Chapter Eight

An etrog which is inflated - i.e., water fell on it after being detached from the tree and it became inflated (Rabbenu Manoach, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 648:15).

decaying - i.e., it produces a foul odor because it is infested with worms (Rabbenu Manoach).

Based on Sukkah 36b, the Ba'al Halachot Gedolot writes that "inflated" and "decaying" etrogim are disqualified only when the blemish is externally visible. However, if the blemish is only internal, they are kosher. (See Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) and commentaries.)

pickled - The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 15) defines "pickled" as "placed in vinegar." However, the Magen Avraham (648:22) maintains that "pickled" should be interpreted according to its definition in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah (105:1-2). Thus, if an etrog has been soaked in water or in any other liquid for more than 24 hours straight, it is considered to be "pickled" and disqualified for use. One should take care regarding this matter when soaking etrogim to preserve their freshness.

cooked - thoroughly on a fire or in boiling water (Rabbenu Manoach).

black, white, spotted - i.e., a mixture of any two or more colors. When the different color is concentrated in only one place, the etrog is not disqualified unless that color covers more than half the etrog's surface area. However, if there is more than one spot of different colors, it is disqualified regardless of their size (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 16).

or green like a leek is unacceptable. - The Hebrew word ירוק refers to two different colors: dark green and yellow. Initially, the etrog, like most citrus fruit, is dark green. As it matures, it turns yellowish.

If it was grown in a mold and shaped into the form of another creation, it is unacceptable - It is not considered "beautiful" because its natural form was changed (Rabbenu Manoach).

If its natural form was preserved, even though it was shaped in different layers, it is kosher. Two etrogim that grow joined together - This is kosher because the etrogim grew naturally in this way. In this instance, when performing the mitzvah, a person should hold both etrogim in his hands. Though the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 20) accepts this decision, there are other authorities who differ. Hence, it is preferable to use another etrog (Mishnah Berurah 648:63).

and an unripe etrog are kosher. - Sukkah 31b mentions etrogim which are small and green as being not fully ripe. However, since the Rambam mentioned those factors previously, it appears that here the intent is different and refers to a fruit that is not yet ready to be eaten, even though it is as large as an egg and has begun to turn yellow. (See also Sukkah 36a.)

In places where the etrogim grow naturally with a slight black tinge, it is kosher. - Rashi (Sukkah 36a) states that if such an etrog is brought to a place where etrogim of a normal color grow, it may not be used.

However, if [the etrogim] are very black - i.e., like a negro - they are unacceptable everywhere - even in Africa, where etrogim of this color grow naturally (Rashi, Sukkah 34b).

649) explains that these requirements apply only "on the first day." According to this explanation, these leniencies would also apply on the later days even in Jerusalem, where it is a Torah commandment to take the lulav on the later days (Chapter 7, Halachah 13).

Others explain that, as mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachot 13 and 15, at present, taking the lulav is a commandment from the Torah only on the first day of the Sukkot. On the subsequent days, the commandment is Rabbinic in origin, instituted to recall the Temple practice. Hence, greater leniency can be taken, because only a Rabbinic ordinance is involved.

All the species which we categorized as unacceptable because of the blemishes we described - Sukkah 36b relates that Rabbi Chanina would eat from an etrog and then use it for the mitzvah. Though an etrog which is lacking even the slightest amount of its substance may not be used (Halachah 7), he still fulfilled his obligation with it. From this incident, our Sages concluded that, on the later days, even such an etrog is kosher.

According to the Rambam's opinion, the same applies to all other physical blemishes on the species. Since there is no greater blemish than an etrog which is bitten into, none of the requirements for "beauty" must be observed on the later days.

Nevertheless, Tosafot, Sukkah 29b and Rabbenu Asher maintain that this leniency applies only to etrogim which are lacking in substance. All the species which were disqualified because they are not "beautiful" may not be used on the later days as well. Though the Shulchan Aruch 649:5 quotes the Rambam, the Magen Avraham (649:17) and the Taz (649:9) quote the other view.

or because they were stolen or taken by force - The Pri Megadim explains that even according to the Rambam, a blessing should not be recited when performing the mitzvah in this fashion.

are [disqualified for use] only on the first day of the festival. - As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 1, there are two explanations why a stolen lulav may not be used on the first day:

a) a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed (מצוה הבאה בעבירה);

b) as stated in Halachah 10, on the first day of the festival a person must own the four species he uses for the mitzvah.

