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Thursday, 13 Cheshvan 5778 / November 2, 2017

Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Order of Prayers - The Text of the Grace After Meals, Shabbat - Chapter One, Shabbat - Chapter Two

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Order of Prayers - The Text of the Grace After Meals

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם הזן את העולם כולו בטובו בחן ובחסד וברחמים ומפרנס לכל כאמור פותח את ידך ומשביע לכל חי רצון1 ומכין מזון לכל בריותיו אשר ברא ברוך אתה יי' הזן את הכל

נודה לך יי' אלהינו ונברכך מלכנו כי הנחלת את אבותינו ארץ חמדה טובה ורחבה ברית ותורה על שהוצאתנו מארץ מצרים ופדיתנו מבית עבדים על תורתך שלמדתנו על חוקי רצונך שהודעתנו על כולם יי' אלהינו אנו מודים לך ומברכים את שמך כאמור2 ואכלת ושבעת וברכת את יי' אלהיך על הארץ הטובה אשר נתן לך ברוך אתה יי' על הארץ ועל המזון

רחם יי' אלהינו על ישראל עמך ועל ירושלים עירך ועל ציון משכן כבודך ועל הבית הגדול והקדוש שנקרא שמך עליו ומלכות דוד משיחך תחזיר למקומה בימינו ובנה ירושלים בקרוב כאשר דברת ברוך אתה יי' בונה ברחמיו את ירושלים

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם האל אבינו מלכנו אדירנו בוראנו גואלנו קדושנו קדוש יעקב המלך הטוב והמטיב שבכל יום ויום גומלנו חן וחסד ורחמים וכל טוב הרחמן ישתבח לדור דורים הרחמן יתפאר לנצח נצחים הרחמן יזכנו לימות המשיח ולבנין בית המקדש ולחיי העולם הבא מגדול ישועות מלכו וגו'3 כפירים רשו ורעבו וגו'4 הודו ליי' כי טוב כי לעולם חסדו:5

נוסח ברכת המזון:

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם הזן את העולם כולו בטובו בחן ובחסד וברחמים ומפרנס לכל כאמור פותח את ידך ומשביע לכל חי רצון ומכין מזון לכל בריותיו אשר ברא ברוך אתה יי' הזן את הכל נודה לך יי' אלהינו ונברכך מלכנו כי הנחלת את אבותינו ארץ חמדה טובה ורחבה ברית ותורה על שהוצאתנו מארץ מצרים ופדיתנו מבית עבדים על תורתך שלמדתנו על חוקי רצונך שהודעתנו על כולם יי' אלהינו אנו מודים לך ומברכים את שמך כאמור ואכלת ושבעת וברכת את יי' אלהיך על הארץ הטובה אשר נתן לך ברוך אתה יי' על הארץ ועל המזון רחם יי' אלהינו על ישראל עמך ועל ירושלים עירך ועל ציון משכן כבודך ועל הבית הגדול והקדוש שנקרא שמך עליו ומלכות דוד משיחך תחזיר למקומה בימינו ובנה ירושלים בקרוב כאשר דברת ברוך אתה יי' בונה ברחמיו את ירושלים ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם האל אבינו מלכנו אדירנו בוראנו גואלנו קדושנו קדוש יעקב המלך הטוב והמטיב שבכל יום ויום גומלנו חן וחסד ורחמים וכל טוב הרחמן ישתבח לדור דורים הרחמן יתפאר לנצח נצחים הרחמן יזכנו לימות המשיח ולבנין בית המקדש ולחיי העולם הבא מגדול ישועות מלכו וגו' כפירים רשו ורעבו וגו' הודו ליי' כי טוב כי לעולם חסדו:

המפטיר בנביא מברך לפניה – One who reads the Haftorah from the works of the Prophets should recite the following blessing before the reading:

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם אשר בחר בנביאים טובים ורצה בדבריהם הנאמרים באמת ברוך אתה יי' הבוחר בתורה ובמשה עבדו ובישראל עמו ובנביאי האמת והצדק

ומברך לאחריה - After the reading, he should recite the following blessings:

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם צור כל העולמים צדיק בכל הדורות האל הנאמן האומר ועושה מדבר ומקיים אשר כל דבריו אמת וצדק נאמן אתה הוא יי' אלהינו ונאמנים דבריך ודבר אחד מדבריך אחור לא ישוב ריקם כי אל נאמן אתה ברוך אתה יי' האל הנאמן בכל דבריו

רחם על ציון כי היא בית חיינו ולעגומת נפש תושיע מהרה בימינו ותבנה מהרה ברוך אתה יי' בונה ירושלים

את צמח דוד עבדך מהרה תצמיח וקרנו תרום בישועתך ברוך אתה יי' מגן דוד

על התורה ועל העבודה ועל הנביאים ועל יום המנוח הזה שנתת לנו יי' אלהינו לקדושה לכבוד ולתפארת על הכל אנו מברכין שמך ברוך אתה יי' מקדש השבת

וביום טוב הוא אומר- On a Festival, One Says

ועל יום טוב מקרא קדש הזה שנתת לנו לששון ולשמחה ברוך אתה יי' מקדש ישראל והזמנים

ואם היה שבת ויום טוב כולל שניהם וחותם

If the day is both the Sabbath and a festival, one should combine the two and conclude the blessing:

מקדש השבת וישראל והזמנים

כנוסח שהוא חותם בתפלה בברכה אמצעית באותו היום כך הוא חותם בברכה אחרונה זו

He concludes this last blessing in the same manner as he concludes the intermediate blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh that day.

המפטיר בנביא מברך לפניה:

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם אשר בחר בנביאים טובים ורצה בדבריהם הנאמרים באמת ברוך אתה יי' הבוחר בתורה ובמשה עבדו ובישראל עמו ובנביאי האמת והצדק ומברך לאחריה:

ברוך אתה יי' אלהינו מלך העולם צור כל העולמים צדיק בכל הדורות האל הנאמן האומר ועושה מדבר ומקיים אשר כל דבריו אמת וצדק נאמן אתה הוא יי' אלהינו ונאמנים דבריך ודבר אחד מדבריך אחור לא ישוב ריקם כי אל נאמן אתה ברוך אתה יי' האל הנאמן בכל דבריו רחם על ציון כי היא בית חיינו ולעגומת נפש (תושיע) מהרה בימינו ותבנה מהרה ברוך אתה יי' בונה ירושלים את צמח דוד עבדך מהרה תצמיח וקרנו תרום בישועתך ברוך אתה יי' מגן דוד על התורה ועל העבודה ועל הנביאים ועל יום המנוח הזה שנתת לנו יי' אלהינו לקדושה לכבוד ולתפארת על הכל אנו מברכין שמך ברוך אתה יי' מקדש השבת וביום טוב הוא אומר ועל יום טוב מקרא קדש הזה שנתת לנו לששון ולשמחה ברוך אתה יי' מקדש ישראל והזמנים ואם היה שבת ויום טוב כולל שניהם וחותם מקדש השבת וישראל והזמנים כנוסח שהוא חותם בתפלה בברכה אמצעית באותו היום כך הוא חותם בברכה אחרונה זו:

הענינות שנהגו רוב העם לקרות מן הנביאים בכל שבת ושבת ומפטירין בהן ואלו הן:

The Passages from the Prophets that Most of the People are Accustomed to Read Each Sabbath as the Haftorah:

בראשית הן עבדי אתמך בו עד אלה הדברים עשיתים ולא עזבתים בישעיה6

תולדות נח רני עקרה לא ילדה עד הטו אזנכם ולכו אלי בישעיה7

לך לך ואל מי תדמיוני ואשוה עד כי אני יי' אענם אלהי ישראל בישעיה8

וירא אליו ואשה אחת מנשי בני הנביאים עד ותשא את בנה ותצא במלכים9

ויהיו חיי שרה תחלת הספר עד יחי אדוני המלך לעולם במלכים10

תולדות יצחק משא דבר יי' אל ישראל ביד מלאכי עד וערבה ליי' מנחת וגו' בתרי עשר11

ויצא יעקב ועמי תלואים למשובתי עד ובנביא העלה בתרי עשר12

וישלח יעקב חזון עובדיה עד סוף ספרו בתרי עשר13

וישב יעקב על שלשה פשעי ישראל עד אריה שאג מי לא יירא בתרי עשר14

ויהי מקץ וייקץ שלמה והנה חלום עד ויהי המלך שלמה מלך במלכים15

ויגש אליו ואתה בן אדם קח לך עץ אחד עד וידעו הגוים כי אני יי' ביחזקאל16

ויחי יעקב ויקרבו ימי דוד למות עד ושלמה ישב על כסא דוד אביו במלכים17

ואלה שמות בן אדם הודע את ירושלים עד ויצא לך שם ביחזקאל18

וארא ולא יהיה עוד לבית ישראל עד ביום ההוא אצמיח קרן לבית ישראל ביחזקאל19

בא אל פרעה משא מצרים עד אשר ברכו ה' צבאות בישעיה20

ויהי בשלח שירת דבורה מן ויכנע אלהים עד ותשקוט הארץ ארבעים שנה בשופטים21

וישמע יתרו בשנת מות המלך עוזיהו עד למרבה המשרה בישעיה22

ואלה המשפטים הדבר אשר היה אל ירמיהו עד לא יכרת איש ליונדב בן רכב בירמיה23

ויקחו לי ויי' נתן חכמה לשלמה עד ושכנתי בתוך בני ישראל במלכים24

ואתה תצוה הגד את בני ישראל את הבית עד ורציתי אתכם ביחזקאל25

כי תשא ודבר יי' היתה אל אליהו עד וירכב אחאב וילך במלכים26

ויקהל וישלח המלך שלמה ויקח את חירם מצר עד ותתם מלאכת במלכים27

ואלה פקודי ויעש חירם עד והפתות לדלתות הבית (במלכים)28

ויקרא עם זו יצרתי לי עד כה אמר יי' מלך ישראל בישעיה29

צו את אהרן עולותיכם ספו על זבחיכם עד באלה חפצתי נאם יי' בירמיהו30

ויהי ביום השמיני ויוסף עוד דוד את כל בחור בישראל עד כל אשר בלבבך בשמואל31

אשה כי תזריע ואיש בא מבעל שלישה עד וילך אתו כברת ארץ במלכים32

זאת תהיה וארבעה אנשים ומדלג עד ולא השליכם מעל פניו במלכים33

אחרי מות התשפוט התשפוט עד ונחלת בך לעיני הגוים ביחזקאל34

קדושים תהיו באו אנשים מזקני ישראל עד צבי היא לכל הארצות ביחזקאל 35

אמר אל הכהנים והכהנים הלוים בני צדוק עד כל נבלה וטרפה ביחזקאל36

בהר סיני יי' עוזי ומעזי עד רפאני יי' וארפא בירמיה37

אם בחוקתי הנבא על רועי ישראל עד והצלתים מיד העובדים בהם ביחזקאל38

במדבר סיני והיה מספר בני ישראל עד וארשתיך לי באמונה בתרי עשר39

נשא ויהי איש אחד מצרעה עד ויגדל הנער ויברכהו יי' בשופטים40

בהעלותך רני ושמחי בת ציון עד ידי זרובבל יסדו הבית בתרי עשר41

שלח לך וישלח יהושע בן נון עד וגם נמוגו כל יושבי וגו' ביהושע42

ויקח קרח ויאמר שמואל אל העם עד כי לא יטוש יי' את עמו בשמואל43

זאת חקת התורה ויפתח הגלעדי עד מימים ימימה בשופטים44

וירא בלק והיה שארית יעקב עד והצנע לכת עם אלהיך בתרי עשר45

פנחס ויד יי' היתה אל אליהו עד ויקם וילך אחרי אליהו במלכים46

ראשי המטות ויתן משה למטה בני ראובן עד מחלק את הארץ ביהושע47

אלה מסעי אלו הנחלות עד ויתנו בני ישראל ללוים ביהושע48

אלה הדברים אשר דבר יי' אל ישראל עד והייתם לי לעם בירמיה49

ואתחנן ואתפלל אל יי' אחרי תת את ספר המקנה עד שדות בכסף יקנו בירמיה50

והיה עקב הלוך וקראת באזני ירושלים עד והתברכו בו כל גוים ובו יתהללו בירמיה 51

ראה אנכי הנה ימים באים נאם יי' והקימותי עד אם יסתר איש במסתרים בירמיה52

שופטים ויהי כאשר זקן שמואל עד ויאמר שמואל אל אנשי ישראל לכו בשמואל53

כי תצא ויאספו פלשתים את מחניהם עד ויי' יהיה עמך בשמואל54

והיה כי תבא אז יבנה יהושע מזבח עד ולא היה כיום ההוא ביהושע55

אתם נצבים ויאסף יהושע את כל שבטי ישראל עד כרמים וזיתים אשר לא נטעתם ביהושע56

האזינו ולקחתי אני מצמרת הארז עד והשיבו וחיו ביחזקאל57

וזאת הברכה ויהי אחרי מות משה עבד יי' ומדלג עד ויהי יי' את יהושע ביהושע58

(העניינות שנהגו רוב העם לקרות מן הנביאים בכל שבת ושבת ומפטירין בהן ואלו הן:

