתקדשה לדעתה הרי זו מקודשת למיאון. היתה מבת שש ועד סוף עשר בודקין את יופי דעתה אם מכרת ומבחנת עסקי הנישואין והקידושין צריכה למאן. ואם לאו אינה מקודשת למיאון ואינה צריכה למאן:
What is meant by the statement that she is consecrated [according to Rabbinic law], and [must perform] mi'un [should she desire to nullify the marriage]? If she was consecrated but no longer desires to remain with her husband, she must perform mi'un in the presence of two witnesses. She should say: "I no longer desire him." Afterwards, she leaves [the relationship] without a divorce, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.14
Why does she leave [the relationship] without a divorce? Because the consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term.15 There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mi'un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce.
חכיצד מקודשת למיאון שאם נתקדשה ולא רצתה לישב עם בעלה צריכה למאן בפני שנים ולומר איני רוצה בו ויוצאה בלא גט כמו שיתבאר בהלכות גירושין. וזו היא הנקראת ממאנת. ולמה יוצאה בלא גט מפני שאין קידושיה קידושין גמורין מן התורה אלא מדברי סופרים והן תלויין שאם ישבה עם בעלה עד שגדלה גמרו קידושיה ונעשית אשת איש גמורה ואינו צריך לחזור לקדשה אחר שגדלה. ואם לא רצתה לישב צריכה למאן ותצא בלא גט:
When a male deaf mute marries a mentally competent woman, or a female deaf mute marries a mentally competent man, the marriage bond is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. Therefore, if a mentally competent man consecrates the wife of a deaf mute man who is herself mentally competent, she is considered to be consecrated to the mentally competent man. He must give her a get, and she is permitted to remain married to her deaf mute husband.16
When, by contrast, a mentally incompetent man consecrates a mentally competent woman, or a mentally competent man consecrates a mentally incompetent woman, the marriage bond is not at all binding - neither according to Scriptural law nor according to Rabbinic law.17
טחרש שנשא פקחת וכן חרשת שנשאת לפקח אין קידושיהן גמורין מן התורה אלא מדברי סופרים לפיכך אם בא פקח וקידש אשת חרש הפקחת הרי זו מקודשת לשני קידושין גמורין ונותן גט והיא מותרת לבעלה החרש. אבל השוטה שקידש פקחת או פקח שקידש שוטה אין כאן קידושין כלל לא מדברי תורה ולא מדברי סופרים:
When a sexually impotent male - whether a s'ris chamah or a s'ris adam - consecrates [a woman], and similarly, when [a man] consecrates an aylonit, the kiddushin are absolutely binding.18
יסריס שקידש בין סריס חמה בין סריס אדם וכן איילונית שנתקדשה הרי אלו קידושין גמורין:
When a tumtum or an androgynous consecrates a woman, or when either of these individuals has been consecrated by a man, there is doubt whether these kiddushin are binding, and because of the doubt, a get is required.19
יאטומטום ואנדרוגינוס שקידשו אשה או שקדשן איש הרי אלו קידושי ספק וצריכין גט מספק:
When a person consecrates one of the women forbidden as arayot, his act is of no consequence. For kiddushin are not binding with regard to these forbidden relationships, with the exception of [kiddushin given] a niddah. When a man consecrates a niddah, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. It is, nevertheless, improper to do so.20
יבהמקדש אחת מן העריות לא עשה כלום שאין קידושין תופסין לערוה חוץ מן הנדה שהמקדש את הנדה הרי זו מקודשת קידושין גמורין ואין ראוי לעשות כן:
When a married woman accepts kiddushin from another man in the presence of her husband, she is considered to be consecrated to the second man. For a woman's word is accepted when she tells her husband to his face that he had divorced her. We assume it axiomatically that a woman would not act so brazenly in her husband's presence [unless it were true].21
If, however, the other person consecrates her outside her husband's presence, these kiddushin are not considered to be binding unless she brings proof that she was divorced before she was consecrated. As long as she is outside her husband's presence, it is possible that she will act brazenly.