The commentaries explain that the Rambam follows the latter rationale. However, those who follow the first opinion (the Ra'avad, the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher) forbid the use of stolen species on the later days as well. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam, while the Ramah follows the other view.

[Though the above explanation is frequently used, it is difficult to accept. First, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:1), the Rambam mentions the reason of מצוה הבאה בעבירה. Also, in Hilchot Chametz U'matzah 6:7 and in Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 5:7 and 5:9, he forbids the use of stolen articles for the performance of a commandment. In addition, he has not yet mentioned the halachah requiring one to own the lulav used on the first day.

The Taz (649:15) clarifies the matter slightly further by explaining that since taking the lulav on the second day is only a Rabbinic commandment, using a stolen lulav is allowed even though it is a מצוה הבאה בעבירה.]

On the second day of the festival - The literal translation of the Rambam's words are "from the second holiday," implying that these leniencies are granted even in the Diaspora, where the second day is celebrated as a holiday. Though all the laws of the holiday apply on the second day as well as the first, this applies only to the laws of the holiday itself. In contrast, in other contexts, since we follow a fixed calendar and know that the holidays fall on their appropriate dates, the restrictions applying to the first day do not apply on the subsequent days (Maggid Mishneh).

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that all the restrictions that apply to the lulav on the first day must also be observed on the second day as well. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 649:5) writes that all the species disqualified on the first day may be taken on the second day, but a blessing should not be recited.

and on the other days - Chol Hamo'ed, when all opinions agree that...

they are all kosher.

Those which are disqualified because of the association with idol worship - mentioned in Halachah 1

or because the etrog is forbidden to be eaten - as mentioned in Halachah 2

On the first day of the festival - It appears from the Rambam's statements that even in Jerusalem, where Torah law requires that the mitzvah be fulfilled for all seven days of the festival, the obligation to own the lulav applies only on the first day.

a person cannot fulfill his obligation by using a lulav that belongs to a colleague and was borrowed from him - As explained in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Biblical source for the mitzvah of taking the four species, Leviticus 23:40, states: "On the first day, take for yourself the fruit of a beautiful tree..." The phrase "for yourself" implies that a person must own the species he uses for the mitzvah (Sukkah 41b).

As mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 25, a borrowed sukkah may be used on the holiday. Though Deuteronomy 16:13 states "Celebrate the Sukkot holiday for yourself for seven days." In this context, only a stolen sukkah is disqualified and a borrowed sukkah is permitted (Sukkah 27b).

Since in both cases, the source for the exclusion is the same phrase, one might ask why the laws pertaining to each are different. Many explain that since, as explained in the commentary to that halachah, the Torah includes a special verse to teach us that a borrowed sukkah is permitted, the scope of the exclusion implied by "for yourself" is limited.

The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:3 explains that since the person owning the sukkah grants his colleague the use of it, the borrowed sukkah can be considered "as his own." Since a person has to treat a sukkah as his permanent dwelling for the seven days of the holiday, it follows that the sukkah was lent for that purpose. Thus, while a person is using it, he may consider it "as his own," i.e., just like his own dwelling. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 19.

unless the latter gives it to him as a present. - Though there are certain restrictions against the transfer of property on a holiday, it is permitted to give a colleague a present (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:11).

If [the owner of the lulav] gives it to him as a present on the condition - The use of the Hebrew term על מנת frees one from certain obligations in phrasing the terms of the conditional agreement. (See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:8.)

that he return it, he may fulfill his obligation with it and return it - There are authorities who require that the owner specifically state that he is giving the lulav to his colleague on the condition that the latter return it. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 658:5) states that even if the owner gives a colleague a lulav without making such a statement, it is assumed that the lulav was given subject to this condition.

for a present given on condition that it be returned is considered a present. - See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:9.

If he does not return it, he does not fulfill his obligation, because it is as though it were stolen. - i.e., by failing to fulfill the condition under which the present was given, the recipient nullifies the legal transfer of ownership. Thus, although he was in physical possession of the article, it did not belong to him. Hence, it is considered to be stolen and, thus, not eligible to be used for the mitzvah (Sukkah, ibid.).

[On the first day,] - before all the adults who desire to use it have fulfilled the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 6)

a lulav should not be given to a minor - The definition of the term "minor" in this context has been the subject of debate among the Rabbis. From the Rambam's phraseology, it appears that he includes all minors in this category. However, Rabbenu Nissim writes that a child of six or seven can transfer property and, hence, his return of the lulav is valid.