) בראשית הן עבדי אתמך בו עד אלה הדברים עשיתים ולא עזבתים בישעיה תולדות נח רני עקרה לא ילדה עד הטו אזנכם ולכו אלי בישעיה לך לך ואל מי תדמיוני ואשוה עד כי אני יי' אענם אלהי ישראל בישעיה וירא אליו ואשה אחת מנשי בני הנביאים עד ותשא את בנה ותצא במלכים ויהיו חיי שרה תחלת הספר עד יחי אדוני המלך לעולם במלכים תולדות יצחק משא דבר יי' אל ישראל ביד מלאכי עד וערבה ליי' מנחת וגו' בתרי עשר ויצא יעקב ועמי תלואים למשובתי עד ובנביא העלה בתרי עשר וישלח יעקב חזון עובדיה עד סוף ספרו בתרי עשר וישב יעקב על שלשה פשעי ישראל עד אריה שאג מי לא יירא בתרי עשר ויהי מקץ וייקץ שלמה והנה חלום עד ויהי המלך שלמה מלך במלכים ויגש אליו ואתה בן אדם קח לך עץ אחד עד וידעו הגוים כי אני יי' ביחזקאל ויחי יעקב ויקרבו ימי דוד למות עד ושלמה ישב על כסא דוד אביו במלכים ואלה שמות בן אדם הודע את ירושלים עד ויצא לך שם ביחזקאל וארא (ולא יהיה עוד לבית) ישראל עד ביום ההוא אצמיח קרן לבית ישראל ביחזקאל בא אל פרעה משא מצרים עד אשר ברכו ה' צבאות בישעיה ויהי בשלח שירת דבורה מן ויכנע אלהים עד ותשקוט הארץ ארבעים שנה בשופטים וישמע יתרו בשנת מות המלך עוזיהו עד למרבה המשרה בישעיה ואלה המשפטים הדבר אשר היה אל ירמיהו עד לא יכרת איש ליונדב בן רכב בירמיה:

ויקחו לי ויי' נתן חכמה לשלמה עד ושכנתי בתוך בני ישראל במלכים ואתה תצוה הגד את בני ישראל את הבית עד ורציתי אתכם ביחזקאל כי תשא ודבר יי' היתה אל אליהו עד וירכב אחאב וילך במלכים ויקהל וישלח המלך שלמה ויקח את חירם מצר עד ותתם מלאכת במלכים ואלה פקודי ויעש חירם עד והפתות לדלתות הבית ויקרא עם זו יצרתי לי עד כה אמר יי' מלך ישראל בישעיה צו את אהרן עולותיכם ספו על זבחיכם עד באלה חפצתי נאם יי' בירמיהו ויהי ביום השמיני ויוסף עוד דוד את כל בחור בישראל עד כל אשר בלבבך במלכים אשה כי תזריע ואיש בא מבעל שלישה עד וילך אתו כברת ארץ במלכים זאת תהיה וארבעה אנשים (ומדלג) עד ולא השליכם מעל פניו במלכים אחרי מות התשפוט התשפוט עד ונחלת בך לעיני הגוים ביחזקאל קדושים תהיו באו אנשים מזקני ישראל עד צבי היא לכל הארצות ביחזקאל אמר אל הכהנים והכהנים הלוים בני צדוק עד כל נבלה וטרפה ביחזקאל בהר סיני יי' עוזי ומעזי עד רפאני יי' וארפא בירמיה אם בחוקתי הנבא על רועי ישראל עד והצלתים מיד העובדים בהם ביחזקאל:

במדבר סיני והיה מספר בני ישראל עד וארשתיך לי באמונה בתרי עשר נשא ויהי איש אחד מצרעה עד ויגדל הנער ויברכהו יי' בשופטים בהעלותך רני ושמחי בת ציון עד ידי זרובבל יסדו הבית בתרי עשר שלח לך וישלח יהושע בן נון עד וגם נמוגו כל יושבי וגו' ביהושע ויקח קרח ויאמר שמואל אל העם עד כי לא יטוש יי' את עמו בשמואל זאת חקת התורה ויפתח הגלעדי עד מימים ימימה בשופטים וירא בלק והיה שארית יעקב עד והצנע לכת עם אלהיך בתרי עשר פנחס ויד יי היתה אל אליהו עד ויקם וילך אחרי אליהו במלכים ראשי המטות ויתן משה למטה בני ראובן עד מחלק את הארץ ביהושע אלה מסעי אלו הנחלות עד ויתנו בני ישראל ללוים ביהושע:

אלה הדברים אשר דבר יי' אל ישראל עד והייתם לי לעם בירמיה ואתחנן ואתפלל אל יי' אחרי תת את ספר המקנה עד שדות בכסף יקנו בירמיה והיה עקב הלוך וקראת באזני ירושלים עד והתברכו בו כל גוים ובו יתהללו בירמיה ראה אנכי הנה ימים באים נאם יי' והקימותי עד אם יסתר איש במסתרים בירמיה שופטים ויהי כאשר זקן שמואל עד ויאמר שמואל אל אנשי ישראל לכו בשמואל כי תצא ויאספו פלשתים את מחניהם עד ויי' יהיה עמך בשמואל והיה כי תבא אז יבנה יהושע מזבח עד ולא היה כיום ההוא ביהושע אתם נצבים ויאסף יהושע את כל שבטי ישראל עד כרמים וזיתים אשר לא נטעתם ביהושע האזינו ולקחתי אני מצמרת הארז עד והשיבו וחיו ביחזקאל וזאת הברכה ויהי אחרי מות משה עבד יי' ומדלג עד ויהי יי' את יהושע ביהושע

כל שבת שקורין בה שתי פרשיות מפטירין בה מענין פרשה אחרונה וזו המנהג ברוב המקומות וכן נהגו רוב העם להיות מפטירין בנחמות ישעיהו מאחר תשעה באב עד ראש השנה

On every Sabbath, that two parshiyot are read, the Haftorah follows the theme of the last parshah. This is the custom in most places. Similarly, the majority of the people follow the custom of reading Haftorot from the comforting prophecies of Isaiah from after Tishah B'Av until Rosh HaShanah.

בשבת שאחר תשעה באב – נחמו נחמו עמי59 – On the Sabbath follow Tishah B'Av

בשניה ותאמר ציון60 – On the second Sabbath

בשלישית עניה סערה61 - On the third

ברביעית אנכי אנכי הוא מנחמכם62 - On the fourth

בחמישית רני עקרה63 - On the fifth

בששית קומי אורי64 - On the sixth

בשביעית שוש אשיש ביי'65
– On the seventh

בריך רחמנא דסייען

נגמר ספר שני ומנין פרקיו ששה וארבעים

הלכות ק"ש – 4 פרקים

הלכות תפלה וברכת כהנים – 15 פרקים

הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה – 10 פרקים

הלכות ציצית – 3 פרקים

הלכות ברכות – 11 פרקים

הלכות מילה – 3 פרקים

Blessed be the Merciful One Who grants assistance.
This concludes the second volume with the help of the Almighty. There are a total of 46 chapters in this volume.

Hilchot Kri'at Shema - 4 chapters
Hilchot Tefillah UVirkat Kohanim - 15 chapters
Hilchot Tefillin UMezuzah V'Sefer Torah - 10 chapters
Hilchot Tzitzit - 3 chapters
Hilchot Berachot - 11 chapters
Hilchot Milah - 3 chapters

כל שבת שקורין בה שתי פרשיות מפטירין בה מענין פרשה אחרונה וזו המנהג ברוב המקומות וכן נהגו רוב העם להיות מפטירין בנחמות ישעיהו מאחר תשעה באב עד ראש השנה בשבת שאחר תשעה באב נחמו נחמו עמי בשניה ותאמר ציון בשלישית עניה סערה ברביעית אנכי אנכי הוא מנחמכם בחמישית קומי אורי בששית רני עקרה בשביעית שוש אשיש ביי':

נגמר ספר שני ומנין פרקיו ששה וארבעים הלכות ק"ש הלכות תפלה וברכת כהנים הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה הלכות ציצית הלכות ברכות הלכות מילה:

Footnotes
3.

II Samuel 22:51. It is common custom to recite this verse only on the Sabbath and festivals and during the week to recite a similar verse, Psalms 18:51. The latter verse implies a progression towards redemption and is thus appropriate during the week when the challenges of exile are acutely felt. The verse cited by the Rambam looks forward to the time when the redemption will be an established fact and, hence, is fitting for these days of spiritual content.

5.

Ibid. 136:1.

6.

Isaiah 42:1-16. At present, the custom is to read from 42:5-43:10.

7.

Ibid. 54:1-55:3. At present, Sephardic custom is to conclude with 54:10 and Ashkenazic custom to conclude with 55:5.

8.

Ibid. 40:25-41:17. At present, the custom is to read from 40:27-41:16.

9.

II Kings 4:1-37. Sephardic custom is to conclude with verse 23.

11.

Malachi 1:1-3:4. At present, the custom is to conclude with 2:7.

12.

Hoshea 11:7-12:14. At present, in many communities, Sephardic custom is to conclude with 12:12. Ashkenazic custom is to begin with 12:13 and to conclude with 13:10.

13.

Ovadiah 1:1-21. This represents the custom in Sephardic and some Ashkenazic communities. Other Ashkenazic communities read Hoshea 11:7-12:14.

18.

Ezekiel 16:1-14. At present, Sephardic custom is to read from Jeremiah 1:1-2:3. Ashkenazic custom is to read from Isaiah 27:6-28:13, 29:22-23.

20.

Isaiah 19:1-25. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 46:13-28.

21.

Judges 4:23-5:31. At present, Sephardic custom is to begin from 5:1. Ashkenazic custom is to begin from 4:4.

22.

Isaiah 6:1-7:6, 9:5-6. This represents the contemporary Ashekenazic custom. Sephardic custom is to conclude with 6:13.

23.

Jeremiah 35:1-19. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 34:8-22, 33:25-26.

26.

I Kings 18:1-46. At present, the Ashkenazic custom is to conclude at verse 39. Sephardic custom is to conclude at that verse, but to begin at verse 20.

27.

I Kings 7:13-22. At present, the Sephardic custom is to conclude at verse 26. Ashkenazic custom is to read verses 40-50.

28.

I Kings 40:50. This represents the contemporary Sephardic custom. Ashekenazic custom is to read Ibid. 7:51-8:21.

29.

Isaiah 43:21-44:6. At present, the custom is to continue to 44:23.

30.

Jeremiah 7:21-9:23. At present, the custom is to read until 8:3 and conclude with 9:22-23.

31.

II Samuel 6:1-7:3. At present, the Sephardic custom is to conclude at verse 6:19. Ashkenazic custom is to read until 7:17.

33.

II Kings 7:3-20, 13:23.

34.

Ezekiel 22:1-16. This represents the contemporary Sephardic custom. Ashekenazic custom is to read Amos 9:7-15.