יגאשת איש שפשטה ידה וקבלה קידושין מאחר בפני בעלה הרי זו מקודשת לשני. שהאשה שאמרה לבעלה בפניו גירשתני נאמנת חזקה אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה. אבל אם קידשה אחר שלא בפני בעלה אין קידושין תופסין בה עד שתביא ראיה שנתגרשה קודם שתקבל הקידושין כל שלא בפניו מעיזה:
When a man consecrates one of the shniyot or a woman forbidden because of a negative commandment [not associated with karet] or because of a positive commandment, the kiddushin are binding absolutely. [The same ruling applies when] a yavam consecrates a woman who was married to the same man as his yevamah.22
There is one exception to the above principle: when a person other than [the yavam] consecrates a yevamah, [the question is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. For our Sages were unsure whether the kiddushin of a yevamah are valid, like those of others in which the relationship is forbidden by merely a negative commandment, or whether the kiddushin are of no consequence, as in the case of an incestuous relationship.
In all the situations mentioned above, although the man who gave the kiddushin is forbidden to consummate the marriage, he must terminate it by giving a get.
ידהמקדש אחת מן השניות או מאיסורי לאוין או מאיסורי עשה. וכן יבם שקידש צרת יבמה. הרי זו מקודשת קידושין גמורין חוץ מיבמה שנתקדשה לזר שהיא מקודשת בספק. נסתפק לחכמים אם הקידושין תופסין ביבמה כשאר חיובי לאוין או אין קידושין תופסין בה כערוה. ואף ע"פ שאסור לו לכנוס אחת מכל אלו הרי זה מגרש בגט:
[When] a man consecrates a gentile woman or a [Canaanite] maidservant, the kiddushin are of no consequence; the woman's status is the same after receiving the kiddushin as beforehand. Similarly, when a gentile or a [Canaanite] servant consecrates a Jewish woman, the kiddushin are of no consequence.
When an apostate Jew consecrates [a woman], his kiddushin are absolutely valid, despite the fact that he willingly worships a false deity. The woman must receive a get from him.23
טוהמקדש כותית או שפחה אינן קידושין אלא הרי היא אחר הקידושין כמו שהיתה קודם הקידושין. וכן עכו"ם ועבד שקדשו בת ישראל אין קידושיהן קידושין. ישראל מומר שקידש אף ע"פ שהוא עובד עכו"ם ברצונו הרי אלו קידושין גמורים וצריכה גט ממנו:
When a man consecrates a woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman,24 she is not completely consecrated until she becomes [totally] free. Once she becomes free, the kiddushin are [automatically] completed, like the kiddushin of a minor who comes of age. There is no need for her to be consecrated again.
If another man consecrates such a woman after she was granted her freedom [before the person who consecrated her originally consummates their marriage], there is doubt regarding the matter,25 and the status of both their kiddushin is in doubt.
טזהמקדש אשה שחצייה שפחה וחצייה בת חורין אינה מקודשת קידושין גמורין עד שתשתחרר וכיון שנשתחררה גמרו קידושיה כקידושי קטנה שגדלה ואינו צריך לקדשה קידושין אחרים. בא אחר וקידשה אחר שנשתחררה הרי זו ספק קידושין לשניהם:
What then is a shifchah charufah [a betrothed maidservant] as described by the Torah [Leviticus 19:20]? A woman who is half a maidservant and half a free woman, who was consecrated by a Hebrew servant.
When a male who is half a servant and half a free man consecrates a woman, [the matter is unresolved, and] the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.
יזואי זו היא שפחה חרופה האמורה בתורה זו מי שחצייה שפחה וחצייה בת חורין שקידשה עבד עברי ומי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין שקידש בת חורין הרי זו ספק קידושין:
When a drunk gives [a woman] kiddushin, they are valid, even if he is very drunk. If he reaches a state of drunkenness comparable to that of Lot,26 the kiddushin are of no consequence. This matter requires ample deliberation.
יחשכור שקידש קידושיו קידושין ואע"פ שנשתכר הרבה. ואם הגיע לשכרותו של לוט אין קידושיו קידושין ומתיישבין בדבר זה:
When a man gives money worth less than a p'rutah as kiddushin, the kiddushin are not valid. When a man consecrates a woman with food or with a utensil worth less than a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt; perhaps the kiddushin are worth a p'rutah in another place.