Support for Rabbenu Nissim's position is brought from the Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 3:10), which relates that Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov gave his etrog as a present to his son and told him: "When you take possession of it and fulfill the mitzvah, return it to me." Nevertheless, the passage does not serve as conclusive proof, because the possibility exists that his son had already reached majority. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) follows the Rambam's view.

since, according to Torah law, a minor can acquire articles - which are given to him by others who consciously desire that the minor acquire the property, in contrast to ownerless articles, which he cannot acquire according to Torah law (Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 4:7).

but cannot transfer them to others. - The transfer of the ownership of an article requires a conscious decision. Torah law maintains that a child lacks intellectual maturity (דעת), and thus is incapable of making such a decision.

Thus, [the minor's] return of the article is not considered to be a return [from a legal perspective]. - i.e., although he has physically returned the article, the child still remains the legal owner.

The Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchot Meshichah 2) notes that according to Rabbinic law, a child can transfer property that he owns to another. Thus, the Rambam's statements seem to imply that any of the four species that are acquired only according to Rabbinic law may not be used for this mitzvah.

A very practical point can be derived from this concept. According to Torah law, property that is purchased changes ownership only after it has been paid for. The completion of a transaction when the property are taken by the purchaser (meshichah) is a Rabbinic institution. Accordingly, if a person purchased a lulav and etrog on the condition that he pay for it after the holiday - even though the seller willingly consented - the purchaser has only acquired the lulav and etrog according to Rabbinic law. Thus, based on this halachah, he would not be able to use it for the mitzvah.

The above applies to the lulav and to each of the other species of the four taken with it. - The verse quoted above includes all the four species, and not only the lulav. Therefore...

If one of them was borrowed, the person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival.

When partners purchase a lulav or etrog together, neither is - considered to be the owner of the species in its entirety. Therefore, neither is...

able to fulfill his obligation with it on the first [day of the festival] - Bava Batra 137b relates that the requirement of owning a lulav includes not only having a share in it, but rather owning it entirely.

unless his colleague gives him his portion as a present. - The principles mentioned in the previous halachah regarding giving a lulav as a present also apply to giving a share of it as a present.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a very frequent application of this concept: a lulav and etrog purchased by a synagogue for the use of all of its members. He quotes the Rashba, who explains that since the etrog was purchased with the intent that it be used by each member of that community, implicit in their agreement is that, on the first day, it will belong to each individual entirely at the time he uses it to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 648:7) quotes this statement as halachah. However, the Magen Avraham 648:10 raises questions concerning it and suggests that each member of the community should grant his colleague his share as a present.

Should brothers purchased etrogim from the funds [of their father's] estate, which they have not divided yet: - This is the case mentioned in Bava Batra (ibid.), from which the above principle is derived. In such an instance, the estate is considered to be the mutual property of all the brothers concerned.

If one of them takes an etrog with the intent of fulfilling his obligation, [the following rules apply:] If he could eat it without the other brothers objecting - it is considered to be his own. Hence,...

he has fulfilled his obligation. If they would object - and require that an equal division of the property be made before it was used, he cannot be considered to be the full owner of the etrog. Hence,...

he does not fulfill his obligation until they give him their share [in the etrog] as a present.

The above principles apply only when the funds of the estate were used to purchase a number of etrogim. Since many fruits of the same species were purchased with the money from the estate, it is possible that the other brothers will not object to one brother's taking an etrog for his own use. However, if the money of the estate was used to buy a number of different species of fruit - e.g.,...

If one brother bought an etrog and another a quince, or together they bought an etrog, a pomegranate, and a quince from the funds [of their father's] estate, which they have not divided yet - we assume that the brothers would desire to have the property formally divided before using it. Hence, they are all considered to be mutual owners of the fruit. Thus,...

one cannot fulfill one's obligation with the etrog until the others give him their share [in it] as a present, even though they would not object to his [use of it].

Even though it is a mitzvah to rejoice on all the festivals - as Deuteronomy 16:14 teaches: "And you shall rejoice on your festivals." Though that verse is mentioned with regard to Sukkot, Deuteronomy 16:11 states with regard to Shavuot: "and you shall rejoice before God," and Rosh Hashanah 4b explains that an analogy is established to include Pesach as well.

there was an additional celebration in the Temple on the festival of Sukkot - The Rambam's words present a question: The Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1) refers to this celebration as Simchat Beit Hasho'evah, connecting it with the drawing of water for the water libation. (See Hilchot T'midim Umusafim 10:6-10.) Indeed, the Talmud (Sukkah 50b; see also the Rambam's commentary on the above-mentioned Mishnah) emphasizes that connection, quoting Isaiah 12:3: "And you shall draw water with happiness." However, here, the Rambam makes no mention of that water at all!