35.

Ezekiel 20:1-15. At present, Sephardic custom is to begin from 20:1 and conclude at 20:20. Ashkenazic custom is to read Ezekiel 22:1-16.

36.

Ibid. 44:15-31.

37.

Jeremiah 16:19-17:14. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 32:6-27.

38.

Ezekiel 34:1-27. At present, the custom is to read from Jeremiah 16:19-17:14.

40.

Judges 13:2-24. At present, the custom is to read until 13:25.

41.

Zechariah 2:14-4:9. At present, the custom is to conclude at 4:7.

44.

Judges 11:1-40. Contemporary custom is to conclude at verse 33.

46.

I Kings 18:46-19:21. At present, the custom is to read this passage only when Shabbos Parshas Pinchas does not fall in the Three Weeks of Mourning.

47.

Joshua 13:15-14:5. As stated in Hilchot Tefilah 13:19, at present, the custom on this and the other two Sabbaths before the fast of Tishah B'Av is to read Haftorot warning of the destruction of Jerusalem. On the Sabbaths after Tishah B'Av until Rosh HaShanah, the custom is to read Haftoros of consolation as the Rambam states.

48.

Ibid. 19:51-21:3.

50.

Ibid. 32:16-44.

51.

Ibid. 2:1-4:2.

52.

Ibid. 23:5-24.

54.

Ibid. 17:1-37.

56.

Ibid. 24:13. Significantly, the Rambam does not mention a Haftorah for Parshas VaYeilech. That omission can possibly be explained on the basis of the words of Rav Saadia Gaon in his Siddur that at times Parshas Nitzavim is divided, while in other instances, he speaks of combining two parshiyot. Thus there is only one Haftorah for Nitzavim-Vayeilech (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 19). In practice, when VaYeilech is read separately, it falls on Shabbat Shuvah and the Haftorah highlights the theme of that Sabbath including the following readings: Hoshea 14:2-10. Joel 2:11-27, Michah 7:18-20.

57.

At present, the custom is to read the song of David, II Samuel 22:1-41.

58.

Joshua 1:1-18, 6:27.

60.

Ibid. 49:14-51:3.

61.

Ibid. 54:11-55:5.

62.

Ibid. 51:12-52:2.

63.

Ibid. 54:1-10. This follows the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text reverses the order of this and the following Sabbath.

64.

Ibid. 60:1-22.

65.

Ibid. 61:10-63:9.

Shabbat - Chapter One

Introduction to Hilchos Shabbos

They contain five mitzvot: two positive commandments and three negative commandments:

1) To rest on the seventh day;
2) Not to perform work on this day;
3) [For the court] not to administer punishment on the Sabbath;
4) Not to proceed beyond the limits [established by the Torah] on the Sabbath;
5) To sanctify the day by taking note [of it].

These mitzvot are explained in the chapters [which follow].

הלכות שבת - הקדמה

יש בכללן חמש מצות שתי מצות עשה. ושלש מצות לא תעשה. וזהו פרטן:

א) לשבות בשביעי.
ב) שלא לעשות בו מלאכה.
ג) שלא לענוש בשבת.
ד) שלא לצאת חוץ לגבול בשבת.
ה) לקדש את יום השבת בזכירה:

וביאור מצות אלו בפרקים אלו:

1

Resting from labor on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment, as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on it]."

What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, he is liable for karet; if witnesses who administer a warning are present, he should be stoned [to death]. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression, he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.

א

שביתה בשביעי ממלאכה מצות עשה שנאמר וביום השביעי תשבות. וכל העושה בו מלאכה ביטל מצות עשה ועבר על לא תעשה שנאמר לא תעשה כל מלאכה ומהו חייב על עשיית מלאכה. אם עשה ברצונו בזדון חייב כרת. ואם היו שם עדים והתראה נסקל. ואם עשה בשגגה חייב קרבן חטאת קבועה:

Resting from labor - Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)

The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.

From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)

on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment - Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day." - In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah. Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular.

Anyone who performs labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment, - Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective.

for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor on it." - Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly - i.e., without being forced by others

as a conscious act of defiance - and not inadvertently.

The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."

The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.

he is liable for karet - כרת means "cut off." Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come.

if witnesses who administer a warning are present - As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed.

he should be stoned [to death]. - See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution.

If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression - accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved

he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature. - The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.

2

Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is liable" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1

ב

כל מקום שנאמר בהלכות שבת שהעושה דבר זה חייב הרי זה חייב כרת. ואם היו שם עדים והתראה חייב סקילה. ואם היה שוגג חייב חטאת:

3

Whenever the expression, "one who performs this is not liable" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2

In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3 in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given "stripes for defiance."4Similarly, whenever the expressions "this should not be performed..." or "it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5 is given "stripes for defiance."

ג

וכל מקום שנאמר שהעושה דבר זה פטור הרי זה פטור מן הכרת ומן הסקילה ומן הקרבן אבל אסור לעשות אותו דבר בשבת ואיסורו מדברי סופרים והוא הרחקה מן המלאכה. והעושה אותו בזדון מכין אותו מכת מרדות. וכן כל מקום שנאמר אין עושין כך וכך או אסור לעשות כך וכך בשבת העושה אותו דבר בזדון מכין אותו מכת מרדות

4

Whenever the expression, "it is permissible to do this" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6 Similarly, whenever the expressions, "one is under no obligation" or "one is not liable at all" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7

ד

וכל מקום שנאמר מותר לעשות כך וכך הרי זה מותר לכתחלה. וכן כל מקום שנאמר אינו חייב כלום או פטור מכלום אין מכין אותו כלל:

5

It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8 - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9 will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10

What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11 and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12

Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13 Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.

ה

דברים המותרים לעשותן בשבת ובשעת עשייתן אפשר שתעשה בגללן מלאכה ואפשר שלא תעשה. אם לא נתכוין לאותה מלאכה הרי זה מותר. כיצד גורר אדם מטה וכסא וספסל וכיוצא בהן בשבת ובלבד שלא יתכוין לחפור חריץ בקרקע בשעת גרירתן. ולפיכך אם חפרו הקרקע אינו חושש בכך לפי שלא נתכוין. וכן מהלך אדם על גבי עשבים בשבת ובלבד שלא יתכוין לעקור אותן. לפיכך אם נעקרו אינו חושש. ורוחץ ידיו בעפר הפירות וכיוצא בו ובלבד שלא יתכוין להשיר השער. לפיכך אם נשר אינו חושש. וכן פרצה דחוקה מותר להכנס בה בשבת אף על פי שמשיר צרורות. וכן כל דבר שאין מתכוין כגון זה הרי זה מותר:

6

[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14 even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].

What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15 he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.

ו

אבל עשה מעשה ונעשית בגללו מלאכה שודאי תעשה בשביל אותו מעשה אע"פ שלא נתכוין לה חייב. שהדבר ידוע שאי אפשר שלא תעשה אותה מלאכה. "כיצד הרי שצריך לראש עוף לצחק בו הקטן וחתך ראשו בשבת אע"פ שאין סוף מגמתו להריגת העוף בלבד חייב שהדבר ידוע שאי אפשר שיחתוך ראש החי ויחיה אלא המות בא בשבילו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

7

Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16

What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17 but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.

Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18 and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.

ז

כל העושה מלאכה בשבת אף על פי שאינו צריך לגופה של מלאכה חייב עליה. כיצד הרי שכבה את הנר מפני שהוא צריך לשמן או לפתילה כדי שלא יאבד או כדי שלא ישרף או כדי שלא יבקע חרש של נר. מפני שהכיבוי מלאכה והרי נתכוין לכבות ואע"פ שאינו צריך לגוף הכבוי ולא כבה אלא מפני השמן או מפני החרש או מפני הפתילה הרי זה חייב. וכן המעביר את הקוץ ארבע אמות ברשות הרבים או המכבה את הגחלת כדי שלא יזוקו בהן רבים חייב ואע"פ שאינו צריך לגוף הכבוי או לגוף ההעברה אלא להרחיק ההיזק הרי זה חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

8

Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19

What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.

How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20 and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21 He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.

Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22 For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23 he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.

ח

כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה ונעשה לו מלאכה אחרת שלא נתכוין לה פטור עליה לפי שלא נעשית מחשבתו. כיצד זרק אבן או חץ בחבירו או בבהמה כדי להורגן והלך ועקר אילן בהליכתו ולא הרג הרי זה פטור. הרי זה קל וחומר אם נתכוין לאיסור קל ונעשה איסור חמור. כגון שנתכוין לזרוק בכרמלית ועברה האבן לרשות הרבים שהוא פטור וכן כל כיוצא בזה. נתכוין לעשות דבר המותר ועשה דבר אחר כגון שנתכוין לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר אינו חייב כלום וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

9

Should a person intend24 to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25 - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26 He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is "purposeful labor" that the Torah forbade.

ט

נתכוין ללקוט תאנים שחורות וליקט לבנות או שנתכוין ללקוט תאנים ואחר כך ענבים ונהפך הדבר וליקט הענבים בתחלה ואחר כך תאנים פטור אף על פי שליקט כל מה שחשב הואיל ולא ליקט כסדר שחשב פטור שבלא כוונה עשה שלא אסרה תורה אלא מלאכת מחשבת:

10

When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27 for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28

To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29 and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.

י

היו לפניו שתי נרות דולקות או כבויות נתכוין לכבות זו וכבה את זו להדליק זו והדליק את זו חייב שהרי עשה מן המלאכה שחשב לעשותה. הא למה הוא דומה למי שנתכוין ללקוט תאנה זו וליקט תאנה אחרת. או למי שנתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה שהרי נעשית מלאכה שחשב לעשותה:

11

One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31

If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32 The same applies in other similar circumstances.

Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33

יא

אבל אם נתכוין להדליק ראשונה ולכבות שניה אחריה ונהפך הדבר וכבה ראשונה ואחר כך הדליק שניה אחריה פטור. כבה זו והדליק זו בנשימה אחת חייב. שאע"פ שלא הקדים ההדלקה הרי זה לא איחר אותה אלא שתיהן כאחת ולפיכך חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה וכל העושה מלאכה במתעסק ולא נתכוין לה פטור:

12

Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34 If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35

What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.

יב

כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה ונעשית ביותר על כוונתו חייב בפחות מכוונתו פטור. כיצד הרי שנתכוין להוציא משא לאחריו ובא לו לפניו חייב שהרי נתכוין לשמירה פחותה ונעשית שמירה מעולה. אבל אם נתכוין להוציא לפניו ובא לו לאחריו פטור שהרי נתכוין להוציא בשמירה מעולה והוציא בשמירה פחותה וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

13

[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36 and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37

יג

היה חגור בסינר והשליך המשא בין בשרו וחלוקו בין שבא זה המשא שדרכו להוציאו בדרך הזאת לפניו בין שבא לאחריו חייב שכן דרכו להיות חוזר:

14

Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38 he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39

For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40

Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41 Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.

יד

כל המתכוין לעשות מלאכה בשבת והתחיל בה ועשה כשיעור חייב. אף על פי שלא השלים כל המלאכה שנתכוין להשלימה. כיצד הרי שנתכוין לכתוב אגרת או שטר בשבת אין אומרים לא יתחייב זה עד שישלים חפצו ויכתוב כל השטר או כל האגרת אלא משיכתוב שתי אותיות חייב. וכן אם נתכוין לארוג בגד שלם משיארוג שני חוטין חייב ואף על פי שכוונתו להשלים הבגד הואיל ועשה כשיעור בכוונה חייב וכן כל כיוצא בזה

15

Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42 they are [both] free of liability.43

This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.

טו

כל מלאכה שהיחיד יכול לעשות אותה לבדו ועשו אותה שנים בשותפות בין שעשה זה מקצתה וזה מקצתה כגון שעקר זה החפץ מרשות זו והניחו השני ברשות אחרת בין שעשו אותה שניהם כאחד מתחלה ועד סוף כגון שאחזו שניהם בקולמוס וכתבו או אחזו ככר והוציאוהו מרשות לרשות הרי אלו פטורין:

16

When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44 For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45 and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.