From this one can deduce that whenever a person consecrates a woman with an article worth money, if it is worth a p'rutah in that country the kiddushin are definitely binding. If it is not worth a p'rutah [there], the status of the kiddushin is in doubt [as above].27
It appears to me that if [a man] consecrated [a woman] with cooked food, a vegetable that will not be preserved or the like, and the item is not worth a p'rutah in that place, the kiddushin are not binding at all. For by the time this item reaches another place, it will spoil and be worthless. This is a reasonable inference; one may rely on it.
יטהמקדש בפחות מפרוטה אינה מקודשת. קידשה באוכל או בכלי וכיוצא בו ששוה פחות מפרוטה הרי זו מקודשת בספק וצריכה גט מספק שמא דבר זה שוה פרוטה במקום אחר. הא למדת שכל המקדש בשוה כסף אם היה באותה המדינה שוה פרוטה הרי אלו קידושי ודאי ואם אינו שוה פרוטה הרי אלו קידושי ספק. *יראה לי שאם קידש בתבשיל או בירק שאינו מתקיים וכיוצא בהם אם לא היו שוה פרוטה באותו המקום אינה מקודשת כלל שהרי דבר זה אינו מגיע למקום אחר עד שיפסד ויאבד ולא יהא שוה פרוטה ודבר של טעם הוא זה וראוי לסמוך עליו:
When [a man] consecrates a woman with less than a p'rutah's worth, or he consecrates two women with a p'rutah, the women are not consecrated. [This applies] even when he sends wedding presents [worth more than a p'rutah] afterwards. Similarly, when a minor consecrates a woman, the kiddushin are not valid, despite the fact that he sent marriage presents after he had attained majority. [This ruling was delivered because the presents] were sent because of the original kiddushin, which were invalid [and therefore are not considered to be significant in their own right].
כהמקדש (אשה) בפחות מפרוטה או שקידש שתי נשים בפרוטה אע"פ ששלח סבלונות לאחר מכן אינה מקודשת. וכן קטן שקידש אע"פ ששלח סבלונות לאחר שהגדיל אינה מקודשת שמחמת קידושין הראשונים שלחן שהיו קידושין פסולין:
When [a man] consecrates a woman by [giving her] money or a legal document, he does not have to place the kiddushin in her hand. Instead, if she consents that he throw them to her and he does so, she is consecrated, whether he throws them into her hand, her bosom, her courtyard or her field.28
If she is standing in a domain belonging to her [prospective] husband, he must place them in her hand or in her bosom. If she is standing in a domain that belongs to both of them, and he threw kiddushin to her with her consent, but they did not reach her hand or her bosom, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. Even when she tells him, "Put the kiddushin down in this place," if the place belongs to both of them the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.29
כאהמקדש את האשה בכסף או בשטר אינו צריך שיתן הקידושין לתוך ידה אלא כיון שרצתה לזרוק לה קידושיה וזרקן בין לתוך ידה בין לתוך חיקה או לתוך חצירה או לתוך שדה שלה הרי זו מקודשת. היתה עומדת ברשות הבעל צריך שיתן לתוך ידה או לתוך חיקה. היתה עומדת ברשות שהיא של שניהן וזרק לה קידושיה מדעתה ולא הגיעו לידה או לחיקה הרי זו מקודשת קידושי ספק. ואפילו אמרה לו הנח קידושין על מקום זה ואותו המקום של שניהם הרי אלו קידושי ספק:
[The following rules apply when the two] are standing in the public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them, and he throws kiddushin to her: If they are closer to him, she is not consecrated. If they are closer to her, she is consecrated. If they are halfway between the two of them, or if there is doubt whether they were closer to him or to her,30 and they were lost before they reached her hand, there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.
What is meant by "closer to him," or "closer to her"? A situation in which he can guard [the kiddushin] and she cannot is considered as "closer to him." One in which she can guard them and he cannot is considered to be "closer to her."31 One in which they can both guard them or neither can guard them is considered to be "halfway between the two of them."