We are forced to say that the Rambam views the verse from Isaiah as a mere asmachtah (an allusion from the Bible with which our Sages connected a verse to an independent concept) and that the celebration came about because of the unique nature of the Sukkot festival. Though this celebration was associated with the water libation, the latter is not the source for the practice. Indeed, the choice of the name Simchat Beit HaSho'evah (the celebration of the house of drawing the water), and not Simchat Hasho'evah (the celebration of the drawing of the water) allows for such an interpretation. (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII).

as [Leviticus 23:40] commands: "And you shall rejoice

before God, your Lord - i.e., in the Temple

for seven days." - Although this verse is used to derive the requirement of taking the lulav in Jerusalem for each of the seven days of the festival (Chapter 7, Halachah 13), its simple meaning remains.

Nevertheless, this charge is not considered to be an independent commandment, but rather an extension (and an intensification) of the mitzvah of celebrating on the festivals. Thus, in Sefer Hamitzvot (Positive Commandment 54), the Rambam describes that mitzvah and explains that it includes "to celebrate with musical instruments and to dance in the Temple....This is Simchat Beit Hasho'evah."

This explanation resolves another question: Mo'ed Kattan 8b teaches that one celebration should not be interposed upon another. For this reason, weddings are not held during the festivals so that the wedding celebrations should not clash with those of the festival.

Thus, were one to consider the celebration of Simchat Beit Hasho'evah as associated with the water offering, one might ask why the Sages instituted such a celebration which might appear to overshadow the celebration of the festival itself. However, the above explanation resolves this difficulty as well, for as stated above, the Simchat Beit Hasho'evah celebration is an extension of the festival celebrations and not an independent matter. (See Likkutei Sichot, ibid.)

What was done? On the eve of the first day of the festival - Two reasons are given why the courtyard was not set up during the festival itself:

a) It involved construction, which is forbidden on Chol Hamo'ed (Knesset Hagedolah)

b) Preparing the courtyard before the festival would allow the celebrations to begin immediately after the departure of the festival (Kinat Eliyahu).

they would set up a place in the Temple - in the open courtyard before the entrance to the Temple courtyard proper. This was called Ezrat Nashim - the women's courtyard - because in contrast to the Temple courtyard, women were allowed to enter the Ezrat Nashim even when they were not offering sacrifices. The Rambam describes the Ezrat Nashim in Hilchot Beit Habechirah 5:7.

where women [could watch] from above, and men from below, so they would not intermingle with each other. - Originally, the men and the women would stand in separate sections on the same level. However, the Sages feared that, particularly during a time of celebration, such closeness might lead to frivolous interaction between the sexes, and decided to have a balcony constructed for the women (Sukkah 51b).

The celebration would begin on the night after the first day of the festival. - Since, as explained in the following halachah, the celebration was not held on the first night of the festival.

Similarly, on each day of Chol Hamo'ed, after offering the daily afternoon sacrifice, they would begin to celebrate for the rest of the day and throughout the night. - Sukkah 53a quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananyah as saying: "While we were celebrating at Simchat Beit Hasho'evah, our eyes saw no sleep."

What was the nature of this celebration? - The Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1-2) states:

Whoever has not seen Simchat Beit Hasho'evah has never seen rejoicing in his life!...

There were golden candelabras....There was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated with the light of Beit Hasho'evah.

The pious and men of stature would dance before them with torches of fire in their hands and recite songs of praise. The Levites would play the harps, lutes, cymbals, and all other types of instruments on the steps...leading down from the Israelites' courtyard.

The flute would be sounded - Indeed, from the Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1), which states: "The flute, for five or six days; this was the flute of Beit Hasho'evah," it appears that this was the major element of the celebration.

and songs played on the harp, lute, and cymbals. [In addition,] each person would play on the instrument which he knew. Those who could sing, would sing. - See the quote from the Mishnah above.

They would dance and clap their hands, letting loose and whistling, each individual in the manner which he knew. Words of song and praise were recited. - Note the following halachah and commentary.

This celebration does not supersede either the Sabbath or the festival [prohibitions]. - Since, as explained above, the celebration involved musical instruments, it would not be held on the first night of the festival (or on the Sabbath), when playing such instruments is forbidden (Hilchot Shabbat 23:4).