[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46 The same applies in other similar situations.

טז

ואם אין אחד מהן יכול לעשותה לבדו עד שיצטרפו כגון שנים שאחזו קורה והוציאוהו לרשות הרבים הואיל ואין כח באחד מהן לעשותה לבדו ועשו אותה בשותפות מתחלה ועד סוף שניהן חייבין ושיעור אחד לשניהן. היה כח באחד להוציא קורה זו לבדו והשני אינו יכול להוציאה לבדו ונשתתפו שניהם והוציאוה. זה הראשון שיכול חייב והשני מסייע הוא ומסייע אינו חייב כלום וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

17

Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47 What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48 one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.

A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49 Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.

יז

כל המקלקלין פטורין. כיצד הרי שחבל בחבירו או בבהמה דרך השחתה וכן אם קרע בגדים או שרפן או שבר כלים דרך השחתה הרי זה פטור. חפר גומא ואינו צריך אלא לעפרה הרי זה מקלקל ופטור אע"פ שעשה מלאכה הואיל וכוונתו לקלקל פטור:

18

Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50 For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51 one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.

The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52

יח

כל המקלקל על מנת לתקן חייב. כיצד הרי שסתר כדי לבנות במקומו או שמחק כדי לכתוב במקום שמחק או שחפר גומא כדי לבנות בתוכה יסודות וכל כיוצא בזה חייב ושיעורן כשיעור המתקן:

19

Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53 he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.

One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54 Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55 when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end.

יט

כל העושה מלאכה בשבת מקצתה בשוגג ומקצתה בזדון בין שהזיד ולבסוף שגג בין ששגג ולבסוף הזיד פטור עד שיעשה שיעור המלאכה כולה מתחלה ועד סוף בזדון ואחר כך יהיה חייב כרת. ואם יהיה בעדים והתראה חייב סקילה. או שיעשה שיעור מלאכה כולה בשגגה מתחלה ועד סוף ואחר כך יהיה חייב חטאת קבועה

Footnotes
1.

The Rambam is explaining that by performing a forbidden act on the Sabbath, a person incurs liability. The nature of this liability depends on his intent and on whether witnesses are present. These factors are common, however, to all the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, in the future, all that is necessary to say is that "the person is liable," and based on the principles stated here, we can determine what his liability is.

2.

Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are "permitted."

3.

Our translation reflects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression מדברי סופרים. There are commentaries (e.g., the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut 2:1) who cite the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) and explain that this expression can refer to a prohibition of the Torah which is derived through the accepted traditions of Biblical exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam's intent is clear; the term refers to prohibitions that the Rabbis instituted on their own initiative as safeguards.

4.

The Rambam discusses this punishment in Hilchot Edut 18:6, explaining that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39). Other authorities offer different interpretations.

5.

Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered.

6.

I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question.

7.

This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).

8.

If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah.

9.

Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term "forbidden labor" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech.

10.

The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of a forbidden labor.

The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)

The concept discussed in this halachah, אינו מתכוין, differs from an ordinary example of a labor performed unintentionally. When we speak of a labor performed unintentionally (בשוגג), the person had no thought whatsoever of performing a forbidden activity. In the case of אינו מתכוין, by contrast, the person performs an act consciously with the knowledge that there is a possibility that it may lead to a forbidden act. Nevertheless, since there is no certainty that the transgression will be committed, he is not held liable.

Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.

Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.

11.

Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text of Shabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute מגדל, "cabinet," instead of ספסל, "bench."

12.

Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.

13.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 13.

14.

As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally.

15.

The addition of the word "merely" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.

This leads to another concept. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In his notes on Chapter 10, Halachah 17, Rabbenu Chayim Soloveitchik states that the Rambam also subscribes to this opinion.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:18) gives an example of this situation: The plug of a barrel of wine was closed with flax. Although some wine will inevitably be squeezed out when the barrel is unplugged - and squeezing is a forbidden labor - since the wine that is squeezed out will be lost, there is no prohibition.

This opinion is not, however, accepted by all authorities. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher in their glosses on Shabbat 103a differ and maintain that, since it is inevitable that a forbidden labor will be performed, such an act is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch's statements, it would appear that it is preferable to follow the more stringent view, but that the more lenient perspective has become popularly accepted.

16.

This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.

As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, "the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression, מלאכת מחשבת, "contemplative work." Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the Torah's prohibition against labor is related to thought. Only when one's actions are purposeful can they be forbidden.

For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains - as explained in Halachah 5 - that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so (אינו מתכוין), he is not liable. Although a forbidden activity results from his conduct, since his thought was not involved in the matter, his work does not resemble the labor that was necessary to construct the Sanctuary. Hence, one is not held liable for such labor on the Sabbath.

In the situation at hand, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, the person performing the forbidden labor is doing so intentionally. Nevertheless, since his intent is not the same as that ordinarily associated - or according to some authorities, associated at the time of the construction of the Sanctuary - with this labor, he is not held liable. (See the comments of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh.)

Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to אינו מתכוין, but follows Rabbi Yehudah's view with regard to a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.

The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command תשבות, "rest," on which basis we observe the Sabbath laws. We find another difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and the other Sages (Pesachim 27a) concerning a word with a similar root. With regard to the command (Exodus 12:15), תשביתו שאור, "destroy leaven," Rabbi Yehudah maintains that leaven must be burned. The other Sages (including Rabbi Shimon) maintain that leaven may be destroyed be other means.

What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)

Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is an intentional act, it is forbidden as such a combination.

It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot (Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) accepts Tosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree.

17.

I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary.

18.

I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame.

19.

Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]." Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be "purposeful work."

20.

As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law.

21.

The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in the carmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.

Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.

22.

See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity - removing an object from his property - but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach).

23.

The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. The Kovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first.

24.

This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, "The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath]."

25.

The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah.

26.

The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.

It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.

Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, "the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come" and render a decision.

27.

This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position.

28.

In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or distinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.

29.

The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath.

30.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.

31.

As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be "purposeful work." In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.

The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.

32.

Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are "purposeful work."

33.

Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as מתעסק, and an inadvertent transgression of a commandment (שוגג) as follows: When a person transgresses בשוגג, he willfully performs the forbidden activity, but is unaware of the prohibition involved. In all the situations described as מתעסק, the person may be aware of the prohibition, but is not consciously controlling his behavior.

34.

Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance - a person who desired to write the name שמעון and instead, wrote the name שם - where a person does not fulfill his intention and is still liable.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name שם and is therefore held liable, as implied by Halachah 14. By putting the focus on intent, the Rambam emphasizes that the leniency stated in this halachah is also an outgrowth of the principle that "The Torah prohibited purposeful work."

35.

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression "he is not liable," means that a person should not be punished - nor is he liable to bring a sin offering - for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.

36.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term.

37.

The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.

Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.

38.

Here the Rambam introduces a new concept, שיעור, the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. When the Torah forbade the performance of labor on the Sabbath, it also specified that a person is not held liable unless his activities are sufficient to bring about a significant result. Thus, a particular שיעור was established for every specific labor.

A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.

[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a שיעור, is considered to have violated a prohibition from the Torah (although he is not liable for punishment or a sin offering) or whether he is considered to have violated merely a Rabbinic commandment.]

39.

One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered "purposeful labor." The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed "purposefully," and since he completed a significant amount of work (a שיעור), he is held liable.

40.

See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.

41.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 18.

42.

A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah.

43.

Shabbat 3a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, explaining that that verse teaches that one is liable only "when one performs the entire labor and not a portion of it; when one person performs the labor and not two."

See also Rashi, Shabbat 93a and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:7 explain that a person is not liable for performing a labor in this manner, because this is not the ordinary manner in which the labor is performed.

44.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone.

45.

Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts.

46.

This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.)

47.

As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.

(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)

48.

However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion.

49.

The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable.

50.

Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath - e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing - involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable.

51.

The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam's wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, "in its place." Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.)

52.

For example, the minimum measure (שיעור) for which one is liable for the constructive act of writing is two letters. Therefore, one is liable for erasing two letters. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 9, a person is liable when he erases one letter which is large enough for two to be written in its place.

53.

The definition of "unintentionally" (בשוגג) is that one is unaware that the activity is forbidden, or one is unaware that the day is the Sabbath. Thus, the situation described by the Rambam would involve, for example, writing one letter knowing that it is the Sabbath and that it is forbidden to do so, and writing a second letter having forgotten either of these factors.

54.

See Halachah 1.

55.

See Halachah 1.

Shabbat - Chapter Two

1

The [laws of] the Sabbath are suspended1 in the face of a danger to life,2 as are [the obligations of] the other mitzvot. Therefore, we may perform - according to the directives of a professional physician3 of that locale4 - everything that is necessary for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger.

When there is a doubt whether or not the Sabbath laws must be violated on a person's behalf, one should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, for the Sabbath laws are suspended even when there is merely a question of danger to a person's life. [The same principles apply] when one physician says the Sabbath laws should be violated on a person's behalf and another physician states that this is not necessary.5

א

דחויה היא שבת אצל סכנת נפשות כשאר כל המצות. לפיכך חולה שיש בו סכנה עושין לו כל צרכיו בשבת על פי רופא אומן של אותו מקום. ספק שהוא צריך לחלל עליו את השבת ספק שאינו צריך. וכן אם אמר רופא לחלל עליו את השבת ורופא אחר אומר אינו צריך מחללין עליו את השבת שספק נפשות דוחה את השבת:

2

[The following laws apply when physicians] determine on the Sabbath that a person needs [a treatment to be administered] for eight days. We do not say that we should wait until the evening so that it will not be necessary to violate two Sabbaths on his behalf.6 Instead, the treatment is begun immediately, on the Sabbath, and even one hundred Sabbaths may be violated on his behalf.

As long as a person is dangerously [ill] - or even if there is a question whether or not he is dangerously [ill] - and requires treatment, [the Sabbath] should be violated [on his behalf]. A lamp may be lit on his behalf and extinguished on his behalf.7 [Animals] may be slaughtered on his behalf, [food] baked and cooked on his behalf, and water heated for him, whether to drink or to use for bathing.

The general principle for a person who is dangerously ill is that the Sabbath should be considered as a weekday regarding all his needs.8

ב

אמדוהו ביום השבת שהוא צריך לכך וכן לשמנה ימים אין אומרים נמתין עד הערב כדי שלא לחלל עליו שתי שבתות אלא מתחילין מהיום שהוא שבת ומחללין עליו אפילו מאה שבתות כל זמן שהוא צריך ויש בו סכנה או ספק סכנה מחללין. ומדליקין לו את הנר ומכבין מלפניו את הנר ושוחטין לו ואופין ומבשלין ומחמין לו חמין בין להשקותו בין לרחיצת גופו. כללו של דבר שבת לגבי חולה שיש בו סכנה הרי הוא כחול לכל הדברים שהוא צריך להן:

3

When such treatment is administered, it should not be administered by gentiles,9 by children,10 by servants, or by women,11 so that they will not view the Sabbath flippantly.12 Instead, the treatment should be administered by the leaders of Israel13 and the wise.

It is forbidden to hesitate before transgressing the Sabbath [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill,14 as [reflected in the interpretation in the phrase of Leviticus 18:5,] "which a person shall perform to live through them," as "['to live through them'] and not to die through them."