כבהיו עומדים ברה"ר או ברשות שאינו של שניהם וזרק לה קידושיה. קרוב לו אינה מקודשת קרוב לה הרי זו מקודשת. מחצה על מחצה או שהיו ספק קרוב לו ספק קרוב לה ואבדו קודם שיגיעו לידה הרי זו ספק מקודשת כיצד הוא קרוב לו וקרוב לה כל שהוא יכול לשמור אותן והיא אינה יכולה זה הוא קרוב לו היא יכולה לשמור אותן והוא אינו יכול זהו קרוב לה. שניהן יכולין לשמור אותן או שניהן אין יכולים לשמור אותן זה הוא מחצה על מחצה:
Bava Batra 48b states that since it was possible for a man to divorce his wife without her consent (in Talmudic times), there was no need for the Sages to abrogate the man's kiddushin. Even if he was forced into consecrating the woman, he could end their relationship at will. With regard to the woman, by contrast, since she cannot initiate a divorce, our Sages abrogated the marriage bond when she was compelled to establish it against her will.
The first woman is consecrated based on the principle stated in the following halachah, that a woman may tell a person to give the kiddushin to an agent acting on her behalf. The second woman is consecrated, because she accepted the kiddushin in silence, which is interpreted as acquiescence.
The fact that she discarded the kiddushin is a clear indication of her rejection of his proposal.
Telling the person to give the kiddushin to someone else also indicates that she does not desire them, nor the consequences of accepting them (Tosafot, Kiddushin 8b).
I.e., that the recipient should act as her agent.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 30:11) quotes the opinion of the Tur, who maintains that if at the outset the woman says, "Put money down in this place and I will be consecrated to you," or "Give food to this dog and I will be consecrated to you," the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. Since the man spent money because of her wishes, one might presume that this can be compared to the law stated in the previous halachah. Nevertheless, since the kiddushin were not given to a person, it is possible that the comparison is not in place, and the kiddushin are not definitely binding. (See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21.)
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 42:2) quotes an opinion that requires stringency in such an instance, but states that leniency should be granted if following the stringent view will cause a woman great difficulty in getting married.
Although the need for witnesses with regard to marriage and divorce is derived from an analogy (gezerah shavah) to claims of monetary law, a difference exists between the two. With regard to a financial claim, no witnesses are necessary if both litigants agree regarding a matter.
As stated in this halachah, this concept does not apply with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. Two rationales are given for this matter:
a) When the man and woman agree with regard to the establishment of a marriage bond, they are limiting the privileges of others, for they are unable to consecrate the woman. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, the rights of others are not restricted (Rashba).
b) There is a fundamental difference between the function of witnesses in cases involving financial matters and their function with regard to wedding and divorce. With regard to financial matters, the function of witnesses is to clarify the truth (eidei berur). With regard to marriage and divorce, by contrast, the witnesses' function is to notarize the event (eidei kiyyum). For a marriage bond to be established - or broken - even when the husband and wife agree that the event took place, witnesses must observe the proceedings (Tumim 90:14, Tzaphnat Paneach, Kallei HaTorah).
This ruling sheds light on a theme of larger scope: the interrelation between Rabbinic law and Scriptural law. For the fact that a woman needs a get to marry another person appears to indicate that according to Scriptural law, the kiddushin are effective.
Many of the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state that the obligation to give a get is of Rabbinic origin. This view would appear to be supported by the Rambam's ruling in Chapter 5, Halachah 1.
If she is not an orphan and has never been married, the right to consecrate her belongs to her father, not to her.
I.e., she was married, the marriage was consummated, and then she was either divorced or widowed. In this and the above instance, the girl does not have sufficient authority to create a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, a bond that is binding according to Rabbinic law may be established, as the halachah continues to explain.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl's marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged the marriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic law. The Ra'avad mentions a third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself.
Our translation is based on the commentary of Metzudot on Isaiah 3:3.
The annulment of a marriage that a girl below the age of majority initiates, as explained in the following halachah.
When a girl is below the age of six, we assume that she does not have sufficient understanding of the nature of marriage to make a commitment that is binding in any way.
Chapter 11, Halachah 8.