The celebration is an extension of a Torah commandment, while the above prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature. Furthermore, it was held in the Temple, where Rabbinic prohibitions of this nature were usually suspended (אין שבות במקדש, Pesachim 65a). Nevertheless, since there is no specific Torah obligation to celebrate in this manner, the celebrations were suspended because of the Rabbinic prohibition (Likkutei Sichot, ibid.).

It is a great mitzvah to maximize this celebration - for the experience of genuine Torah happiness is a fundamental and necessary element of our service of God, as explained in the following halachah.

The common people and anyone who desired would not perform [in these celebrations] - Though they would attend, as mentioned in the final clause of the halachah

only the greatest of Israel's wise men: the Rashei Yeshivot, the members of the high court, the pious, the elders, and the men of stature. - for it was only their celebration that could inspire the people with spiritual feeling.

They were those who would dance, clap their hands, sing, and rejoice in the Temple on the days of the festival of Sukkot. - Sukkah 53a relates how Hillel the Elder would rejoice at Simchat Beit Hasho'evah. Other Sages would also participate. For example, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would juggle eight torches of fire and bow down so low he could kiss the ground. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 5:3) relates how Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzedek would perform unique feats of jumping.

However, the entire people - the men and the women - would come to see and hear - deriving joy from this passive participation.

, the Rambam derives a fundamental principle in the service of God.

The happiness with which a person should rejoice in the fulfillment of the mitzvot and the love of God who commanded them is a great service. - By mentioning this concept at the conclusion - but as part - of the these halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how the celebration of the festivals is not just an isolated experience, but rather is intended to influence the totality of our service of God. The rejoicing of the festival of Sukkot enables us to appreciate true happiness in all aspects of our Torah service.

Whoever holds himself back from this rejoicing is worthy of retribution, as [Deuteronomy 28:47] states: "...because you did not serve God, your Lord, with happiness and a glad heart." - This verse comes after the full description of the curses and retribution which God will visit upon the Jewish people for their sins. From the Rambam's statements, it appears that it is the lack of happiness in the service of God, and not the sins themselves, which brought about this punishment.

The Ari, Rabbi Yitzchak Luria, explains that even though the punishment comes for the sins, had the Jewish people served God with true joy and happiness, that happiness would have caused Him to overlook those transgressions, regardless of how serious they were. In contrast, a lack of happiness in the performance of the mitzvot demonstrates a deficiency in the person's awareness of the connection to God established thereby.

Whoever holds himself proud, giving himself honor, and acts haughtily in such situations is a sinner and a fool - for he is concerned with himself, rather than with God.

Concerning this, Solomon warned [Proverbs 28:10]: "Do not seek glory before the King." - i.e., God, in whose presence we are at every moment.

[In contrast,] anyone who lowers himself and thinks lightly of his person in these situations - transcending his self-consciousness and committing himself to God totally, without any restrictions

is [truly] a great person, worthy of honor - his ability to open himself up to God allows him to serve as a medium for the expression of His greatness, and thus, his own personal prestige rises, because, as our Sages commented: "A king's servant is like a king."

who serves God out of love. - See Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 10.

Thus, David, King of Israel - The mention of David's position further emphasizes the concept explained. Alternatively, a king has a connection to each of his subjects. Thus, mentioning the example of the king of Israel emphasizes how each Jew has a potential to achieve this rung of service.

declared [II Samuel 6:22]: "I will hold myself even more lightly esteemed than this and be humble in my eyes," because there is no greatness or honor other than celebrating before God, as [II Samuel 6:16] states: "King David was dancing wildly and whistling before God." - When Michal, Saul's daughter, witnessed David's recklessness and total lack of inhibitions, she reproved him for conduct unbefitting a king. David answered her sharply, explaining that it is precisely this ability to give oneself totally over to Godliness which characterizes a Jewish monarch and makes him fit to lead the people in the service of God.

Though the Rambam stresses how an approach of humility and happiness befits people of honor - as is obvious from the nature of the Sages' celebration of Simchat Beit Hasho'evah - these ideas also apply to every Jew. When an individual is conscious of God's constant presence, he will naturally be infused with these two emotions. He will feel his own smallness in God's presence, yet he will also feel real joy at the knowledge that God is with him at every moment, and that through his service of Torah and mitzvot, he can develop a greater connection with Him.

May our service of God with joy hasten the time when "crowned with eternal joy" (Isaiah 35:10), we will be able to "rejoice before God, your Lord, for seven days," in the Messianic Temple. May we merit it, speedily, in our days.