This teaches that the judgments of the Torah do not [bring] vengeance to the world, but rather bring mercy, kindness, and peace to the world. Concerning those non-believers who say that [administering such treatment] constitutes a violation of the Sabbath and is forbidden,15 one may apply the verse [Ezekiel 20:25]: "[As punishment,] I gave them harmful laws and judgments through which they cannot live."16

ג

כשעושים דברים האלו אין עושין אותן לא ע"י נכרים ולא ע"י קטנים ולא ע"י עבדים ולא ע"י נשים כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם. אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת לחולה שיש בו סכנה שנאמר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם. ואלו האפיקורוסים שאומרים שזה חילול שבת ואסור עליהן הכתוב אומר גם אני נתתי לכם חוקים לא טובים ומשפטים לא יחיו בהם:

4

When a person's eyes are ailing - i.e., when he has a secretion from either one or both of them, when tears flow from them due to great pain, when blood flows from them, or when they are affected by fever,17 or by other afflictions of this like - he is considered among those individuals who are dangerously ill.18 The Sabbath may be violated on his behalf, and anything necessary for his treatment may be performed for him.19

ד

החושש בעיניו והוא שיהיה בשתיהם או באחת מהם ציר או שהיו דמעות שותתות מהן מרוב הכאב או שהיה דם שותת מהן או שהיה בהן קדחת וכיוצא בחלאים אלו הרי זה בכלל חולים שיש בהן סכנה ומחללין עליו את השבת ועושין לו כל צרכי רפואה:

5

Similarly, a person who has a wound20 in his body cavity - from his lips inward,21 whether in his mouth, his digestive organs, his liver or spleen, or any of the other organs in his body cavity - is considered to be dangerously ill and does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition]. His ailment is serious, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf immediately without [waiting for] an assessment.22

A wound on the back of the hand or on the back of the foot is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity. It does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition] for us to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. A fever that causes the flesh to wince23 is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on this person's behalf.

Similarly, we should violate the Sabbath laws whenever a physician24 assesses an ailment as dangerous, even when it affects only the exterior of a person's skin.

ה

וכן אם יש מכה בחלל גופו מן השפה ולפנים בין בפיו בין במעיו בין בכבדו וטחולו או בשאר מקומות כל שיש בחללו הרי זה חולה שיש בו סכנה ואינו צריך אומד שחוליו כבד הוא לפיכך מחללין עליו את השבת מיד בלא אמידה. ומכה שהיא בגב היד וגב הרגל הרי היא כמכה של חלל ואינה צריכה אומד ומחללין עליה את השבת. והחום שמסמר את הבשר כמכה של חלל דמי ומחללין עליו את השבת וכן כל חולי שהרופאים אומרין שזה יש בו סכנה אע"פ שהוא בעור הבשר מבחוץ מחללין עליו את השבת על פיהם:

6

When a person swallows a leech, water may be heated for him on the Sabbath, and any medical treatment that is necessary may be administered, since his life is in danger. Similarly, when a person is bitten by a rabid dog25 or a poisonous snake or other reptile, any medical treatment that is necessary to save him may be administered. [The same laws apply] even when there is merely a question of whether or not [the bite] can cause death.

ו

הבולע נימא של מים מחמין לו חמין בשבת ועושין לו כל צרכי רפואה מפני שהיא סכנת נפשות. וכן מי שנשכו כלב שוטה או אחד מזוחלי העפר שממיתין אפילו היו ספק ממיתין ספק אין ממיתין עושין לו כל צרכי רפואה להצילו:

7

When physicians assessed that a sick person required a fig, and ten people ran and brought26 him ten figs at once,27 they are all absolved of liability entirely.28

[The same decision applies] if the ten people brought the figs one after another, even when he recuperated after the first fig, for all of them had license to bring them.

ז

חולה שאמדוהו רופאים להביא לו גרוגרת אחת ורצו עשרה בני אדם והביאו לו עשר גרוגרות בבת אחת כולן פטורין מכלום. ואפילו הביאו בזה אחר זה ואפילו הבריא בראשונה שהרי כולם ברשות הביאו:

8

If a sick person required two figs, and two figs could be found only on two separate stems - while three figs were found on another stem - we should remove the stem that has three figs, even though only two are required.29 [It is preferable] to cut only one stem and not two stems, so as not to increase [the performance of the forbidden labor of] gleaning.30 The same applies in all similar situations.

ח

חולה שהיה צריך לשתי גרוגרות ולא מצאו אלא שתי גרוגרות בשני עוקצין ושלש גרוגרות בעוקץ אחד כורתין העוקץ שיש בו שלש אף על פי שאין צריכין אלא לשתים כדי שלא ירבו בבצירה אלא יכרתו עוקץ אחד ולא יכרתו שנים וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

9

When food is cooked for a sick person on the Sabbath and the sick person leaves some over after eating, a healthy person is forbidden to eat from the remainder, lest [this cause] more food to be added for him.31

When, however, an animal is slaughtered for a sick person on the Sabbath, it is permissible for a healthy person to partake of uncooked meat32 [from that animal].33 A decree was not enacted, because there is no possibility of an additional [activity] being performed [for a healthy person].34 The same applies in all similar situations.

ט

המבשל לחולה בשבת ואכל החולה והותיר אסור לבריא לאכול מן המותר גזרה שמא ירבה בשבילו. אבל השוחט לחולה בשבת מותר לבריא לאכול ממנו בשר חי שאין בדבר תוספת כדי שנגזור שמא ירבה בשבילו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

10

When a sick person is not dangerously ill,35 all his needs should be cared for by a gentile. What is implied? We may tell a gentile to perform [forbidden labors]36 on his behalf and he performs them. [This includes] cooking, baking, bringing medicine from one domain to another and the like. Similarly, one may have one's eyes treated37 by a gentile on the Sabbath even though there is no danger involved.

Furthermore, if [the sick] require treatment that does not involve the performance of [forbidden] labors,38 they may be treated even by Jews. For this reason, it is permitted to perform [physical activities for the benefit of the sick]; for example, one may lift [the tendons of] the ears, lift up cartilage around the heart,39 restore broken bones to their places, or perform other activities of this like.

י

חולה שאין בו סכנה עושין לו כל צרכיו על ידי נכרי. כיצד אומרין לנכרי לעשות לו והוא עושה לבשל לו ולאפות ולהביא רפואה מרשות לרשות וכיוצא באלו. וכן כוחל עיניו מן הנכרי בשבת אע"פ שאין שם סכנה. ואם היו צריכים לדברים שאין בהן מלאכה עושין אותן אפילו ישראל. לפיכך מעלין אזנים בשבת ומעלין אנקלי ומחזירין את השבר וכל כיוצא בזה מותר:

11

When a woman in the process of childbirth squats to give birth,40 her life is considered in danger and the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf. A midwife may be called from a distant place41 and the umbilical cord may be cut and tied.

If she requires a light when she cries out because of labor pains, a candle may be lit for her. [This leniency is granted] even if she is blind, because light has a calming influence42 even if she does not see.

If she needs oil or the like, it may be brought for her. If possible, the items that are brought should be brought in an uncharacteristic manner; for example, a friend should bring a utensil tied in her hair.43 If this not possible, it may be brought in the ordinary manner.44

יא

היולדת כשכורעת לילד הרי היא בסכנת נפשות ומחללין עליה את השבת. קוראין לה חכמה ממקום למקום וחותכים את הטבור וקושרין אותו, ואם היתה צריכה לנר בשעה שהיא צועקת בחבליה מדליקין לה את הנר. ואפילו היתה סומא מפני שדעתה מתיישבת עליה בנר ואף על פי שאינה רואה. ואם היתה צריכה לשמן וכיוצא בו מביאין לה. וכל שאפשר לשנות משנין בשעת הבאה כגון שתביא לה חברתה כלי תלוי בשערה ואם אי אפשר מביאה כדרכה:

12

We should not help an idolatress45 give birth on the Sabbath, even if payment is offered. We do not worry about the possibility of ill-feelings being aroused.46 [This applies even when] there is no violation [of the Sabbath laws] involved.

[In contrast,] one may offer assistance to a daughter of a ger toshav who gives birth, since we are commanded to secure his well-being.47 We may not, however, violate the Sabbath laws on her behalf.

יב

אין מילדין את העובדת כוכבים ומזלות בשבת ואפי' בשכר ואין חוששין לאיבה ואע"פ שאין שם חילול. אבל מילדין את בת גר תושב מפני שאנו מצווין להחיותו ואין מחללין עליה את השבת:

13

From the time a woman in childbirth has a flow of blood48 until the birth - [and indeed,] after birth for three days49 - the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf, and all her needs should be met.50 [This applies] regardless of whether she says she requires such treatment or she maintains that she does not require such treatment.

Between the third and the seventh day [after childbirth], if she maintains that she does not require treatment, the Sabbath laws should not be violated on her behalf. If she remains silent,51 and certainly if she maintains that she requires treatment,52 the Sabbath laws should be violated on her behalf. Between the seventh and the thirtieth day, her status is analogous to that of a sick person who is not dangerously ill. Even if she maintains that she requires treatment, [forbidden] labors should be performed on her behalf only by a gentile.53

יג

חיה משיתחיל הדם להיות שותת עד שתלד ואחר שתלד עד שלשה ימים מחללין עליה את השבת ועושין לה כל צרכיה. בין שאמרה צריכה אני בין שאמרה איני צריכה. ומשלשה עד שבעה אם אמרה איני צריכה אין מחללין עליה את השבת. ואם שתקה ואין צריך לומר אם אמרה צריכה אני שמחללין עליה את השבת. ומשבעה ועד שלשים יום הרי היא כחולה שאין בו סכנה ואפילו אמרה צריכה אני אין עושין לה מלאכה אלא על ידי נכרים:

14

A fire may be kindled54 for a woman after she has given birth55 even in the summer, since cold is very difficult for a woman to bear after childbirth in the cold regions. In contrast, a fire should not be kindled for other sick people to warm themselves.56 Nevertheless, if a person let blood and became chilled, a fire may be kindled for him even in the summer.

After cutting his umbilical cord,57 we may wash a new born baby on the day he is born, even when this requires heating the water on the Sabbath.58 Herbal powder59 can be applied to his skin and his limbs can be tied,60 for it is dangerous not to perform these activities for him.

Similarly, a baby may be washed before circumcision, after circumcision,61 and on the third day after circumcision62 with water that is heated on the Sabbath,63 because of the danger [to him].

יד

עושין מדורה לחיה ואפילו בימות החמה מפני שהצנה קשה לחיה הרבה במקומות הקרים. אבל אין עושין מדורה לחולה להתחמם בה. הקיז דם ונצטנן עושין לו מדורה אפילו בתקופת תמוז. ומרחיצין את הולד בשבת ביום שנולד אחר שחותכין את טיבורו אפילו בחמין שהוחמו בשבת. ומולחין אותו ומלפפין אותו מפני שסכנה היא לו אם לא יעשו לו כל אלו. וכן מרחיצים אותו לפני המילה ולאחר המילה וביום השלישי למילה בחמין שהוחמו בשבת מפני הסכנה:

15

When a woman dies while in labor on the Sabbath, a knife should be brought - even if it must be carried through the public domain - and the woman's womb cut open and the fetus removed, for it is possible that it will still be alive.64

[The rationale for this ruling is] that the Sabbath laws are violated even when there is only a possibility of saving a life,65 and even in such instances, where there is no chazakah on which to base our presumption that the fetus is alive.66

טו

האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה מביאין סכין בשבת אפילו דרך רשות הרבים וקורעין את כריסה ומוציאין את הולד שמא ימצא חי שספק נפשות דוחה את השבת ואפילו לזה שאין חזקתו חי:

16

[All] activities necessary to save a life should be performed on the Sabbath; there is no necessity to receive license from the court. The more zealous one is [in this regard], the more praiseworthy.

What is implied?67 If one sees that a child has fallen into the sea, one may spread out a net and hoist him up, although one catches fish together with him. If a person hears that a child fell into the sea and spreads out a net to hoist him up, but raises up only fish, he is absolutely free of liability.68

If he intended to raise up fish and [in fact] lifted up both fish and a child, he is not held liable.69 Since he lifted up a child together with the fish, he is not held liable even when he did not hear that the child had fallen into the water.70

טז

מפקחין פיקוח נפש בשבת ואין צריך ליטול רשות מבית דין. והמקדים להציל הנפש הרי זה משובח. כיצד ראה תינוק שנפל לים פורש מצודה ומעלהו ואע"פ שהוא צד הדגים עמו. שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלותו והעלה דגים בלבד פטור מכלום. נתכוין להעלות דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק פטור אפילו לא שמע שטבע הואיל והעלה תינוק עם הדגים פטור:

17

If71 a child fell into a pit, a person may dislodge a clod of earth, and lift [the child] up, even though he creates a step when he dislodges it. If a door was locked with a child inside, a person may break the door down and take the child out, even though he chops it into pieces of wood which are appropriate to use for work,72 lest the child become frightened and die.