As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gerushin 11:6, if the girl reaches majority before she states that she desires to nullify the marriage bond, Rabbinic law requires her to receive a get before she marries another person. If she continues living with her husband and they engage in sexual relations after she attains majority, the marriage bond is binding according to Scriptural law.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, stating that the woman should not be allowed to remain married to her deaf mute husband. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that since the marriage of a deaf mute is a Rabbinic institution, our Sages did not impose the same restrictions that would apply had the marriage been effective according to Scriptural law.
Others state that the Rambam's ruling applies only when the mentally competent man merely consecrated the deaf mute's wife. If he consummated the marriage (nisu'in), the deaf mute is forbidden to continue living with her after her divorce.
Our Sages differentiated between the marriage of a deaf mute and that of a mentally incompetent person as follows: the marriage of a deaf mute may be harmonious and has the possibility of enduring. The marriage of a mentally incompetent person, by contrast, will surely be plagued by friction and will not endure. For a mentally competent will never be comfortable living with a mentally incompetent person. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 6 and Yevamot 112b.)
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:2) states that this is a sensitive matter, for it is difficult to determine when a person is completely incompetent or not.
All the terms mentioned in this halachah are explained in Chapter 2. Although s'ris adam (a person who has been castrated) is forbidden to marry, if he violates this prohibition, the marriage bond is binding and a get is required for severing the relationship. With regard to an aylonit, see Chapter 24, Halachot 1-2, and the accompanying notes.
The Ramah (Even HaEzer 44:5) quotes the Tur as stating that an androgynous is considered to be a male, and the kiddushin that he gives are binding.
This ruling is relevant in the present age, for it is frequent that a woman is a niddah at the time of a marriage. A wedding should never be planned to coincide with the woman's niddah state. Nevertheless, since weddings are often planned well in advance, and women's menstrual cycles are flexible, it is possible that the calculations will be in error, and the wedding will be scheduled for the time when the woman is a niddah. In such a situation, the commonly accepted ruling is to hold the wedding. Nevertheless, restrictions are placed on the couple's being in private until the woman purifies herself. Needless to say, sexual relations are forbidden.
The Ra'avad states that the woman's word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get from the second person. She is not allowed to marry him, nor may she collect her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 17:2) states that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam's ruling rests is no longer a viable support.
The situation is as follows: A man who was married to two women died while childless. As required by Deuteronomy, Chapter 5, one of his brothers (the yavam) marries one of his widows (the yevamah). Afterwards, neither the yavam nor any other of the deceased's brothers is allowed to marry the deceased's second wife. (See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12.)
Rav David Cohen (Section 9, Responsum 1) states that the intent is that we are obligated to force the apostate to divorce his wife, lest he cause her to violate Torah law.
E.g., a Canaanite maidservant who was owned in partnership by two masters. One granted the woman her freedom, but the other did not.
Our translation follows the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, who explains that there is a question whether or not the kiddushin of the first person are valid. Nevertheless, if the couple marry and consummate their relationship, this establishes their wedding bond.
Who was totally unaware of what he was doing (Genesis, Chapter 19).
The commentaries (see Beit Shmuel 31:6) debate the status of the kiddushin when one knows for a fact that they are worth a p'rutah in another place. Some maintain that they are absolutely binding, and others maintain that their status remains doubtful.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 30) states that the woman's field or courtyard must be protected. It is possible to state that this is the Rambam's opinion as well, and he relies on the statements he makes in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9 regarding giving a present (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between the two and explain that the laws governing kiddushin are more lenient. The Beit Shmuel 30:3 maintains that this is the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 30:1). See Chelkat Mechokeik 30:2.
Although this would not be acceptable with regard to a business transaction (Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 4), an exception is made here, because of the possibility that the man lent the woman rights to his share of the property.
See the Beit Shmuel 29:9, which interprets this as meaning that two pairs of witnesses observed the throwing of the kiddushin, one maintained that the kiddushin were able to be guarded by the man, and one that they were able to be guarded by the woman. If, however, there was only one pair of witnesses, and they were unsure whether the woman could guard them, the kiddushin are not effective, because it is as if they were given without being observed by witnesses.
The Makneh states that the Rambam relies on his statements in Hilchot Gerushin 5:13, which state that the woman must be able to bend over and take the object. Others do not make such a stipulation.
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