If a fire broke out and a person is inside the building and we fear that he may be consumed by the flames,73 a person may extinguish the fire to save him, although he prepares a pathway while extinguishing the fire. Whoever acts first to save him is praiseworthy. One does not need to ask permission from the court in all instances when there is a danger to a person's life.

יז

נפל תינוק לבור עוקר חוליא ומעלהו ואע"פ שהוא מתקן בה מדרגה בשעת עקירתו. ננעל דלת בפני תינוק שובר הדלת ומוציאו ואע"פ שהוא מפצל אותה כמין עצים שראויין למלאכה שמא יבעת התינוק וימות. נפלה דליקה ויש שם אדם שחוששין שמא ישרף מכבין אותה להצילו מן האש ואע"פ שהוא כובש דרך ומתקנה בשעת כיבוי. וכל הקודם להציל הרי זה משובח ואינו צריך ליטול רשות מבית דין בכל דבר שיש בו סכנה:

18

When an avalanche has fallen, and there is a doubt whether or not74 it has fallen over a person,75 it may be cleared. If the person was discovered to be alive, but was crushed [by the fallen debris] to the extent that it is impossible that he will recover, [the debris] may be cleared and the person taken out to enable him to live [however] long he does.76

יח

מי שנפלה עליו מפולת ספק הוא שם ספק אינו שם מפקחין עליו. מצאוהו חי אף על פי שנתרוצץ ואי אפשר שיבריא מפקחין עליו ומוציאין אותו לחיי אותה שעה:

19

If [in the process of clearing the debris,] they [reached] his nose and saw that he was not breathing, he should be left there,77 for he has died already.78

Although it is discovered that people on the upper level of a landslide have died, one should not assume that those on the lower levels have died. Instead, [the debris] should be cleared away from all of the people, for in a landslide it is possible that those on the upper level will die, while those on the lower level will remain alive.

יט

בדקו עד חוטמו ולא מצאו בו נשמה מניחין אותו שם שכבר מת. בדקו ומצאו עליונים מתים לא יאמרו כבר מתו תחתונים אלא מפקחין על הכל שאפשר במפולת שימות העליון ויהיה התחתון חי:

20

When an avalanche fell on a courtyard in which were located both gentiles and Jews - even if there were a thousand gentiles and only one Jew, we should remove all [the debris] for the sake of the Jew.79 Should one80 of the individuals leave and enter another courtyard and that courtyard collapse upon him, we should remove [the debris]. Perhaps the person who departed was a Jew, and [all] those who remain were gentiles.81

כ

היתה חצר שיש בה עובדי כוכבים ומזלות וישראלים אפילו ישראל אחד ואלף עובדי כוכבים ומזלות ונפלה עליהם מפולת מפקחין על הכל מפני ישראל. פירש אחד מהם לחצר אחרת ונפלה עליו אותה חצר מפקחים עליו שמא זה שפירש היה ישראל והנשארים עובדי כוכבים ומזלות.

21

When they all left this courtyard to go to another courtyard, and as they were proceeding, one of them whose identity is unknown departed and entered a third courtyard and was covered by an avalanche, [the debris] should not be removed from him.82

Since they left their original place, [the presence of] a Jew is not accepted as an established fact. Hence, we assume that anyone who separated from this group as it was proceeding was part of the majority. Accordingly, if the majority were Jewish,83 even a person separated from them [who entered] another courtyard after they left their original place - should he be covered by an avalanche, we should remove [the debris] from him.

כא

נעקרו כולן מחצר זו לילך לחצר אחרת ובעת עקירתם פירש אחד מהן ונכנס לחצר אחרת ונפלה עליו מפולת ואין ידוע מי הוא אין מפקחין עליו. שכיון שנעקרו כולם אין כאן ישראל וכל הפורש מהן כשהן מהלכין הרי הוא בחזקת שפירש מן הרוב. לפיכך אם היה הרוב ישראל אע"פ שנעקרו כולם ופירש אחד מהם לחצר אחרת ונפלה עליו מפולת מפקחין:

22

A person who is traveling in the desert and does not know which day is the Sabbath should count84 six days and consider the seventh day as holy. He should recite the blessing of the day [Kiddush] and recite Havdalah at the conclusion of this "Sabbath" day.85

Every day, even on the day on which he recites Kiddush and after which he recites Havdalah, he is allowed86 to earn87 only enough for his livelihood, so that he will not die. It is forbidden for him to earn more than his livelihood, for there is a possibility that every day is the Sabbath.

If the person knows that the day is the eighth day or the fifteenth day after his departure, he is allowed to work on that day, for it is certain that he did not depart on the Sabbath.88 On the other days, he is allowed to earn merely his livelihood.

כב

המהלך במדבר ולא ידע מתי הוא יום שבת מונה מיום שטעה ששה ומקדש שביעי ומברך בו ברכות היום ומבדיל במוצאי שבת. ובכל יום ויום ואפילו ביום זה שהוא מקדש ומבדיל בו מותר לו לעשות כדי פרנסתו בלבד כדי שלא ימות. ואסור לו לעשות יותר על פרנסתו שכל יום ויום ספק שבת הוא. ואם ידע שהוא שמיני ליציאתו או חמשה עשר ליציאתו וכיוצא בזה המנין הרי זה מותר לעשות מלאכה באותו היום שהרי הדבר ודאי שלא יצא בשיירא בשבת. ושאר הימים חוץ מיום זה עושה כדי פרנסה בלבד:

23

[The following rules apply] when gentiles lay siege to Jewish cities:89 If their intent was financial gain, the Sabbath laws should not be violated because of them, nor are we allowed to wage war against them.90 If a city is located near the border, however, we should march against them with weapons and wage war against them even when they are demanding hay or straw.91

In any location, if the gentiles' intent was Jewish lives, or if they engaged in battle with a city or laid siege to it without stating a specific intention,92 we must wage war against them, and the Sabbath laws should be violated because of them. It is a mitzvah93 for every member of the Jewish people who can come [to their assistance] to go out and aid their brethren who are under siege and save them from the gentiles [although it is the] Sabbath. It is forbidden to wait until Saturday night.

After they have saved their brethren, they may return home with their weapons on the Sabbath, so that a dangerous situation will not be created in the future.94

כג

עובדי כוכבים ומזלות שצרו על עיירות ישראל אם באו על עסקי ממון אין מחללין עליהן את השבת ואין עושין עמהן מלחמה. ובעיר הסמוכה לספר אפי' לא באו אלא על עסקי תבן וקש יוצאין עליהן בכלי זיין ומחללין עליהן את השבת. ובכל מקום אם באו על עסקי נפשות או שערכו מלחמה או שצרו סתם יוצאין עליהן בכלי זיין ומחללין עליהן את השבת. ומצוה על כל ישראל שיכולין לבוא ולצאת ולעזור לאחיהם שבמצור ולהצילם מיד העובדי כוכבים ומזלות בשבת. ואסור להן להתמהמה למוצאי שבת. וכשיצילו את אחיהן מותר להן לחזור בכלי זיין שלהן למקומם בשבת כדי שלא להכשילן לעתיד לבוא:

24

Similarly, if a ship is sinking at sea95 or a city is surrounded by a [flooding] river, it is a mitzvah to go out on the Sabbath and use every possible means to save them.

Even when a single individual is being pursued by gentiles, by a snake, or by a bear with the intent to kill him, it is a mitzvah to save him, even when it is necessary to perform several forbidden labors on the Sabbath. It is even permitted to forge weapons to save him. Similarly, we should cry out [to God] on their behalf, make supplications,96 and sound the trumpets97 to summon help for them.98

We should not cry out [to God] or make supplications because of plague99 on the Sabbath.

כד

וכן ספינה המטורפת בים או עיר שהקיפה כרקום או נהר מצוה לצאת בשבת להצילן בכל דבר שיכול להצילן. ואפילו יחיד הנרדף מפני העובדי כוכבים ומזלות או מפני נחש או דוב שהוא רודף אחריו להרגו מצוה להצילו. ואפילו בעשיית כמה מלאכות בשבת ואפילו לתקן כלי זיין להצילו מותר. וזועקים עליהן ומתחננים בשבת ומתריעין עליהן לעזור אותם. ואין מתחננים ולא זועקין על הדבר בשבת:

25

We should lay siege to gentile cities [at least] three days before the Sabbath.100 We may wage war with them on any day, even on the Sabbath, until we conquer [the city], even if the war is voluntary in nature.101 The oral tradition,102 interprets [Deuteronomy 20:20] "until you have subjugated it," as teaching that [one should wage war] even on the Sabbath.

Surely, the above applies103 with regard to a war that we are obligated to wage. Indeed, it was on the Sabbath that Joshua conquered Jericho.104

144

כה

צרין על עיירות העובדי כוכבים ומזלות שלשה ימים קודם לשבת. ועושין עמהן מלחמה בכל יום ויום ואפילו בשבת עד שכובשין אותה ואע"פ שהיא מלחמת הרשות. מפי השמועה למדו עד רדתה ואפילו בשבת ואין צריך לומר במלחמת מצוה. ולא כבש יהושע יריחו אלא בשבת

Footnotes
1.

The Rambam uses the expression דחויה, which, as evident from Pesachim 77a and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:15, implies that although a prohibition is not enforced, it has not been lifted entirely. In contrast, the term הותרה would imply that no trace of the prohibition remains.

The Kessef Mishneh and other authorities question the implications and the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of terms. [In a responsum (Vol. 1, 689), the Rashba illustrates the difference between these terms. A person was in need of meat on the Sabbath and there was non-kosher meat available. If the Sabbath laws are דחויה, it would be proper to eat the non-kosher meat. If the Sabbath laws are הותרה, it would be preferable to slaughter a kosher animal on the sick person's behalf. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:14) states that, in such a situation, one should slaughter a kosher animal, implying that the laws are הותרה. (Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:16 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:39.)]

See the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, Responsa 455, which explains the concept of הותרה as meaning that, with regard to this person, it is as if the laws of the Sabbath were never commanded. (See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which explains that although the Rambam stated that a threat to Jewish life overrides the observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah in Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 5, he emphasizes this concept with regard to the Sabbath laws for the following reason. The other prohibitions are דחויה in the face of a threat to life, while the Sabbath laws are הותרה.

2.

Yoma 85b uses the expression, "Violate one Sabbath on his behalf, so that he will be able to observe many Sabbaths [in the future]." This expression, however, is not halachically exact. Even when one knows that the person will not live to observe many other Sabbaths, as long as he is alive we are obligated to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. See Halachah 18.

3.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:10), which cites an opinion that states that we may rely on the evaluation of experienced God-fearing individuals, even if they are not physicians.

4.

Rav Kapach explains that, with this expression, the Rambam implies that we may rely on a local physician and need not seek the advice of a greater expert who lives further away.

5.

See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:8, which gives further details regarding a difference of opinion between physicians.

6.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:13 states that this applies even if there is no danger that the person will die immediately. Since there is a danger that he may die later if the treatment is not administered at this time, the Sabbath laws may be violated.

7.

Note that the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:5, specifies that the leniency to extinguish a lamp is granted only when it is impossible to move it - or, alternatively, the sick person - to another place or veil the lamp's light.

8.

There is a question among the Rabbis if this statement is to be interpreted literally or not. As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, there is a difference of opinion if the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life. According to the opinion that they are merely דחויה, an attempt should be made to minimize the violation of the Sabbath laws if doing so does not constitute a threat to the person's life. (See Tzafenat Paneach, Shulchan Aruch HaRav, ibid. and the Mishnah Berurah 328:14.)

9.

Gentiles are not obligated to observe the Sabbath, and thus having them administer the treatment would not involve the violation of a Torah commandment. Nevertheless, they should not be entrusted with the care of the sick for the reason stated by the Rambam.

10.

Since they are below the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, according to the Torah itself the observance of the mitzvot is not incumbent upon them, and only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

11.

Although women and servants are obligated to observe the Sabbath laws, since in many areas of Torah and mitzvot, their obligations are less than men, having them violate the Sabbath laws in this instance could cause the Sabbath to be regarded flippantly, as explained in the next note.

12.

The Rambam's choice of wording, based on Yoma 84b, has raised several questions among the commentaries. The most literal interpretation is given by the Merkevat HaMishneh, who explains that when people see that the Sabbath laws are violated by the gentiles for Jews or by women or children, they may get the impression that the observance of these laws is not very crucial, and leniencies may be taken on other occasions - even when there is no valid reason. If, however, it is Torah Sages who violate the laws, the common people will realize that it is only the seriousness of the situation that allowed for this leniency.

Among the other interpretations given why the laws should not be violated by women and children, is that this might cause them to violate the Sabbath laws in the future (Kessef Mishneh).

Significantly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:12) explains that the reason the treatment should not be administered by gentiles is the possibility for delay. Accordingly, if there is no delay involved and one can be sure that the same quality of treatment will be given, it is preferable that the treatment be administered by gentiles.

The commentaries explain that the difference between his opinion and that of the Rambam (quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) depends on the question discussed above: Are the Sabbath laws הותרה or merely דחויה in the face of a danger to life.

[See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which states that the Rambam's wording here indicates that he sees the violation of the Sabbath laws in such situations as an expression of reverence and regard for the Sabbath.]

13.

This also is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Yoma, ibid. Others (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:12) understand the phrase גדולי ישראל in that passage as meaning simply "adult males."

14.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 8:5) states, "A person who [administers treatment] quickly is praiseworthy, and one who raises questions is considered as if he shed blood.

15.

The Rambam is referring to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and others who do not accept the oral tradition.

16.

The Rambam seems to be interpreting the verse as meaning that since these individuals purposefully misinterpret the Torah, God causes their misinterpretations to be cruel and harsh so that they will not live and spread such an approach.

17.

Significantly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state קדח, "piercing pain" (the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Avodah Zarah 28b), rather than קדחת, "fever."

18.

Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., explains that there is a connection between the eyes and the heart, and such a person is therefore considered to be dangerously ill.

19.

From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:9), it appears that once an eye ailment is nearly healed, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. See also Hilchot Milah 16.

20.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:3) states that this can also apply to an infection. Disquiet and pain are not, however, considered sufficient cause to violate the Sabbath laws.

21.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) substitutes "teeth" for "lips," and explains that a toothache can also be considered cause to violate the Sabbath laws. The Ramah and subsequent commentaries, however, qualify this statement, explaining which types of toothaches can be treated by Jews and which can be treated only by gentiles. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:3 and Mishneh Berurah 328:8.)

22.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ramban as explaining that this applies only when we are unsure if the wound is dangerous or not. In such a situation, we are not required to wait for a physician's assessment and may treat the wound immediately. If, however, we know - or a physician says - that a wound is not dangerous, a Jew may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. It may, however, be treated by a gentile. This ruling is also quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:4).

23.

This phrase is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Avodah Zarah 28a and refers to an extremely high fever. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) appears to interpret it as referring to a type of malaria that causes fever and chills simultaneously.

24.

From the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:5), it would appear that if the sick person himself says that the Sabbath laws should be violated on his behalf, his word should be heeded.

25.

See Yoma 10:4 and the Rambam's commentary on that mishnah.

26.

Either they brought the figs from the public domain or picked them from the tree. Both of these activities involve the performance of labors forbidden on the Sabbath.

27.

This situation refers to an instance where none of the ten know of the others' activities. Alternatively, each one thought that he would be able to bring the fig before the other person (Mishnah Berurah 328:42).

28.

I.e., they need not bring a sin offering, nor do their actions cause them any spiritual blemishes. Indeed, to quote the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:15), "all of them receive a bountiful reward from God" for their actions. 29. If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:16). (See also Halachah 9.)

30.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) emphasizes that if there is any danger of delay or difficulty, the threat to a Jew's life overrides all these considerations.

31.

On Saturday night, however, a healthy person may eat from the remainder. Moreover, there is no need for him to wait the amount of time necessary to cook the food [(כדי שיעשו) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 318:2, and commentaries].

32.

The meat need not be salted to remove the blood. Although this is generally done as a preparation for the cooking process, it is necessary only because blood will move from place to place within the meat during cooking. There is no prohibition against eating raw meat even though it has not been salted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:1-2).

The Kiryat Melech Rav notes that this explanation is appropriate according to the interpretation of the Tosafot (Chulin 14a). The Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), however, requires even uncooked meat to be salted before one partakes of it. Several different explanations are offered for this difficulty. See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.

33.

For this leniency to be granted, the Ra'avad requires that the sick person have been ill before the commencement of the Sabbath, and his attendants to have thought of slaughtering the animal for him at that time. Otherwise, the animal is considered muktzeh. Although the latter prohibition is waived on behalf of the sick person, it is still enforced as regards the healthy individual.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:2 and Shulchan Aruch Harav ibid 318:5) explain that in this instance, the prohibition of muktzeh does not apply at all.

34.

Slaughtering an animal is a single activity which will provide enough meat for both the sick person and the healthy individual. Allowing the healthy person to eat from the meat will not cause any increase in the violation of the Sabbath laws.

35.

This refers to ailments which, although not threatening to a person's life, are after all serious, and cause him to be confined to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17) or which cause him to feel weakness throughout his entire body (Ramah, loc. cit.). In contrast, if the person merely feels ill or has a minor ailment in a particular limb, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against taking medication even when the performance of forbidden labors is not involved. (See Chapter 21, Halachah 31.)

36.

As is explained in Chapter 6, the Rabbis forbade a Jew to tell a gentile to perform work on his behalf on the Sabbath. This prohibition is, however, relaxed because of the sick person's condition.

37.

The Hebrew word כוחל refers to the application of powder or eye-paint to the area around the eyes. Although certain Talmudic passages appear to indicate that this was merely a cosmetic practice, in certain instances it had medical value. The leniency to treat the eyes is granted, because, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4, there is a connection between the eyes and the heart.

38.

There is a question regarding activities in which a Rabbinic prohibition must be transgressed. Although asking a gentile to perform a forbidden labor is also prohibited by the Rabbis, some commentaries make a distinction between such a prohibition and a prohibition that involves the performance of an activity.

The wording chosen by the Rambam in this halachah and in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, has left room for speculation concerning his ruling on this question. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam allows the performance of any activity even when there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved. The Kessef Mishneh differs, and explains that according to the Rambam, any activity forbidden by the Rabbis may not be performed despite the fact that a person is bedridden by illness.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) does not follow either of the interpretations of the Rambam's view, but instead suggests following the opinion of the Ramban, who permits the performance of any activity forbidden by the Rabbis, provided that it is performed in an abnormal manner. Furthermore, if there is a danger to a specific limb, the Rabbinic prohibitions are waived, and such activities may be performed in the normal manner. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:19 is even more lenient and allows one to perform activities that are forbidden by the Torah itself, provided one performs them in an uncharacteristic manner.

39.

There are times when the cartilage around the heart becomes compressed against the body and it must be lifted up in order to facilitate breathing (Avodah Zarah 29a).

40.

Our translation is based on the description of the techniques of midwifery used in Talmudic and post-Talmudic times. Others translate the term as a woman being bent over with labor pains. Compare to Halachah 13, which mentions the possibility of performing forbidden labors on a woman's behalf from the time "when there is a show of blood." See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:3), which mentions both these terms and also refers to the condition when a woman is overcome by labor pains to the point where she must be carried by her friends. Any one of these three conditions constitutes a danger to life for which the Sabbath laws may be broken.

41.

The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:3) states that this leniency applies even when she lives beyond the Sabbath limits (see Chapter 27). Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:9, which state that a mid-wife may be called in the preliminary stages of labor.

42.

She feels more secure knowing that she will be cared for properly in the light than if she were cared for in the dark (Tosafot, Shabbat 128b).

43.

These rulings are based on Shabbat, ibid. In his commentary on that text, the Ramban explains that this principle applies regarding all instances when the Sabbath laws are violated because of a danger to life. If it is possible to reduce the extent to which they are violated, one should do so.

The Maggid Mishneh postulates that the Rambam would not require such stringencies at all times. Were that the case, the Rambam would have stated this principle earlier. Instead, this is a specific ruling applicable with regard to a woman in childbirth. Greater stringency is applied in this instance, because although there is a threat to the woman's life, the probability of a woman's actually dying is very low. (It can be explained that the difference of opinion between the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh revolves around the question whether the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life, as explained in the notes on Halachot 1 and 2.)

44.

Note Sefer HaChasidim, which states that it is preferable that a woman prepare everything necessary for childbirth from the ninth month onward, so that if she gives birth on the Sabbath, only a minimal amount of forbidden labor will have to be performed.

45.

The term "idolatress" is used here to refer to a gentile who actually worships idols. In contrast, the term ger toshav refers to a gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:1-2 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.)

In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to offer medical treatment to an idolater even for a fee. Accordingly, this halachah extends that principle to include a woman in childbirth. The question is raised, however, concerning the majority of the gentiles in the present age. Although the Rambam considers Christianity as idol worship, many authorities do not. According to the latter opinions, although these gentiles are not idolaters, they have not gone through the formal process of acceptance of the seven laws commanded to Noach and cannot therefore be considered as gerim toshavim.

Many authorities (see the commentary on the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim) maintain that it is permitted to treat such people during the week. On the Sabbath, however, one may not perform forbidden labors on their behalf. (See the Mishnah Berurah 330:8, which speaks very critically about physicians who violate the Sabbath laws on behalf of gentiles.) According to these authorities, one would be allowed to treat these gentiles on the Sabbath provided that there was not any forbidden labor involved. Note, however, Rav Kapach, who quotes Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state "gentile" instead of "idolatress."

46.

According to the generally accepted interpretation of Avodah Zarah 26b, the intent is that the non-Jews will understand that the Sabbath is a sacred day for the Jews. Even when they see that the Sabbath laws are violated for the sake of saving a Jew's life, they will accept the rationalization that the Sabbath laws may be violated only on behalf of an individual who observes the Sabbath.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:8 mention that if a physician fears that ill-feeling will be generated by his refusal to care for gentiles, he may deliver their babies, provided that he does not perform labors that are forbidden by the Torah itself.

47.

Based on Leviticus 25:35, Avodah Zarah 65a states that the Jews are required to maintain the well-being of such gentiles and, if necessary, the Jews should support the gentiles from their charitable funds.

48.

The Rambam chooses the more lenient of the opinions mentioned in Shabbat 129a, for a woman can begin bleeding well before she gives birth.

49.

Although the Lechem Mishneh states that the counting of the three days should begin from the time the uterus opens, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the three days start from birth. (See the Be'ur Halachah 330.)

50.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:12 explain that this refers to activities that a woman's friends will customarily perform on her behalf after she gives birth. A doctor need not be consulted about these matters. Nevertheless, if a doctor says that these activities are unnecessary, they should not be performed.

51.

From the Rambam's wording (and indeed, this is the ruling of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:14), it appears that the woman is still considered to be dangerously ill. Hence, unless she protests to the contrary, it is assumed that this treatment is necessary.

52.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Mishnah Berurah, loc. cit., state that the woman's word is accepted even against the opinions of many doctors.

53.

According to the halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:21), there is one exception. A fire may be kindled for a woman within thirty days after she has given birth. See the notes on the following halachah.

54.

Preferably, the fire should be kindled by a gentile. If, however, there is no gentile available, the fire may be kindled by a Jew (Mishnah Berurah 330:21).

55.

The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears to him that the Rambam (and Shabbat 129b, upon which this halachah is based) is speaking about a woman who gave birth less than a week previously. Although weight is given to this view (see Be'ur Halachah 330), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:6) states that it refers to a woman within a month of childbirth.

56.

The commentaries question whether this refers to a person who is dangerously ill or to a person who is merely seriously ill, but in no danger of dying. According to the latter view, a fire may be kindled on behalf of someone who is dangerously ill.

57.

Sefer HaKovetz states that cutting the umbilical cord involves the violation of a forbidden labor and is permitted only because of the danger involved. Most authorities, however, maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

58.

As mentioned above, most authorities maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition may be waived on behalf of a new-born. Thus, this is interpreted as referring to water that was heated on the Sabbath by a gentile.

59.

מלח is usually rendered as "salt." Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:3. (See also Mishnah Berurah 330:24.)

60.

This is useful in straightening the child's limbs.

61.

See Hilchot Milah 2:8. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 331:9) writes that although in Talmudic times, washing a baby at this time was considered as a matter of vital importance, it is no longer common practice. The Ramah (loc. cit.) explains that it is customary to wash the baby before the circumcision with water that was heated on Friday, and to wash him after the circumcision on Saturday night.

62.

There is greater discomfort on the third day after the circumcision, as explained by the commentaries on Genesis 18:1 and 34:25.

63.

At present, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if it appears necessary, the baby may be washed with water that was heated before the Sabbath. Needless to say, in all situations, should a doctor state that such a washing is necessary, his advice should be followed.

64.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 330:5) states that it is no longer customary to follow this practice even during the week. We wait a considerable time after the woman loses consciousness, because we are afraid that she did not die, but merely fainted. Hence, by the time we are certain that she has died, we can assume that the fetus is also no longer alive.

Needless to say, at present, when our improved technology makes it possible to monitor the physical functioning of both the mother and the fetus, the physicians should decide on the basis of the information before them. Regardless of the practical application of this ruling today, the principles on which it is based are significant and should be applied in other circumstances.

65.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:7, which adds that this ruling is granted despite the fact that the fetus will normally die in such a situation. Although probability (רוב in Hebrew) is a significant factor in halachah, the possibility of saving a life overweighs it.

66.

Generally, a living person can be assumed to continue to live (chezkat chayim) until we are certain that he has died. Although such a presumption cannot be made with regard to this fetus, permission is, nevertheless, granted for the Sabbath laws to be violated on its behalf.

67.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:13) rephrases the concepts stated in this halachah slightly, connecting the praise given a person for being zealous in saving a life with the situation concerning catching fish described afterwards. According to the Shulchan Aruch, this situation teaches us that a person is considered praiseworthy for saving a life on the Sabbath even if he accrues personal benefit through his actions - for example, in the case at hand, in addition to saving a life, the person also receives a catch of fish.

68.

The Rambam adds the term "absolutely" to indicate that it is desirable to spread out and raise one's nets to try to save the child (Lechem Mishneh). Significantly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 13:6, states that the person is not held liable even if he intended to catch the fish together with the child.

69.

The Or Sameach writes that he is given "stripes for rebelliousness" (the punishment usually given for the violation of a Rabbinic ordinance), since he intended to perform a forbidden activity. See a parallel ruling, Hilchot Nedarim 12:18.

Significantly, when mentioning this instance in Hilchot Shegagot 2:15, the Rambam states that the person acted בשוגג when catching the fish - i.e., he was unaware that it was the Sabbath or was unaware that it is forbidden to fish on the Sabbath.

70.

This reflects the Rambam's decision regarding a difference of opinion between the Sages in Menachot 64a. One opinion holds the person liable for it considers his intent of primary importance, while the other frees him of liability for it views his actions as most significant.

71.

These instances are cited by Yoma 84b as a continuation of the development of the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may perform an activity to save someone else's life, although in the process of doing so, one derives benefit. The Talmud explains why it is necessary to mention all these different instances.

72.

The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam alters the text of the Talmud slightly to imply that the person breaking down the door did not do so with the intent of using the wood. Rav Kapach differs, noting that, as mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Rambam absolves the person of liability even when he has an intent to benefit from his actions. (See also the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.)

73.

Yoma, ibid., explains that this leniency is granted even when the fire breaks out in a courtyard other than that in which the person was located. If the fire appears to pose a danger to his life, it may be extinguished.

74.

I.e., a person was seen in the vicinity of the avalanche and we are unsure whether or not he was able to escape or not.

75.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this leniency is granted even when there are several doubts involved: Perhaps the person was not trapped under the avalanche. Even if he was trapped, perhaps he is no longer alive and the performance of the labor of clearing will be to no avail.

76.

This communicates a fundamental concept in Torah law: Even a fleeting moment of a Jew's life is precious enough for all possible efforts to be performed to save him even if it is necessary to violate Torah law.

77.

Although we are commanded to show respect for a corpse and not to leave it exposed, we are not allowed to violate the Sabbath laws for such a purpose. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yoma 8:5.)

78.

Based on Genesis 7:22, "all that has the breath of the spirit of life," Yoma 88b states that whether a person is breathing or not is the determining factor of whether he is considered alive or not. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:11 rule that even if we see that his heart is not beating, he is not considered dead until we are certain that he is not breathing.

The conception of breath as the determinant of life is significant in the present age, when it is possible that a person will continue to breathe despite brain death. The question of whether such a person is considered alive has been raised today within the context of many contemporary medical issues. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. II, Responsum 174) and other authorities of the present age have ruled that breath is still the fundamental determinant whether or not a person is alive.

79.

This halachah is based on the following principles:

a) As mentioned in Halachah 12, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to save a gentile's life.

b) כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה - "Whenever there is a doubt concerning the identity of objects in a fixed position, we consider the probability as 50%." Since there is at least one Jew in this courtyard, until his body is located, it is considered as if there is a 50% probability that every body found is the Jew. (See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 8:11.)

80.

Even if several people departed, the same rule would apply, as long as the entire group did not leave its original place. See the following halachah.

81.

The Rambam's decision depends on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's text of Yoma 84b. There the Talmud explains that although in general we follow the principle, כל דפריש מרובא פריש - "Whenever an entity separates itself from a group, we assume that it was part of the majority" - in this instance, since the matter involves a possible threat to a Jewish life, this principle is given a slightly different interpretation. Since the group remains in its place, its fixed nature (קביעות) is not disrupted.

It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad, Rashi, and the Ramban have a different approach to the passage in Yoma. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 329:2) follows the opinion quoted by the Rambam.

82.

Again this ruling depends on Rav Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Yoma 84b. Other authorities differ, as mentioned above.

83.

This implies that if a person of unknown origin is found buried under a landslide in a place whose population is primarily gentile, we are not allowed to remove the debris from him. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:26.) This is a matter of question on which there is a responsum attributed to the Rambam (although its origins are disputed). (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4:34, which quotes the Rambam's opinion, and the Ramah, loc. cit., who allows the debris to be removed.)

84.

He should start counting the six days immediately on the day on which he realizes that he has lost touch with the weekly calendar.

85.

Similarly, in his daily prayers, he should recite the prayers of the Sabbath on that day. The recitation of these prayers was instituted so that the person should not lose consciousness of the observance of the Sabbath entirely.

86.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 344:1) states that as long as the person has means, he is not allowed to work at all. Permission to work is granted only when it is a life and death matter. This explains why this halachah is included in this chapter.

87.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that although there is a prohibition against walking beyond the Sabbath limits, it is not as serious as the prohibition against forbidden labors. Hence, it is waived in order to allow this person the opportunity to reach a settled area and observe the Sabbath in a proper manner.

88.

If he earns enough on that day to support himself for several days, he must cease work until his means are exhausted (Mishnah Berurah 344:11).

89.

Although these laws surely apply to Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, these same laws are also relevant to Jewish communities in the diaspora.

90.

Since their intent is only financial, the Sabbath laws may not be violated for this reason. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:17, which state that at present, even when gentiles initially come only for pillage and plunder, since they have no compunctions about killing Jews, particularly if one will defend his property, any gentile raid on a Jewish community is considered a question of life and death warranting the violation of the Sabbath laws.

91.

The rationale is that if a border city is conquered, the enemies will have a vantage point from which to conquer the entire land. This concept has relevance beyond the Sabbath laws. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Shelita has explained that these principles are relevant to the territorial disputes between Jews and gentiles in Eretz Yisrael today. Returning any territory to the Arabs would jeopardize the safety of the entire land.

92.

War must be waged against them because it is possible that their intent is to kill. Hence, we follow the principle that the Sabbath laws may be violated even where there is merely a question of a threat to life.

93.

I.e., an obligation. See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 1:14, which describes the mitzvah (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not stand by idly while your neighbor's life is in danger."

It is told that in the Maccabean revolt, the Greeks once attacked the Jews on the Sabbath. The people, unaware of this law, refused to take up arms in defense and thousands died. Afterwards, the Rabbis publicized this ruling.

94.

Eruvin 45a relates that originally it was forbidden for the people to return with their weapons, and they would leave them in a home within the city's wall. Once the enemy forces saw that the Jews were returning unarmed and attacked them. More Jews were killed in the confused scramble for their weapons than by the enemy attack. After this event, the Sages allowed those who come to assist a besieged city to return with their weapons.

95.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this applies only when one knows that there are Jews on the ship. If we do not have such information, it would appear that we should assume that the passengers of the ship are gentiles and should not endeavor to save their lives.

96.

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that it is a mitzvah to cry out to God for assistance in the event of any distressing situation that affects a Jewish community. On the Sabbath, however, it is only proper to make such requests when there is an immediate threat to human life. Just as such requests are made on behalf of a community, they should also be made on behalf of a single individual whose life is threatened (Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6, Hilchot Shabbat 30:12).

97.

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that, as part of the mitzvah of entreating God's mercy, trumpets should be sounded. Nevertheless, trumpets should be not be sounded for this purpose on the Sabbath, since sounding the trumpets violates a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Shofar 2:7). Here, however, the intent in sounding the trumpets is to alert the Jews in the surrounding area and to summon them. The prohibition is waived for this purpose. (See Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6.)

98.

Just as one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew's life, one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew who is being forced to adopt a gentile way of life (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:29 and the Mishnah Berurah 306:57).

99.

See Ta'anit 22b.

100.

In Chapter 30, Halachah 13, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted "so that the soldiers' minds will be settled and they will not be overly preoccupied on the Sabbath." Although the war will require violation of the Sabbath laws, efforts should be made to minimize the tension and anxiety experienced by the soldiers to the greatest degree possible.

See Hilchot Melachim 6:11 which states that we can lay siege to gentile cities "on the Sabbath." The Kessef Mishneh notes the contradiction and suggests amending the text of Hilchot Melachim in light of our halachah. The Lechem Mishneh, however, explains that this clause of our halachah speaks of a milchemet reshut, a war which we are not obligated to wage, while Hilchot Melachim speaks of a milchemet mitzvah, a war which we are obligated to wage.

101.

Hilchot Melachim describes a voluntary war, a milchemet reshut, as a war fought "to expand the borders of Israel or magnify [the king's] greatness and reputation." In contrast, a war that is obligatory in nature, a milchemet mitzvah, refers to "the war against the seven nations [who occupied Eretz Yisrael], the war against Amalek, and [a war] fought to assist Israel against an enemy which attacks her."

102.

Sifre on Deuteronomy (loc. cit.), Shabbat 19a.

103.

According to the Kessef Mishneh's (Hilchot Melachim 6:11), this refers to the leniency of waging war on the Sabbath. The restriction of laying siege to a city three days before the Sabbath, in contrast, applies only with regard to voluntary wars. In an obligatory war, we may lay siege to a city even on the Sabbath itself.

104.

Rav Kapach notes that the citation of a historical event as proof of a law is extremely out of character for the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. He explains that the Rambam's statements are directed against statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that Jericho did not fall on the Sabbath.

It is possible to explain the Rambam's statements from another perspective. Joshua was instructed concerning the conquest of Jericho by Divine command. Indeed, according to human reason, there was no reason why Jericho should have been conquered on the Sabbath. Hence, the fact that God delivered such a command is a clear directive that one may begin a milchemet mitzvah on the Sabbath.

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